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# CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

## God

BEING

A CONTRIBUTION TO A PHILOSOPHY OF THEISM

BY

REV. JOHN T. DRISCOLL, S. T. L.

Author of Christian Philosophy : A Treatise on the Human Soul

---

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**TO MY  
Mother**

**who first spoke to me of God and urged me ever  
to be faithful and true in His service**

**THIS VOLUME  
is  
DEVOTEDLY INSCRIBED**



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## PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION.

---

In 1890 a translation of Father Hettinger's *Apology* by Father Bowden of the Oratory appeared under the title of *Natural Religion*. The great reputation of the writer drew attention to the work. Many criticisms appeared and of especial interest was an article on "Reason Alone" — "A Reply to Father Sebastian Bowden," in the *Fortnightly Review*, Nov. 1890, by W. H. Mallock. The importance of the problem was brought clearly to mind. Convinced that the existence of God was a certainty — how present this truth to the mind of the present day? This volume is the fruit of the thought and study.

The success attending the publication of the work on the Human Soul constrained the writer to adopt the comparative method with this treatise also. The subject is heavy and abstruse in parts. An effort has been made to render the reading as easy as possible. Hence the illustrations, and references to modern literature, and relegation of doubts and controversies to the notes at the foot of the page.

The line of thought worked out in this volume is a departure from that followed in many treatises on the subject. The writer takes the idea of God as a fact of consciousness. The question is not how the idea came to the individual mind. But are we justified in holding the idea, and what is its content? Hence an investigation into the grounds of the idea. Viewed in this aspect, it becomes a study in Psychology. Now, as the idea of God is not an individual but a universal fact, the course of investigation is of more than a personal value. It is a study of the human mind.

Some particular questions, *e. g.*, capability of the mind to conceive the Infinite, the problem of Personality are not dis-

cussed at length. The latter notion has been examined in the volume on the Human Soul. The former pertains to a treatise on the Theory of Knowledge, whose proper place is in the Philosophy of Mind. This treatise is published in the hopes that it will bring light and comfort to those who believe, and help dispel the clouds of error and misunderstanding under which so many are struggling.

The writer acknowledges the debt of gratitude to the kind friends who have in word and deed encouraged the progress of the writing, and so carefully examined the proof-sheets of the work.

Dec. 8th, 1899.

## PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION.

---

In issuing the second edition of the present work I take advantage of the opportunity to state more explicitly my line of reasoning. Let us suppose that I am seated in my library on a winter evening surrounded by a few friends. Some may differ from me on religious belief; at any rate the truth of God's existence is called into question. As a Catholic priest I am asked and expected to express the result of my reflections on the problem. It will not be enough to say that I was taught in earliest childhood by a revered mother to say my prayers, to read carefully selected stories from the Bible, to learn the beautiful and profound lessons in the Catechism. This may be interesting and true and yet may carry no weight whatsoever to the minds of my hearers as to the objective verification of the belief. So I take a different starting point. I begin by stating that I have an idea of God. This I call a psychological fact. To show that this idea is not my own peculiar property, I point out that it is a primary conviction and possession of mankind as proved from the records of history, especially from the department known as the history of religion. The belief in God or the idea of God is therefore a fact of human consciousness not only universal in space, *i. e.*, as possessed by every nation now inhabiting the earth, but universal in time also as is proved by the written annals and monuments of mankind, even by language itself. For language is the true index of thought and feeling, and

leads us far back beyond written records. The analysis of the words employed in known languages to express the idea of God reveals the important truth that the consciousness of mankind had a twofold basis for the idea, viz., the nature of man himself and reflection on the material universe. In discussing the origin of the idea of God I maintain that it is not innate, as some philosophers teach; nor is it explained by evolution, as the advocates of the Science-Philosophy would have us believe; nor is it due to intuition, as is the contention of modern philosophers, especially of the Hegelian schools. I call attention to a twofold knowledge of God. The one is a vague and obscure knowledge, which is common to all men. The other is a more elaborate and complete knowledge, and comes from instruction and divine revelation. The former knowledge is not learned by teaching; it arises spontaneously from our rational nature; the rational man has it by himself; it is the knowledge which nature suggests. I point in the explanation of this to the teaching in Catholic schools that the human soul is made to the image and likeness of God; that it is made to know God; that from the indeliberate exercise of its own faculties by a kind of natural movement it comes to the knowledge of God: "*Insita et cum natura conserta notitia.*" This knowledge is, therefore, vague and confused. Revelation and instruction purifies and makes it more complete. I furthermore maintain that this spontaneous knowledge of God is distinguished by two important characteristics: (a) It arises from rational nature by the use of faculties connatural to all. Hence it is not an intuition, nor is it the result of a special faculty. On the contrary, it can be compared to a spontaneous inference. (b) It is universal with human nature.

The sources of this knowledge are common to all who have the free use of reason. These sources are the world of man and of nature.

The consideration of man's being opens up the spheres of mental and of ethical life. The analysis of the concept, of the judgment, of the first principles, of reasoning itself leads the mind to the conviction in the existence of objective truth. We recognize that the mind is powerless to change its conceptions at will; it finds that the idea is such or such and takes it as it is found. We are forced to admit the objective reality of external and necessary truth. This truth pervades the universe in some wonderful manner. The mind is under its silent potent sway. Thus the world of external reality enters into the world of thought. The mind may turn or twist the mass to its own special ends or purposes. Nevertheless the content is objectively real, the content comes from without; the peculiar form and shape only can be ascribed to mental activity. The first principles of Logic and of Metaphysics are closely akin, and Scientists assure us that the solar system is ruled by truths and principles which make up the abstract science of Geometry and appeal for confirmation to the experimental science of Astronomy. Thus the mind does not make, it finds truth. In ordinary and scientific language we speak of new discoveries, of the bounds of knowledge enlarged from day to day. The ingenuity of man makes instruments to reach out and apply the truth; but the truth itself is beyond his control. In its presence he stands powerless. Its sway is absolute and universal. It knows no limitations of time, of space, or of any created intelligence. This absolute dominion of truth can only be explained in God. Its basis is not the human mind

or existing things. Unchangeable and eternal it rises above the changing fortunes of contingent beings and points to a mind unchangeable and eternal whence it has its source and only sufficient explanation.

The testimony of our moral nature is more obvious and convincing. In stronger and clearer voice it calls us to look beyond ourselves to one who prescribes the fundamental laws and principles of human conduct and alone is able to satisfy the desires of the soul. The dictates of conscience, the abiding sense of responsibility, the strong aspirations of our common nature awaken in the mind the consciousness of dependence on one who is far above and yet deep down in the recesses of the soul. It assures us that God is not only intelligent and great, but just and good.

Looking out into external nature I find grounds for the validity of my idea of God. The great fact impressed upon the mind by the world without is that all things change. Spring follows winter and summer follows spring in orderly succession. Night gives place to day and day to night in unvarying round. The seed is planted in the ground, rises in a stalk, flowers and produces seed again. We change from youth to manhood to old age. The disposition to change is inherent in everything and the fact obtains with the necessity of the law. In this fact we can distinguish: the thing which changes, the change itself, the cause of the change and the marvelous harmony in the changes. The first leads to a consideration of the contingency of things; the second to movement; the third to the analysis of cause; the last to the phenomena of order and contrivance. In pursuing our analysis on these lines we draw the facts from the discoveries of science. The various departments of physical science present

various aspects of the one great world around us. Each in its own proper sphere sets forth the relations of the phenomena and the laws which govern their movement. The universe in its entirety cannot be known from one alone. Thus these various lines of investigation coalesce into a unity. We are brought to the conviction that there is a Monism not in the sense that things are one in nature, for even Prof. Haeckel is cited by Mr. Mallock as admitting that the energy of the universe is of two kinds, but a Monism of order and harmony where beings so different one from another in nature and activities nevertheless merge to constitute one grand whole.

Having shown how strong and valid are the grounds for the idea of God, and that the progress of knowledge in every department of human investigation is far from weakening or relegating to the obscure regions of filmy Metaphysics this primary conviction of the mind I next proceed to investigate the nature of the idea. Hence the discussion of Providence makes up the second part of the book, for the Chapter on Creation should be viewed as the complement of the argument for God's existence. In discussing the Providence of God I pursue the same method of Analytical investigation. To combat the prevailing tone of Pessimism I have shown that the framework of the world is one of order and harmony, that the truth of the Final Cause, made more evident day after day by the wonderful discoveries of modern science, forces the mind to admit the native adaptation and fitness of things one for another, that this adaptation is not the result of change but follows from the nature of things to such an extent that not only order but existence demands it. Hence the elaborate analysis of the idea of

Goodness, and the association of this idea with the study of the Final Cause. In discussing the problem of Evil I have made a distinction between lower creation and the world of man, between the physical order and the moral order. In the former there is no confusion, because of the rigid prevalence of and subservience to necessary law. In the moral world the element of free-will must be taken into account. The moral order therefore is constituted by the free obedience of the rational creature to the moral law whose primary expression is the voice of conscience and whose complete authoritative mandate is contained in Christian Revelation and set forth in Christian Ethics.

Thus it is made evident that the notion of Goodness is primarily and more perfectly revealed in human consciousness by the voice of conscience revealing the existence of a moral law, whereas in lower creation it is shadowed forth only by the prevalence of order and harmony, of adaptation and fitness. And this brings to mind the teaching so often repeated in the writings of the early Christian Fathers, viz., that the soul of man is made to the image and likeness of God, that on the other hand in created things below man we only detect "Vestigia Dei" as it were "The vestiges of God." In the same sense the Scholastics teach that God is revealed in different ways by the different spheres of creation:—a difference which is grounded in the nature and constitution of the individual beings, which must not be viewed as opposed to one another but by virtue of universal harmony as coalescing into one grand whole. The importance of this distinction cannot be over estimated. In contemporary Philosophy and Theology great stress is laid on the immanence of God in the world. This is true,

yet from the immanence of God in creation we cannot infer that all created things reveal Him in the same manner. The immanence of God in the world does not destroy the differences of nature in created things. The trend of thought to-day is to view the world as the Pantheistic manifestation of God. God is immanent in the world, i. e., "*essentia præsentia, potentia,*" and yet transcendent to it by virtue of his uncreated nature.

To meet the difficulties which arise in discussing the Providence of God we should avoid a narrow and restricted viewpoint. Only by viewing the problem in a broad light can the mind reach a solution that is in any way satisfying. Hence it is that stress is laid on the universal reign of law : physical, chemical, biological, physiological ; that attention is called to the sensitive constitution of living organisms, and to the native limitations of created things. Furthermore, God's Goodness and Providence is revealed in a special manner by the life and mission of His own Incarnate Son. Christian Faith throws a flood of light upon the nature of God and the problem of human destiny which reason alone by virtue of its own limitations is utterly unable to attain.

Some writers have criticised this volume in the light of a definition of Religion. Let us grant that Religion is the relation which exists or should exist between a free intelligent creature, *i. e.*, man, and his Creator, *i. e.*, God. In simple truth I maintain that this treatise is not a work on religion. Religion supposes the two elements, man and God, and deals with the duties of one to the other. In a previous work I have taken up the problem of man and endeavored to prove that he has a free, intelligent, and immortal soul. In this volume I have taken up the other term of the relation and

set out to show that a consideration of man and the universe leads the mind to a conviction of God's existence, not as the Soul of the world but as its Maker and Ruler. An exact treatise on religion, *i. e.*, on the relations between man and God, I have not yet attempted to write. In making this statement the purpose is to confine the discussion within proper limits. If I have cited the historical fact that religion is a universal phenomenon as shown by the records, the monuments, and even the language of mankind, I desired merely to emphasize the fact that the conviction in the existence of God is everywhere to be found, not to discuss the nature and truth of these various beliefs.

In carrying on this discussion I do so as a Catholic priest, candidly admitting that the conviction of God's existence was impressed on my mind primarily by the teachings of Faith. It is also a conviction of reason in so far as by a psychological analysis into the grounds of the idea I have found in the world of nature and of man a justification of my belief. The method of "Dubium Philosophicum," *i. e.*, a philosophical doubt, is not employed. This method may be useful in Scholastic disputation or in special circumstances. The present method, which may be called Psychological, was followed because it seemed to be more in touch with the prevailing tone of thought. The personal note is avoided throughout only for the purpose of giving breadth and stability to the argument. That the book is not complete, a glance at the title-page shows. A treatise on the divine attributes would make the volume too bulky and is beyond the scope of the work.

This edition is annotated throughout by references to treatises which have appeared since its first publica-

tion. Through the kind permission of the *North American Review*, there is added, by way of Introduction, an article which appeared in that *Review* for March, 1903. This article, entitled "Philosophy and Science at the Dawn of the Twentieth Century," was a rejoinder to Mr. Mallock's criticisms of the present work set forth in his latest work, "Religion as a Credible Doctrine," and which were originally published in a series of articles to the *Fortnightly Review*, under the title, "Religion and Science at the Dawn of the Twentieth Century." As this article has never received a reply, and as its aim was to show that the ground on which Mr. Mallock's criticisms rest was false, no further attention was thought necessary for his arguments in detail.

In an Appendix I have criticised at some length the Gifford Lectures of Dr. Royce and of Prof. James. The authority of the Lectures as the latest exposition of religious thought, the place which the writers hold among American Philosophers, and the evident signs of development shown in their previous writings render a detailed examination at once interesting and instructive.

The present volume contains no explicit and detailed treatise of Personality in God. This problem has been treated elsewhere. However the idea of Personal God is everywhere supposed. The constituent elements of Personality are Intelligence and Will. The arguments adduced to prove the existence of God are so formulated as to show that the world of nature and of man cannot be explained without recourse to a Supreme Being possessing Intelligence and Will. This is what is understood by a Personal God. Hence a Personal

God is not a God with a body, for the possession of a body is an element of human personality. God, therefore, in the Christian sense is not an abstract Being, nor a material force, but a Being of Intelligence and Will to whom the existence of the world is due and from whom its activities are derived.

*March 7, 1904.*

## PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE AT THE DAWN OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY.\*

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BY THE REV. JOHN T. DRISCOLL, S. T. L.

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The latest contribution to the discussion of the so-called controversy between Science and Religion from a critical point of view is the work, "Religion as a Credible Doctrine," by Mr. William H. Mallock. In that work, Mr. Mallock maintains that the nineteenth century will be characterized in the annals of history as the battle-ground between the forces of religion and of science. This conflict, which has been waged with varying fortunes, is, he says, our heritage from the past, and he seizes the opening of a new century as an opportune time for setting forth the condition of both parties and the points at issue between them. Or, to use a metaphor he delights in, he proposes to sum up the debit and credit sides and present an accurate record of gains and losses. He thus appears in the humble rôle of "intellectual accountant."

Mr. Mallock has honored me by associating me with Father Maher, the learned English Jesuit, with Dr. Hettinger, and Dr. William G. Ward, of revered memory, as an exponent of Catholic teaching. In referring in a very friendly way to my work on Christian Philosophy,† he has been good enough to say

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\* Reprinted from the North American Review, March, 1903.

† "Christian Philosophy; God."

that the conclusions which I have aimed at establishing in that treatise are the precise conclusions which he himself desires to exhibit as worthy of reasonable acceptance. But he takes exception to the methods which I have followed in reaching these conclusions. Mr. Mallock assumes that there is an insurmountable barrier between the religious and the scientific domain, and on that basis he pursues his investigations; whereas I have regarded the field from a higher standpoint, with the result that objects which, on a close view, seem to conflict or to be isolated from each other are discerned in this more comprehensive outlook, as coalescing in harmonious unity—not a unity of nature, such as the monism of Prof. Haeckel, for instance, would imply, but a unity of order. Now, I believe that this recent contribution of Mr. Mallock is nothing more than the repetition of a shibboleth now grown old, and that his discussion is superficial. I am confident that closer examination will reveal, more and more clearly as the years go on, the simple and far-reaching truth that, in the history of the human interpretation of the world and of man, the nineteenth century will stand forth not as a battle-ground between religion and science, but as a battle-ground between spurious philosophies, where the fundamental and priceless problem at issue was the dignity and powers of the human mind.

The pendulum of thought swings from one extreme to the other. Thus, in philosophy, we discern the trend of thought from Idealism to Materialism, and from Materialism back to Idealism. In literature, a romantic period is followed by a period whose dominant tone is realistic, and this in turn gives way to a

subsequent idealism. The intellectual accountant whose main work is the balancing of accounts, is apt to view facts as figures and base the estimate on their face value. The philosophic mind welcomes facts gladly, but is not content with viewing them as figures. It investigates their causes, and is rewarded with the discovery that the facts apparent on the surface of the time-stream have a richer and deeper meaning, in so far as they are manifestations of currents more or less strong, more or less conflicting, agitating the minds and throbbing in the breasts of men.

## I.

An exact and profound knowledge of the problems which confront us is to be obtained only by viewing our mental life against the background of the lights and shadows cast by the struggles and victories and failures of those who have gone before.

The nineteenth century dawned with the rise of a philosophical system which boasted that it was destined to work in the world of mental science a revolution analogous to that which had been achieved by Copernicus in astronomy. With that claim by way of preface to the "Critic of Pure Reason," Emmanuel Kant published a work which has influenced the human mind profoundly for upwards of a hundred years. Copernicus revolutionized astronomical science by proving that the sun, not the earth, is the centre of the solar system. Kant maintained that truth, the light of our mental world, did not consist in conformity of thought to things, but resided in the mind alone. Reality must coincide with thought, not thought with reality. The mind thus becomes

supreme, with no test, no guide, no restraining force outside of itself.

This doctrine of Subjective Idealism, expressed in careful language, with a parade of deep and abstruse reasoning, was adopted with enthusiasm by the learned world. Disciples sprang up on every side. Fichte developed the Idealism of his master into a Transcendental Egoism. This teaching profoundly influenced Carlyle and Emerson, and even to-day its traces are found in the associations of Ethical Culture. Hard on Fichte, came Schelling with the doctrine of the Absolute, and then Hegel, the last and greatest of Kant's followers, who was destined, by the grim irony of events, to deal the idealistic movement a blow from which it has never recovered. Space does not permit a minute examination of Hegel's teaching. Sixty years ago his name was supreme in the schools of Germany. But he developed Idealism too far; with the inevitable result that reaction followed. Hegel's own disciples split into warring bands in the effort to explain their master's teaching.

Thus, looking back over the lapse of fifty years, we are brought face to face with vivid scenes of a rapidly shifting panorama. First, we behold a great multitude in loud acclaim of the Hegelian system of philosophy as the greatest achievement of the human mind; then, a few groups with diverse shreds of a dismembered system, each crying out the absurdities of the other, each proclaiming that it alone possessed the real doctrine, and in that very proclamation falling into absurdities more glaring still; then, the world looking on in amazement and doubt with the questions, What is Truth? and Is it in the care of

such as these, or is it not somewhere else after all? Finally, we see these same onlookers turning away from the strife of a broken and extravagant Idealism, and seeking truth in the material things which could be grasped by sense observation and experiment. The physical sciences dealing with the various aspects of material nature were then making giant strides, and men gloried in the possession of a sure and undisputed source of knowledge.

The science of the physical universe, acquired by patient investigation into its phenomena and laws, is a triumph of the human mind. It is a characteristic and glory of the nineteenth century. The method pursued in this department of mental activity is known as the method of Induction. But the inductive method was not the discovery of our later times. Aristotle described the process, and a most interesting section of the "Summa" of St. Thomas Aquinas is that part wherein he investigates, by means of this method, the virtues and vices even of our ethical life. Furthermore, a careful examination of the processes employed in physical science will show that the inductive method is only a part of the scientific method. Induction leads from facts or phenomena to the formulation of laws or hypotheses. But the laws must be applied to facts constantly recurring to observation; the hypotheses must be verified before they have any weight. Now the application of laws to facts and the verification of hypotheses are not features of Induction in its more restricted sense. They accompany it and are supplementary to it; yet they are more properly termed processes of Deduction. Hence except when reinforced by deductive features the inductive method has proved inadequate for the

acquisition of scientific truth. In our ordinary life, the two methods are in like manner employed. Do we not apply the rules or principles, or truths, whatever the name may be, acquired by past experience with men and things to the elucidation of events which succeed one another in the swiftly moving moments of the day? The nature of the human mind has not changed in these few hundred years which, according to Mr. Mallock, mark the passage from the theological to the scientific period of thought. The scientific spirit of our later days has only shown the necessity of careful observation and experimentation, and that in the field of physical nature hitherto imperfectly explored by the mind.

The recourse to investigation of the physical world, with the insistence on the processes of careful observation and experimentation, was a distinct gain to the cause of human knowledge. But, in the flood-tide of a reaction against a spurious Idealism, and in the enthusiasm born of abounding success in the discovery of material truth, scientists exceeded just limits. The great problems of existence, of origin and destiny, which are ever present to the mind, still remained to be dealt with and challenged solution. With these problems confronting them, some of the leading scientists, not content with the condemnation of a false philosophy nor with their own proper work of ascertaining and classifying the facts of material nature, set up a philosophy of their own based entirely on the limited knowledge of physical things. Mental and ethical life were regarded as phases of the material world, and the laws of physics were held to reign in rigid sway throughout. The result was the creation of a new system of philosophy, exagger-

ated and partial like the Hegelian Idealism, but at the opposite extreme.

Thus we see the rise of a philosophical school which held sway during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Its teaching has been termed Naturalism, because it denies the Supernatural and admits no revelation other than that obtained through the manifestation of the laws which exist in the material universe. By others, it is termed Positivism, because it teaches that we can know only things capable of positive and material proof. Again, it is called Agnosticism, because it professes to know nothing of the soul, of God, or of truth other than that obtained by sense-observation and experiment. A better term would be Science-Philosophy, because its inherent contradiction is revealed in this name. Certain it is, the new doctrine cannot be called Science, for positive science, to cite the words of M. Berthelot, "investigates neither first sources nor the ends of things, but it establishes facts and connects them by their immediate relations. \* \* \* The mind ascertains these facts by observation and experiment." The exponents and defenders of the Science-Philosophy were brilliant and versatile, but by no means profound. Its sway has passed with their death. The growing strength of a new philosophical movement is rapidly relegating it to a place in past history. Hence we can understand in its full force the lament of Mr. Mallock: "The pens of our Huxleys and Tyn-dalls and Darwins lie where they fell; and there is none left in strength among us to sum up the issue of that struggle, with knowledge and sympathy."

This Protean system, as has been said, is not Science, although it insistently claimed the title. It was

a philosophy, different from, yet for the time more dangerous than, other philosophies which have sprung up in the course of history. Its home was not in the secluded quiet of university life; its advocates were not retiring students. On the street, in the newspapers, during the short intervals of daily labor, in the home, its doctrines were discussed and vigorously defended. At the same time, earnest thinkers, men like Agassiz, Pasteur, Secchi, Claude Bernard, arose to attack the pretensions of the new philosophy. To them, as the preservers of science, is due the gratitude of mankind. They took the weapons so lauded by their opponents, and, by the use of a rigorous induction from well-ascertained facts, they pierced the bubble of this inflated system. Among them are to be found men of strong religious convictions, of great scientific achievement, who resented the unwarranted attack upon the priceless heritage of faith, falsely made in the name of science. They clearly perceived the fallacy of a philosophy masquerading in the guise of physical science, and they labored earnestly to tear aside the mask, to separate the false from the true, and let science stand forth in its true light before the gaze of men.

I do not deny that there were opponents of Science-Philosophy who had little to offer by way of a consistently reasoned philosophical system in place of what they rightly attempted to destroy. A glance over the variously modified systems of philosophic thought in Germany during the past fifty years, shows how weak and insufficient at times was the remedy suggested. The Hegelian Idealism which occasioned the rise of the Science-Philosophy, also contained in its own beginnings the fruitful seeds of doubt.

Hamilton tried to combine Kant and Reid, with the result that, on the one hand, he produced Huxley who coined the word "Agnosticism," and, on the other, Mansel, who proposed the system of his master as an irrefutable philosophic defense of Christian faith. Thus, Huxley, a leader of the Science-Philosophy, was the direct result of a false philosophical system; and the conflict between reason and faith, so apparent in recent English literature, is the offspring of false philosophical principles. The same spirit of scepticism prevailed in the Kantian offshoots throughout Germany and France. As a result, reason and faith, far from being recognized as existing in just and harmonious accord, are placed by this false system in the position of interminable strife. Hence, Christian faith is retained, if retained at all, only in apparent contradiction to reason; and reason, if consistently adhered to, leads to the abandonment of faith. In illustration, I cite Mr. Mallock's closing chapters. He openly proclaims not only that the conclusions in one department of human knowledge contradict the conclusions in another, but that "each in its last analysis contradicts itself." Thus, we may admit the truth of two contradictory doctrines, "without doing any more violence to our intellect than we are compelled to do implicitly whenever we believe anything." If there is meaning in these words, it is that they are a restatement of Kant's antinomies. And in presenting, by way of conclusion, his own convictions as to the proof for God's existence, Mr. Mallock openly adopts Kant's well-known distinction of theoretical and practical reason, confesses that the former leads to contradictions, and that the latter alone, in the

categorical imperative, with its implied sense of responsibility, gives the sure basis for our belief in God.

Is Mr. Mallock aware that the distinction between theoretical and practical reason is without foundation; that the categorical "ought" of Kant is nothing more than the arbitrary dictum of the individual will; that these principles which he calmly proposes as the final and best answer of the mind on the validity of God's existence, are the fruitful sources of Agnosticism in Philosophy, of Individualism in Ethics, of Anarchism in Sociology?

I have tried to point out that, in discussing the alleged conflict between Science and Religion, an examination of the terms is of primary importance. The truth has been brought out that Physical Science was not a party to any conflict, that the real issue was between the false pretensions of a Science-Philosophy and the variously modified forms of Idealism, which, however specious, proved upon closer analysis to be narrow, inconsistent and false. This explains the chaos of thought which resulted in a widespread spirit of doubt. Thus, we are brought to a consideration of the statement made in the opening of the present article, that the vital problem at stake in the nineteenth century was the dignity and nature of the human mind.

The possession of a spiritual soul endowed with intelligence and free-will gives to man a peculiar position in the visible universe. In one way or another, the Science-Philosophy bitterly assailed this truth and contended that man was only an animal, thus making Phychology a part of Physiology or Biology. Others more radical and consistent, at-

tempted to explain human nature by the principles of Physics and reduced human life to the laws of motion. A luminous illustration is Mr. Mallock's appeal to the Phenomenal Idealism of Sensism in the effort to destroy the distinction between mind and matter, and to force the reader to accept as the creed of modern science either the Unknowable of Mr. Spencer, with its confusion of the notions of substance and essence, or the one substance of Spinoza, with its modern development into the Double-Aspect theory. The attempt was a failure. A careful analysis of our mental operations shows that thought and free-will are utterly unlike the activities manifested in the brute or inanimate world. In common with the brute, we possess sense-life; but, over and above, we rejoice in the activities of a mind which can form abstract and universal notions, can analyze, synthesize and carry on a sustained process of carefully reasoned thought. The power of free-will, with its sense of responsibility, is not the capacity to act without a cause or motive, but the power of choice between acting or not acting, or between various courses of action proposed by the mind. The powers of self-consciousness and of self-determination are the crown and glory of our spiritual nature. The one is not to be separated from the other. In vain we seek an explanation of them in Physiology, Biology or Physics. The process of reasoning by which this truth is ascertained consists in the application of the laws of Induction and the Method of Residues to the phenomena of conscious experience. The admission of a spiritual or super-organic principle to explain the spiritual or super-organic operations of the mind and will, is forced by pure stress

of evidence upon the mind of the unbiased seeker for truth. The proof of a spiritual soul in a man is a vindication of human dignity and a triumph for human knowledge. The narrow limits of a Science-Philosophy are broken down, and the scope of philosophical observation is broadened and enriched. In addition to the department of Physical Science, we behold the spheres of mental and of moral life. They are not blended one into the other, but each stands forth clear and distinct, each with its own wealth of truth to be acquired by processes carried on in accordance with its own subject-matter and laws.

In broadening the sphere of human knowledge by the elevation of Psychology and of Ethics to the dignity of special sciences, distinct from the sciences which investigate the material world, the need is felt of a rigid inquiry into the nature of the mind, of a complete and exact description of the laws and processes which govern it in its pursuit of truth. The great result of the labor of Socrates was the rout of the Sophists by his insisting on the value of definite concepts. He thus removed the shadows of doubt, and brought about the free activity of thought. Hence arose the splendid monuments of human reason left in the works of Plato and Aristotle. Some hundreds of years later, St. Thomas Aquinas gathered together the scattered fragments of truth and welded them into the system of Scholastic Philosophy, the greatest production of carefully reasoned thought the world has ever seen. A like labor is incumbent on the present. The work most needed to-day is a Theory of Knowledge, written with a clear conviction of the dignity and powers of the mind, and in sympathetic knowledge of the struggles and doubts of those

who have immediately gone before. The materials are at hand, but the work itself will show in a clearer and more detailed manner what I have tried briefly to point out, viz., that the nineteenth century is characterized not by a conflict between Religion and Science, but by a bitter conflict of rival philosophies, and that the fundamental issue is the dignity and validity of human reason.

## II.

Turning now from the general proof of my thesis set forth in the preceding pages, I shall deal with a special illustration furnished by Mr. Mallock. He repeatedly cites Professor Haeckel as the leading representative of Science. Now, I maintain that, whatever claim Professor Haeckel may have to the title of scientist, he certainly is also a philosopher. He comes before us as an exponent of the Science-Philosophy. When Professor Haeckel discusses the problems of God's existence, of human freedom and immortality, he is no longer a scientist. He has passed beyond the field of observation and experimentation on physical facts, and entered the domain of metaphysics, which is the proper sphere of philosophy. The problems of origin and destiny are beyond the range of physical science. Even a biologist, like Professor Haeckel, should not presume, as a scientist, to discuss and solve the origin of primitive life. The philosopher may make the attempt, and in so doing he will subject his reasoning and conclusions to rigid criticism. Thus, in making this attempt, Professor Haeckel is a philosopher, and the aspects of his teachings cited and approved by Mr. Mallock are

the conclusions of a philosopher, and as such we shall briefly review them.

First of all, Professor Haeckel is guilty of the false use of the term science, which he employs as if it were restricted to physical science. This is an undue narrowing of human knowledge and is in direct contradiction to our conscious experience. There are mental science and moral science as well as physical science. Each presents the results of investigations pursued in its own special field, according to its own methods. The processes of thought properly carried out in the examination of any department of human knowledge are justly termed scientific.

Again, Professor Haeckel is obliged to face a serious difficulty in explaining the origin of life. He proposes the theory of spontaneous generation. If that theory be false, he admits that his whole system falls to the ground. Fifty years ago, this statement could be put forth without much fear of the consequences. Appeal could have been made to the facts of obvious experience, as illustrated in the generation of flies and bugs from putrid matter. Since then, however, Pasteur and Tyndall have proved conclusively, by a long and careful series of experiments, that life can only come from life, and that the dictum, *omne vivum e cellula*, formulates a scientific truth. The opponents of the Science-Philosophy justly called attention to this fact and demanded an answer. Did Professor Haeckel abandon his system, or attempt to modify it in accordance with the truths of science which he so loudly acclaims? On the contrary, he grows indignant and appeals to the unknown. In present conditions, he admits, the law of Biogenesis holds sway, but what of the primitive stage

when life first made its appearance on the globe? The conditions then *might be* such, he suggests, that life did not come from life but from inorganic matter. In reply, it can be said that *what we do know* is, that the law of Biogenesis is a fundamental law of Biology, that Astronomy teaches the formation of the earth from a primitive nebula, and Geology proves that in the eozoic age of our planet there were no signs of life upon it. We accept this teaching and propound it, not with a view to establish the religious nature of man, as Mr. Mallock suggests, but to show the existence of God as the author of life. If our reasoning does not hold — that is, if the law of Biogenesis did not apply to primitive life, and if primitive life came from non-living matter — then a law of Biology has actually changed. What becomes of science on the supposition that the laws of material nature were in primitive times other than they are now, it is not for me to explain. Our position is strong, and cannot be affected by the unsupported assertions of the Science-Philosophers. And, if we consider the problem without regard to those who are interested in its discussion, we can maintain that the truths of science — as distinguished from the mere guesses and speculations of the Science-Philosophers — are not antagonistic to the conclusions of philosophy, that we are not forced to accept conclusions which hopelessly contradict each other. The ascertained facts and laws of physical science we gladly admit. The philosophical inferences therefrom are regarded as certainties, or as endowed with greater or less probability, in proportion to the weight of evidence supporting them and the rigid accuracy of the reasoning process by which they have been reached. The law of Bio-

genesis is in possession, and our inference is based on that admitted truth. The law of Abiogenesis has not a shred of evidence to favor its acceptance.

Another contention very dear to Professor Haeckel, and to the exposition of which Mr. Mallock devotes many pages, is the theory of evolution. This may be regarded as the framework in the edifice of Science-Philosophy, just as the law of Abiogenesis is its corner-stone. Now, what is there in the theory of Evolution? Some fifty years ago an ardent and patient young scientist discovered data which forced him to change his opinion on the development of some forms of life. But had mankind up to that time been ignorant that there is a law of growth, and that growth is a law of life? Jesus repeatedly draws illustrations from this biological law, and before the publication of "The Origin of Species" appeared the "Development of Christian Doctrine" by John Henry Newman. Men knew, in a general way, that living things grow, and that there were limits to the growth of the individual. They possessed, however, no minute knowledge of the various methods of generation, or of the laws governing the processes of growth. By close observation of the forms of life, Darwin discovered certain modifications and influences—*e. g.*, environment—whose scientific value had not been generally recognized. Immediately the world rang with plaudits over a great discovery. A new name was coined, and Evolution was proposed as a theory with a universal application. I do not wish to disparage a scientific discovery. I admit that Darwin's labors opened a new field of investigation which has been of great interest and value to Biology. Life and the laws of life are full of mysteries, and the

growth of an embryo, like the growth of a child's mind, gives rise to beautiful and profound reflections. The secret of Darwin's fame was that he turned our gaze to the laws of growth and showed that our eyes were holden to things about us. Science scored a triumph and every candid mind gloried in the achievement. But when Evolution, with its beautiful kernel of truth, was seized by the Science-Philosophers and proposed by them as an explanation of the universe and of man, it ceased to be a problem of science and became forthwith a problem of philosophy. God was ruled out of the world and a hypothesis assumed sway. The abstract idea of growth was extended into a theory, and men forgot that living things differ in nature one from another, and that the character of the development was determined by the nature of the being.

As an illustration in point, let us take the alleged evolution of man from the brute. Science-Philosophy professedly teaches this form of development. Investigation of brute life shows that the animal possesses sense organs and sense knowledge. Psychology teaches that man has sense-life and sense-knowledge and is, therefore, an animal; but, over and above this knowledge, he is endowed with intelligence and free-will. The operations of mind are of a different order from the operations of sense. The mind abstracts, judges and reasons from the data of sense. Modern English Psychology in the term "thought" includes the operations of intellect and of sense. This confusion has had disastrous consequences in the philosophy of mental life. The use of the one term "thought" to designate two classes of operations different in kind served to obliterate the radical dif-

ference between them and make the passage from one to the other, or the designation of one for the other, simple and natural to the untrained mind. Nevertheless, the difference is there and can never be blotted out by a fallacious logomachy. The distinction of sense and intellect is a fundamental psychological fact, and it only can account for the diverse operations of the mind. The theory of evolution is impotent to bridge this chasm. A likeness in the nature of things must be shown. This, evolution has not yet shown and never will be able to show.

### III.

A final proof of the main contention of this article shall be taken from the acts of one who stands before the world as its greatest living statesman and prophet. Throughout a pontificate longer than ordinarily falls to the successor of St. Peter, Leo XIII. has proved himself by repeated acts to be an illustrious benefactor of mankind. Singularly endowed with great powers of mind, trained by a long and varied experience in the conduct of men and in the management of affairs, he brings to his high office a mature wisdom which has reflected signal glory on his reign. Almost his first act after election to the Pontificate was the publication, in 1878, of the encyclical "*Aeterni Patris.*" With the eye of a seer, he looks out into the world and detects the cause of the confusion and doubt which so profoundly disturbed the mind of his generation. He saw that men were in darkness because false philosophical systems had cast baneful shadows over the mind. He repeatedly insists that there is not and cannot be any conflict be-

tween Science and Religion. He realizes that a false philosophy, whether clothed in the garb of science, or built upon an erroneous interpretation of mental life, is the element which brings discord into the harmonious blending of knowledge. Not content with indicating the evil, he proposes the remedy. Looking into the treasury of truth, he selects the Scholastic Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas as the beacon which will cast a clear light on the troubled mind of the nineteenth century.

Thus was ushered in the Neo-Scholastic period. We find its beginnings farther back in the Latin works of Liberatore, in Trendelenberg, in Barthélemy St. Hilaire. But with the encyclical of the Holy Father an enthusiasm for the study was aroused. The "Summa" of St. Thomas became the text-book in Catholic schools, the principles which form its framework were spread abroad through publications in every language. The broad view, the clear thought, the sound doctrine, the exact expression so characteristic of the Angelic Doctor, exerted a deep and wide influence. The spirit of calm and solidity which gave to Scholastic Philosophy its strong hold on the mind of the Middle Ages breathed through the teachings of the Neo-Scholastic school. Writers came forth to face the motley array of current philosophies, with a clear knowledge of the weakness in their adversaries and confident in the possession of a strong, carefully reasoned system of truth concerning the universe and man. A true philosophy brought into harmony the scattered and partially obscured rays of truth. It dispelled the clouds of doubt which hung so long over the minds of men. It showed the true sphere and work of physical science, urged it to pursue its fruit-

ful labors, and was the first to proclaim the discovery of physical laws or facts.

I do not deny that Neo-Hegelianism in England contributed, in no small degree, to usher in the new movement. But its value was rather negative, in so far as it helped to overthrow the Science-Philosophy by an insistence on the conscious facts of mental and of ethical life. No modification, however, of a system radically erroneous, as was Hegel's Idealism, can hope for any length of time to retain a hold on the mind. Thus, it cannot present a broad, sound and consistent theory of knowledge or of ethics. In this, its positive side, it betrays an inferiority to Neo-Scholasticism. There we have a clear and true presentation of mental life, an exact and profound system of morals, and a just estimate of investigation into the material universe, all uniting to form a magnificent structure with no gap or jar to mar its integrity.

I have endeavored to make my purpose clear. The line of thought and the principles set forth in this article are followed out in detail and applied to the special problem of God's existence in my work on Christian Philosophy, which Mr. Mallock has criticised. What I maintain is, that a sound philosophy should recognize the truth of physical, of mental and of moral science; that it should be broad and profound, clear and exact, so as to keep intact the limits of each, to prevent one from conflicting with the other, and thus build up in all fulness and proportion the magnificent structure of human knowledge.

JOHN T. DRISCOLL.

## INTRODUCTION.

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§ 1. God is the greatest word in language, the most profound and far-reaching problem in philosophy.<sup>1</sup> Found on the lips of every rational creature, it yet unfolds a depth of meaning which the greatest intelligence has never exhausted. It enters into the lowliest lives to restrain, uplift and sanctify. In times of sore trial the thought of God is like a beacon in the gloom, breaking through the darkest cloud with a ray of hope, and brings the message of light and peace, and happiness beyond. Speak of God to the sorrow-laden and depressed; their burden becomes lighter and their heart more strong. The great astronomer, after untold labor spent in investigating the laws of the heavenly bodies, lifts his soul in humble thanksgiving to God for the unutterable joys experienced in the contemplation of His works.<sup>2</sup> To bring a message about God to our fellow-men is the highest duty and privilege. The message is a glad tidings to the human soul which ever yearns for more knowledge concerning its origin and destiny. "Thou hast made us for Thyself, O Lord, and our heart is restless till it rest in Thee."<sup>3</sup>

§ 2. A message, to be of value, must appeal to living men. Special questionings and difficulties are a part of every individual mind. A wise physician examines the nature of the disease before prescribing a remedy.

<sup>1</sup> Ladd, Introduction to Philosophy, p. 400.

<sup>2</sup> E. g. Kepler, cf. Order in the Physical World, tr. from the French, by T. J. Slavin, p. 9.

<sup>3</sup> St. Aug. Confess. I. 1, c. 1.

History is a reflex of the individual. Its periods are characterized by a predominance given to certain problems or to varied aspects of life. Hence special difficulties arise which must be answered. The knowledge of God's truth is ever increasing, an abundance of material is at hand. The need is to gather this and give to it a shape and form best fitted to break the advance of error.

§ 3. Our age is an age of scepticism. The storm of doubt, bitter and relentless, has swept over our lives. Beliefs and truths, dear to the soul and sanctioned by time-honored tradition, have been ruthlessly assailed. Timid minds have seen the dark hosts rapidly forming, have beheld positions believed impregnable successfully assailed and viewed in anticipation the ruin and desolation of what made life precious. The fundamental truths of religion are the object of attack. The existence of God, the nature of the soul, the fact of revelation are questioned. At such a time it is not wise to fly to the refuge of faith. The most decisive battles of to-day are fought beyond the breastworks of revealed truth.<sup>4</sup> The arms we use are those of reason, the missiles are the most certain facts of consciousness and of physical science. In employing these we claim the right to use any legitimate method. We deny the claim of adversaries to limit us to any one method or any one class of facts, and then cry out that the reasoning is not conclusive. Methods vary, even though legitimate. In time of war the wise leader disposes his army with a view to capture the position of the enemy. In like manner we claim the right to employ the method best suited to the present exigencies of the subject.

<sup>4</sup> Balfour, Foundations of Belief, p. 2; Wordsworth, The One Religion, p. 6.

§ 4. The considerations adduced are the heritage of Christian Philosophy handed down by the pens of St. Augustine and St. Thomas. The marvellous advance in the sciences furnish increased data for argument and illustration. The question is considered under all aspects. All sources of knowledge are investigated. History, Language, Psychology, Ethics, the Physical Sciences, each comes with its special testimony. The aim is simply to collect the data and show their bearing on the Idea of God; to answer the question: What is meant by God and has the idea of God an objective validity?

§ 5. This is a problem of modern thought. Is the mind constrained to admit that the Theistic interpretation of the universe is the true one? All that is true and noble in human life depends on the answer. The trend of philosophic speculation renders the discussion imperative. The wide interest and large circulation of treatises on the Idea of God is a sign of the times. In our own country the recent contributions of Prof. Royce and of Prof. Fiske hold the attention of readers. In chapter IV the views of the former are critically examined. Under a thoughtful and attractive style he proposes an ethical and idealistic Pantheism. The Idea of God by Prof. Fiske is a popular work, and appeals strongly to the undisciplined mind. In the present treatise however the reader will clearly see: (1) That his theory of the origin of the idea of God is flatly contradicted by facts.\* (2) That his presentation of the Christian idea of God as set forth by St. Augustine is absolutely false.\* (3) That he confounds the teaching of St. Athanasius and of Clement of Alexandria with the doctrine of Spinoza, Lessing,

\* *Idea of God*, ch. III., pp. 154, 163; *infra*, ch. III., s. II.

\* *Idea of God*, ch. V., VI.

## CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.

and Schleiermacher.' (4) That far from presenting a Theistic doctrine, his is rather a Cosmic Pantheism.'<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Idea of God, pp. 94, 103, 109, 112.

<sup>2</sup> Idea of God, ch. XIII., p. 166.

## CHAPTER I.

### AGNOSTICISM.

§ 1. History is the record of the human race. It sets forth what man has achieved in the various spheres of human activity. We there behold the many phases of a nation's life from its early rise through all its progress in government, in science, in letters, in conquest on to its decline and fall. Thus nation comes after nation and government gives way to government. The map of the world is ever changing and each change appeals to us with keen interest as involving the hopes, resolves and fortunes of human beings like ourselves.

§ 2. The mere narration of facts may please the <sup>Philosophy of History.</sup> young; it is not sufficient for the more mature mind. He seeks to get behind the facts, to grasp the causes, to know why and how a people rose from amidst their neighbors and exercised an influence upon contemporaneous and subsequent periods. Thus we are led to the most attractive study of the Philosophy of History.

§ 3. Our interest is now centered upon the history of thought. The world has seen epochs characterized by the activity and splendor of literary work. They have been called the intellectual ages of mankind. In spite of many differences we may still detect some striking resemblances which form a basis for comparison and contrast. Thus the thoughtful student sees reasons to compare the present period of philosophic thought to the period of Greek Philosophy at the birth of Socrates and to the Middle Ages at the time of St. Thomas Aquinas.

## I.

## AGNOSTICISM.

Present time can be compared to Greece at the birth of Socrates.

§ 4. In the fifth century, B. C., Athens was the center of intellectual life in Greece. There from all parts gathered teachers and those anxious still to learn. To the Athenian success meant position in the state and an influence in public affairs. For this the knowledge of Rhetoric or of public debate was a necessity. Hence the multitude of individual teachers who claimed to propose what all so eagerly sought. They became known as Sophists, *i. e.*, wise men — an appellation of honor at first, but with Socrates and Plato indicating boastful, fallacious and venal men.

work of Socrates.

§ 5. The lifework of Socrates was to expose the pretensions of these men, to show the distinction between true and false knowledge. This is done by a process of intellectual analysis. At times he leaves the adversary in doubt as in the Dialogues of Search; again he proposes positive and definite truths. In both the aim is apparent, viz., the necessity of forming clear conceptions. The principal elements of Logic are found in the dialogues; afterwards they were thrown into scientific form by Aristotle. Thus was given a deathly blow to the universal scepticism of the time.<sup>1</sup>

modern Agnosticism.

§ 6. Modern thought is running in a parallel course. The current tone is Agnostic, which is as Prof. Schurman says, the "Apotheosis of Scepticism."<sup>2</sup> The passing generation has been deeply imbued with its spirit. In Philosophy, Mr. Spencer is its acknowledged leader; in Science, Mr. Huxley and Mr. Tyndall champion its teaching; in Literature, George Eliot,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Zeller, *Socrates and the Socratic Schools*.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Belief in God*, by Pres. Schurman.

Mrs. Humphrey Ward are its open defenders. Not confined within the walls of the university or lecture hall, it has become a topic of conversation in the parlor, the dining-room and on the railway carriage. The college-graduate and the daily laborer are heard to voice its sentiments. The tendency is to question everything; and philosophy, science, as well as common sense assure us that the only state of mind on the important problems of life and of being is one of doubt.'

## II.

## ORIGIN.

§ 7. The term "Agnosticism" is of very recent origin of the term. Mr Huxley is very ingenuous in telling how it was coined. When a young man, he became a member of the Metaphysical society of London, he found himself out of place in the company of men each of whom had a reputation as the parent of an *ism* of some kind. He felt constrained to be like his associates and broached the doctrine of Agnosticism. In a spirit of humility he openly confessed that he was an Agnostic because he did not know nor could he ever hope to know a solution for the fundamental truths of religion.\*

§ 8. The doctrine, however, signified by the term <sup>the</sup> doctrine. Agnosticism is not new. It is of the same nature as that proposed by the Sceptics in the time of Socrates. Nevertheless in its modern form it cannot claim to be

\*Theological Essays, R. H. Hutton, p. 22; Is Life Worth Living, W. H. Mallock, ch. VIII; The Great Enigma, W. S. Lilly, ch. III., IV.

“Essays on Some Controverted Questions, IX., Prof. Huxley; his article in XIXth Century, Feb., 1895, in criticism of Mr. Balfour’s “Foundations of Belief.”

“The Roots of Agnosticism, by James Seth in the New World, Sept., 1894.

a direct offspring. It is a truth of history that like effects may be traced to the working of independent causes. The cause at the base of the Greek Scepticism as well as of modern Agnosticism is the failure on the part of the human mind to acquire definite and true knowledge of things. Thus we find Socrates ever occupied in an analysis of the definition. The Dialogues are discussions concerning the meaning of words. In our own day the fundamental problem of Philosophy is in like manner the theory of the notion. The circumstances, however, which brought the cause into play are not the same in both periods. We shall briefly indicate the sources and development of modern Agnosticism. They can be summed up under three heads: Philosophical, scientific and religious.

1° Its  
causes Phil-  
osophical.

(a) Locke's  
teaching a  
source of  
Agnos-  
ticism.

1°. *Philosophical.*

§ 9. (a) Locke is called the parent of English Psychology. A disciple of Descartes, he yet shows independence of mind in differing from his master, e. g., rejecting innate ideas, and in working out his own peculiar theory of knowledge. He teaches that sensation and reflection are the two sources of knowledge. The former embraces the knowledge of external objects. The latter is so much like this that it might be properly called the internal sense.\*

§ 10. Thus is found an explanation for Locke's empiricism. To him reflection is a more refined form of sensation. The radical difference between sense and thought is obliterated; the one runs into the other, of which it is a more shadowy form. The higher powers of mind are ignored. As a consequence we only know the qualities or sensitive appearances of

\* *Human Understanding*, b. II., ch. I, sec. IV.

things; the real substance or essence is beyond reach.<sup>1</sup> Substance unknown. Therefore in the founder of English philosophy we find traces of the modern school of Agnosticism.

§ 11. Starting from Locke's principle that the mind knows external objects only through mental representations,<sup>2</sup> Berkeley quickly developed into Idealism. Ideas, i. e., mental representations are the direct and proper objects of cognition; the *esse* of things is their *percipi*.<sup>3</sup> Hume combined the Agnosticism of Locke and the Idealism of Berkeley and taught an open and radical scepticism.<sup>4</sup>

§ 12. The destructive character of Hume's writings aroused Kant. For upwards of twenty years he labored on his great work *A Critic of Pure Reason*. He was confident that he had given a death blow to scepticism and placed human knowledge on a firm lasting basis.

§ 13. (b) Kant taught that the mind independent of all experience, creates in itself certain pure forms of knowledge. Into these forms and clothed by them are fitted the materials of knowledge, i. e., the phenomena furnished by the senses. The forms of Intuition are Space and Time; the forms of thought are the twelve Categories.<sup>5</sup> The categories are purely ideal; they have no objective validity. Yet they are the direct object of the perceiving mind. For the mind in the act of apprehending an object clothes the object with its own ideal vesture. The forms or vesture constitute with Kant the *phenomena*. The

<sup>1</sup>"Indeed as to the real essence of substances we only suppose their being without precisely knowing what they are." Ib. B. III., ch. IV., sec. VI.

<sup>2</sup>Ib. B. IV., ch. I., sec. I.

<sup>3</sup>Berkeley's Works V. 1, sec. 3, The Theistic Argument, J. Dimon p. 42.

<sup>4</sup>Treatise on Human Nature; The Theistic Argument, J. Dimon, DD., pp. 6, 7.

<sup>5</sup>Critic of Pure Reason.

real objects, as they are in their own concrete existence independent of the mind, are never known."<sup>13</sup> "We know nothing but our manner of perceiving them."<sup>14</sup> The objects in their own objective nature are called by Kant *noumena*. Hence the famous distinction which obtains even to our day between the *phenomena* and the *noumena*. The ideal appearances make up our knowledge; the real things are unknown and unknowable. The speculative reason cannot know God; He becomes the postulate of practical reason. Thus in attempting to refute Hume, Kant becomes the parent of modern Agnosticism.<sup>15</sup>

Influence  
of Locke  
and Kant  
upon  
modern  
thought.

§ 14. The direct influence of the real phenomenalism of Locke, and the ideal phenomenalism of Kant upon the formation of modern thought can be easily traced. The two currents worked their own way along until in our own day the waters intermingle and their separate identity is merged into a wider and more powerful stream.

§ 15. Locke's theory of knowledge developed by Hume influenced Hartley, Priestley, Bentham and James Mill. Drawing the inspiration and teaching from his father, J. S. Mill proposes it with a wealth of detail and analysis in his Logic, a work which exercised a profound influence on the English mind of the past generation. He thus became the logician, while Mr. Spencer is termed the metaphysician, and Mr. Bain the psychologist of the Association School.

Philosophy  
of Associa-  
tion is  
Agnostic.

§ 16. Hence the only system of philosophy which can be considered as the product of the English mind is the direct offspring of Locke and Hume. It teaches with them that we can only know the external appear-

<sup>13</sup> Royce, *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 321, 360.

<sup>14</sup> Critic, Transc. Aesthet., p. 37.

<sup>15</sup> A. K. Rogers, *Modern Philosophy*, p. 225.

ances of things, that what we term substance is only a bundle of qualities united by the laws of association, that the real essence is unknown and unknowable."<sup>15</sup> The bounds of human knowledge are confined within the domains of sense. The notions of cause, of substance, of essence are explained in a new meaning. God, soul, etc., may exist; the human mind is unable to say so; therefore to us they are as good as not existing. But this is the distinctive character of Agnosticism.

§ 17. The influence of Kant comes through another course. During the eighteenth century the Scotch school of philosophy alone withstood the power of English scepticism and materialism. With Reid it became a strong citadel of Theistic argument. Sir W. Hamilton, however, recognized the weakness in the position of his predecessor. At the time Kant was in the zenith of power and his teaching was considered impregnable. To him, therefore, Hamilton went for the material to supply what was lacking in Reid. His work was an attempt at a reconstruction. It was eagerly welcomed by Christian writers and for upwards of fifty years was the recognized manual of Theistic philosophy outside of the Catholic church.

§ 18. The real effect of Hamilton was contrary to what he and his disciples expected. His theory of the notion was riddled by J. S. Mill."<sup>16</sup> His philosophy of the conditioned is nothing more than an exposition in English form of the categories of Kant. The mind in the act of knowing fixes limits on the object known."<sup>17</sup> Thus we can only know the limited, *i. e.*, the finite.

<sup>15</sup> Essays on Religion, J. S. Mill, p. 263.

<sup>16</sup> Examination of Sir W. Hamilton.

<sup>17</sup> "To define a thing is to give it limits." Knight, Aspects of Theism, p. 157.

Kant  
through  
Hamilton a  
source of  
Agnosticism.

Mansel a  
disciple of  
Hamilton.

The infinite is a mere negation, *i. e.*, of the finite. God becomes not an object of knowledge but of faith.<sup>18</sup>

§ 19. Dean Mansel in his Bampton Lectures<sup>19</sup> publicly and expressly attempted to harmonize this doctrine with the tenets of Christian teaching. The result was disastrous. The fallacy of the reasoning, the weakness of his position were too patent to be passed by in silence. Christianity suffered by being allied to a false philosophy. And the effort to follow the lead of Hamilton and Mansel has brought English non-Catholic Apologetics to its present low position and made it so easy a mark for trenchant writers like Huxley and Spencer.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Scientific.

position  
and influ-  
ence of  
physical  
science.

<sup>20</sup> Scientific.

§ 20. A second factor in the development of modern Agnosticism is found in the rise and progress of physical science. Our century is truly an epoch of scientific discovery. By observation and experimentation every department of nature has been compelled to disclose its treasures and to reveal its laws. The old classic curriculum in the most conservative universities has been shattered and scientific departments formed with special academic degrees. The importance of a scientific education is loudly proclaimed, the methods of scientific investigation are praised to the exclusion of any other.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Lectures, V. 11, p. 374; Theological Essay, R. H. Hutton, pp. 6, 86.

<sup>19</sup> The Limits of Religious Thought.

<sup>20</sup> The Theistic Argument, by J. Dimon, p. 22. Thus Prof. Fraser holds that the alternative lies between either "a sceptical alienation from an uninterpretable universe" or "reconciliation with the universe in hopeful moral faith." Phil. of Theism, 2d series, p. 3. This is the position of Kant. Cf. also The Christian Doctrine of God in Lux Mundi, p. 88; Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, B. II., ch. IX.; Pres. Schurman in the Philosophical Review, vol. IV., May, 1895.

<sup>21</sup> The Great Enigma, W. S. Lilly, p. 201.

§ 21. The Physical sciences are of great value. No <sup>their value.</sup> one will deny that a larger knowledge of nature ennobles man and contributes to the material comfort of life. Nevertheless the physical sciences investigate only one department of nature. Logic, Ethics, Metaphysics cannot be classed as physical sciences.

§ 22. The exclusive attention paid to physical science <sup>the source of their power.</sup> is due to the rise of Positivism and the decline of <sup>to Hegel's Metaphysics.</sup> Hegelianism. The metaphysics of Hegel, the culminating point in the development of Kant, was considered to be the last and final effort of the human mind in solving the mystery of the universe. Its merits were instantly recognized, but its critics were not silent. They succeeded in exposing the assumptions on which it was based and the contradictions it involved. The result was a division of Hegel's disciples into three warring camps. The controversy was bitterly carried on by the small parties of followers. Many minds, however, paused in dismay. To them metaphysics was a synonym for whatever is extravagant, unintelligible and absurd.<sup>\*\*</sup>

§ 23. At this crisis Comte broached the system of <sup>and to Comte's Philosophy.</sup> Positive philosophy. His aim was to constitute a hierarchy of the physical sciences and set forth sure and true methods to be followed in the pursuit of knowledge. His success was very great. The system was propagated in England, America, Germany, Italy, as well as in France. He taught that observation and experimentation were the only channels of knowledge, that what was beyond the limits and scope of the senses did not exist, that the only knowledge deserving the name was physical knowledge. In England J. S.

<sup>\*\*</sup> Hence Prof. Pfleiderer writes that we find ourselves in a sort of interregnum in Philosophy. Phil. of Religion, vol. II., p. 115.

Mill, Mr. Spencer, Mr. Harrison, George Eliot, and Mr. Lewes championed the new philosophy. In the hands of Mr. Huxley, Mr. Tyndall and Mr. Youmans, however, it appears under its true nature, *i. e.*, a scientific Agnosticism.

**Mr. Huxley** § 24. While Mr. Huxley acknowledges his indebtedness to Hamilton<sup>22</sup> and to Hume,<sup>23</sup> and repudiates Comte, his principles are nevertheless the principles of Positivism.<sup>24</sup> He tells us that Agnosticism is a method, the essence of which lies in the vigorous application of a single principle, *viz.*, in matters of knowledge follow reason as far as it will guide you and not pretend that conclusions are certain which are not demonstrated or demonstrable.<sup>25</sup> This principle, innocent in itself, becomes vicious when interpreted after Mr. Huxley's own mind. To him it means that any reality beyond phenomena and their laws is unknowable.

**Mr. Tyndall.** § 25. Mr. Tyndall attempts to explain life by mechanical processes; he discerns in matter "the promise and potency of life;"<sup>26</sup> he affirms the phenomenal nature of knowledge, and holds out the teaching of Democritus as the final word of modern science.<sup>27</sup> With him the only means to arrive at truth are those employed by physical science, *viz.*, exact observation and experiment. He appeals to these as to a final tribunal in his celebrated strictures on prayer and special providences. Material agencies alone exist, and what lies beyond is in the region of the unknowable.

<sup>22</sup> Essay in XIXth Century, Feb. 1895, on Mr. Balfour's Foundations of Belief.

<sup>23</sup> Life of Hume, by T. Huxley.

<sup>24</sup> The Physical Basis of Life, p. 123; Scientific Aspects of Positivism; Essays upon some Controverted Questions, Essay IX.; The Theistic Argument, J. Dimon, pp. 8, 9, 10.

<sup>25</sup> Ib., Essay IX., Agnosticism.

<sup>26</sup> Belfast Address in Fragments of Science.

<sup>27</sup> Modern Theories in Philosophy and Religion, by Prin. Tulloch, art. Scientific Materialism.

Notwithstanding many contradictions and veiled attempts to conceal the meaning of words and phrases he persists in advocating this doctrine. What is the Unknowable with Mr. Spencer, becomes to him the Inscrutable.<sup>26</sup>

§ 26. The same tone of thought was persistently <sup>In America.</sup> advocated in America by the writers of the Scientific Monthly. With a show of knowledge put forth in an attractive style they tried to convince readers that religious truth was beyond the sphere of exact thought, that science alone could verify its assertions; that what was not within the limits of scientific methods could not be known. Thus science became the ally of unbelief and no man of disciplined mind was presumed to know anything whatsoever about the great truths pertaining to God or to the soul.<sup>27</sup>

### 3°. *Religious.*

<sup>28</sup> Relig-  
ious.

§ 27. A final element in forming the tone of modern scientific thought must be sought for in religion. False presentations of a truth are the most insidious errors and lead to the most disastrous consequences.

False pre-  
sentations  
of religious  
truth a  
source of  
Scepticism.

§ 28. With the rise of Protestantism the great problems of discussion were the freedom of the will, the doctrine of grace, *i. e.*, of divine supernatural help, and of predestination. They assumed a most malignant and repulsive form in the Creed of Calvinism. The history of religious thought shows how bitter was the strife. God was described as a being of infinite power who created and destined men to eternal damnation without giving any means to enable them to

<sup>26</sup> Pop. Scien. Monthly, Dec. 1876.

<sup>27</sup> Against this form of Phenomenalism Mr. Balfour directed his Essay, *The Foundations of Belief*, Ib., p. 6. As a work of philosophical criticism the reasoning is very strong.

reach eternal blessedness. The human soul revolted from a religion so terrible.<sup>11</sup> Hence we can understand the indignant protest of J. S. Mill although we can hardly reconcile it with his gospel of Utilitarianism.<sup>12</sup> In America Jonathan Edwards upheld the rigid Calvinistic creed with voice and pen.<sup>13</sup> The result was a reaction to an opposite extreme. While some religious minds as, e. g., Emerson, Carlyle, etc., sought relief in a vague Pantheism;<sup>14</sup> others, e. g., Froude, Th. Parker, drifted away to Scepticism or a pure natural religion. In New England the effect is seen in the Unitarian revival of some thirty years ago. The movement spent itself with the death of its leaders and was merged into the swelling tide of scientific Agnosticism.<sup>15</sup>

### III.

#### DOCTRINE.

Mr. Spencer the real Philosopher of Agnosticism.

§ 29. Mr. Tyndall and Mr. Huxley left fragments of the Agnostic teaching scattered through various essays and addresses. For a systematic and minute exposition we must go to Mr. Spencer. As the exponent of the Synthetic Philosophy he is styled the Apostle of Modern Agnosticism. A brief examination of his teaching is not therefore out of place.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>11</sup> John Fiske, Idea of God, pp. xxx., 41, 42.

<sup>12</sup> Examination of Sir W. Hamilton, vol. I, p. 131.

<sup>13</sup> J. Edwards, by F. B. Sanborn, in Jour. of Specul. Philosophy, Oct., 1883.

<sup>14</sup> Recollections and Impressions, O. B. Frothingham, ch. XV., XVI.; Carlyle, Life and Letters.

<sup>15</sup> "The Unitarians set forth a religion of ethics instead of a Gospel of faith; their word is practically not regeneration, but self-culture; Christ is an interpreter of nature and only so a redeemer \* \* \* the literature of the day religious only in form; a substitute for Christianity; praises Christ as the greatest of heroes; finds God in all; speaks of culture, refinement and philanthropy; a captivating and plausible religion." Cf. Bushnell, Nature and the Supernatural, pp. 24, 28.

<sup>16</sup> The Great Enigma. W. S. Lilly, ch. IV.

§ 30. In the very beginning of his volume *First Principles*, Mr. Spencer defines the limits of knowledge. He draws a distinction between phenomenon and noumenon. In this he is a disciple of Kant. The former, he tells us, the mind can grasp; the latter can never become the object of knowledge. This opens the way for a sharp distinction between science and religion. Science investigates phenomena; its conclusions can therefore be known and verified. Religion is concerned only with the noumenon; its teachings become objects of faith, not of ascertained fact.<sup>27</sup> We may believe that there is a soul or a God; we cannot prove the assertions.<sup>28</sup>

§ 31. In the light of this distinction we can understand what Mr. Spencer means by the phrase "the Relativity of Knowledge." The words are simple, but the meaning is very uncertain and vague. Found in every treatise on Modern philosophy, they are rarely employed in the same sense. It is necessary, therefore, to examine them carefully.

§ 32. (a) By Relativity of Knowledge Mr. Hamilton<sup>(a) Mr. Hamilton.</sup> means that we can never know reality except under modifications imposed by the perceiving mind, after the same manner that objects appear blue when viewed through blue glasses.<sup>29</sup> This is the teaching of Kant, and leads to Idealism and Scepticism. We do know existing things. Knowledge is a postulate of modern science and is confirmed by sound reasoning.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>27</sup> The same distinction is drawn by the Neo-Kantians. Ernest Laas attempts to bridge the chasm between science and religion by appealing to the esthetic sense. His teaching is termed an esthetic religious Neo-Kantianism. Cf. Pfleiderer, *Phil. of Relig.*, vol. II., p. 178.

<sup>28</sup> *Lux Mundi*, p. 49.

<sup>29</sup> *Metaphysics*, I., p. 148.

<sup>30</sup> *The Roots of Agnosticism*, by James Seth, in the *New World*, Sept., 1894.

(b) Mr.  
Mill.

§ 33. (b) Mr. Mill proposes another explanation. He holds that we know a thing only as distinguished from something else. Thus our consciousness is of difference, *i. e.*, an object is known to be what it is by contrast with what it is not. Hence knowledge is based on the perception of relations.<sup>41</sup> But this is not true. Our knowledge is primarily of things. As a consequence we can compare things. We never contrasts objects not known.<sup>42</sup> Some of our concepts, *e. g.*, short and tall, are essentially relative, but not all are so.

(c) Mr.  
Grote.

§ 34. (c) Mr. Grote's version brings us back to the days of the Greek Sophists.<sup>43</sup> Things are as they appear to be. As they appear to me so they are to me; as they appear to you, so they are to you. Thus what is true to one, may be falsehood to another. Truth, therefore, varies with the individual.<sup>44</sup> The error lies in making the individual mind the measure of things. Truth consists in the conformity of the mind with objects. There are certain tests or criteria laid down in Logic which assure us when this conformity is had. We hold the truth if the evidence is in the mind's possession.<sup>45</sup>

(d) Mr.  
Spencer.

§ 35. (d) By the phrase "Relativity of Knowledge" Mr. Spencer is more closely allied to Hamilton than to the others. His teaching is the logical sequence of the distinction between phenomenon and noumenon. The phenomenon only is in relation to the mind knowing; the noumenon is outside all relation to the

<sup>41</sup> The Theistic Argument, J. Dimon, p. 40; Cosmic Philosophy, J. Fiske, vol. I., p. 14; Significance of T. H. Green's teaching in Jour. of Spec. Phil., Oct., 1883.

<sup>42</sup> The Great Enigma, W. S. Lilly, p. 222.

<sup>43</sup> Plato, Protagoras.

<sup>44</sup> Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 373.

<sup>45</sup> McCosh, Fundamental Truth.

knower."<sup>44</sup> What is behind and beneath phenomena is unknown."<sup>45</sup> We know the impressions produced on us; we are compelled to think of these in relation to a positive cause."<sup>46</sup> This cause is termed the Absolute.<sup>47</sup> The Absolute linked as it is with the concepts of external creation and of self-existence is inconceivable as Mansel teaches."<sup>48</sup> Yet he tells us that this Unknown, inasmuch as it is the highest abstract truth in science, philosophy and religion, presents the safest ground for a reconciliation between them."<sup>49</sup>

§ 36. The Agnosticism of Mr. Spencer, therefore, comes in direct descent from Kant through Hamilton and Mansel. Its initial point is the distinction between the phenomenon and the noumenon, and its fundamental principle is the Relativity of Knowledge, understood in the sense that phenomena alone can be known. In explaining the origin of knowledge we discover traces of the phenomenal idealism which characterizes the English school of Association philosophy. It can with difficulty be distinguished from Positivism."<sup>50</sup>

## IV.

## CRITICISM.

§ 37. (1) Just as the present epoch bears comparison with Greek thought at the time of Socrates by reason of a prevailing scepticism, so the corrective employed

<sup>(1)</sup> Fundamental error is in the theory of the concept.

" The Theistic Argument, J. Dimon, pp. 11, 13, 14, 37.

" Lewes, Problems of Life and Mind, 1st series, p. 397.

" First Principles, pp. 93, 96, 108; Principles of Psychology, vol. I., p. 209; XIXth Cent., Jan., 1884.

" Ib., ss. 11, 13; XIXth Cent., Feb., 1889; Mansel, Limits of Religious Thought, L. II., III.

" Ib., ss. 8, 10; The Theistic Argument, J. Dimon, p. 17; Prof. Knight wisely writes that Mr. Spencer's aim is "to reconcile science and religion in the recognition of mystery." Aspects of Theism, p. 134.

" Christian Philosophy — The Soul, ch. IV.

so effectually in the one may be adopted with equal success in the other. The life-work of Socrates was to place knowledge on a firm basis. The method he used was one of cross-examination. In pursuance of what he felt to be a divine mission he questioned everyone.<sup>51</sup> Especially he sought the rhetoricians. Professing a desire to be instructed, he listened to the discourse and proposed difficulties. Apparently on the defensive, he was ever the aggressor. In dialectic he had no superior. His penetration, humility and irony left him the victor. He occupied himself almost exclusively in determining conceptions logically. His teaching was mainly moral, viz., inquiry into the meaning of virtue, courage, wisdom, etc. In this method are found the elementary processes of true Logic, e.g., analysis, division, definition, classification, etc. His work, however, was not complete. He pointed out the true method to be followed in dealing with the problem of doubt. It was reserved for the master-mind of St. Thomas to solve the true nature of the notion, and to employ with precision the logical processes of Aristotle in the problem of the universal which deeply agitated the schools of the Middle Ages.

*Method of  
Socrates  
and teach-  
ing of St.  
Thomas to  
be fol-  
lowed.*

§ 38. To-day the same situation confronts us. Kant taught a theory of the concept which leads to Agnosticism. Hamilton vainly tried to reconcile Kant with the traditional Scotch philosophy. J. S. Mill proposes the old doctrine of the Nominalists, viz., that ideas are only names. They overlook the distinction between intellect and sense.<sup>52</sup> Hence the current errors in philosophy. The problem of the notion is the source of all the confusion; its true solution the only real remedy.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. Zeller, *Socrates and the Socratic schools*.

<sup>52</sup> Agnosticism, Pres. Schurman, in *Phil. Rev.*, vol. IV., May, 1895,

In setting it forth we must adopt the method of Socrates and the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas. This is done in a treatise on Philosophy of Mind.<sup>12</sup>

§ 39. (2) The position of the Agnostic in the Theistic controversy contains a semblance of truth. There is a true and a false Agnosticism. The distinction is based on the difference which should be made between simple and comprehensive knowledge. We may have a clear and distinct knowledge of a thing without being able to grasp it in its entirety.<sup>13</sup> Thus our knowledge is certain, but limited.<sup>14</sup> Much more so it is true of God. We speak of God's infinite power, goodness and truth. The words have a definite meaning, and express definite concepts, but cannot tell the whole truth.<sup>15</sup>

§ 40. We thus express our knowledge of God — a knowledge of God partial, it is true, but sufficient to distinguish God from any other being. Our minds are too limited in range and power to penetrate the inmost recesses of the divinity, to comprehend His judgments, or to trace out His ways. Nevertheless we know that God is and in part we know what He is. The Holy Bible in many passages shows that the human mind can know God but not comprehend Him. The Fathers of the church again and again insist upon the distinction.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>12</sup> The Theistic Argument, J. Dimon, pp. 5, 37, 39, sq.; G. Lewes, Problems of Life and Mind, 1st series, vol. I., p. 16.

<sup>13</sup> "Alind est enim videre, alind est totum videndo comprehendere," Aug., Epis. 147, n. 21.

<sup>14</sup> "A man may infer" writes Prof. Dimon, "that the author of Hamlet was intelligent without professing to sound all the depths of Shakespeare's mind." The Theistic Argument, p. 117.

<sup>15</sup> "Deus Ineffabilis est; facilius dicimus quid non sit quam quid sit," Aug. Enar. in Ps. 85, n. 12.

<sup>16</sup> A very good criticism of Kant's antinomies carried out on this line is found in Found. of Relig. Belief, by Prof. Wilson, p. 197.

Spencer's  
Contradic-  
tion.

§ 41. Mr. Spencer even is forced unconsciously to make a distinction. In the first part of First Principles he tries to prove that God is unknowable. In the second part he admits His existence. Thus the Unknowable can be known.<sup>48</sup> And Mr. John Fiske,<sup>49</sup> in criticising Frederick Harrison, cites St. Athanasius as teaching that God is revealed to mankind only through incarnation in Christ — a doctrine held to-day by the Neo-Kantians with Ritschel, whereas the holy Doctor in the same treatise expressly declares that God is known from the order and harmony of creation.<sup>50</sup> In explaining the meaning of Unknowable the same writer forgets to make a distinction between simple and comprehensive knowledge,<sup>51</sup> and tells us that we know not the infinite but only its phenomenal manifestations<sup>52</sup> — an error due to the radical mistake of confounding intellectual with sense-knowledge.<sup>53</sup>

Agnosti-  
cism con-  
founds  
these.

§ 42. Thus modern Agnosticism rests on a confusion of concepts. It is clothed in a garb of false humility. It extols the greatness of the infinite or absolute and belittles the strength of the human intelligence. It thus tends to separate the soul from God by an impassible barrier.<sup>54</sup> Of its nature it is destructive of religion whose office is the union of man and his maker. Hence it comes that from one point of view Mr. Spencer is considered by many thinkers to be a continuator of the Deism of the last century; whereas from another he is held to represent what is best in Spinoza's teach-

<sup>48</sup> Pfeiderer, Phil. of Relig., vol. II., p. 157.

<sup>49</sup> Idea of God, p. xxvii.

<sup>50</sup> St. Athanasius, C. Gentes.

<sup>51</sup> Ib., pp. xxviii, 36.

<sup>52</sup> Ib., p. xxviii.

<sup>53</sup> pp. 136, 140.

<sup>54</sup> The Great Enigma W. S. Lilly, p. 214, sq.

ing, and thus to stand as the ablest defender of Cosmic Theism or rather Cosmic Pantheism."<sup>44</sup>

§ 43. (3) Against Agnosticism we teach that there is a Philosophy as well as a History of Religion. It is a science which deals with the fundamental questions of the soul. It infers conclusions from physical, moral, and intellectual data. From a study of the world and of man it rises to the conception of an infinite mind which has fashioned and guides all. The inference is sound and certain. The course of reasoning by which it was reached can be thrown into a system and we have the science of Theodicy. The light which guides us is the light of reason. Philosophy teaches the possibility, and History the fact of divine revelation. God has taught us more about Himself. The only-begotten of the Father hath revealed the treasures of grace and of glory hidden from the human mind. The revealed truths form the science of Theology. In the beginning of the Summa of Theology, St. Thomas discusses the problem whether Theology may be termed a science, and answers in the affirmative. The reasons he adduces are valid to-day.

## V.

### INFLUENCE.

§ 44. The influence of Agnosticism upon the English and American mind during the past fifty years has been very great. It has been hailed as a new Gospel.<sup>45</sup> Consisting, in its essence, of a few main principles, it has, like Positivism, generated a tone of thought and a certain manner of viewing things. Here is found the

<sup>44</sup> Fiske Cosmic Philosophy; Jacobi, Jewish Ideals, p. 58; XIXth Cent., Oct., 1877; Fortnightly Rev., May, 1873; J. Fiske, Idea of God, ch. VIII., XIII.

<sup>45</sup> An Agnostic's Apology, by Leslie Stephen.

real secret of its power. Every department of knowledge has been infected by its virus. In Biology it has become identified with the theory of Evolution; in Biblical Studies with the so-called Higher Criticism; in Theology with Ritschl and the Neo-Kantians." Wherever a destructive tendency appears, there is found a congenial atmosphere. The physical sciences, however, are its stronghold. Disclaiming any knowledge whatsoever of metaphysical principles, it scatters broadcast false metaphysics. Its garb of false humility serves to conceal its venom and to attract the unwary. Its defenders are praised as men of honest and strong minds. In public lecture halls its doctrines are proclaimed by elegant and attractive speakers.

*In Literature.* § 45. Literature has been deeply imbued with its spirit. Matthew Arnold, George Eliot, Mrs. Humphrey Ward and Hall Caine propagate it in their writings; Swinburne, La Conte De Lisle, in their poetry."<sup>6</sup> Tennyson tells us

"I have but faith, I cannot see,"  
"There is more faith in honest doubt  
Believe me, than in half the creeds."

And proclaims the Gospel of modern thought in the touching and beautiful lines:

"O yet we trust that somehow good  
Will be the final goal of ill.  
That nothing walks with aimless feet;  
That no one life shall be destroyed  
Or cast as rubbish to the void  
When God hath made the pile complete.  
Behold, we know not anything;  
I can but trust that good shall fall  
At last — far off — at last, to all,  
And every Winter change to Spring.

<sup>6</sup> Gerhart, Institutes of the Christian Religion; Stuckenbergs German Thought, p. 169.

<sup>6</sup> S. Law Wilson, D. D., The Theology of Modern Literature.

So runs my dream: but what am I?  
 An infant crying in the night:  
 An infant crying for the light:  
 And with no language but a cry.  
 I falter where I firmly trod,  
 And falling with my weight of cares  
 Upon the great world's altar-stairs  
 That slope through darkness up to God,  
 I stretch lame hands of faith, and grope  
 And gather dust and chaff, and call  
 To what I feel is Lord of all,  
 And faintly trust the larger hope.  
 O life as futile, then, as frail!  
 O for thy voice to soothe and bless!  
 What hope of answer or redress?  
 Behind the veil, behind the veil."

— *In Memoriam, LIV,—LVI.*

§ 46. Signs of a reaction are, however, now apparent. Reaction. The fact that so many men, eminent in the scientific world, are also devout Christians, has an influence upon the minds of the younger generation. Time has permitted a sober judgment to view with impartiality the works of the leading agnostics, to ask what they have really done and to separate the chaff from the wheat. Agnosticism is viewed as the natural and logical result of a wrong theory of knowledge. Now, as with Socrates and St. Thomas, the all-important problem is to form fixed and definite universal concepts. The problem of to-day. To discuss the problem here would be to extend the present treatise beyond just limits. A full historical and critical treatise pertains to Philosophy of Mind.

## CHAPTER II.

### FACT.

§ 1. Contact with other minds is invested with a peculiar charm. The thoughts, the hopes, the fears of those we meet in the varied relations of daily life, are a subject of surpassing interest. They appeal to us as sharers in a common humanity. Great is the delight felt in the study of physical nature and in the knowledge of her secret treasures. Greater still is that derived from a study of man, whether in the development of the individual, or in the course of history, or in the products of genius, *e. g.*, Literature and the Fine Arts.

Belief in  
God a  
Psycholog-  
cal Fact.

§ 2. In the present essay we are concerned not with an individual and isolated example. The bounds of the inquiry are much wider; they extend to and embrace the whole human race. The purpose is to discuss the validity of the belief in God. This is a primary conviction and possession of humanity. We deal, therefore, with a psychological fact. Its concrete expression is found in the various forms of religious worship which have held so prominent a place in human history. The inquiry is not concerning the proximate sources whence man derived the belief. In this authority and custom play an important part.<sup>1</sup> We are occupied with the ultimate grounds and justification of the idea. Thus the discussion is more philosophical and of more permanent value.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Foundations of Belief, by A. Balfour.

<sup>2</sup> Bowne, Philosophy of Theism, p. 7; Mill, Essays on Religion, p. 128.

§ 3. The initial point of our inquiry is not an assumption.<sup>Aim is to show that this fact has a sound basis.</sup> We do not reason from an hypothesis but from a fact. The fact is taken as it is presented in conscious experience.<sup>4</sup> The train of our reasoning will show at every step that this fact has a sound basis and can be verified to a certainty. Thus it is not an ideal product of subjective affections, e. g., of imagination, of hope, or of fear; it has an objective content which is grounded in the very nature of things.

## I.

## THE FACT IS UNIVERSAL.

Fact is universal.

§ 4. Now it is a fact that all men believe in God. This belief is the possession of civilized as well as of savage nations.<sup>5</sup> No tribe has been found without a religion, and no religion without some conception of God.<sup>6</sup> The assertion that tribes exist who have no notion of a higher being has been refuted by facts.<sup>7</sup> The Benedictine monks of Australia say that the natives <sup>in</sup> Australia. believe in an Omnipotent Being, the creator of heaven and earth, whom they call Motogon.<sup>8</sup> The Australian will say "No, not seen him, i. e., Baiame, but I have felt him."<sup>9</sup> Waitz tells us that the religious ideas of the African tribes are so high that if we do not like to <sup>in Africa.</sup> call them monotheistic, we may say at least that they

<sup>4</sup> Supernatural Religion, vol. I., pp. 64-67.

<sup>5</sup> This method is pursued by Prof. Bowne in Philosophy of Theism, p. 8. He, however, shows the influence of Kant in resting belief in God not on demonstration but on the practical reason, and in renouncing demonstration, p. 32.

<sup>6</sup> Cicero, de Leg. I., 8; Disp. Tusc. I.; Plutarch, adv. Colotem, ch. 31; Tyler, Primitive Culture, vol. I., p. 425; vol. II., p. 18; Spencer, First Principles, pp. 4, 13; F. B. Jevons, Introduction to the History of Religions, p. 7.

<sup>7</sup> Religion of Primitive Peoples, D. G. Brinton, p. 30.

<sup>8</sup> Origin and Growth of Religion, by M. Müller, p. 78; Natural Religion, p. 85.

<sup>9</sup> Ib., p. 17.

<sup>10</sup> Jour. Anthropol. Instit. vol. II., p. 269.

have come very near the boundaries of true monotheism.<sup>10</sup> "However degraded these people may be," writes Mr. Livingstone, "there is no need telling them of the existence of God or of a future life. These two truths are universally admitted in Africa. If we speak to them of a dead man, they reply: 'He is gone to God.'" This testimony is confirmed by Quatrefages,<sup>11</sup> Müller,<sup>12</sup> Wilkes,<sup>13</sup> Wilson,<sup>14</sup> Lang.<sup>15</sup>

**In America.** § 5. Careful research into the customs and language of the aborigines of America reveal the same truth. To the Indians God is the Great Spirit.<sup>16</sup> With some the idea of God is very lofty.<sup>17</sup> Again we find it existing in cruder and lower expression.<sup>18</sup> Darwin's description of the natives of Patagonia as very low is refuted by Giacomo Bove.<sup>19</sup> Nevertheless, however imperfect and childish the expression may seem, it represents the highest and most perfect idea which the mind for the time and circumstances can grasp.<sup>20</sup> If we, with the great advantages of civilization, with the wealth of knowledge in Religion, Philosophy, History and Science handed down from the past and pouring in

<sup>10</sup> Waitz, *Anthrop.*, vol. II., p. 167; Müller, *Origin and Growth of Religion*, p. 107.

<sup>11</sup> *Missionary Travels*, p. 158.

<sup>12</sup> *The Human Species, Hommes Fossiles et Hommes Sauvages; The Pygmies*, ch. VII.

<sup>13</sup> L. c.; *Chips*, vol. I., p. 45; *Science of Religion*, p. 39.

<sup>14</sup> *Exploring Expedition*.

<sup>15</sup> North and South Guinea, p. 209.

<sup>16</sup> *The Making of Religion*.

<sup>17</sup> *Ethnography and Philology of the Hidata Indians*, W. Mathews.

<sup>18</sup> Prescott, *Conquest of Mexico*; Schoolcraft, *Oneota*, p. 342.

<sup>19</sup> Thus Payne, in his *History of the New World*, vol. I., p. 389, says that the lowest savages have no God. The difficulty is found in his meaning of God. Cf. "The Making of a Religion," A. Lang.

<sup>20</sup> Müller, *Natural Religion*, p. 83.

<sup>21</sup> Müller, *Science of Religion*, p. 116; Pfleiderer, *The Philosophy of Religion*, vol. III., p. 15.

from all sides, still find a difficulty and a fruitful source of error in the effort to express abstract and immaterial concepts by way of metaphor or analogy, why should we be supercritical in dealing with the savage mind? We must for the moment forget our advantages, put ourselves in sympathy with them and judge them on their own ground. Their environment is narrow, the data of their experience are limited. The difficulty in expressing immaterial ideas is therefore much greater than ours.

§ 6. Hence religion, in its most general sense, is a conclusion universal phenomenon of humanity.<sup>22</sup> Patient research day by day brings into stronger light the great truth

That in all the ages  
Every human heart is human,  
That in even savage bosoms  
There are longings, yearnings, strivings  
For the good they comprehend not.<sup>23</sup>

## II.

### PRIMITIVE MONOTHEISM.

Primitive  
Monoth-  
ism.

§ 7. Religion is a phenomenon universal not only in place but in time also. The records of all nations from the very dawn of history show that the human race has at all times sought for God.<sup>24</sup> Abundant proofs are furnished by the new department of science, The History of Religions, which has sprung up in our own generation. It investigates the religious beliefs of past nations as they are revealed in the written records, in the customs, laws and life, in the language, and from these data presents some information of

Belief in  
God uni-  
versal in  
time.

shown by  
History of  
Religions.

<sup>22</sup> Tiele, Outlines, p. 6.

<sup>23</sup> Müller, chips, vol I., p. 30.

<sup>24</sup> Cicero, de Leg. I., 24; Aristotle, de Coelo, I., 3; Seneca, ep.

117. The fact is taken as a proof by Cicero de Nat. Deor. I., 17; Aristotle, Rhetor. I., 13; St. Thomas, C. Gent. II., 34.

by comparative  
Philology.

what our remote ancestors have thought and felt concerning their origin and destiny. In the discussion of the primitive beliefs of mankind language is by far the most important source. True index of thought and feeling it goes far beyond written records. The materials so far collected are imperfect. Yet they all converge to the important truth that the farther back we go in the history of religious thought, the more certain it appears that the earliest belief of mankind was monotheistic.<sup>28</sup>

**The method followed.** § 8. In treating this subject we shall be candid and loyal to truth. Nothing is gained by a travesty of facts. The only method to be followed is a deeper and more exhaustive study of the very branch of knowledge which at first sight is supposed to present unsurmountable difficulties to the Christian believer.<sup>29</sup> In thus proceeding the inference shall be safe and sound.

**In India.** § 9. The sacred Books of the Hindus are made up of various writings covering the space of a thousand years. The most ancient is the collection called the Vedas. It embraces the Rig-Veda, the Sama-Veda, the Yagar-Veda, and the Atharva-Veda. Of these the Rig-Veda is the oldest and the most valuable for our present study.<sup>30</sup> Its age has been variously estimated from 1500 to 2000 B. C.<sup>31</sup> A careful examination of these records shows traces of a primitive monotheism.

<sup>28</sup> *Apologie du Christ*, Hettinger-Jannin, vol. I., ch. VIII.

<sup>29</sup> Wiseman Lectures on Science and Religion, Lect. III.; "True reverence is shown in treating every subject however sacred, however dear to us, with perfect confidence; without fear and without favor; with tenderness and love by all means, but, before all, with an unflinching and uncompromising loyalty to truth." Müller, *Science of Religion*, p. 6.

<sup>30</sup> *Physical Religion*, Müller, pp. 58, 74.

<sup>31</sup> Hopkins, *Religions of India*, p. 5; Muir's *Sanskrit Texts*, vol. I., p. 4; vol. II., p. 206; vol. III., p. 116.

Thus we read <sup>10</sup>

In the beginning there was neither aught nor naught,  
There was neither sky nor atmosphere above.  
There was neither death nor immortality.  
There was neither day nor night, neither light nor darkness.  
Only the Existing One breathed calmly self-contained.

God is called *Ekam Sat*, i. e., the only existing being. True it is that traces of a nature-religion can be found in the Vedas.<sup>11</sup> But to say that the Vedic gods are nothing more than natural phenomena personified and worshipped, or that nature-worship is the primitive type of Indian Religion is to betray the superficial observer.<sup>12</sup> The moral and spiritual basis is older, and more in accord with the fundamental principles recognized by the primitive Aryans.<sup>13</sup> "That which is and is one," says the Rig-Veda,<sup>14</sup> "the poets call in various ways." Or it puts the question "He who established the six worlds, is he that one which exists in the form of the unborn Being?"<sup>15</sup>

§ 10. That this one is not a barren unity of philosophy,<sup>not a philosophical unity.</sup> such as is found later in the pantheistic teaching of the Upanishads, is evident from parallel passages."

" He who is our Father that begot us, he who is our creator,  
He who knows all places and all creatures,  
He who gave names to the gods, being one only,  
To him all other creatures go, to ask Him."

<sup>10</sup> Rig-Veda, x, mant, 120.

<sup>11</sup> Tiele, Elements of The Science of Religion, 1st series; Outlines of Primitive Belief, C. H. Keary, pref., p. xi.; History of Religion, by A. Menzies, p. 324.

<sup>12</sup> God in Nature, by Baron Bunson; The Teaching of the Vedas, M. Phillips, p. 83.

<sup>13</sup> Ib., p. 35, 40, 45, 103, 104, 110; Origins of Religions and Language, F. C. Cook, pref., pp. 5, 6; d'Harlez, Avesta and articles in Jour. Asiatique.

<sup>14</sup> R.-Veda, I., 164, 46.

<sup>15</sup> Rig-Veda, I., 164, 6; x, 121, 8; Müller, Physical Religion, p. 366.

<sup>16</sup> Rig-Veda, I., 164, 46; x, 82, 3; Müller, Origin and Growth of Religion, p. 216.

Thus Father Calmette does not hesitate to say that the true God is taught in the Vedas."<sup>26</sup> And scholars of great name, *e. g.*, Adolphe Pictet,<sup>27</sup> Müller,<sup>28</sup> Dr. A. B. Smith,<sup>29</sup> Prof. Banergea,<sup>30</sup> Card. Gibbons,<sup>31</sup> F. E. Ellingwood,<sup>32</sup> Prof. Wilson,<sup>33</sup> M. Phillips,<sup>34</sup> Muir,<sup>35</sup> J. M. Mitchell,<sup>36</sup> do not hesitate to declare that the loftier conceptions of the Vedic religion are unquestionably the earlier, and that they show clear traces of a primitive monotheism.

The more primitive is the belief, the purer it is.

§ 11. The farther back, therefore, we go in the history of the Indian peoples, the purer becomes the form of religious belief. Idolatry is shown to be a degeneration.<sup>37</sup> In the Vedas different gods are worshipped. Some writers maintain that this is due to a personification of natural forces, that primitive man reads behind the powers of nature agencies separate and distinct after an analogy of his own volitional power, that thus the conception of one God is only a later growth.<sup>38</sup> Others, *e. g.*, Müller, hold that the different names in the Vedas express different deities. Reasoning on this basis, we can conclude with Tiele that the Jews at different times worshipped three different Gods, *e. g.*, Elohim, Jahweh, Adonai. Others that the different

<sup>26</sup> Müller, *Physical Religion*, p. 44.

<sup>27</sup> *Les Origines Indo-Européennes*.

<sup>28</sup> *History of Ancient Sanscrit Literature*; Chips, vol. I., pp. 23, 349; *Science of Religion*, pp. 37, 57, 86, 88, 99.

<sup>29</sup> *Intro. to Christian Theology*, p. 166.

<sup>30</sup> *Aryan Witness*.

<sup>31</sup> *Our Christian Heritage*, ch. II.

<sup>32</sup> *Oriental Religions and Christianity*, ch. VII.

<sup>33</sup> *Essays*, vol. II., p. 51.

<sup>34</sup> *The Teaching of the Vedas*.

<sup>35</sup> *Sanscrit Texts*, vol. III., p. 245; vol. V., p. 412.

<sup>36</sup> *Present Day Tracts*, vol. VI, n. 33. *The Hindu Religion*.

<sup>37</sup> *Oriental Religions and Christianity*, by F. E. Ellingwood. ch. VII.; *Origins of Religions and Language*, F. C. Cook, p. 10.

<sup>38</sup> *Destiny of Man*, J. Fiske, p. 78.

names for God only represent different manifestations or attributes of the one God."

§ 12. A better explanation can be sought in language. It is a historical fact that the early form of religious belief was monotheistic. Now the names employed by the mind to designate spiritual facts are all drawn from conscious individual experience. In the beginning, man naturally expressed the power and attributes of the infinite in different words drawn from nature and from life. The tendency of language is to become crystallized. Words gradually lose their etymological force. They stand out as distinct and independent facts in our mental life. What first was a sign, becomes itself an object. Thus a language monotheistic in its primitive signification gradually becomes polytheistic in fact."

§ 13. The oldest and most trustworthy records of the Iranian worship are contained in the Gathas.<sup>41</sup> The sacred chants are attributed to Zoroaster.<sup>42</sup> His life was an attempt to restore the primitive belief. Hence the doctrine of the Gathas is viewed as pure Iranian.<sup>43</sup> Written in a different dialect from the rest of the Avesta, they form the kernel about which the sacred literature of the Persians clustered in an after-growth.<sup>44</sup>

§ 14. Now the Gathas inculcate belief in Ahura <sup>Ahura</sup><sub>Mazda</sub>, the self-existing, omniscient being.<sup>45</sup> He is the

<sup>41</sup> Physical Religion, Müller, p. 44; Oriental Religions and Christianity, F. E. Ellingwood, ch. VII.

<sup>42</sup> Müller, Science of Language, vol. I.

<sup>43</sup> Science of Religion, Müller, p. 18.

<sup>44</sup> Origines du Zoroastre, by Jas. Darmesteter, in Annales du Musée Guimet, t. 24, p. 5; Origins of Religion and of Language, F. C. Cook, p. 203.

<sup>45</sup> Ebrard, Apologetics, vol. II., p. 217.

<sup>46</sup> Present day Tracts, vol. V, n. 25; The Zend-Avesta and The Religions of the Parsees, J. M. Mitchell.

<sup>47</sup> Müller translates *Ahura* by "living," *Mazda* by "am who

all powerful Lord who made heaven and earth and all that is therein, and governs everything with wisdom."<sup>44</sup> The sole really personal being is Mazda Ahura."<sup>45</sup> The two spirits in antagonism are below him."<sup>46</sup> Thus the opposition of Ahrimau is of a later date."<sup>47</sup> Originally he was a good spirit created by Ahura."<sup>48</sup> The Amesha-Speutas in the Gatha have the nature of abstract ideas or qualities, *i. e.*, attributes of Ahura. Afterwards they formed a kind of celestial council."<sup>49</sup> The spiritual unique nature of Ahura is attested beyond question."<sup>50</sup> He is identified with Varuna, the god of light, of justice and of the moral order, whose worship antedates Indra and who is conceived as the most spiritual of the Vedic gods."<sup>51</sup>

**conclusion.** § 15. We can therefore with perfect safety accept the conclusions of d'Harlez,<sup>52</sup> of Darmesteter,<sup>53</sup> of Tiele,<sup>54</sup> that the primitive form of Iranian belief was monotheistic."<sup>55</sup>

am," hence the self-existing living one; Hibbert Lectures, p. 191; so also Pfeiffer in Phil. of Religion, vol. III., p. 86, Chips, vol. I., p. 124. According to Mr. Cook, *Asura* or *Ahura* means Lord, and is derived from *asu*, *i. e.*, life, and ultimately from the verb *as* in zend, *ah i. e.*, to be, and cites the St. Petersburg dictionary and Grassman. It thus has an affinity to the Hebrew verb *to be*, the root of Jahweh, Origins of Religion and of Language, p. 51, note, p. 71; while *Mazda* is derived from *Maz i. e.*, great and *da i. e.*, knowledge, ib., p. 141.

<sup>44</sup> Gathas, I., chant I.

<sup>45</sup> Tiele, Elements of the Science of Religion, 1st series, p. 47.

<sup>46</sup> Ib.

<sup>47</sup> Cook, l. c. p. 141, Present Day Tracts, vol. V, n. 25, by J. M. Mitchell.

<sup>48</sup> Pfeiffer, The Philosophy of Religion, vol. III, p. 84.

<sup>49</sup> Present Day Tracts ib., p. 16.

<sup>50</sup> The God of Zoroaster, by L. H. Mills, in New World, March, 1895.

<sup>51</sup> Origins of Religions and Language, F. C. Cook, pp. 65, 141.

<sup>52</sup> Avesta and articles in Jour. Asiatique.

<sup>53</sup> The Zend-Avesta, in Annales du Musée Guimet, tom. 21; Origines du Zoroast.<sup>54</sup> ib. tom. 24; Contem. Review, Oct., 1879.

<sup>54</sup> Elements of the Science of Religion, 1st series.

<sup>55</sup> Study of Five Zoroastrian Gathas, L. H. Mills, DD.

§ 16. The same truth comes out from a critical study (c) <sup>Greece and Rome.</sup> of the religions of Greece and Rome.<sup>10</sup> When we ascend to the very dawn of Grecian history we are met with the fact that the idea of God, as the supreme being, was firmly implanted in the minds of this branch of the Aryan race.<sup>11</sup> The worship of the powers of nature came afterwards, and gave rise to the family of gods which in Greece and in Rome surrounds the person of Zeus.

§ 17. A critical study of the Aryan religions convinces the student that in them we find no illustration of an evolution and progress from a low to a higher form.<sup>12</sup> Everywhere we find signs of degeneracy from higher and purer forms.<sup>13</sup> The fact is forced upon the mind that idolatry is explained by a tendency everywhere evident, to sink from a purer knowledge of God to what is lower and corrupt.<sup>14</sup>

§ 18. Under the strong light thrown by contemporary <sup>15</sup> Egypt and China scholarship upon the ancient religions of Egypt and of China, the same truth is brought into clear view.

<sup>10</sup> Ellingworth, Oriental Religions and Christianity, ch. VII.; Müller, Science of Religion, p. 82.

<sup>11</sup> Müller, Chips, vol. II., p. 146, who cites Welchers' Mythology.

<sup>12</sup> Present Day Tracts, vol. VI. n. 33; The Hindu Religion, J. M. Mitchell; F. C. Cook, l. c., p. 70.

<sup>13</sup> As Mr. Darmesteter so well writes "The religion of the Indo-European race, while still united, recognized a supreme God, an organizing God, almighty, omniscient, moral. The conception was a heritage of the past." Contemp. Review, Oct., 1879.

<sup>14</sup> S. H. Kellogg, Genesis and Growth of Religion, p. 271; Müller, Chips, vol. I. pp. 37, 48. "Is it not something worth knowing that before the separation of the Aryan race, before the existence of Sanscrit, Greek or Latin, before the God of the Vedas had been worshipped, and before there was a sanctuary of Zeus among the sacred oaks of Dodona one Supreme Deity had been found, had been named, had been invoked by the ancestors of our race?" Science of Religion, Müller, pp. 27, 82; also The Religion and Thought of the Aryans of Northern Europe, R. Brown, F. S. A.

Hence primitive belief of the Aryans was monotheistic.

Polytheism is shown to be an aftergrowth and corruption."<sup>19</sup>

(a) Egypt. § 19. In the most ancient monuments of Egypt the simplest and most precise conception of one God is expressed. He is one and alone; no others are with Him. He is the only Being, living in truth, *i. e.*, *Maat*, which signifies a straight and inflexible rule."<sup>20</sup> "Thou are one," we read, "and millions of beings proceed from thee."<sup>21</sup> He has made everything and he alone has not been made. The hidden god from whom in the beginning all things came into existence is represented as declaring "

I am Tum, a being who is one alone  
I am the great God, the self-existing.

God a self-existing spiritual unity. God, therefore, is not only a unity, he is a self-existent unity. He is the spirit more spiritual than all spirits, the self-existent one, unbegotten, eternal."<sup>22</sup> More than 5000 years ago in the valley of the Nile the hymn of praise arose to the one God. He is termed *natar*, *i. e.*, the *imperishable one*, according to Tiele, who cites de Rougé, and Brugsch,<sup>23</sup> or the *strong one*, according to Renouf, who traces a striking resemblance of the word to the Hebrew *El Shaddai*.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>19</sup> Religions of Ancient Egypt, Le Page Renouf; p. 262.

<sup>20</sup> In the Egyptian as in the Aryan and Semitic languages, the notion of stretching out is connected with the notions of straight, right, righteous, true, rule, row, order. Our word rule, Latin *regula*, comes from the Aryan *Arg*, which means to stretch out. In Gothic *rakja*, *rach-ts*, means right, straight. Hence the Egyptian *maat* signifies not only truth and justice but order and law in the physical and in the moral world. Renouf, I c., p. 123.

<sup>21</sup> M. de Rougé, in Annales de la Phil. Cret., t. XX., p. 327, quoted in Renouf's Hibbert Lectures, 1879, p. 89.

<sup>22</sup> Book of the Dead, ch. 17.

<sup>23</sup> Tiele, Egyptian Religion, p. 218; History of Religion, A. Menzies, p. 142.

<sup>24</sup> Tiele, I. c., p. 225.

<sup>25</sup> Renouf, Religions of Ancient Egypt, pp. 102, 254.

§ 20. Monotheism, therefore, is a fact clearly hence monotheistic expressed in ancient Egyptian records.<sup>60</sup> It is no less true that the sublimer portions of the Egyptian religion are not the comparatively late result of a process of purification from earlier and grosser forms.<sup>61</sup> That the worship of the Egyptians was polytheistic from the beginning was taught by Tiele in Outlines of History of Religion,<sup>62</sup> in a later work he expresses the contrary opinion.<sup>63</sup> The heritage of that ancient civilization is the belief in one supreme God, the creator and lawgiver of men whom He has endowed with an immortal soul.<sup>64</sup> These primitive truths now shine forth from the rank growth of mythology and superstition in which they had been well-nigh buried.<sup>65</sup>

§ 21. In China the powers of nature, the spirits of ancestors are invoked and worshipped. But behind all there is found the conviction in the existence of some higher power, who is the creator and preserver of the world.<sup>66</sup> This monotheistic belief is a tradition handed down from the earliest period of their history.<sup>67</sup> The primitive Chinese worshipped Chang-Ti, *i. e.*, supreme Lord. Together with him lower spirits were associated.<sup>68</sup> Chang-Ti was the supreme ruler, one,

<sup>60</sup> Tiele, *l. c.*, p. 222; Ebrard, Christian Apologetics, vol. III., p. 267.

<sup>61</sup> Renouf, *l. c.*, p. 95; Wordsworth, The One Religion, p. 32; Rawlinson, Religions of the Ancient World, p. 29.

<sup>62</sup> P. 45.

<sup>63</sup> Cf. *supra*.

<sup>64</sup> Prof. Rawlinson History of Ancient Egypt, vol. I., p. 314; Records of the Past, vol. II., p. 129; IV., p. 99; VI., p. 100.

<sup>65</sup> De Rougé, *l. c.*; Renouf, *l. c.*, p. 262; Ellingwood, Oriental Religions and Christianity, ch. VII.; Wilkinson, Ancient Egyptians, vol. IV., p. 178; Lenormant, Manual d'Histoire Ancienne, vol. I., p. 522.

<sup>66</sup> Müller, Science of Religion, p. 88.

<sup>67</sup> Edkins, Religions in China, p. 95.

<sup>68</sup> D'Harlez, in New World, Dec., 1893; F. M. James, in New World, June, 1897.

invisible, spiritual, the only true God." According to Mr. Legge, Ti was the one supreme object of homage as far back as we can go.<sup>10</sup> Tien, *i. e.*, heaven,<sup>11</sup> is a naturalistic and polytheistic word, used at first metaphorically, *e. g.*, "may heaven grant," afterwards obscured and corrupted the primitive faith.<sup>12</sup> Hence Mr. Legge, and Mgr. d'Harlez unhesitatingly declare that 5000 years ago the Chinese were monotheists.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Semitic  
Races.

§ 22. When we turn to the Semitic races we have in the Holy Bible a record of Jewish belief, which is beyond question. Their early government was a theocracy. They stand forth a clear example of a nation monotheistic throughout the course of its history. Renan attempts to explain this by a monotheistic instinct in the Semitic race.<sup>14</sup> The explanation is rejected, but it is a striking testimony of a fact.<sup>15</sup> Fallen into idolatry again and again, the Jews are

<sup>10</sup> La Relig. Chinoise, d'Harlez.

<sup>11</sup> Legge, Religion of China, p. 18.

<sup>12</sup> Müller, Science of Religion, p. 86.

<sup>13</sup> D'Harlez, La Relig. Chinoise; New World, Dec., 1893; The Chinese, Dr. W. Martin, p. 163; Shoo-King, by Dr. Legge, ch. 27.

<sup>14</sup> D'Harlez in Dublin Review, vol. 43, p. 109; The Catholic World, Jan., 1897.

The *Tao-Te-King*, *i. e.*, The Book of Tao and of Virtue, is the basis of Taoism. Scholars do not agree in its interpretation. After an exhaustive analysis Mr. d'Harlez reaches the conclusion: "L'origine de tous les êtres et leur lois sont dans un être premier, infini, éternel, spirituel, et personnel, infiniment bon et parfait, que l'esprit de l'homme ne peut comprendre ni nommer. Cet être infini a produit tous les êtres particuliers en les faisant sortir de sa substance. Il les formèt distincts de lui-même, mais il continue à les régir, à leur fournir tout ce que est nécessaire à leur existence. Les êtres doivent s'appuyer sur lui, se servir de lui comme d'un point d'appui et d'une source de dons nécessaire à leur perfection morale. Ils doivent imiter ses vertus et retourner à lui à la fin de leur existence." Le *Tao-Te-King*, par. M. d'Harlez, Annales du Musée Guimet, t. 20, p. 23.

<sup>15</sup> Pfeiderer speaks of "a natural predisposition," Philos. of Religion, vol. III., p. 117.

<sup>16</sup> Müller, Chips, vol. I., p. 340, who explains the fact by primitive revelation, p. 348.

recalled to the service of the one true God by a series of punishments, inflicted by the voice of the Prophets. Rising up one after the other these great and holy men, filled with the divine spirit, strove in word and in deed to uplift the people from the depths to which they had sunk. Thus the primitive belief remained untarnished and was preserved to the coming of Christ. The nations among whom the Jews lived were idolatrous. Scholars, however, assure us that this idolatry was a degeneracy, that traces of the primitive faith show a monotheistic conception.<sup>49</sup>

§ 23. Even among the lowest and most barbarous tribes, traces of the same belief are found. The natives of Africa have sunk to the lowest grade of humanity. Covered over, as their belief is, with the crudest forms of superstition and fetichism, passing away also before the advance of Christian civilization, we yet find reminiscences of a supreme God.<sup>50</sup> In their conceptions the ethical element predominates.<sup>51</sup> As Dr. Robertson Smith truly observes, "even in its rudest forms Religion was a moral force."<sup>52</sup> The Bushmen, Fuegians, Australians have moral and omniscient gods, *i. e.*, makers of things, fathers in heaven, friends, guardians of morality, seeing what is

<sup>49</sup> Renan; Müller; Ebrard; Ellingwood; The Oriental Religions and Christianity, p. 225; Montfiore in Hibbert Lectures, 1892, writes: "The worship of a chief divinity is undoubtedly a characteristic feature of the Semitic religion," yet adds "analogy does not lead us to believe that if we were to go farther and farther back into prehistoric times we should find a higher and purer religion, but rather one vaguer, meaner, and more trivial." P. 25. The conception of primitive belief with Hume and Pfleiderer as "an irrational and pathological phenomenon" (Phil. and Devel. of Religion, vol. I., pp. 13, 28), is contradicted by historical facts.

<sup>50</sup> Müller, Science of Religion, p. 39.

<sup>51</sup> Lang, The Making of Religion, pp. 194, 280.

<sup>52</sup> Religion of the Semites, p. 53.

**Australia.** good or bad in the hearts of men.<sup>100</sup> The aborigines of Australia are probably the lowest extant in the scale of civilization. Yet their religious conceptions are so lofty that we naturally seek an explanation in European influence or in a higher civilization.<sup>101</sup> An all-knowing being observes and rewards the conduct of men; he is named with reverence, if named at all; his abode is in the heavens; he is maker and Lord of all things; his lessons soften the heart; he is called *Papang*, i. e., Father, *Mungun-uguar*, i. e., our Father.<sup>102</sup> This supreme being is not the product of ancestor worship; for it is held where the latter is not found.<sup>103</sup>

**In Guinea.** § 24. In Guinea the natives worship "The Ancient One, The Ancient One in the Skyland, Our Maker, Our Father, Our Great Father."<sup>104</sup> Waitz teaches that if the African negroes are not called monotheists, they are still on the borders of monotheism.<sup>105</sup> The belief in one supreme Being who made and upholds all things is universal.<sup>106</sup>

**In America.** § 25. In America the Pawnees worship *Ti-ra-wa*, i. e., the Spirit Father, or *A-ti-us ta-kaw-a*, i. e., our Father in all places.<sup>107</sup> The Zunis speak of God as *Awonawilona*, i. e., the all-Father.<sup>108</sup> The Indians of Missouri worship "The Old Man Immortal," The Great Spirit, The Great Mystery.<sup>109</sup> The Tinne of British America have the word *Nayeweri*, i. e., he who creates

<sup>100</sup> Lang, I. c., p. 176.

<sup>101</sup> Ib., p. 191.

<sup>102</sup> Brough Smith, The Aborigines, I., 428; Taphin, The Native Races of Australia.

<sup>103</sup> Lang, I. c. ch. XIII., XIV.

<sup>104</sup> Ib., p. 222.

<sup>105</sup> Ib., p. 229.

<sup>106</sup> Wilson, North and South Guinea, p. 209.

<sup>107</sup> Lang, I. c., p. 255, 257.

<sup>108</sup> Ib., p. 271.

<sup>109</sup> Ethnography and Philology of the Hidatsa Indians cit. by Müller, Hibbert Lectures, p. 17.

by thought. The Algonquin speaks of *Kitche Maneto*, who created the world, " by an act of his will." <sup>110</sup> The Aztecs of Mexico pray to *Tota*, i. e., our Father; the tribes of North America to " grandfather " or great " grandfather."

§ 26. If to this we add the tradition universal both among civilized and savage nations that formerly heaven was nearer to men than it is now, that the creator himself gave lessons of wisdom to human beings, but afterwards withdrew from them to heaven where He now dwells, the reasoning will be made much more cogent. We find this tradition with the ancient Hindus,<sup>111</sup> with Greek and Romans,<sup>112</sup> as also with African and Mexican tribes.<sup>113</sup>

§ 27. The anthropological theory that God was evolved out of ghosts or ancestor-spirits can in no way explain the savage concepts of God. On the contrary, the facts show a corruption of a purer and older form. The fact is universal that mankind shows an inclination to fall away from a primitive monotheism.<sup>114</sup> This tendency, so universal in history, can only be explained by admitting that monotheism was the original belief of mankind.<sup>115</sup> Mr. Tylor himself admits that " The degeneration theory, no doubt in some instances with

universal tradition that formerly heaven was nearer earth.

<sup>110</sup> Schoolcraft, Oneota, p. 342.

<sup>111</sup> Rig-Veda, I., 179, 2; VII., 76, 4; Muir's Sanscrit Texts, vol. III., p. 245; The Teaching of the Vedas, M. Phillips, p. 175.

<sup>112</sup> Müller, Hibbert Lectures, 1878, p. 170.

<sup>113</sup> Duke of Argyle, Contemp. Review, June, 1881; Prescott's Mexico; Lang, The Making of Religion, *passim*.

<sup>114</sup> Abbé de Broglie, Problèmes et Conclusions de L'Histoire des Religions, ch. II., III.

<sup>115</sup> Ebrard, Christian Apologetics, vol. III., p. 317; The Making of Religion, A. Lang, p. 328, 334; Genesis and Growth of Religion, S. H. Kellogg, p. 271; Origins of Religion and Language, F. C. Cook, p. 70; Oriental Religions and Christianity, by F. Ellingwood, ch. VII.; Rawlinson, The Religions of the Ancient World, p. 242.

fairness, may claim such beliefs as mutilated and perverted remains of higher religion.<sup>116</sup>

**conclusion.** § 28. From this testimony we may with perfect safety consider the conclusions as well established: (1) That the farther back we go in the history of any religion, the purer become the religious concepts, hence the fact of *primitive purity* for which we have the testimony of Renouf, deRougé, Müller, Rawlinson, Tiele. (2) That everywhere evident traces are found of the corruption of primitive belief, hence the fact of *degeneracy* for which we appeal to the labors of Dr. Robertson Smith, Müller, Kellogg, Ebrard, Phillips, etc. (3) That all nations point in tradition to the time when heaven was closer to earth, hence the traces of *primitive revelation*, e. g., Müller, Phillips. (4) That the ascertained results of historic criticism show the earliest known belief of the Persians, the Hindus, the Egyptians, the Chinese, to be a pure and spiritual *monotheism*, for which fact we have the researches of d'Harlez, Darmesteter, Tiele, Legge, de Rougé, Renouf.<sup>117</sup>

### III.

#### THE EXPRESSION OF THE FACT.

Comparative Philology reveals the thoughts of primitive man.

§ 29. The course of our investigation is not yet over. The materials at hand enable us to advance a step farther. A new science yet remains untouched which opens the way into a land flowing with milk and honey, filled with objects of delight and of food for the mind. Within our memory the Department of Linguistics was placed upon a scientific basis. It opens up a new

<sup>116</sup> Prim. Culture, vol. II., p. 336; Pfleiderer, Phil. of Religion, vol. III., p. 42.

<sup>117</sup> Reasoning from the data of language Müller infers a primitive Aryan, Semitic and Turanian religion. Science of Religion, pp. 82, 93.

country for exploration and conquest, where every word is a sculptured monument revealing the highest and deepest thoughts, feelings, aspirations of mankind. By the study of language we can enter into the thoughts of past ages, and become cognizant of their inmost consciousness. Especially is this true with the problem of God.<sup>118</sup>

§ 30. It has been shown that belief in God is a phenomenon universal both in place and in time. The fact, however, does not satisfy us. We seek the causes of the fact. What were the sources whence man derived the belief. The science of language gives the answer and bids us seek in the phenomena of the moral relations: Thus, *e. g.*, *Jahweh*, *i. e.*, the one who is; *Ahura*, *i. e.*, the living one; *El*, the powerful shown in Elohim, Ilah, Allah, Babylonia, *i. e.*, *bab*, gate and *el*; *Elyon*; *Shaddai*, *i. e.*, the Mighty; *Bel*, *i. e.*, Lord; *Molech*, *i. e.*, King; *Adonai*, *i. e.*, Lord; *Wodin*, *i. e.*, the all-Father. In the lower tribes cited above we have the Zulu, *Unkululu*, *i. e.*, Father,<sup>119</sup> the Australian *Papang*, *i. e.*, Father.<sup>120</sup> In Chinese *Ti* means sovereign.<sup>121</sup>

§ 31. Another source by which primitive man expressed his concept of God is in the Physical world. Thus we have *Dyaus Pitar* of the Aryans, *Tien* of the Chinese, *Deva* from the root *Div*, *i. e.*, to shine. From the Sanscrit root we have the Greek *Zeus*, the Latin *Deus*, the Persian *Daeva*, the German *Tius*, *Tiu*, the Celtic *Dia*, the races of Central Asia *Teo*.<sup>122</sup> The Vedic

(a) God expressed by moral and metaphysical concepts.

<sup>118</sup> Müller, *Chips*, vol. IV., p. 221.

<sup>119</sup> Pfeiderer, *Philos. of Religion*, vol. III., p. 42.

<sup>120</sup> A. Lang, *op. cit.*

<sup>121</sup> Müller, *Science of Religion*, p. 75, sq. Thus Pfeiderer has no grounds for asserting that "the names of gods of different religions all alike refer to natural phenomena." *Philosophy of Religion*, vol. III., p. 13, 237.

<sup>122</sup> Ebrard, *Apologetics*, vol. II., p. 145; *The Idea of God and*

*Agni* is formed from the root *ag*, *i. e.*, to move quickly;<sup>123</sup> and *Varuna* from *var*, *i. e.*, to cover, and signifies the wide-spreading sky.<sup>124</sup> *Num* or *Juma* of the Samoyedes, *Jumula* of the Finlanders, is from *jum*, *i. e.*, thunder, and *la*, *i. e.*, place, hence the place of thunder, or the sky. The same word, modified by phoenetic rules, is found among the Lapps, the Ethonians, the Syrjanes, the Tcherejuissians, the Votyakes.<sup>125</sup> The Mongolian *Teng-ri*, *i. e.*, Lord of the sky, the Hunnish, *tang-li*, the modern Yakute word *sangara* are the same as the Chinese *Tien*.<sup>126</sup>

§ 32. Thus for the first time the deepest germs of the consciousness of God among the different nations of the world have been laid open.<sup>127</sup> As yet the material is not complete. Nevertheless we are warranted to find, in our own being and in the world without, the ground on which rests our concept of the supreme being.<sup>128</sup>

the Moral Sense, W. R. Baines; Müller, Chips, vol. I; Science of Religion, pp. 63 sq.; Physical Religion, p. 136; Origins of Religions and Language, F. C. Cook, p. 59, who cites Grimm, History of the German Language, 2d ed., p. 282, and German Mythology, ch. IX.

<sup>123</sup> Müller, Physical Religion, p. 122.

<sup>124</sup> Chips, vol. II, p. 65.

<sup>125</sup> Müller, Science of Religion, p. 89.

<sup>126</sup> Ib., p. 92.

<sup>127</sup> Müller, Chips, vol. IV, p. 221.

<sup>128</sup> Idea of God and the Moral Sense, by H. R. Baines.

## CHAPTER III.

### ORIGIN OF THE BELIEF.

§ 1. A distinction should be drawn between the <sup>origin and grounds of our belief in God.</sup> origin of our belief in God's existence and the grounds whereby we strive to justify this belief. One logically and naturally leads to the other; yet they are distinct, and capable of separate treatment. They give rise to different trains of thought and are centers around which cluster different groups of erroneous notions. We shall now set forth the various theories which attempt to explain the origin of the idea of God.

#### I.

##### THEORY OF INNATE IDEAS.

§ 2. In the effort to combat a philosophy of sense, <sup>Innate Ideas.</sup> and render the spiritual nature of man secure from all attacks, some thinkers of great name have contended that our ideas do not all come through the channels of the senses, but some at least have their source in the mind alone. These are the natural endowments of the soul. Hence God in creating man not only bestowed a mind with its activities, but also implanted in the mind one or more ideas already formed. They are due then not to the suggestion of sense, nor to the activity of mind, but whole and entire were our possession from the first dawn of consciousness. This is called the theory of Innate Ideas.

§ 3. This theory was proposed in different forms by <sup>proposed in different</sup> its defenders. From the dawn of philosophic speculation even to our own day, men of great power and

elevation of mind have set it forth with skill and force.<sup>1</sup> Plato, Descartes, Leibnitz, Kant, and Rosmini are its apologists. Kant taught that the subjective forms of sensation and of intellect were innate. Rosmini holds that the idea of indeterminate being, *i. e.*, of being in general, alone was innate. The former led the way to scepticism and agnosticism; the latter inclines to Pantheism. A criticism of their position will be presented elsewhere.

(a) **Plato.**

§ 4. (a) Plato held that the souls of men were created in the beginning, and for some fault committed were sentenced to be inclosed in the body as in a prison. The ideas, which we have, do not come from experience; they were implanted in the mind at the moment of its creation. The body acts upon the soul in a depressing manner, and causes these ideas to become obscure and fade away. The objects we meet in experience recalls the ideas once had and brings them fresh to mind. The mind learns nothing new about things; they are only the occasion whence it recalls long-forgotten knowledge. The theory of Plato thus becomes a theory of reminiscence.

(b) **Des Cartes.**

§ 5. (b) The strange teaching propounded by Plato was not followed by his disciples, was bitterly attacked by the Christian Fathers, and fell into oblivion. Des Cartes took it up, corrected it in parts, *e. g.*, the pre-existence of souls, and proposed it in a new form.<sup>2</sup> Ideas are of three kinds, he tells us. If, *e. g.*, I examine my own consciousness I find some ideas are *adventitious*, *i. e.*, the ideas of external objects which I experience in the varied life of the day, which come and go, and have no permanent influence upon my mental life; others are *innate*, *i. e.*, they do not come

<sup>1</sup> F. Bowen, in *Modern Philosophy*, ch. II

<sup>2</sup> Medit. III Cousin's edition, vol. I, p. 268.

through the senses, but whole and entire are the very endowment of my rational nature, e. g., transcendental notions, axioms and first principles speculative and moral, mathematical figures, and especially the idea of God; finally others are *factitious*, i. e., they are the product of discursive thought and are formed by the mind reasoning from the data it possesses in the *innate* and the *adventitious*.

§ 6. (c) Leibnitz taught that the mind has confused (c) Leibnitz. notions of mundane objects. These he calls innate ideas. At the same time a *power* or *inclination* or *disposition* is inherent in the mind by virtue of which these confused notions on the occasions of sensation are elaborated and rendered more distinct. Thus sensation arouses the mind and makes it aware of the treasures stored within. Under the action of the mind the notions take form and shape, and become the primary truths and axioms of reasoning and of science.<sup>8</sup>

§ 7. (1) The theory of Innate Ideas is of value on Criticism (1) the the supposition that our ideas can be explained in theory rests no other way. This is the criterion of every hypothesis. If, therefore, it can be shown that ideas on assumption. can be readily explained without resorting to this assumption, the theory is deprived of its foundation. Now all our ideas can be explained by the activity of the mind and the data of sense. The explanation is much simpler and more in conformity with mental operations.

§ 8. (2) It is false to maintain that we have ideas (2) no ideas antecedent to sensation. Consciousness testifies that to sensation. the mind forms ideas from the contents of sensation. This is done by its power of abstraction. Hence the idea of being, of unity, of moral duty, etc. The faculty is innate because it is the mind itself in action. The

<sup>8</sup> New Essays. Dr. Hodge, in Systematic Theology, teaches that idea of God is innate.

ideas, however, are not. The first principles are intuitions, *i. e.*, truths which the mind perceives to be immediately evident. They may be called spontaneous judgments, *i. e.*, the spontaneous assent of the mind to the truth presented. Even these suppose data which comes not from the inner constitution of the thinking faculty, but point to some external source.

Idea of God  
not innate. § 9. (3) The defenders of this theory held that at least the idea of God is innate. Their motive was good. In this way they strove to stem the tide of atheism and irreligion. Their zeal, however, was not according to knowledge. It is not at all necessary to hold that the idea of God is innate. The foundation stone of our faith rests secure and impregnable. The vast concourse of Christian apologists have never proposed this hypothesis. On the contrary, they have combatted it strenuously. In fact if the idea of God were innate how can we explain the different modes men have adopted to express it? The names of God are by no means identical, they do not spring from the same root. Some, *e. g.*, in the Indo-European family of languages, have their source in the phenomena of the external world. If the idea were innate, it would be as definite and as exacting as a first principle. Now words give expression to our ideas. It would follow, therefore, that the word for God would be as exact and as forceful as the idea. Experience shows that this is not so. The mind of man has expressed the idea of God in various ways.<sup>4</sup>

It is derived  
from ob-  
jective  
sources. § 10. The phenomena of the external world, the truths of the moral order, the voice of consciousness, the power and reign of truth have placed their stamp

<sup>4</sup> "Equidem unum esse Deum summum quis tam demens . . . negat esse certissimum? Hujus nos virtutes per munandum opus diffusas, multis vocabulis, invocamus quoniam

upon the expression of the idea. To say that external objects awaken or render clear the idea already imbedded in the recesses of the mind is a pure assumption and is in opposition to conscious experience. For if the idea were implanted in any form, the act of awakening or of rendering it clear would not change its nature. It should appear the same.\*

## II.

### THEORY OF EVOLUTION.

§ 11. The principal adherents of this school of <sup>doctrine and teachers.</sup> thought are Spencer, Huxley, Tyndall, Tyler,<sup>1</sup> Reville.<sup>2</sup> They concur in teaching that the idea of God is a mere product of the imagination. Its universal and deep hold upon the mind demanded an explanation. Various causes have been proposed. This difference is, however, accidental. The source and process of formation is the same. The primitive condition of man is supposed to be that of the barbarian and savage.<sup>3</sup> His thoughts and feelings were just a shade higher than those of the brute. Brought in contact with the raging elements and the mysteries of nature, his child-like mind was prone to think mighty and hidden persons to be the cause.<sup>4</sup> Hence the fields, the woods, nomen ejus cuncti proprium videlicit ignoramus."<sup>5</sup> Aug. Epis. 16; Aristotle, *de Mundo*, c. VII; Müller, *Science of Religion*, p. 124.

<sup>5</sup> Locke bitterly assailed the innate ideas of Descartes. His position is sound; but the reasons he alleges are without basis, viz. (a) there are natives to whom the notion of God is strange. (b) The greatest variety of opinion exists among the various nations as to the nature of God.

\* Primitive Culture, ch. II.

<sup>1</sup> *Histoire des religions des peuples non-civilisés*, vol. II.

<sup>2</sup> Pfeiffer, *Philosophy of Religion*, vol. III, p. 4, writes "how could primitive man with his quite undeveloped mental powers be able to grasp the difficult thought of one infinite God, who is pure spirit."

<sup>3</sup> Sir J. Lubbock, *Origin of Civilization*, p. 119.

the mountains and heavens were peopled with divinities."<sup>10</sup> Fear and wonder made him in ignorance create gods. Thus Lucretius wrote,<sup>11</sup> and in our own day Mr. Tyndall proposes the same doctrine as the explanation most natural to ignorant minds to account for the phenomena of nature.<sup>12</sup> To Hobbes' ignorance and fear were the causes;<sup>13</sup> so also Hume in his Natural History of Religion;<sup>14</sup> J. S. Mill, however, rejects this explanation.<sup>15</sup> Mr. Flammarion, the illustrious savant, sees the theologians driven from stronghold to stronghold before the irresistible march of scientific knowledge.<sup>16</sup> To him ignorance and fear are the very reason of their existence.

§ 12. It is sufficient to indicate these views. To the thoughtful student no refutation is needed. They are as shallow as they are blatant. Popular with a certain few, their strength lies only in negation. They are based on wrong and degraded notions of human nature, they are accepted only as a protest against an exaggerated or a fancied form of religious teaching.

Spencer. § 13. A powerful writer and laborious student of our time has attempted to apply with a scientific parade of learning and of logic the theory of evolution to our idea of God.<sup>17</sup> The author of *Synthetic Philosophy*

<sup>10</sup> Fiske, *Idea of God*, p. 65; to him Theism is a much later development partly due to political circumstances. *Ib.*, p. 72.

<sup>11</sup> *De Rer. Nat.* V, 1161; "Primus in orbe deos fecit timor." Statius, *Theb.* III, 661; Epicurus, cf. Cicero, *de Nat. Deor.* I, 20.

<sup>12</sup> *Fragments of Science, Prayer.*

<sup>13</sup> Cf. his *Leviathan, Pfleiderer Philosophy of Religion*, vol. I, p. 112.

<sup>14</sup> Sections 1-8.

<sup>15</sup> *Utility of Religion*, p. 100.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. also J. Fiske, *Idea of God*, pp. 107, 108.

<sup>17</sup> J. Fiske, *The Idea of God*; J. Cotter Morison in the *Service of Man* accepts the evolutionary theory of God and advocates the religion of humanity; *Evolution of the Idea of God*, by Grant Allen; Darwin in *Descent of Man*, vol. I, pp. 63, 65; *My Creed*, by M. Savage; d'Aviella, *Gifford Lectures*, 1899;

has been before the public too long and has obtained the reputation of too much learning, to be passed over in silence. He is the foremost representative of a school which a few years ago exercised a wide and deep influence on the English and American mind," but which is now on the decline. In his *Principles of Sociology*, Mr. Spencer gives a long and elaborate treatise on the origin and growth of the idea of God. As the exponent of modern Positivism, his words deserve more than a passing notice."<sup>10</sup>

§ 14. Mr. Spencer bases his reasoning on the facts of dream-life. Death takes away our dear and loved ones. The separation is not final. They come back to us in the shadowy dreamland. We see the well-known countenances, hold converse with them, and live in the trust that they are not far distant. Thus arose the belief in ghosts with a semi-substantial, *i. e.*,

Pfeiderer, *Philosophy of Religion*, vol. III, pp. 3, 22, 32; Prof. Knight, *Aspects of Theism*, p. 19; *History of Religion*, A Menzies, p. 28, sq.

" " If it should be found, as I am persuaded is the fact, that the human mind begins with a vague naturalistic-humanistic conception of the gods — a conception whose elements are not yet differentiated, much less opposed — and that reflection after developing this latest contrast in the opposite directions of naturalism and animism, rises everywhere with the progress of civilization to a synthesis of both nature and man in one eternal and infinite ground, the history of the development of the religious consciousness would be itself an argument in favor of that hypothesis." Belief in God, by J. G. Schurman, pp. 72, 78. An attempt, however, of a reconciliation with Hegel is evident — *e. g.*, " The method is based on the fact that all existences, all objects of thought or inquiry are in a state of becoming," p. 74; or when he speaks of " man's consciousness of God," p. 134. Again he writes " God did not first exist and then as though in need of something else, create a world. It is of the essence of spirit to manifest or reveal itself. And just because God is a spirit, the world is his constant expression. Creation is the external self-revelation of God." Pp. 139, 208, 217, 227.

<sup>10</sup> Pfeiderer, *Philosophy of Religion*, vol. III, p. 13; Christian Philosophy, The Soul, ch. IV.

semi-corporeal, form.<sup>20</sup> This implied the conviction that in some way the dead were re-animated. The after-life, which thence grew upon the imagination, was at first temporary. Under the influence of fancied hopes and fears it became more and more enduring.<sup>21</sup> This leads to the notion of another world,<sup>22</sup> peopled with supernatural agents.<sup>23</sup> The unscientific and ignorant mind looked upon these beings as real. Their power was greater than any other being and they were supposed in some mysterious way to exercise an influence over our health and good-fortune. Hence arose the conviction that they must be propitiated, — a conviction which obtained a deep and permanent hold upon the mind and resulted in a permanent worship.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>20</sup> 15. According to Mr. Spencer, propitiation was first offered to our near relatives. Hence the primitive form of religion was ancestor worship.<sup>25</sup> Not those alone who recently departed and were closely joined by bonds of kinship became the objects of our prayers and sacrifices; our forefathers who died long ago and who left behind a memory of power and position, received likewise a share of our worship.<sup>26</sup> By reason

the human,  
semi-human  
and divine.

<sup>20</sup> Prin. of Sociology, vol. I, ch. XIII; The Supernatural, Its Origin, Nature and Evolution, by John G. King, 2 vol.; A Modern Zoroastrian, by S. Lang, p. 149, 156; J. Fiske, Idea of God, pp. 69, 75, 106.

<sup>21</sup> Ib., ch. XIV.

<sup>22</sup> Ib., ch. XV.

<sup>23</sup> Ib., ch. XVI.

<sup>24</sup> Christian View of God and the World, Dr. Orr, p. 466.

<sup>25</sup> P. 147. With Pfeiderer primitive religion was a worship of house-gods. Phil. and Development of Religion, vol. I, p. 38. Belief in God, he writes, was formed out of the prehistorical belief in spirits, which in turn points back to two sources; ancestral and nature spirits, p. 103. The former are found in dream-life, the latter shown in the personification of nature, p. 104. He does not agree with Spencer in explaining nature deities by ancestral spirits, but admits two distinct sources, p. 106, sq.

<sup>26</sup> P. 149.

of the remoteness a distinction began to dawn upon the mind between the *human*, the *semi-divine* and the *divine*.<sup>"</sup> Remoteness magnified their deeds and made them appear more than mere mortals. Hence mankind grew to look upon and act to them as gods. To Mr. Spencer idolatry and fetich-worship are only aberrant forms of ancestor worship.<sup>"</sup> The animal worship, as practiced by the Egyptians, he explains by pronouncing it a special form of ghost-belief.<sup>"</sup> Thus Mr. Spencer believes that he has solved in the most natural and convincing manner the origin of our idea of God.<sup>"</sup>

§ 16. (1) What strikes the reader in this explanation is the extreme candor of the writer. He sees things which no one else ever saw before, and tells them so openly that he seems to be convinced of their truth.<sup>"</sup> To do so, however, he assumes from the very beginning all that he strives to prove; taking for granted that this process is the most natural one, he accumulates facts and arranges them in a most plausible manner. Yet the process of reasoning is throughout filled with gratuitous assumptions, and untrustworthy evidence.<sup>"</sup>

§ 17. (2) The theory of Evolution is not in accordance with facts and scientific reasoning. Mr. Spencer is its authoritative and most learned exponent. Day by day his standing and strength is weakening. The

<sup>"</sup> P. 150.

<sup>"</sup> Ib., ch. XXI.

<sup>"</sup> Ib., ch. XXII.

<sup>"</sup> The Making of Religion, Andrew Lang, p. 1.

<sup>"</sup> The theory that religion is the outgrowth of soulworship is very old. Enhemerus said the gods were deified men, e. g., Zeus, King of Crete, cf. D. G. Brinton, Religion of Primitive Peoples, p. 42. Resuscitated by the mythologists of the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries, it is brought before the minds of to-day by the labors of Spencer and Lippert. Pfleiderer, The Philosophy of Religion, vol. III, p. 12.

<sup>"</sup> The Making of Religion, by A. Lang, p. 46.

elaborate system propounded by him after years of labor will not be lasting." Too many defects have been pointed out, too many assumptions and weak arguments have been unmasked not to create in the mind of the student a well-founded belief that the reasoning is faulty throughout. Elsewhere radical defects have been indicated. Now such a theory can offer poor support for an explanation of the idea of God. The more so that the explanation to be valid supposes the theory to be sound."<sup>23</sup>

§ 18. (3) To study the existing beliefs of uncivilized races in the hope that thus is obtained the surest index of their primitive condition is a false principle, utterly disregarded by contemporary historical science. Waitz and Gerland have shown that the religion, language and politics of the savages in Africa and Australia bear unmistakable traces of a higher and earlier stage."<sup>24</sup> How explain the fact that in Polynesia the worship of the high gods has been expelled by that of ancestors?"<sup>25</sup>

(3) a petitio principii. § 19. (4) Finally our idea of ghosts does not create, it supposes a belief in a future life. Dreams are abnormal states of the mind. To take such a foundation for an elaborate theory concerning the origin of a belief which exercises a universal and deep influence on men, betrays poor logical acumen and shows the inherent weakness of the argument. The conviction of a future life is part and parcel of our waking thoughts; it springs from the highest promptings of our nature; it is imbedded deep in the soul. Yet Mr. Spencer can tell us that "the idea of ghost is the primitive type of the supernatural." On the contrary the dead seem to come back in dreams and hold con-

<sup>23</sup> Pfleiderer, *The Philosophy of Religion*, vol. III, p. 15.

<sup>24</sup> S. H. Kellogg, *Genesis and Growth of Religion*, ch. III.

<sup>25</sup> Pfleiderer, *The Philosophy of Religion*, vol. III, p. 15.

<sup>26</sup> Ib., p. 16; Lang, *The Making of Religion*, *passim*.

verse with us, only because there is imbedded in our souls a conviction of an after life. Ghosts are a particular result, not the cause of the belief." They are the projection of the mind's hopes and fears, of its affections and longings. These take shape in the imagination and stand before us in the well-known lineaments of our near and dear departed. Dreams are accidental occurrences in our daily lives. Some people rarely, if ever, dream. The belief in God and in a future life are universal and form part of our waking conscious lives.<sup>20</sup> So close to us and so imperative are these beliefs that do what we may we cannot shake them off. To propose an accidental cause for a widespread and permanent effect is a futile attempt, or it supposes a silent "begging the question" in the course of the reasoning.

### III.

#### THEORY OF THEOSOPHY.

§ 20. The word Theosophy has a wide meaning. In *Meaning of Theosophy.* its etymology it means "those who are wise in the things of God." This wisdom is supposed in different persons to be acquired in different ways. Thus the word Theosophy has been applied to various physical processes practiced in the far East; and the Gymnosopists and Yogis have been called Theosophists. Here by Theosophy is understood a special knowledge of God by virtue of a direct contemplation or insight into the divine essence.

§ 21. This theory appears in a special form with <sup>(1)</sup> the *teaching of Pantheism.* those who claim a direct insight into the divine essence.

<sup>20</sup> Müller, *Science of Religion*, Lect. III.

<sup>21</sup> The Idea of God found in lowest known grades of savagery; *The Making of Religion*, by A. Lang, p. 175.

In the early ages of Christianity the Gnostics professed to have this knowledge, whence their name. To the Neo-Platonists the contemplation of the divine essence was the noblest exercise of man. This was accomplished by a divine illumination, an inner light.<sup>29</sup> Pantheists at all times have professed the same teaching. Thus Fichte writes "Man reaches the knowledge of God in pure thought, which is the eye of the soul. By this he perceives God, for what is pure thought but the divine existence."<sup>30</sup>

(a) Ontologism.

(a) Catholic theory.

§ 22. That man by the exercise of natural reason alone has an intuition of the infinite, was broached by Catholic writers in France about fifty years ago. The leaders were de Bonald, Bonnetti and Ventura. The aim was to stem the tide of a materialistic and atheistic philosophy. In this way the existence of God was not only placed beyond question, but was even rendered incapable of proof, for we do not prove what we see. The movement spread and acquired adherents of great name. At the same time it was subjected to most rigorous criticism. Its philosophical basis was shown to be most untrustworthy. In the Vatican Council human reason was vindicated by the teaching that the existence of God can be demonstrated to a certainty.<sup>31</sup> To-day Ontologism counts no defenders among Catholic writers. Looking back to the time of the conflict we can clearly see that the doctrine had its rise in a mistaken zeal, which was not in accord with truth.

(b) modern non-Catholic writers.

§ 23. Ontologism, no longer proposed as Catholic teaching, is, nevertheless, most strenuously advocated by many non-Catholic writers of the present day. Thus Dr. Harris writes: "The belief in God is a

<sup>29</sup> Hours with the Mystics, R. A. Vaughn.

<sup>30</sup> Hunt, Pantheism, p. 264.

<sup>31</sup> Denziger, Euchiridion, p. 387.

rational intuition necessarily arising in its own self-evidence in contemplating the process of thought in any line of inquiry."<sup>44</sup> Prof. Knight proposes an intuitional argument for the belief in God."<sup>45</sup> Dr. Luthardt speaks of an intuitional idea of God."<sup>46</sup> Müller holds that an intuition of God is a radical element of all religions; "<sup>47</sup> and adds to make clear his meaning "We pity a man born blind, we cannot be angry with him."<sup>48</sup> Prof. Fisher speaks of an intuition of the Infinite."<sup>49</sup> So also Dr. Harris,<sup>50</sup> Prof. Wilson,<sup>51</sup> Prof. Fraser,<sup>52</sup> C. M. Tyler,<sup>53</sup> Princ. Caird,<sup>54</sup> T. H. Green,<sup>55</sup> Edward Caird.<sup>56</sup> On the other hand, we find Prof. Flint rejecting the doctrine."<sup>57</sup>

§ 24. This recent form of Ontologism is due to the influence of Hegel. With the destructive criticism passed by Mr. Mill on the philosophy of Sir Wm. Hamilton, English Theistic writers were left without a philosophical basis. The Association school could never be brought into harmony with Christian thought. Hence they turned to Hegel. Now the fundamental principle of Hegel is the unity of the divine and the human consciousness. This unity gave rise to the

<sup>44</sup> *Self-Revelation of God*, p. 154.

<sup>45</sup> *Aspects of Theism*, pp. 11, 131, 119, 120, 143; Lindsay in *Recent Advances in Theistic Philosophy of Religion*, p. 89.

<sup>46</sup> *Fundamental Truths of Christianity*, p. 57.

<sup>47</sup> *Chips*, vol. I, pp. x, 235.

<sup>48</sup> *Ib.*, p. 53.

<sup>49</sup> *Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief*, p. 40.

<sup>50</sup> *Philosophical Foundations of Theism*.

<sup>51</sup> *Foundations of Religious Belief*, p. 8.

<sup>52</sup> *Philosophy of Theism*, 2d series; Calderwood, *Philosophy of the Infinite*.

<sup>53</sup> *Bases of Religious Belief*, p. 120.

<sup>54</sup> *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 131, 249.

<sup>55</sup> *Prolegom to Ethics*, p. 72.

<sup>56</sup> *Evolution of Religion*, vol. I, p. 164.

<sup>57</sup> *Theism*, p. 80, sq. Dr. McCosh must not be classed with these writers. He holds "that there are certain intuitive principles which proceeding upon external facts lead to a conviction of the existence of God." *Method of Divine Government*, p. 520.

concept of the divine intuition.<sup>44</sup> Some writers, however, hesitate to use the word *intuition*. To them God is a necessary postulate of thought.<sup>45</sup> In this form the theory will be examined elsewhere.

**Criticism.** § 25. To hold that we have an intuition of the Infinite is to advance a pure assumption. Consciousness gives no warrant for the assertion. In this explanation how can we admit that men deny or doubt the existence of God? Agnosticism is another name for atheism and scepticism, and is the great philosophical error of the present day. The theory falls in face of facts.

(3) Theory of special faculty. § 26. A second form of Theosophy is found in the doctrine of those who hold that man has a special faculty by which he perceives God.<sup>46</sup> It is very much akin to the Ontological phase. Thus we speak of the *intuition* of Plotinus, the *intellectuelle Auschauung* of Schelling, the *intuitive reason* of Coleridge.<sup>47</sup> Through Schelling and Coleridge it influenced the Transcendentalists of New England.<sup>48</sup> Recently this theory has been broached by a writer whose world-wide reputation gives to his opinion a great weight. Mr. Müller

**Coleridge.** **Müller.** teaches that besides sense and reason there is in man a third faculty by which he apprehends the infinite.<sup>49</sup> This faculty is a power independent of sense and reason, a power in a certain sense contradictory to sense and reason, a very real power which alone cannot be

<sup>44</sup> With Baader "the eye through which God sees me is the same as that in which I see God." Cf. Pfleiderer, Phil. of Religion, vol. II, p. 32.

<sup>45</sup> Lindsay, Recent Advances in Theistic Philosophy of Religion, p. 89.

<sup>46</sup> Hunt, Pantheism, p. 181.

<sup>47</sup> Hours with the Mystics, R. O. Vaughn; Aids to Reflection, Coleridge, pp. 225, 249.

<sup>48</sup> Dimon, The Theistic Argument, p. 64.

<sup>49</sup> Science of Religion, pp. 12, 14. Prof. Tiele speaks of "man's original, unconscious, innate sense of infinity" in Elements of the Science of Religion, vol. II, p. 233; cf. Morris Jastrow, The Study of Religion, 1902, ch. V.

overcome by them. This faculty is at the root of all religions. Yet he denies that a mysterious element is thus introduced into Psychology."<sup>11</sup>

§ 27. By this teaching Mr. Müller aimed at crushing the school which denies the possibility of conceiving the infinite."<sup>12</sup> But this teaching is not at all necessary to attain the desired result. His error is based on a false theory of knowledge. He is a disciple of Kant. Now Kant denied that the intellect could transcend the finite and reach the divine."<sup>13</sup> To Mr. Müller it is evident that sense cannot do so. Nevertheless, he was conscious of such a conception, and to account for the fact he postulated another faculty. A true exposition of the power of mind, of the distinction between intellect and sense, of the sphere and limits of both shows that the mind has a knowledge of the infinite without the need of resorting to a third and special faculty.

§ 28. Finally Theosophy appears in the religious feeling of Jacobi and Schleiermacher.<sup>14</sup> They maintained that the divine is immediately revealed through *faith*, *i. e.*, religious feeling."<sup>15</sup> The sense of absolute dependence is the religious feeling in its simplest form."<sup>16</sup> This teaching is the legitimate consequence of Kant's theory of knowledge, and of Spinoza's Pantheism."<sup>17</sup> If the mind cannot reach objective truth, how shall we obtain it? Kant held the existence of God was a postulate of

<sup>11</sup> Hibbert Lectures, 1878, p. 26; *The Philosophy of Right*, D. Liey, p. 135.

<sup>12</sup> Ib., Lect. I.

<sup>13</sup> Müller, *Science of Religion*, p. 13.

<sup>14</sup> "Thus the pious soul has an immediate knowledge of the Infinite in the Finite." The infinite to him, however, was impersonal, hence Pantheistic. Cf. Hunt, *Pantheism*, p. 312.

<sup>15</sup> Burt, *History of Modern Philosophy*, vol. II, p. 13; Lotze, *Phil. of Religion*, pp. 1-8.

<sup>16</sup> *The Religious Feeling*, by Newman Smyth, p. 35; L. B. Hickok in *Creator and Creature* combines Kant and Jacobi.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Hunt, *l. c.*

the practical reason. Under the fire of criticism, what becomes of the practical reason? There is no warrant for the distinction between theoretical and practical. To stem a rising rationalism Jacobi appealed to feeling. God exists because he feels that it is so. To give objective validity to the feeling, he made it the channel of divine revelation, or rather found in this feeling an intuition of a divine reality.”

**Criticism.** § 29. The same criticism can be passed on all three forms. They spring from a false theory of knowledge; they have no basis in consciousness; they are gratuitous assumptions to supply an imaginary need. The facts are answered with more ease and truth in the following theory.

#### IV.

#### THE THEORY OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.

The Christian Fathers.

§ 30. The task of the early Apologists and Fathers of the Church was to show forth the truth of the Christian religion against the false philosophy and religions of the time. Their writings are the store-house whence the schoolmen drew the materials for the magnificent structure of reasoned faith, the pride and glory of the human intellect. Under the guidance of divine faith they have sounded the depths of man's nature and of his relation to God. To explain the origin of the idea of God in the human mind is not an isolated problem, occupying the attention of one only.”

““ The method of all the higher truths of religion is different, *i. e.*, from the scientific method, being the method of faith, a verification by the heart and not by the notions of the head.” H. Bushnell, *Nature and the Supernatural*, p. 20. This tendency predominant with Fred. Robertson, Theod. Parker.

“The problem of primitive revelation whether in its nature or extent is not here discussed. That pertains to a treatise on Religion. The argument is an induction from facts and the purpose is to state the facts.

It is a question which agitated the very greatest among them. Their teaching has been carefully collected," and presents the following facts:

§ 31. (1) The Fathers set forth a two-fold knowledge <sup>two-fold knowledge of God.</sup> of God. The one is a vague and obscure knowledge which is common to all men. The other is a more elaborate and complete knowledge and comes from instruction and divine revelation.

§ 32. (2) The former knowledge is not learned by <sup>obscure and elaborate: their nature.</sup> teaching; it arises spontaneously from our rational nature; the rational man has it by himself; it is a natural anticipation of the mind; what man obtains from his own nature and without instruction; what man learns from himself and not from another; the knowledge which nature herself suggests."

§ 33. (3) This is explained by saying that the human soul is made to the image and likeness of God; that it is made to know God; that from the indeliberate exercise of its own faculties by a kind of natural movement, it comes to the knowledge of God. " *Insita et cum natura conserta notitia.*" This knowledge is therefore vague and confused. Revelation and instruction completes and makes it more scientific.\*

§ 34. (4) This spontaneous knowledge of God is distinguished by two important characteristics: (a) It arises from rational nature by the use of faculties con-natural to all. Hence it is not an intuition, nor is it the result of a special faculty. On the contrary, it can be compared to a spontaneous inference. (b) It is universal with human nature. The considerations, whence its source, are obvious and common to all who

<sup>11</sup> Petavius, *de Deo*, l. I; Franzelin *de Deo*, p. 94, sq.

<sup>12</sup> Clemens Alex. Strom. V. p. 612; Gregorius Nazianz. or. 28, al. 34. n. 5, 6; Aug. in Joan. tr. 106, n. 4; Chrysostomus, ad Pop. Antioch, h. 9. n. 2.

Athanasius *Contra Arianos*, *De Incarnatione Verbi*.

have the free use of reason. These obvious sources, indicated again and again by them, are the world of nature and of man."

This teaching thus harmonizes with the results of comparative Philology. Historical science brings its testimony in favor of Christian Philosophy. In the following pages we shall investigate these two sources and strive to find a detailed and philosophical justification for our natural possession, *i. e.*, the idea of God.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>13</sup> St. Aug. Enar. in Ps. XLI, n. 7, 8. "Praecipuum et principale speculum ad videndum Deum est animus rationalis inveniens seipsum. Si enim invisibilia Dei per ea, quae facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur, ubi quaeso, quam in ejus imagine, cognitionis ejus vestigia expressius impressa inveniuntur?" St. Bernard, De Domo Inter., c. 12.

<sup>14</sup> Hartman therefore errs in holding that religion is not an original and inseparable element, but was acquired by man on his way upwards. To him the motive element was egoistic endaemonism, the creative factor was poetic fancy. History of Religion, A Menzies, p. 43. These elements may enter as factors in the historic deterioration of religious belief, they are not primitive causes of the belief itself. Prof. Gruppe holds that religion is an acquired social habit. Müller, Physical Religion, p. 87.

## CHAPTER IV.

### MENTAL LIFE.

§ 1. The consciousness of the human race bears testimony to the idea of God. It is the common property of humanity. Shared alike by barbarian and civilized, by unlettered and learned, it finds varied expression in language and exerts a profound influence on thought and action. We shall not here discuss the historic development of the idea or pass in critical review the various phases in which it has been realized. That pertains to the History of Religion. The aim of the present treatise is to investigate its philosophic basis, to seek the sources whence it has its origin, to analyze the grounds which gives to the idea an objective validity and prove that a being really exists whom we call God.

§ 2. The testimony for the idea was sought and found in human consciousness.<sup>1</sup> In like manner we shall seek in consciousness first of all for the grounds which give to the idea an objective value. The method to be pursued is psychological. The basis for the idea must be very near and close to us. Its universality and deep influence on our lives can only thus be explained.<sup>2</sup> In truth, as shall be shown, our whole nature stretches up and cries aloud to God. Religion and worship are only the various expressions for the

Consciousness furnishes grounds for the idea of God.

<sup>1</sup> Tertullian, *De Testimonia Animae*. *Sero te amavi, pulchritudo tam antiqua tam nova!* *Sero te amavi!* *Et ecce intus eras, et ego foras, et ibi te quarebam.* Aug. *Confess.* I. X, ch. 27; XII, 25; *De Vera Relig.*, XXXIX, *The Great Enigma*, W. S. Lilly, p. 266.

<sup>2</sup> Janet, *Traite Elementaire de Philosophie*, p. 843

cry, only means whereby the human soul tries to find its Maker and show to Him the homage of adoration, of love and of praise. Then we can turn to the world without, which proclaims alike to the popular mind, to the scientist and to the philosopher, that it did not create itself, that its existence and activity are due to a higher and greater being, whose "everlasting divinity and power" is shown throughout.\*

## I.

*First source to be investigated in mental life.* § 3. In setting forth the sources whence arose the idea of God, philosophers at all times have delighted in making an appeal to our conscious mental life.

From Plato and St. Augustine down to contemporary writers this line of thought has been presented in various ways. The intellect itself, or the idea, or the force and reality of truth have suggested to the most profound and subtle minds the world has seen, reasons for the faith that is in them. Its fortunes have been varied and with a great many it has fallen into dispute. The fact, however, that so many acute and brilliant minds have been impressed with one or more of its forms leads the thoughtful student to suspect that it is not altogether lacking in force, and gives the hope that if presented in the proper manner, it may have a well-grounded basis, though not so readily grasped by the ordinary mind.

## II.

## ERRORS.

*The a priori argument.* § 4. (1) The famous *a priori* argument for the existence of God is based on the consideration of the idea. For upwards of one thousand years it has been eagerly

\* St. Augustine, Enar. in Ps. 41, n. 8; 73, n. 25; 134, n. 10.

and fiercely discussed in the schools and has been proposed in slightly different ways in the hope that each succeeding presentation would stand firm against future criticism. By Kant and recent writers it is called the ontological argument.

§ 7. (a) St. Anselm, the father of the school-men, <sup>(a) St. Anselm.</sup> was the first to present this argument in scientific form. He reasons thus: I have an idea of a being infinite in all perfections. The mind cannot conceive a being greater than this. Hence, he infers that such a being ought to exist. For if it did not exist, then it would not be the greatest being which the mind could conceive. Therefore it has both an ideal and a real existence.<sup>4</sup>

§ 8. (b) Scotus, the *doctor subtilis*, proposes the argu- <sup>(b) Scotus.</sup> ment in different words. The most perfect being, he writes, can exist; the possibility of the existence is implied in the idea. Therefore, he concludes, it must exist. For if such a being did not *really* exist, it would be not possible to exist. For, in order to be possible it must be real. Hence the notion of its possibility implies its reality.

§ 9. (c) Descartes recognized the fallacy in the <sup>(c) Des Cartes.</sup> wording of the argument and attempted to place it upon a sound basis. He employs as a criterion the principle that whatever we conceive clearly and distinctly must be true. When I examine the idea, which I have, of the most perfect being, he reasons, I find that the note of existence is therein contained, just as in the notion of a triangle the truth is contained that

<sup>4</sup> *Proslogium*, ch. 2, 3; St. Bonaventure, *Itinerarium*; Shedd, *History of Doctrine*, vol. I, p. 238; Flint, *Theism*, p. 279; Dr. Sterling says that "the very thought of God is that which is, and can not be." *Gifford Lectures*, 1890, 1st series, Lect. X; *The Being of God*, P. H. Steenstra, p. 80; Shedd *Dog. Theol.*, p. 222; McCosh, *Intuitions of the Mind*.

the three angles are equal to two right angles, or in the idea of a circle that the points on a circumference are equally distant from the center. Therefore, if not more evident, it is at least as certain that God, who is a being of such infinite perfection, exists, as any demonstration of Geometry could make.\*

(d) Leibnitz.

§ 10. (d) The reasoning of Descartes did not seem conclusive to Leibnitz.\* He found in this presentation, as in the others, the same logical fallacy, viz., concluding directly from the ideal to the real. He tried, unsuccessfully, however, to avoid the rock; nevertheless his reasoning is very captious. The divine being is a being which is determined to existence by its own essence, *i. e.*, a being whose existence is explained not as the effect of another being, but as due to its own infinite essence. Now, he adds, such a being, is evidently possible. Therefore it must really exist. For if it did not really exist, it would not be possible.'

Criticism.

§ 11. In form and process the argument follows that of Scotus. Its weakness at first sight is more difficult to detect than with the arguments of Anselm and Descartes. Nevertheless the same criticism can be made of all. In every form so far presented the argument concludes from the ideal to the order of real existence. The ideal, as such, has only an ideal content. The element of reality must come from another source than from the creative fancy of the mind. An inference

\* Prin. Phil., I, 14; Discours de la Methode, pt. IV, med. 3d.

\* New Essays, B, IV, ch. 10.

\*\* "In order to prove that God exists it is sufficient to prove that He is possible. Now we have proved that God is possible. Therefore He exists." The Monadology of Leibnitz, by R. Latta, p. 274. "What is possible and what a general principle compels us to say *must* be, that certainly is," Bradley, Appearance and Reality, pp. 149, 395; to him the absolute is shorn of personality and moral attributes, hence not God.

from the pure ideal to the real exists. When, therefore, we reason that the element of existence must be contained in the idea of the most perfect being, we conceive such a being is or is possible, the ready answer is: Granted if *ideal* existence is understood, if, however, there is question of *real objective* existence, then we do not know; or granted, if it can be otherwise shown, that such a being has real objective existence.\*

§ 12. (2) These forms of the ontological argument have little influence on present philosophical thought. They are of value only as historical vestiges of the working of the human mind in the effort to draw from inner consciousness some assurance for the existence of God. The effort is worthy of praise; it has undoubtedly a real basis; the criticism made is that the method is faulty or that the principle is erroneous.

§ 13. With the German disciples of Kant, the argument assumes a new form.\* Presented in an attractive style and with a certain pretense to deep reasoning, it is fitted to appeal to the philosophical mind. Its influence upon the present state of the Theistic argument is very great. The right wing of Hegel's followers, e.g., Goeschel, Gabler, Daub and Erdmann, as opposed to the left, i.e., Strauss, and the extreme left, e.g., Feuerbach, have made this argument in a special manner their own possession.<sup>10</sup> It appears in the writings of Prof. Caird, Dr. Schurman, Dr. Sterrett, Prof. Pfleiderer, Prof. Green, and the followers of the Neo-Hegelian school.

Hegel's  
teaching.

\* St. Thomas, I. q. 2, 1 ad. 2.

<sup>9</sup> Kant himself rejects the argument, Critic, ch. 3, § 4.

<sup>10</sup> Belford Bax, Handbook to History of Modern Philosophy, p. 390.

found in  
Fichte.

§ 14. The adumbrations of the present form of the so-called Ontological argument appear in Fichte. To him God and the world are two mutually involving spheres of consciousness.<sup>11</sup> They can be viewed as thought-relations involving each other.<sup>12</sup> God as cause is postulated to explain the effect in so far as there is an effect to explain; and the effect is effect of its cause only in so far as it displays its causality.<sup>13</sup>

more scientific with  
Hegel.

§ 15. With Hegel, however, this reasoning assumes a more consistent form.<sup>14</sup> He held that thought and being were identical.<sup>15</sup> The world of thought, of nature, and of man was an evolution of the *idea*. The spirit exists by a necessity of thought. The concrete existence of the categories, nature and spirit, is deduced from their essence, which is thought.<sup>16</sup> He holds that we cannot by argument reason from the sensible world to God. The argument to be employed is only an expression of thought itself, for thought is the elevation of the spirit above the limits of the finite to those of the invisible and infinite.<sup>17</sup> Therefore the real character of the proof is the assertion by the spirit of the actuality of the infinite ideal. The assumption on which it rests is that primal being is self-existent. We can deny God only by denying self-existence;

<sup>11</sup> Fichte, by A. B. Thompson, p. 134.

<sup>12</sup> This argument is presented with some modifications by Prof. Bascom, Natural Theology, ch. III, § 7. Cf. Foundations of Religious Belief, by Prof. Wilson. With Cousin "the finite and infinite are logical correlatives." Elem. of Psych., p. 375. So also Prof. Schurman, in Philos. Review, vol. IV, May, 1895.

<sup>13</sup> Ib., p. 142.

<sup>14</sup> Logic, Introd., § 51.

<sup>15</sup> Phil. and Devel. of Religion, by Prof. Pfleiderer, vol. I, p. 148; H. Halder, Some Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy, in Phil. Rev., vol. V, p. 263.

<sup>16</sup> Hegelianism and Personality by Prof. Seth, p. 110.

<sup>17</sup> Histoire de la Philosophie, par P. Janet et G. Seailles, p. 851.

but this is equivalent to the spirit denying itself — a patent contradiction.<sup>18</sup>

§ 16. This fundamental concept of Hegel that the idea is the source and essence of all things, which in themselves are only the forms of its evolution, is presented in various ways by his followers. Thus, (a) some tell us that the aim of the Ontological proof is to identify the idea of God with that of self-existence which must be assumed.<sup>19</sup> (b) Or that the belief in God is constitutive of intelligence itself.<sup>20</sup> (c) Or with Prof. Caird that the belief in God is a psychological necessity. (d) Or, finally, with Prof. Pfleiderer, teach that while thinking and being are different, contrary to Hegel's dictum, yet they are constituted for each other by the conformity of the laws on both sides and in this agreement of the two sides the unity of the ordering principle, *i. e.*, of the effectuating thinking or the omnipotent reason of God reveals itself.<sup>21</sup>

§ 17. The Ontological proof in the hands of its most recent defenders is pure Pantheism. Thus the unity of the divine and human consciousness is the reason given why the mind is assured of the existence

<sup>18</sup> Basal Concepts in Philosophy, by A. D. Ormond, p. 271.

<sup>19</sup> "God is the absolute and transcendent ground of the world. The world is the product of an imminent spiritual potency which has as its immediate presupposition spiritual self-activity." "This self-activity as the self-existent *prius* of all being we have found to be God. His self-activity is a presupposition of immanent potency. The immanent ground of the world-process is a spiritual potency which leads it in its evolution through stages of mechanism and life up to the soul of man in which spirit becomes self-conscious. Thus man is a potency whose infinite and perfect actuality is God." Basal Concepts in Philosophy by A. D. Ormond, pp. 280-281.

<sup>20</sup> "That God is the ultimate ground and source of all things whether they be living or in earth, thinking or unthinking, seems to me not merely a conclusion reached by reflection and inference, but an intuitive belief constitutive of intelligence itself." J. G. Schurman, Agnosticism and Religion, p. 26.

<sup>21</sup> Philosophy and Development of Religion, vol. I, p. 148.

of God. The objections to the pantheistic teaching are also valid in the present case. God and the human soul are not identical. Memory and consciousness make us aware of our personal identity and assure us that we are individuals distinct both from God and created things.”

### III.

#### THEORY OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.

*A true argument may be formulated.* § 18. Our inner life contains true sources for our idea of God. The human mind again and again, in spite of failure, seeks there a justification of its belief. An instinctive conviction, as it were, tells that the idea is more than a passing fiction. It has an abiding presence, and a silent overshadowing power. A difficulty is found in tracing it to the proper source. The hope is nevertheless held that in some way its true ground can be discovered. Erroneous notions as to our mental nature and activity, a false analysis of our mental content may obscure the truth. It cannot entirely rob us of the heritage which is a part of our being and of our life.

““ The intuition of an Absolute Reason is (1) the necessary pre-supposition of all other knowledge so that we cannot know anything else to exist except by assuming first of all that God exists; (2) the necessary basis of all logical thought so that we cannot put confidence in any of our reasoning processes except by taking for granted that a thinking Deity has constructed our minds with reference to the universe and to truth; (3) the necessary implication of our primitive belief in design so that we can assume all things to exist for a purpose only by making the prior assumption that a purposing God exists — can regard the universe as a thought only by postulating the existence of an Absolute Thinker. We cannot prove that God is, we can show that in order to the existence of any knowledge, thought, reason in man, man must assume that God is.” Dr. Strong in Systematic Theology, pp. 33, 34. The writer tries to combine Anselm, Descartes and Hegel. The argument labors with the defects of all. Dr. Caldecott, The Philosophy of Religion, pp. 36-42.

§ 19. We do not reason from the idea to the actual <sup>method.</sup> existence of the object therein represented. That has been shown to be a false process. We take the idea, investigate it as it is given in consciousness, and seek a basis or foundation for its content. This line of reasoning is legitimate and opens up the wide range and infinite possibility of our mental life. The idea is received as a product or an effect. The activity of the mind may explain its form. The content or comprehension of the idea, however, is not the result of the mind's activity, but has an external or independent basis. The reasoning, therefore, is not *a priori*, but proceeds from the effect to the cause.

§ 20. At the initial point of the investigation a vital <sup>Theories of the Uni-</sup><sub>versal Idea.</sub> problem comes to view. The real value of the universal idea has been discussed in the schools for centuries. The Nominalist holds that the idea is a name only. This view exercises wide and deep influence on modern thought.<sup>23</sup> The Realist teaches that the ideas as such have an objective reality. This is the opinion of Plato and is now obsolete. Scholastic philosophy draws a distinction. It teaches that the idea is formed by the mind and is therefore a mental product; nevertheless, its content or comprehension is based in objective reality.

§ 21. A criticism of these opinions shall not be presented here. The discussion would entail too much space and more properly pertains to Philosophy of Mind. The view of Scholastic philosophy is there shown to be in accord with the known processes of mental life and is implied in ordinary and scientific language. Its exposition naturally leads up to our argument for the existence of God.

<sup>23</sup> Scientific Theism by F. Abbott.

(a) The idea.

Scholastic teaching.

§ 22. Consciousness reveals our inner life; it tells the thoughts, desires, feeling which we experience through the swiftly running moments of the day. By its testimony we know that our ideas are *singular, particular or universal*. Thus the idea of one person or object really existing, e. g., Peter, a stone, is called a singular idea; the idea of several objects, e. g., a group of men, a few stones, is called a particular idea; the idea of a whole class of persons or objects, e. g., humanity, stone, is called a universal idea. The universal idea is the idea properly so called. It is the direct and proper effect of the mind brought into contact with external objects. The universal idea is defined as an idea which contains one quality or attribute which is common to many individuals. Thus, e. g., *humanity* is a universal idea inasmuch as it expresses the one quality, e. g., *human nature*, which is possessed by all mankind. So also *whiteness* is a universal idea because its content is a quality which is found in many objects.

proved by consciousness.

§ 23. That such ideas exist in the mind is abundantly proved by an examination of our mental life. They do not exist in a limited number. The mind is busy in their constant formation. It is not confined within the bounds of things actually existing. Not all the objects exist to which the idea may extend, e. g., the idea of humanity extends to all men: past, present and future. Or again, the idea may express an essence which as such does not actually exist, but which is conceived as possible. The mind, therefore, draws a clear distinction between existing and possible things.

possible essences.

§ 24. Let us examine the possible essences. What is their nature? They are not absolutely nothing. They stand midway between a contradiction and an

actual fact. The mind can have no positive conception of a contradiction. It does not actually exist, nor can it ever exist. It has no reality of existence nor of essence. It is an absolute nothing. An actual fact has a reality both of essence and of existence. Now a possible thing does not actually exist, but it can exist. It is not something absurd and contradictory. We cannot say that it has a reality of existence, because as yet it does not actually exist; but we can say that it has a reality of essence, inasmuch as the mind conceives it as a thing which may exist in the concrete. The fact that a thing is possible does not depend on the mind. The distinction of the possible and the impossible stands out clearly in our mental life. The mind cannot make or change the one or the other. A round square, or, two plus two equals five, can never be other than impossible. The intellect discovers the truth and in its presence stand in silent and helpless acquiescence.<sup>44</sup> Nor can we say that the possible or the impossible depends on existing things. If so, then all possible things would exist; but this we know to be false. Therefore a possible thing which is the object of the mind is of its own intrinsic nature independent both of the mind and of existing things.

§ 26. Some reason, however, must be given for its <sup>reason of</sup> possibility. The human mind seeks to know why one thing is possible and another is not. A closer analysis of the nature of the possible alone can give a reason which will be well-grounded and strong against adverse criticism.

§ 27. The elements which go to make up the con-<sup>its intelligible charac-</sup>ception of a possible thing are perceived to combine in ter.

<sup>44</sup> Aug. de lib. Arbit. 1, 2, ch. 12. To him truth is our highest good." Quid petis amplius quam ut beatus sis? Et quid beatius eo qui fruitur inconcussa et incommutabili et excellentissima veritate." Ib., ch. 13.

harmonious accord. But there is more than a mere mechanical combination. The elements are intelligible not only as units, but also as a combined whole. The mind conceives them forming a harmonious unity. The character of intelligibility is stamped upon them. The mechanical combination takes place because the mind conceives it as something intelligible. It has a positive reality inasmuch as it is the direct object of thought. What is impossible is unintelligible. If the mind could conceive it, it would be possible.

*its explanation.*

§ 28. The intelligibility of the idea is what must be explained. The mind does not make it so; it simply finds that such and such an object can be conceived. The intelligibility is not purely ideal. It is only the content of the idea brought into the range of the mind's action. Now the content of the universal idea has a basis in objective reality. In the case of actually existing things this cannot be doubted or gainsaid. The same is also true of possible essences. The simple fact of existence makes no change or difference in their relation to the mind. The actual and possible are equally intelligible. The content of the one, as of the other, is also based in an objective reality.<sup>\*\*</sup>

*found in objective truth.*

§ 29. The consideration of possible things, therefore, leads the mind to the conviction in existence of objective truth. It conceives this truth as the basis of and the reason why some things appear intelligible and others do not. This basis is real, just as the content of the idea is real. It is necessary because the mind is powerless to change its conceptions at will; it finds that the idea is such and such and takes it as it is found. What it is

<sup>\*\*</sup> The reasoning from possibility is to be viewed in connection with what follows. Thus in scope as in the manner of drawing the inference this argument must be distinguished from that of Kant. Cf. Janet, *Traité Élémentaire*, p. 852.

now, it always was and always will be. The essence of a horse could never be other than it is; if so, the horse itself would be something else. Hence, we are constrained to admit an external, necessary basis to explain the content of a possible concept. We are led to the objective reality of an external and necessary truth. This truth pervades the universe in some wonderful manner. The mind is under its silent, potent sway.

§ 30. What is true of the idea can be affirmed in like manner of the judgment. With the latter the truth is much more apparent and can be more readily grasped. We do not base our reasoning on the ordinary judgments employed in daily life. They depend upon a variety of circumstances and are conditioned by changing things. Instead we take the first principles of thought, e. g., the principles of contradiction, of excluded middle, of identity. These principles are said to be immediately evident. The connection between subject and predicate is so intimate and necessary that the mind cannot help perceiving and affirming it. They are called metaphysical principles; without them discursive thought would be impossible; they impose upon the mind a law which it is powerless to resist. It is natural to seek the true value of these principles. Their control of the mind is supreme and inexorable. Are they, then, merely subjective and the consequences of the mind's own nature?

§ 31. First of all we observe that the name applied to them is that of metaphysical principles. Now Metaphysics or Ontology is the science of real being. Its principles and fundamental notions are drawn from the consideration of the essence of things. They are, therefore, objectively real. Logic, on the contrary, is the science of mental operations and deals with ideal

first principles  
in logical  
and onto-  
logical order.

being. Again, the first principles of Logic and the first principles of Metaphysics are closely akin. They are called by the same name, e. g., the principles of contradiction, of excluded middle, etc. They are only different expressions of great truths which pervade the universe. The logical principle of contradiction, "the mind cannot affirm or deny the same thing of another at the same time and under the same circumstances," has an objective validity when worded in Metaphysics as "the same thing cannot be and not be at the same time." So also for the principles of identity and of excluded middle. The former expression is the logical, the latter is the ontological principle.

§ 32. Hence, the first and fundamental principles of the mind are valid in the world of external reality, just as the fundamental principles of the physical world pervade and dominate our mental life. The logical principles do not depend upon existing things. They apply to the past and future, as to the present. If they were purely mental, their existence could be explained by the constitution of the mind. But they are objectively real and point to a real and objective basis."<sup>6</sup>

(c) reasoning.

§ 33. Finally, the same line of thought is verified in reasoning. The mental operation of reasoning consists of the comparisons of ideas and of judgments with the view to draw a conclusion. Ideas and judgments, therefore, form the material of our reasoning. Now if the idea and the judgment are objectively real in the sense explained, and if they can only be explained by postulating a basis which is objectively real, it follows that the process of reasoning is not the product of idle fancy, but to be of value, it must be carried on in con-

<sup>6</sup> The Great Enigma, W. S. Lilly, pp. 205, 228.

formity to objective things."<sup>1</sup> The world of external reality then enters into the world of thought. The mind may turn or twist the mass to its own special ends or purposes. Nevertheless, the content is objectively real, the content comes from without; the peculiar form and shape only can be ascribed to mental activity. An apt illustration is drawn from Mathematics.

§ 34. Mathematics is distinguished from the other sciences because of its abstract character. It deals with abstract properties of numbers. It is distinctively a work of the intelligence. I, e. g., could shut myself in a room and for twenty years or more give myself up to the study of Geometry without once seeking verification for my conclusions in the world without. The result would be a complete science well-connected and exact. It would not be the result of experience; it is purely and solely a mental work. Yet scientists assure us that the solar system is ruled by the truths and principles which make up the science of Geometry and to confirm the statement they point to the physical and experimental science of Astronomy.

§ 35. How explain this marvellous accord? A world of truth lies around. We see only in part and we know only in part. The mind finds traces and indications of wonderful harmony between mental and physical worlds;<sup>2</sup> a harmony which can only be explained by a basal unity. Not that one is the reflection of the other, nor are they two aspects of the same thing. Such views contradict known truths and cannot be sustained. But both suggest a unity which is above or

<sup>1</sup>"Hoc ita esse debet, illud non ita; hoc ergo querens unde judicarem, cum ita judicarem, inveneram incommutabilem et veram veritatis aeternitatem, supra mentem meam commutabilem." Aug. Conf., I. VII, c. 17.

<sup>2</sup>Chadbourne. Natural Theology, Lect. VIII, IX, X.

beneath, according as we view it, superior to or more fundamental than either. This unity we cannot see for our eyes are holden, but we do see the traces of its light in the world of sense and of thought, and from the participation, which we share in common with all thinking beings and forming their constitution and written law, we reason to its real existence. Else all thinking things, all objects of our thought would be shrouded in darkness and mystery and our minds would be put to inevitable confusion.”

St. Augustine's reasoning.

§ 36. This train of thought enables the reader to grasp the force of St. Augustine's famous argument drawn from the power and reign of truth.” The mind does not make, it finds the truth. In ordinary and scientific language we speak of new discoveries made, of the bounds of knowledge enlarged from day to day. The ingenuity of man may make instruments and appliances to reach out or to apply the truth; but the truth itself is beyond his control.” In its presence he stands powerless. Its sway is absolute and universal.” It knows no limitation of time, of space, or of any created intelligence. This absolute dominion of truth can only be explained in God. Its basis is not the human mind, or existing things. Unchangeable and eternal it rises above the changing fortunes of contingent things, and points to a mind unchangeable and eternal, whence its source and only sufficient explanation.

<sup>\*\*</sup> S. Th. I. q. 16, a. 5, ad. 2; I. q. 12, a. 2; I. q. 88, a. 3; I. 2. q. 93, a. 2; 3. q. 5, a. 4, ad. 2; I. q. 84, a. 5; C. Gent. I. 3. e. 47; Card. Zigliara, I. 4, c. 12, 13.

<sup>\*\*\*</sup> De Lib. Arbit. I. 2, ch. 8-12-14—where he also reasons that the highest truth is the greatest good; De Vera Relig., ch. 30, 31; Soliloq. I. 1, n. 3; Confess. XII, 25; Bossuet, Connaissance de Dieu et soi même, ch. IV-VII.

<sup>“</sup> Dr. William Ward, Philosophy of Theism, vol. I.

<sup>“</sup> Fenelon, Demonstration de l'existence de Dieu, p. 1, ch. IV, § 1.

§ 37. The conclusion, therefore, is evident. An analysis of our mental life leads us to the existence of God.<sup>23</sup> The reasoning is from the effect. At first sight, obscure and subtile, its power grows upon reflection. Our minds are subject to the laws and reign of truth. The truth is not purely subjective, not the fanciful creation of the imagination. It has objective elements and an objective basis. It is necessary and eternal, pervading alike the world of matter and of mind. It constrains us to admit an external and necessary mind. Therefore, God exists, the foundation and source of truth.<sup>24</sup>

## IV.

## DR. ROYCE'S ARGUMENT.

§ 38. The course of reasoning set forth at first sight bears a resemblance to that of Prof. Royce and found in his works "The Religious Aspect of Philosophy," "Spirit of Modern Philosophy," "The Conception of God." Upon closer examination a wide and fundamental difference is seen.

§ 39. Prof. Royce admits his indebtedness to Kant, Schelling and Hegel. He candidly ranks himself among the post-Kantian philosophers. Yet he is unlike them all. With Kant he admits that theoretical reason can never give us external reality, that only a moral faith or insight can give certainty to what is beyond consciousness. Hence, the chapter on the Postulates. The external world, the existence of God are postulates of

<sup>23</sup> St. Aug. in Joan. tr. 23, n. 9, 10, 11.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Hontheim, Theodicea, p. 128; Boedder, Theologia Naturalis, p. 48; Balmes sees in the reasoning mind an argument from intellectual order, Fundamental Philosophy, p. 11, B. IV. ch. 23. As such it bears contrast with the proofs from the moral and the physical order. The force of the argument, however, rests in showing that truth is objective.

moral insight. Unlike Prof. Fraser he does not rest here." He attempts to justify the postulate and show in what way the moral faith is rational. He does not seek the reason for it in the faith or religious feeling of Jacobi and Schleiermacher, nor in the asthetic sense of the Neo-Kantians, nor in the religion of humanity. He turns abruptly and tries to justify his position from intimate analysis of the theoretical reason. Hence, his candid and beautiful chapters on scepticism and pessimism. In developing the argument he appeals (1) to the very act of thinking, *i. e.*, thought itself; " (2) to the fact of error; " (3) to the fact of ignorance."  
These are phases of the one and same argument and show a growing development in the writer."

**facts true.** § 40. (1) The facts adduced by Prof. Royce cannot be questioned. They are a part of the conscious experience of every mind. Young and old, uneducated and learned, are forced to admit that they are in ignorance of many things, that day by day the knowledge of truth is increased, that they have been frequently in error, and that the possibilities of error are great. On these facts our argument was raised, and we are happy to know that Prof. Royce has grasped their significance and set them forth with a grace of expression and a wealth of detail.

**false as  
Prof. Royce  
words  
them.** § 41. (2) If, however, we view these data, not absolutely, but in Prof. Royce's environment, we do not see what their real value in the present case can be. He sets forth with Kant's famous distinction, and develops it and makes it his own. He is thus in an

<sup>28</sup> Phil. of Theism, 2d series, p. 4.

<sup>29</sup> Spirit of Modern Philosophy, part II, ch. XI.

<sup>30</sup> Religious Aspect of Philosophy, ch. XI.

<sup>31</sup> Conception of God, p. 15.

<sup>32</sup> New World, June, 1898; A New Form of Theism, by J. E. Russell.

idealistic atmosphere. His Supreme Reality is "An ultimate aspect of things." " His initial point is absolute scepticism. The very effort to rid himself of this shows the fundamental principle to be false. Nevertheless, he retains it in spite of the open contradiction and makes no effort to question its truth.<sup>41</sup>

§ 42. What is the test for subjective truth? Not <sup>test for</sup> ~~truth~~ conformity with external reality. This he expressly rejects. But conformity with a higher intelligence.<sup>42</sup> Hence, he is a disciple of Berkeley. Here he falls into a *petilio principii*. He sets forth with the data of consciousness to reason God's existence, as absolute Truth. Yet he postulates the existence of the All-Knower or All-Enfolder to justify the veracity of the data. This was the mistake of Descartes.

§ 43. Again, his exposition of thought and of judgment is incorrect. The idea is the apprehension of a reality, the judgment is a perception of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas. Hence, an objective element is found in both. Yet Prof. Royce explains them as wholly and entirely subjective. In setting forth the nature of error, he confounds intention with attention, and in passages almost following each other expresses most contradictory statements.<sup>43</sup> If judgment and idea not only as acts, but viewed in their contents, are purely subjective, we reach only a subjective inference. The All-Knower is a creation of the mind; it is not objectively real. To postulate it as a reality shows that the demonstration, as such, has failed absolutely to give a reasoned truth. We admire much in Prof. Royce; his beautiful and thoughtful style, his candor

<sup>41</sup> Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 222.

<sup>42</sup> Spirit of Modern Philosophy, ch. XI; Religious Aspect of Philosophy, ch. VI, VII.

<sup>43</sup> Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 342, 378.

<sup>44</sup> Religious Aspect of Philosophy, pp. 398, 399.

and truthful spirit, his penetrating criticisms of Scepticism, of the Dieu-Progrès, of the Relativity of Knowledge. He has grasped the issue fairly; has seen many truths. His prepossessions and his assumptions taken from others we object to. They are all centered in a false epistemology. He has shown an honest development in philosophy, has rejected opinions once entertained which gives the hope of further development still. There is a true Idealism, and Christian philosophy gladly welcomes truth in any form.

**Pantheistic.** § 44. Finally, this truth must not be identified with God.<sup>44</sup> This is the Pantheism of Fichte.<sup>45</sup> From the intellectual, moral and physical order we reason to God's existence; but God is not the order itself.<sup>46</sup> With as much truth I could, on seeing a beautiful mansion, maintain that the symmetry and truth revealed in the building is its maker. No, these point to an Architect, just as the reign of truth points to a Mind.

<sup>44</sup> *Spirit of Modern Phil., ch. XI; Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 194.

<sup>45</sup> *Hunt, Pantheism*, p. 264.

<sup>46</sup> *Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 195.

## CHAPTER V.

### MORAL LIFE.

The analysis of mental life does not exhaust the content of conscious experience. Man is not only an intellectual, he is a moral being also. Endowed with a mind capable of acquiring a knowledge of himself and of external things, he likewise possesses a heart filled with longings for what is true, and beautiful and good. A consideration of mental data shows the existence and power of a mind transcendent and immanent, the source and basis of objective truth. Our moral nature in stronger and clearer voice calls us to look beyond ourselves to one who prescribes the fundamental laws and principles of human conduct, and alone is able to satisfy the desires of the soul.

§ 2. The moral argument embraces the lines of reasoning based upon the existence and power of a moral law over human life and upon the longings of the human soul. It naturally separates into two parts. The former is better known as the argument from conscience; the latter as the argument from fundamental desires.

§ 3. The argument from conscience has always been its force. a favorite with Theistic writers. Much simpler in form than that from ideas, it appeals to data more obvious. Its force is apprehended not only by those whose minds have been disciplined to metaphysical reasoning. The uneducated are conscious of the still small voice which speaks silently from the depths of the soul. Much, however, depends upon the manner in which the argument is proposed.

## I.

I<sup>o</sup>. THE MORAL ORDER.

right and  
wrong.

§ 4. The distinction between right and wrong is a primary conviction of the human soul. Go where you will the wide world over, speak to persons in every rank of society from the years of budding reasoning even to decrepit old age, you will find that this truth is an inalienable possession of mankind.<sup>1</sup> An obligation presses upon us to do what is right. We may do wrong, but we are conscious of violating a law. The obligation, therefore, is not of physical necessity. It does not take away the exercise of free-will. The necessity is a moral one. It is that which has a basis in the relation of means to an end. A rational creature must employ certain means to obtain a definite end. True, he need not use these means; but the end cannot be secured without them.<sup>2</sup>

man acts  
for a  
purpose.

§ 5. Now it is a fact of consciousness that, when we act in the full possession of our faculties, we act for a purpose or an end. The reason is found in our nature as intelligent beings. Our waking lives are made up of efforts to reach determined objects. Thus the mind is led to grasp the notion of a moral order.

unity of  
physical  
nature.

§ 6. We look out into the world around us and see creatures differing in nature, but devoid of intelligence, putting forth activities of various kinds. An order and harmony prevails throughout. Every object possesses activities and exerts these not by virtue of free-determination but through a physical necessity. It cannot act otherwise than it does. Nevertheless, a unity of action obtains and the world is viewed as a

<sup>1</sup> Date of Modern Ethics, by Rev. J. Ming. S. J., p. 175.

<sup>2</sup> Mgr. d'Hulst, Confer. de Notre Dame, 1892.

system. The relation of means to ends is everywhere visible and furnishes the basis on which the argument from design rests.

§ 7. The same truth reigns in human life. With this <sup>of moral</sup> distinction, however, that lower creation by a physical necessity, in virtue of their nature, act in a determined way for definite ends. Human action, on the contrary, is free. The individual sees the end and bends the energies of mind and of body to its possession. A unity and harmony should also prevail in our moral life.<sup>3</sup> This only is had by an ultimate unity of tendency. The conscious apprehension of this exercises a directing and controlling influence over individual acts. Thus, human acts can be viewed as constituting a system. On this fact is based the science of Ethics.<sup>4</sup>

§ 8. The reason for the unity and harmony which <sup>reason of</sup> should reign in moral life is found not alone in <sup>this moral</sup> unity. the subjective consciousness of the individual, but in an objective moral order. All men seek happiness. Happiness is the ultimate purpose of activity. Men have sought happiness in riches, in honor, or in sensual pleasure. The result is bitter disappointment. In so acting men do not live up to the standard which should guide their lives. Here is seen the sphere and power of the moral law. It is the guide and sanction for what conduces to our true last end. The sanction is needed because of the free-will in the human agent. By following its guidance we shall surely obtain true happiness. The obligation to obey it is

<sup>3</sup> Royce, *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, pp. 140, 141.

<sup>4</sup> The objection that the moral law is only the expression of man's constitution is not of great weight. How in this hypothesis can we explain its binding force in spite of free will and the fact of disobedience? Pfleiderer, *Phil. of Relig.*, vol. III, p. 264.

<sup>Sanction in the individual.</sup> therefore based in the very nature of things.<sup>8</sup> Only thus is unity and harmony obtained in our moral life. By acting contrary to the moral law we bring unhappiness to ourselves and destroy the harmony which should otherwise exist.<sup>9</sup> Order is preserved by obedience to its dictates; if disorder is found it is due to the exercise of free-will.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>In history.</sup> § 9. This truth is not limited to individual consciousness. The distinction between good and bad is found in the laws, literature and religious beliefs of all peoples. If nations differ as to the morality of individual acts, the difference is due to varying circumstances or to an error of judgment. The great fundamental distinction is never obliterated.

§ 10. We cast a hasty glance over the history of the past. The records of nations and of men rise before us. The sanction of the moral order is not confined to the individual. Not only does happiness follow the performance of a good act, and remorse attend an evil action. Virtue and truth triumph sooner or later. A man sacrifices honor, wealth, position, in obedience to the moral law; his portion is contempt, calumny, may be death. The years roll on and time rights

<sup>8</sup> "Lex aeterna moderatrix humanarum." St. Aug. De Lib. Arb., I. I, c. 6.

<sup>9</sup> Martineau, *A Study of Religion*, vol. I, p. 21.

<sup>10</sup> In a suggestive chapter on Moral Insight Prof. Royce reasons that ethical doubt leads to the apprehension of "the absolute and the universal will," (p. 172). It is true that doubt as to what we ought to do "towards the attainment of universal harmony," (p. 141) may arouse in the mind the conviction of a moral order. Nevertheless it is not true to say that the standard of action is "the universal will" which results from the effort to become "one with all the conflicting wills," (pp. 172, 173). Such a standard is neither absolute nor universal; it is merely the subjective product of the mind, and as such ideal. Cf. *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, B. I, ch. VI, VII.

<sup>8</sup> S. Th. I, 2, q. 93, a. 4; q. 94, a. 5; Meyer, *Inst. Jur. Nat.*, p. 232; Fisher, *Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief*, p. 18.

everything. The true condition shines forth like the sun. A moral action is justified by the progress of events, and men look back in praise to what so many saw only to condemn. The record of Christian virtue is a striking illustration. Dragged before public tribunals, tortured, robbed of wealth and position, the scorn of men, the sport of wild beasts, the early martyrs went to an ignominious death. But might does not constitute right. The day surely comes when the position shall be reversed, when the last shall be first and the first shall be last. Thus morality triumphs, as history abundantly proves. Victory ultimately crowns the efforts of those who strive to obey

The written and unchanging laws of heaven  
 They are not of to-day or yesterday,  
 But ever live and no one knows their birthtide.<sup>9</sup>

## 2<sup>o</sup>. CONSCIENCE.

§ 11. The moral law so universal in time and place, *conscience*. so exacting in its behests is made known through the voice of conscience. Conscience is thus the judgment of the individual as to the morality of his own conduct; it is the application of the moral law to the particular events and circumstances of life.<sup>10</sup>

§ 12. This hidden monitor proclaims the ineradicable *its office*. distinction between good and evil. It awakens in the soul the consciousness of obligation and of duty. It is the ultimate basis and guide of human action. Its voice is ever heard urging, restraining, praising or condemning.<sup>11</sup> I carry with me in the lonely silence of

<sup>9</sup> Antigone, 454-456.

<sup>10</sup> Card. Newman, Grammar of Assent; Data of Modern Ethics, J. Ming, S. J. p. 186; Flint, Theism, p. 402; Cicero de Repub., I, II, ch. 22.

<sup>11</sup> Müller's definition of conscience is therefore partial and erroneous. Natural Religion, p. 181.

my room a judge and witness of my most secret thoughts. From its decisions there is no appeal. For they are the promulgations and applications of an eternal law which rules the course of history and of man. The commands of duty, the consciousness of obligation, the "ought" or "ought not," are the inseparable witnesses of every thought, word, or deed."<sup>13</sup>

### 3°. ARGUMENT.

<sup>argument formulated.</sup> § 13. The argument from conscience can now be formulated. It rests upon the moral order of the universe as an ultimate basis. Everywhere are found indelible marks of a morally constituted world.<sup>14</sup> What is held so firmly in the consciousness of the individual, pervades the laws, customs, and religious beliefs of mankind, and is verified by the course of history. Conscience, therefore, only promulgates a law eternal and necessary. Now a moral law imposing upon a free agent the obligation of right and of duty, constraining him to obedience even at the loss of wealth and position, entailing self-sacrifice and suffering, contravening at times our individual hopes and desires, furnishing an unfailing source of strength in trial, rewarding the good with peace and buoyancy of mind, punishing the evildoer with the agony of remorse and the foretaste of utter failure, must have a moral source and basis above and beyond the will of the individual. Conscience thus reveals a Lawgiver, who is the source of the moral order, the supreme judge of human action. The same Being who formed the human mind

<sup>13</sup> Moral Philosophy, W. Hill, S. J., ch. VIII; Goethe, Tasso, III., 2; Tacitus, Annals, VI, 6; Cicero, de Leg., I, 14; Balfour, Foundations of Belief, p. 79; The Great Enigma, W. S. Lilly, p. 305

<sup>14</sup> Martineau, A Study of Religion, vol. II, p. 370; Dimon, The Theistic Argument, Lect. VIII.

and is the basis of the truth which reigns supreme throughout the universe, giving the explanation of its constitution and harmony, also formed the moral order, the source and explanation of the harmony which should prevail in the world of man.

§ 14. This argument has been a favorite with <sup>its history.</sup> Christian writers. Tertullian appeals to it in his defense of Christianity.<sup>14</sup> St. Augustine presents it in most beautiful passages of his confessions. Pascal, Fenelon, Bossuet, Butler, and Card. Newman word it in language penetrating and sublime. It awakens in the mind the consciousness of dependence on one who is far above and yet deep down in the recesses of the soul. It assures us that God is not only intelligent and great, but also just and good. It has made heroes throughout the ages, and when enlightened by Christian faith is the unfailing source of Christian sanctity.

#### 4°. ERRORS.

§ 15. To Kant the moral argument appealed with <sup>Kant.</sup> great force.<sup>15</sup> It presented a barrier against the destructive tendencies of his intellectual philosophy. He called the idea of duty and of moral obligation a postulate of the practical reason. On this he raises the argument for the existence of God. The peculiar position occupied by Kant in the philosophic world gave great weight to this line of reasoning. Theistic writers again and again have cited it with approval. A brief examination of its worth will not, therefore, be out of place.

§ 16. Kant taught that personality constituted man <sup>his notion of morality.</sup> an absolutely independent being. Hence man has in

<sup>14</sup> De Anima, c. 7. Dr. Fairbairn in The Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 2d ed., 1902, writes "the ethical in man means an ethical universe," p. 88, "the ethical in man involves an ethical God," p. 291.

<sup>15</sup> Critic of Judgment, § 86; Knight, Aspects of Theism, p. 175.

himself his own end. This independence is what gives value to a morally good act.<sup>14</sup> Then man acts as a person. A law imposed from without is not law, but power. Autonomy is of the essence of morality. An autonomous law alone can be moral. It is then actuated by a motive purely moral, *i. e.*, for itself.

**Its effects.**

§ 17. Hence the rise of independent morality. Fichte propagates the new doctrine. It is found in Grotius,<sup>15</sup> and in Rousseau.<sup>16</sup> Through them it has influenced modern thought. We find it openly taught by the most recent German disciples of Kant, by the apostles of Culture under the leadership of Matthew Arnold and Emerson, by the Ethical societies in our own country,<sup>17</sup> and finds a congenial expression in the Religion of Humanity.

**Criticism.**

**a new teaching.**

**not justified.**

§ 18. The moral teaching of Kant is something new in history. It differs both from Stoicism and from Christianity. To him duty is not a manifestation of nature, as with the Stoics, nor does it come from God alone. It is an absolute, an independent law. We obey it not through the hope of earthly happiness or future reward.<sup>18</sup>

§ 19. A morality which is not from divine origin, nor can be considered as the expression of nature, cannot be justified. It is nothing more than an individual or hereditary habit. It cannot be reconciled with the explicit testimony of consciousness, with the imperative demands of duty, nor can it furnish the data for any sound system or science of Ethics.<sup>19</sup> According

<sup>14</sup> T. Pesch, *Kant et la Science Moderne*, p. 170.

<sup>15</sup> *de Jure Belli*, Proleg. n. 11.

<sup>16</sup> *Social Contract*.

<sup>17</sup> Pesch., l. c., p. 189.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Hutton, *Modern Guides of English Thought in Matters of Faith*, p. 271.

<sup>19</sup> *La Morale de Kant*, par A. Cresson, ch. IV.

to Kant morality rests on the individual judgment. Now experience shows that judgments vary. In the conflict who is right? The inevitable result is moral scepticism and pessimism."<sup>11</sup>

## II.

## FUNDAMENTAL DESIRES.

§ 20. The force of this train of reasoning consists in <sup>line of argument.</sup> showing that our nature reaches out to and cries aloud for God. The cry comes from the depths of our being. It is not a passing phase of human emotion. It is persistent and as universal as mankind. The longings of our nature in various ways give expression to the cry for light and life. Only He who made the human soul can appease its cravings."<sup>12</sup>

§ 21. (1) The mind is made to know truth. This is <sup>aspiration for truth.</sup> its object and in possession of truth it rests content. Now the capacity of the mind for truth is infinite. It penetrates the heavens above and the earth beneath. In restless activity it ever seeks new fields for investigation. Created nature does not satisfy the desire of knowledge. From the contemplation of the universe the mind rises to the Creator. With reverence and wonder it strives to penetrate the Divine essence and tell of the infinite perfections contained therein. True to this rational tendency Plato placed the happiness of the philosopher in the contemplation of truth. And Christian Theology teaches that man's ultimate end and highest good is had in the vision of the God-head."<sup>13</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Royce, *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, B. I, ch. V, VI.

<sup>12</sup> Prof. Porter, *Science and Sentiment*; Dr. Davidson, *Burnett Lectures, 1892-93.*

<sup>13</sup> St. Aug. Confess. I. VII, ch. 10; de Doctrina Christ, I. 1, ch. 8, 9.

*love of the  
good.*

§ 22. (2) The will of man naturally seeks the good. The apprehension of good not attained is the source and explanation of rational activity. Its possession brings rest and happiness. Now the capacity of the will for good is infinite. The passing objects of this world do not bring a lasting satiety. The heart is too deep and great to be appeased with anything less than the eternal and uncreated good. Hence the will in its longings passes beyond the present and seeks a future existence. The apprehension of a future life includes the possession of God, the highest good to the human soul.<sup>24</sup>

*desire of  
life.*

§ 23. (3) The desire of life is fundamental. It springs from the depths of our being. Man longs to live. For life he willingly surrenders wealth and position. The conviction that the visible world does not include the sum-total of life is an inalienable possession of the human race. Man bridges the dark chasm of death and reaches out to a future existence with its untold possibilities, its larger scope and fulness of life. In prayer we cry aloud to the living God, in whose life we shall have life. The expression of this desire is a fact of individual consciousness and finds abundant illustration in the religious records of mankind. Belief in immortality is inseparably connected with belief in God.

*longing for  
happiness.*

§ 24. (4) The desire of happiness is a common property of humanity. Everywhere man seeks to be happy.<sup>25</sup> Now this desire cannot be satisfied perfectly by the goods of this world. Our happiness here is only

<sup>24</sup> St. Aug. Enar. in Ps. 26; de Civ. Dei, I. II, ch. 10.

<sup>25</sup> "At si dixisset; omnes beati esse vultis, miseri esse non vultis; dixisset aliquid quod nullus in sua non agnosceret voluntate, quidquid enim quisquam latenter velit, ab hac voluntate quae omnibus hominibus satis nota sit non recederit." Aug. De Trin. I. VIII, ch. 3.

transitory. The human soul seeks for something more lasting than temporal pleasures. I do not deny that men are happy in this life.<sup>27</sup> Pessimism is not a fact or a true scheme of philosophy. Only this, that there is a void in the human soul which earthly pleasures cannot reach or satisfy. The avocations of a busy life may still the want for a time. But in the lonely silence of night, with the passing away of friends and old companions, in the growing consciousness of life fast ebbing, this desire becomes strong and unmistakable. We cannot quiet its voice. The pleasures of life are weighed in the balance and found wanting. We reach out in thought and desire beyond the limits of present existence. We seek a lasting happiness in the presence and possession of a Being whose infinite perfections satisfy every craving of the soul, and in whose fruition is found eternal blessedness.<sup>28</sup>

**§ 25.** (5) That man is a religious being is a truth of <sup>man's</sup> <sup>religious</sup> nature. Just as mankind shows its social nature in the existence of communities, in the laws and customs which govern the domestic and civic relations, so in like manner history furnishes proof of his religious nature. Everywhere are found temples, religious rites, and a priesthood of some kind. It seems as natural for men to express after this fashion their belief in God, who is the Author and Father of their being, as it is to gather into communities, to exercise the various acts of a community life.

**§ 26.** The argument from our desires has been <sup>strength of</sup> <sup>the argu-</sup> severely criticised.<sup>29</sup> That we desire an object, it is

<sup>27</sup> W. H. Mallock, *Is Life Worth Living*, p. 3.

<sup>28</sup> "Cognoscere Deum in aliquo communi sub quadam confusione est nobis naturaliter insertum in quantum Deus est hominis beatitudo." St. Thomas, i. q. 2, a. 1.

<sup>29</sup> J. S. Mill, *Essays on Religion*, p. 139; Prof. Fraser, in *Philosophy of Theism*, p. 201.

said, is no valid proof that the object exists. The best reply is to remove obscurity and exaggeration. We appeal not to every desire, but only to those which are fundamental, common to all men, and thus viewed as the voice of our human nature. Again, the argument must not be considered independent and alone. True, it has not the force of other lines of reasoning. Nevertheless, in connection with them it has force, subsidiary maybe, yet very great. It shows that man's nature in its entirety looks up to God.

## CHAPTER VI.

### CONTINGENCY.

§ 1. Man is the highest and noblest being in the visible universe. He stands at the head of the scale of beings which vary in perfection down to the lowest forms of organic life. His nature is not satisfied with what is below; it craves something higher; in many ways it reaches out and cries to God.

§ 2. The data on which is based the proof of the existence of God are not confined to our own nature. Through the senses the mind is brought in contact with the world about us. External things become the objects of thought. To the eager student the various aspects of nature appeal with an absorbing interest. Each discovery, like a rift in the clouds, enlarges the vision and enables the mind to catch a glimpse of that marvellous background of law and order which obtains throughout. Thus we have the various departments of physical science which are only various aspects of the one great world around us. Each in its proper sphere presents the relations of the phenomena and the laws which govern their movement. Nevertheless, they are not isolated; they bear relations one to another, and when viewed as a co-ordinated whole they give the best accredited and scientific knowledge of the visible universe.<sup>1</sup>

Sources of  
idea of God  
in the world  
without.

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Stirling says the three proofs: Cosmological, Teleological and Ontological "constitute together but the three undulations of a single wave, which wave is a natural rise and ascent to God." Gifford Lectures of 1890; Dimon, The Theistic Argument, p. 77.

**The fact of movement.** § 3. As we look out into the world the mind is impressed with the great fact that all things change.<sup>1</sup> Spring follows Winter, and Summer follows Spring in orderly succession. Night gives place to day, and day to night in unvarying round. The seed is planted in the ground, rises in a stalk, flowers and produces seed again. We too change from youth to manhood, to old age. The disposition to change is inherent in everything, and the fact obtains with the necessity of a physical law.

**Its aspects.** § 4. In this fact we can distinguish (a) the thing which changes, (b) the change itself, (c) the cause of the change, (d) the marvellous order in the changes. The first is the basis on which rests the argument from contingency; the second leads to the argument from motion; the third gives the argument from causality; the last is the argument from order and contrivance.

## I.

### BASIS.

**argument from contingency.** § 5. The argument of contingency arises from a consideration of the beings which make up the world. By observation and experiment we investigate their nature and constitution. The one dominant factor, which prevails throughout, is dependence.<sup>2</sup> No existing thing is isolated; a constant action and interaction takes place. As a result particular beings undergo various modifications. These changes clearly show that the

<sup>1</sup> Aug. de Lib. Arbit., I. 2, ch. 17.

<sup>2</sup> Pfleiderer agrees with Kant and Hume and Strauss in maintaining that in proving the individuals contingent we cannot infer that the whole is so. Cf Phil. and Devel. of Religion, p. 148; The Philosophy of Religion, vol. III, p. 256. The argument in its present form is valid for the whole as well as for the parts. Ronayne, God Knowable and Known, p. 19.

beings themselves are dependent. As such they are not sufficient for themselves but need support one from another. The character of dependence is, therefore, marked indelibly upon the visible universe. It is the finger of God. The knowledge of this fact constrains the mind to admit the existence of a being distinct from the world, yet over all, who alone can give a sufficient reason for its dependence. We must, therefore, prove, 1, that the world is contingent; 2, that this fact demands an explanation in the necessary being, which is God.\*

## II.

### ARGUMENT.

§ 6. To obtain a knowledge of the world we go to the physical sciences. They set forth the properties, relations and laws of external nature. There are found facts and principles which furnish the materials for our argument.

§ 7. (1) Chemistry treats of the composition of substances and the changes which they undergo. It tells us that substances are made up of small particles of matter called atoms. As to the quality or essence of these atoms scientists at present are divided. The great majority maintain that there are seventy-six elements essentially different one from the other. Some contend that further analysis will disclose some common basis underlying these elements which accounts for the fact of their manifold combinations.\*

"The phenomena or changes in the universe have indeed each of them a beginning and a cause, but their cause is always a prior change; nor do the analogies of experience give us any reason to expect, from the mere occurrence of changes, that if we could trace back the series far enough we should arrive at a Primeval volition." Mill, *Essays on Religion*, p. 153. The objection is answered in the following pages.

\* Cooke, *New Chemistry*, pp. 117, 118; Harper, S. J., *Metaphysics of the School*, vol. I; *The Unseen Universe*, p. 160. Recent discoveries with regard to Radium and the application of the theory of aeons as the basis of the new physical chemistry now attracting so much attention, seem still further to substantiate the views here set forth.

<sup>Shows that elements are limited (a) from their number.</sup> § 8. Now if the elements be different, e. g., seventy-six, the question naturally arises why are there so many and not more or less. Their existence is limited.

The mind can easily conceive more or less existing. The fact that constant experimentation discloses an element hitherto unknown, or proves an element to be compound which before was considered simple, or reduces so-called simple elements to a simpler one, is proof for the contention. The elements themselves are silent; they contain no sufficient reason for their present existence; they are limited and dependent. If there be essentially only one element, two suppositions can be made. Either the atoms are limited in number or they are infinite. In the former hypothesis they are limited and dependent. The latter hypothesis cannot be held, for it demands that an infinite number of atoms actually exist. But this is not only without foundation in fact, but is opposed to the principles of sound reasoning, as will be shown further on.

<sup>(b) from their determined mode of existence.</sup>

§ 9. Furthermore these atoms have a physical concrete existence. They therefore exist in a determined concrete mode and shape. To affirm that a physical reality has not special modes and form is equivalent to assert that it does not exist. It cannot be maintained that a material atom has infinite modes of existence at one and the same instant of time. Some determined mode and figure is of the essence of matter. True, a material atom may undergo successive changes and assume various shapes as a result of the interaction of other elements and in obedience to mechanical or chemical laws. But these modifications are a striking proof of its intrinsic dependence.

<sup>(c) from their definite combination.</sup>

§ 10. Finally, atoms combine in definite proportion and their action follows on certain definite lines. Hence the laws of chemical equivalents and multiple

proportions. The nature of the elements, therefore, requires that they combine in such and such a manner. Now the determined mode of action reveals their limited and determined nature. We therefore conclude that their nature is dependent and limited; that they present no sufficient explanation for this limitation.

§ 11. (2) Physics is that department of natural (<sup>(a)</sup> *Physica*) science which treats of the general properties of bodies and the causes that modify those properties. From it are drawn strong and irrefutable proofs of our thesis.

§ 12. (a) The great law of Physics is the law of inertia. (<sup>(a)</sup> *mechanical Physics* the law of inertia.) According to this law, matter is indifferent to rest or motion. If it be in a state of rest, it will remain so unless an impulse to motion is imparted from an external cause. If it be in a state of motion, it will continue to move until an external impediment causes the motion to retard or to cease.\*

§ 13. Now in its physical existence matter must be either in a state of rest or of motion. If the former, it would exist in a solid or liquid or a gaseous state. If the latter, the motion would be of a certain velocity and in a definite direction. Ordinary observation shows that matter exists in all these conditions. In the hypothesis that matter is absolute and not dependent on any other being whatsoever, how can we account for its indifference to rest or motion? If it were absolutely independent then rest or motion would be of its essence. In the former case no motion would be possible; in the latter there would be no rest. Ordinary experience shows that these suppositions are contrary to fact, and the law of inertia proves that they are repugnant. Hence we have the remarkable, yet

\* Hence in explaining the law of inertia writers distinguish the inertia of movement and the inertia of repose. Cf. Père Villard, *Dieu Devant la Science et la Raison*, ch. III.

fundamental, fact that matter must exist either in a state of rest or of motion; nevertheless, it is absolutely powerless to determine itself to one state or the other. The determination exists as a physical fact, and the law of inertia which reigns supreme proves to conviction that the determination cannot come from matter itself. The conclusion, therefore, is obvious that it comes from some external source. Hence the dependence of matter is an evident inference from the science of Physics.

(b) Thermo-Dynamics. § 14. (b) Thermo-Dynamics is the name given to that department of physical science which treats of the mechanical action or relations of heat. Its origin is very recent, but so important have been the discoveries in this field and so deep an insight has it presented to a fuller comprehension of the mysteries which envelop the interaction of nature's forces that it holds a prominent place in the interest of scientific men. The labors of Helmholtz, of Tyndall, and of Thompson have been zealously taken up by the younger generation and the records of scientific meetings present the marvellous successes which have attended investigations in this special field.

shows a convergence of laws working to a definite end.

§ 18. The knowledge of a physical law is a solution to many facts shrouded in obscurity. It opens a vista along which the mind can travel. Not only present occurrences become simple and easy to explain. The future also is brought within the sphere of study and we are enabled to predict what will happen for the coming years. Our inferences will become certainties if the mind be enabled to detect a convergence of laws working steadily and irresistibly to a definite end. This is the nature of the present proof. The science of Thermo-Dynamics sets forth laws or principles which show to conviction that the time will come when

the universe will have an end. If it had an end we can infer that it had a beginning. At any rate it is not eternal, but is limited and dependent.

§ 16. (1) A fundamental law of Physics is the conservation of matter. Formerly it was thought possible that matter could be destroyed. In proof of this, appeal was made to ordinary facts which fell under the observation of the senses, *e. g.*, combustion. It was reserved to modern science to prove how false and superficial was this belief. Lavoisier, the founder of Chemistry, proposed a series of experiments which proved that matter is subject to constant change, but is never destroyed. Thus by a balance it can be shown that the weight of a piece of wood before combustion is equivalent to the ashes, smoke and gases, *e. g.*, oxygen and carbonic acid, set free by the process. On this fact Chemistry as a science is based, and this principle gives validity to the formulas which express ascertained and possible Chemical combinations.

§ 17 (2) The discovery of this law led scientists to suspect that what was true of matter could be verified of the forces which enter into play in the physical universe. Almost simultaneously Dr. Meyer in Germany (1842), and Dr. Jules in England (1843), propounded the great law of the conservation of energy. By repeated and scientific experimentation, they showed that mechanical work could be converted into heat and *vice versa*. Hence the formula to express the mechanical equivalent of heat (772 foot-pounds). Scientists began to experiment on the other forms of energy. Helmholtz, Thomson, and Rankin found that this principle was true of chemical affinity, light, gravity and electricity. The unity of the physical forces was proclaimed as a fact.<sup>1</sup> The mind was

<sup>1</sup> *L'Unité des forces physiques*, par. P. Secchi, S. J.

enabled to thoroughly understand the process of the steam-engine, and the way was opened to the introduction of the various mechanical contrivances, e. g., electro-motors, which hold so important a place in modern life.

no destruction of physical force. § 18. In the interaction of physical forces, there is no such thing as destruction. The loss or gain is only apparent. Constant transformations and conversions have place, nothing more. The law of the conservation of energy is considered an established fact. Unremitting study and experimentation have resulted in its repeated verification. Day by day the known range of its application is extending. Up to the present not one exception has been discovered.

(3) law of the dissipation of energy. § 19. (3) Nevertheless, in the working of this law, in the transformations which constantly take place, a remarkable phenomenon has been noted. It has been called by Thomson the law of the dissipation of energy. By this is meant that in the transformation of forces one form of energy gradually absorbs the others. Thus mechanical work or electricity can be converted into heat, yet experiment has shown that it is impossible to convert the whole amount of heat into another form of energy. A residuum always remains after conversion which cannot be reached. There is no actual loss of energy; only a gradual increase in the amount of heat and a corresponding decrease in the amount of the energies.\*

tendency of natural forces to heat. § 20. Hence a study of the laws of Physics clearly shows that natural forces have a tendency to be reduced to heat. The inference is clear. If the amount of heat in the universe is gradually increasing at the expense of other forms of energy, the time will come when all these energies will be no more and heat

\* Faye, *L'Origine du Monde*, p. 310.

alone exist. Now the natural tendency of heat is to a uniform temperature.

§ 21. Thus the world is slowly and surely moving on <sup>The inference.</sup> to the time when there shall be a perfect equilibrium, when all motion shall cease, when life shall be impossible, when one mean temperature shall pervade throughout. There would be no day or night, no change of seasons, no heat or cold; the grass would not grow, no trees or flowers would cheer the eye, no storm-cloud, no light or shadow, no gentle breeze or chill blast, no moving thing around. Only a deep and dull silence reigns; it is the death of the universe. No earthly mortal shall live to see its solemn and awful end. That the end will come is as certain as the certainty of a physical law. It is true in the mind of a devout believer there is a possibility that God may avert the calamity. Our argument is based only on the consideration of the world, such as it is.\*

§ 22. (3) Astronomy is the science which treats of <sup>3° Astro-</sup><sub>nomy.</sub> the heavenly bodies, their properties and the causes of their various phenomena. From earliest times men have been led to study the phenomena of the heavens, to trace out the course of the stars and to discover the laws which regulate their movements. A strange charm clings to the astrologers of old, and the remnants of their theories which have survived the lapse of time appeal to the mind like tales of imaginative fiction. With the labors of Copernicus, Galileo, Tycho Brahe, Kepler and Newton, astronomy was divested of its atmosphere of the marvelous, was placed upon a solid basis and took the position and rank of a science.

\* Conservation of Energy, by Balfour Stewart, p. 164, 188; The Theistic Argument, J. Dimon, p. 131; The Unseen Universe, p. 126.

formation  
of stellar  
world.

§ 23. At present Astronomy in its total extent does not claim our consideration. Attention is drawn to that portion of the science which treats of the formation of the stellar universe. In the preceding proof the laws of Physics clearly showed that the universe would have an end. The laws of Astronomy, on the contrary, constrain the mind to admit that the world had a beginning.

nebula-  
Theory.

§ 24. The science of Astronomy maintains that the solar system was gradually evolved from a primordial gaseous mass called nebula. The theory which obtains with scientists of to-day is that proposed by Kant and La Place. It is the famous nebula theory and aims at explaining the gradual formation of the stellar universe.

its explana-  
tion.

§ 25. Suppose a planetary nebula, like, e. g., the one at present existing in the constellation of Andromeda, diffused in the space now occupied by our solar system. The power of attraction, with which it was endowed, caused the particles to gradually condense. In course of time a body was formed at its center. This body in some manner acquired a rotary motion. In the process of rotation it gradually threw off one ring after another. These in turn condensed and assumed a spherical shape. Hence the solar system in its present state.

an initial  
point must  
be admitted

§ 26. This hypothesis is proposed in the name of science. It cannot be rejected, else the charge might be made that we are dogmatic and unscientific. In admitting it we show that we are in full accord with the principles and spirit of modern science. Astronomy thus confesses that the universe had a beginning. It did not always exist as it does now. By successive stages of development it reached its present condition. The whole process of development was directed and

sustained by definite laws.<sup>10</sup> Further on we shall see that law is the indication and expression of mind. Insistence upon this train of thought would carry us beyond the sphere of our argument. What we contend for is that an initial point in the development must at least be admitted.<sup>11</sup> It does not concern us at present whether or not the nebulous mass exists from eternity. Elsewhere it is shown that this cannot be maintained. If we grant that the nebula is eternal, then it may have possessed from eternity the forces of attraction and of repulsion. The acquisition of these forces at some later period necessarily points to an extrinsic cause. Now let us admit that these forces are eternal, the question naturally arises in the mind, why then did the development begin so recently? Physical forces act in an invariable manner. An invariable process from eternity would have exhausted the development in the eternal past. Yet astronomers busy themselves in computing the age of the earth and of the stellar bodies in space. A suspension of action on the part of the forces cannot be explained by the forces themselves. It must be due to an extrinsic cause. Here again we are brought to a standstill.<sup>12</sup>

the development  
eternal or  
not.

in either  
case the  
conclusion  
is strong.

§ 27. (4) Geology is the science which treats of (4) Geology the structure of the globe, the causes of its physical features and its history. As a science its origin dates only from the past generation. In this short period it has deciphered on the rocks the history of the earth's formation. It tells us that fire and water were the great agencies which had play in the consolidation of the earth's crust from its primitive nebulous condition. The various stages in the process of

<sup>10</sup> Science and Revelation, F. Peck.

<sup>11</sup> De Pressensé, A Study of Origins, p. 146.

<sup>12</sup> Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, B. II, ch. I, § II.

points to time when no life existed, e.g., the Azoic age. The characteristics of each age are clearly indicated and the various forms of life peculiar to each are noted. One fact, however, is clearly shown, viz., that there was a time when no life in any form whatsoever existed. Therefore, Geology teaches that the period of life on this globe is limited, that life had a beginning, that at a period in the remote past, which science has approximately determined, no living being, not even a blade of grass could be found upon the surface of the globe. Geology, therefore, forces the conclusion upon us that terrestrial life is not eternal, that it is limited and as a consequence dependent.<sup>13</sup>

(5) Biology. § 28. (5) It is certain that terrestrial life had a beginning. Geology points out the strata of the earth and shows that in the Azoic age no living thing existed. Paleontology traces back the scale of living things and points to the earliest trace of life.<sup>14</sup> Now a fundamental and well-established law of Biology is that life can only come from life. Therefore, living beings on earth are dependent and point to some

teaches that life can only come from life.

<sup>13</sup> Mr. Schurman passes over the argument in the following manner: "Natural history assures us there was a time when the earth held no living or thinking beings. But since they have actually appeared, it is certain there never was a time when nature had not the capacity of producing them. And instead of regarding nature before their emergence as a chaos, we are bound to interpret it as a developing cosmos which contains in itself the promise and potency of all terrestrial life and intelligence." The reason is that "atoms are merely the hypothetical elements of that material vesture in which spirit has eternally expressed itself. Spirit is the eternal reality and nature its eternal manifestations . . . Nature is the externalisation of spirit and no more separable from it than the spoken word from the thought it symbolizes." Cf. Belief in God, p. 156. It is to be wondered whether Hegel would recognize himself in this "hypothetical vesture."

<sup>14</sup> Tait, Recent Advances in Physical Science, Lect. VII; Prof. Young, The Sun, p. 276.

external cause as the sufficient reason for their existence. For the past two hundred years the problem of the origin of life has been most eagerly studied. Two main solutions have been proposed.

§ 29. (a) Materialists contend that the universe ought to be explained by its own inherent forces alone. Hence they proclaim the theory of spontaneous generation, *i. e.*, the spontaneous production of life as resulting from the action of physical or chemical energies. This is the law of *Abiogenesis*.

§ 30. (b) Others hold that in the animal or vegetable kingdom life can only come from life. To explain the beginning of life they contend for the intervention of a force distinct from the material universe. This is the law of *Biogenesis*. The real question at issue is the existence of a living Creator. The former wish to explain the phenomena of the universe without having recourse to God. The latter find a necessity for action on the part of God, and the strongest proof that He has acted.

§ 31. To the minds of the ancients there was no doubt that life was spontaneously generated. Aristotle believed that many living beings, *e. g.*, insects, worms, etc., were generated by the forces of matter alone; hence the formula: *corruptio unius, generatio alterius*. Lucretius says that for this reason men speak of Mother Earth.<sup>16</sup> Virgil describes the spontaneous generation of bees,<sup>17</sup> Origen cites the production of worms as a fact admitted without question,<sup>18</sup> and St. Augustine holds this to be the only opinion of antiquity.<sup>19</sup> During the Middle Ages the spontaneous generation of certain beings was held as a fact simply. Avicenna

<sup>Spontane-</sup>  
<sup>ous Genera-</sup>  
<sup>tion.</sup>

<sup>its history.</sup>

<sup>ancient.</sup>

<sup>medieval.</sup>

<sup>16</sup> De Nat. Rerum, V. 793.

<sup>17</sup> Georg. IV.

<sup>18</sup> Contra Celsum, IV. 57.

<sup>19</sup> De Civ. Dei, XVI. 7.

attributed this to the power of matter alone. St. Thomas, on the contrary, advanced the opinion that if matter produced living things it was in virtue of a special power from God."<sup>10</sup> This interpretation of spontaneous generation by Christian Philosophers was widely different from Materialists.

**modern.**

**labors of Redi.**

§ 32. In 1644 Van Helmont and Kircher gave receipts for the production of mice and of snakes. Towards the close of this century the first blow was aimed at the theory. Dr. Francisco Redi of Tuscany (1668) showed that worms in meat were the maggots of flies' eggs. This was done by placing meat in jars so sealed that the flies could not touch it. The invention of the microscope, however, in revealing a new world of living beings, brought the old doctrine into favor. Needham and Buffon were the leaders in the revival. They found a strong adversary in Abbé Spallanzani (d. 1799), who tried to show, inconclusively, however, through lack of means, that the latent life so generated was due to atmospheric germs. The problem was reopened and earnestly debated up to the middle of the present century.

**In early part of present century.**

§ 33. The discovery of oxygen and its presence as a necessary condition to existing life marked an epoch in the controversy. In 1836 Schultz and Swann made notable experiments in sterilizing air which pointed to the impossibility of spontaneous generation. By causing air to pass through hot glass tubes or sulphuric acid they showed that the quantity of oxygen was preserved while the organic matter was destroyed. The experiments were not conclusive because the nature of what was destroyed could not be known. Twenty years later Mr. Ponchet declared that he saw infusoria spontaneously generated in a sterilized liquid which

<sup>10</sup> St. Thom. I, q. 71, a. 1.

had been put in contact with the air despoiled of germs. Claude Bernard, Quatrefages and Payen in vain pointed out to him the causes of the mistake.

§ 34. In 1860 the French Academy proposed the Pasteur problem as a prize-subject with a view to have the question thoroughly discussed. Mr. Pasteur now began the experiments which have given him lasting fame. He proved that our atmosphere is swarming with germs of life which are the real cause of putrefaction. He showed that pure air deprived of germs does not produce putrefaction in a fermentable liquid, because the germs are not always so abundant. Hence the phrase "*omne vivum e cellula*" was verified for the world of infinitely small beings as well as for those visible to the naked eye.

§ 35. In 1872 Dr. Bastian claimed that he found the physico-chemical conditions apt to produce life without germs. Pasteur in reply pointed out three causes of error against which he had not guarded himself.\* About the same time Fremy and Frecul held that a living being could not be born from brute matter, but it could be produced by organized matter, e. g., the ferment of wine is caused by the cells of parenchyme which make up the grape-juice. This is spontaneous generation under another form. Pasteur made still more decisive experiments. He discovered that fermentation was a function of life, that the phenomenon is produced in fermentable liquids by atmospheric yeast-germs, that grape-wine is unable to ferment of itself, that the organic yeast which causes the fermentation comes from without the grain, that the air-germs in summer are deposited on the grapes, and in autumn, when the grapes are crushed, the germs mingle with the juice and cause fermentation.

\* Popular Science Monthly, Dec., 1881, p. 248.

Tyndall. § 36. In England Mr. Tyndall bestowed upon the problem most extended and minute study. He showed why the brewer put yeast in barley-juice to make beer. For over a year he conducted most careful experiments and conclusively proved that fermentation, or putrefaction, is the result of pre-existing germs. "There is in experimental science," he writes, "no conclusion more certain." In presence of such facts it will be absolutely monstrous to say that swarms of bacteria have been spontaneously generated."<sup>11</sup>

Virchow. § 37. Mr. Virchow says "There is not a single known positive fact that spontaneous generation ever took place; those who hold the contrary are contradicted by scientists, not by theologians." The conclusion, therefore, is a fact which cannot be questioned; living substances can only come from substances already possessing life."<sup>12</sup> Now Geology shows most conclusively that terrestrial life had a beginning. The inference is clear. The existence of living beings on earth can ultimately be explained only by recourse to a living cause outside and above the universe, who communicated to this earth the fact and potency of life."<sup>13</sup>\*

(6) Anthropology. § 38. Anthropology is the science which deals with the history and races of mankind. It differs from Biology in this, that it considers man alone, the highest form of terrestrial life. It estimates approximately the length of time man has inhabited the globe. At present we are not concerned with the exactness of its statements. One truth is sufficient,

<sup>11</sup> Add. in Glasgow, 1876, in *Fragments of Science*; Huxley, *Lay Sermons*; Quatrefages, *Darwin et ses Precurs.* Franc., p. 174; Thein, *Anthropology*, ch. I; Schanz, *A Christian Apology*, vol. I, ch. VIII; Flint, *Anti-Theistic Theories*, p. 488.

<sup>12</sup> *God Knowable and Known*, M. Ronayne, S. J., p. 24.

<sup>13</sup> Traces of this argument are found in Aug. Conf. I. III, ch. 6, n. 10; de Vera Relig., ch. XI; Soliloq. I. I, n. 3; de Doct. Christ, I. I, ch. 7, 8; in Joan. tr. 19, n. 11.

\* This argument from Biology must be viewed in connection with the arguments from Geology and Astronomy of Doubts about Darwinism by a Semi-Darwinian, Longmans Green & Co., 1903, p. 29.

viz., there was a time when no human being existed on earth. A study of man's nature shows that in common with the brute he is an animal. Yet over and above he possesses intelligence and free-will which mark him off from all living beings and make him lord of creation. Now Psychology proves that sensation, which is the characteristic of animal nature, cannot spring from lower forms of life, e. g., life of a plant, and that intelligence does not come from sensation. Wherefore the sense and intellectual life on earth had a beginning. But the reason for this cannot be sought in any living earthly thing because all other forms of life belong to a lower scale. Hence they are due to an external cause.

§ 39. Mathematics is the science which treats of quantity either discrete, e. g., numbers, or continuous, e. g., magnitudes. Distinguished into several special departments, it enunciates laws and principles which hold sway throughout the material world. Primarily dealing with quantity in the abstract, its data and inferences find logical and natural application in the concrete. Hence we have the distinction between pure and applied mathematics. Therefore the principles of mathematics can be applied to the universe as a whole because of its quantity or magnitude, with the same reason that they are applied to Architecture, Astronomy and Navigation.

§ 40. Now the science of Mathematics sets forth certain truths or principles which show conclusively that the material universe is limited in time and in space. Therefore it is not eternal or infinite, but dependent and finite.<sup>\*\*</sup>

§ 41. The question of the infinite in time and in space is not two-fold. It can be resolved into that of

<sup>\*\*</sup>The suggestive article in *Revue des Questions Scientifiques* 1878, vol. I, afterwards published in the volume *Les Confins de la Science*, by Father Carborelle, S. J.

**Problem of infinite number.**<sup>"</sup> The solution of this gives the answer to the difficulties involved in the former. For the concepts of space and of time, so frequently arising in the mind, are in reality more difficult to analyze than that of number. The reasoning is not based on the abstruse problems of higher mathematics. We take the simple integral number found in the ordinary school Arithmetic. The problem to be discussed is that of the infinite number. It is a problem full of difficulties. For centuries it has engaged the thoughts of philosophers. Can a consideration of the integral numbers used in Arithmetic bring us any nearer a solution and give a definite conception free from ambiguity and error?

Is infinite  
number a  
contradic-  
tion

§ 42. (a) Some maintain that an infinite number is a contradiction. But this assertion cannot be held. Taken in its widest generality, as the phrase itself would justify, it appeals to us without any warrant whatsoever, and is known to be false. St. Augustine says that there is an infinity in number is a certainty beyond dispute.<sup>"</sup> In setting forth proofs for the existence of God, St. Thomas omits the consideration of the infinity of number, restricts himself to one aspect merely, and proposes an argument based on the truth that an infinity of efficient causes succeeding one another is false. Pascal candidly admits that there is an infinity in number, but in the same breath adds that he knows not what it is. The ambiguity of the statement is clearly shown by Kant, who places it side by side with its contradictory as among the antinomies of pure reason.

<sup>"</sup> Rabier, however, holds that the infinity of number is *poten-*  
*tial*, of space is *actual*. *Lécons de Philosophie*, p. 465.

<sup>"</sup> De Civ. Dei., l. XII, ch. 18.

§ 43. It is not absurd; else why is recourse had to <sup>not absurd.</sup> the infinite number to explain many things which come under daily observation. Ask a boy with a hat full of marbles if more and more can be had and the answer will be there is an infinite number. To his mind there is no limit to the number of possible marbles; other boys have many more than he, and his store can be augmented beyond all possible computation. We often find ourselves reasoning after much the same manner, and the like answer so naturally arising precludes any further doubt or question. The same is true of continuous quantity. A line, e. g., is made up of geometrical points. If we ask how many points make up the line, the answer is an infinite number; but this limitation is due to the mind's action; it is not inherent in the points themselves. So, too, when we try to compute the number of integers in algebraic roots.

§ 44. (b) Others try to clear up the obscurity by <sup>distinction of act and potency.</sup> making a distinction between act and possibility. Thus they contend that number can be infinite when viewed as a potency or possibility, not when it is considered as actually existing. The phrase: an infinite number actually existing involves a contradiction, is a time-honored dogma in philosophy and in theology. Thoughtful minds have presented it as an unanswerable argument to prove the existence of God, and as a stumbling-block in the path of Materialism. We do not deny that it contains truth. Only worded in such fashion it is ambiguous and admits of further analysis. Take for example the concepts of a line, of time, of space. The points in a line, the intervals in time, the distances in space actually exist. Yet it can be maintained that they are infinite, and it is impossible with the sole aid of this distinction to show that the contention is false.

distinction  
of unde-  
termined.

§ 45. (c) Another distinction, therefore, is necessary. It has been shown that an infinite number is not a contradiction or an absurdity. Nevertheless, so worded, it is ambiguous. This can be cleared up by asserting that as such it is by its own nature undetermined. Hence we maintain that an infinite number is conceivable, but it is essentially undetermined. The proof of this statement is very clear. Of two finite numbers, I can say that one is greater than the other. The justness of the estimate would be questioned by no one. If, however, I should say that of two infinite numbers one is greater than the other, my words become contradictory and absurd.

infinite  
number es-  
sentially  
undeter-  
mined.

§ 46. Let us take, e. g., two infinite series, a, b, c, and 1, 2, 3. Now these series are equal. Yet I can suppose 1 to be 10 or 20, or 100 times greater than a. A comparison, therefore, of infinite series by reason of quantity becomes impossible. The same holds good of continuous quantity. Take, e. g., an isosceles triangle. Suppose a line EF be drawn parallel to the base, AB intersecting the sides AC and BC. Now it is proved by a geometrical process that EF is shorter than AB. Admitting that the points of the line be infinite, we have one infinite greater than the other. At the same time by connecting the points in a special manner they could both be made equal. Finally let us compare an arithmetical with a geometrical progressive series, e. g., 1-2-3 and 2-4-6, etc. Now one series is greater than the other, yet both are infinite. Hence it is evident that we cannot compare two infinite numbers by reason of quantity. This is due to their nature. They cannot receive a quantity which determines them and makes them able to be grasped by the mind. They constantly elude all efforts to individualize or determine them. They are, therefore, essentially undetermined.

§ 47. The conclusion is clear. An infinite determined number is an impossibility. An infinite undetermined number contains nothing absurd. Thus when it is said "there is an infinity in number" the undetermined number is understood. When, again, others say "an infinite number is a contradiction" they speak of the determined number. Having found the proper distinction and presented a solution to the question of infinite number, we can now apply this principle to the infinite in time and in space.

§ 48. Now between two determined points in space there cannot be an infinite interval. This is possible only when one of the extremes is undetermined. For, if we grant that the interval were infinite, it could be expressed in numbers which would be at the same time determined and infinite. This, as has been shown, is impossible. Mathematicians speak of lines meeting in infinity, e. g., two parallel lines, the asymptote meets its curve in infinity. The language can be justified, but it should not be forgotten that the meaning is that the lines will never meet at all.

§ 49. And hence (1) the material universe had a beginning.<sup>11</sup> A past event, e. g., a material phenomenon of any kind whatsoever, can have actually taken place only on the condition that it existed at a determined instant of time. To maintain that it existed at an undetermined epoch is to take away all its reality and to render it an impossibility. But two determined instants in time cannot be separated by an infinite interval. The distance between them is finite. Therefore the eternity of matter is an impossibility, and the series of phenomena which make up the material universe must have had a beginning.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup> *The Unseen Universe*, p. VII, XV, XVIII.

<sup>12</sup> What basis has Mr. Schurman for the opinion "we do not know that the world had a beginning in time and see no evidence to suppose it had." Cf. *Belief in God*, p. 149.

(\*) universe  
is limited in  
space. § 50. (2) The material world is limited in space. Are the stars which fill the heavens infinite in number? The answer is very simple. Each star is determined by its own existence. Thus the entire number is determined. As such it cannot be infinite. Again, if the material world had an infinite extent, real phenomena would exist, separated one from another by infinite distances. But this, it has been shown, cannot be maintained. Therefore the universe is limited in all directions.

objection  
from Geom-  
etry.

§ 51. It may be said that this reasoning does not hold good of abstract geometrical figures. The reason is that by their abstract nature, they contain undetermined parts. The mind determines each part in the very act of conceiving it. Nevertheless a conception of the whole is possible without a determination of all the parts. A material phenomenon, on the contrary, is of necessity determined by its own existence. The place it occupies in space is necessarily determined.

This  
reasoning  
can be ap-  
plied to  
atoms.

§ 52. The same line of reasoning can be applied in all its cogency to the atoms which are supposed to make up the universe. They exist in the concrete; as such they are determined. Therefore they cannot be infinite. In face of this what should we say of John Stuart Mill's assertion that "the world does not by its mere existence bear witness to God?" "

" Essays on Religion, p. 153; Pfleiderer, Phil. of Relig, vol. III, p. 257; St. Thomas, C. Gent., I. I, ch. 13; II, 15; Sum. Theol. I, q. 44. a 1, 2; I. q. 45, a. 12. "Ex operibus corporis agnosco viventem; ex operibus creaturae non potes agnoscere Creatorem!" Aug. Enar., in Ps. 73, n. 25. "Interrogavi terram, et dixit, non sum (Deus); et quaecumque in eadem sunt, idem confessa sunt. Interrogavi mare et abyssos, et reptilia animalium vivarum, et responderunt; non sumus Deus tuus; quaere super nos. Interrogavi auras flabiles et inquit universus aer cum incolis suis; Fallitur Anaximenes; non sum Deus. Interrogavi coelum, solem, lunam, stellas; neque nos sumus Deus, quem quaeris, inquiunt. Et dixi omnibus his quae circumstant fores carnis meae; Dixistis mihi de Deo, meo quod vos non estis, dicite mihi de illo aliquid. Et exclamaverunt voce magna; ipse fecit nos." St. Aug. Confess. X. 6.

## CHAPTER VII.

### CAUSALITY.

§ 1. Causality is a primary conviction of the human mind.<sup>1</sup> It is at the basis of our mental life.<sup>2</sup> Universal in application with people of every age, race or condition, it enters into every subject of thought, every topic of conversation, whether by the laborer in the humble service of daily toil, or by the thoughtful student in the effort to solve the problems of life and of being. To the untutored mind of the child and of the savage its working in the physical world presents countless sources of wonder. The world is pictured as filled with mysterious beings. The mind is naturally prone to personify the objects acting around us. The error is laid bare by experimental investigation and reflection which enables the mind to trace the physical laws and to grasp the real nature of the proximate causes. The objective truth of causality remains intact; its apprehension only becomes more intelligent. From a spontaneous judgment it has assumed the form and force of a philosophical certainty.

#### I.

##### THE PRINCIPLE.

§ 2. The principle of causality enters into every argument for the existence of God.<sup>3</sup> Around and through it are woven the facts of ordinary and scientific investigation. Hence comes the consistency and

<sup>1</sup> “Inest homini naturale desiderium cognoscendi causam cum intuetur effectum.” St. Thomas, I. q. 12, a. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Farges, *L'idée de Dieu*, p. 59.

cogency of the reasoning. In a certain sense, therefore, the other arguments proposed can be called arguments from causality. Nevertheless a special train of thought can be formulated from the consideration of causality in existing things. It takes the name and rank of a distinct proof.\*

(1) distinction of causes.

§ 3. (1) Aristotle in his *Metaphysics* distinguishes four kinds of causes; material, formal, final and efficient. Thus, *e. g.*, a sculptor forms a statue of Washington out of a piece of marble. The stone out of which the statue is made is called the *material* cause; the form or figure which makes the marble appear in the likeness of our country's hero, is called the *formal* cause; the motive of the worker or the purpose of the work, *e. g.*, money, reputation, the ornamentation of a public building, is considered as the *final* cause; finally the agent who by the exercise of his own energy slowly and with labor fashions the work is the *efficient* cause. This division obtains in Scholastic Philosophy and has been most fiercely and persistently attacked by modern writers. The present argument is based on efficient causes; in the following chapter the problem of the final cause will be discussed.

(b) argument based on efficient cause.

§ 4. (2) The efficient cause can be either moral, *e. g.*, when the action is due to a command, entreaty, etc., or physical, *e. g.*, the agencies of the material universe exercise a real activity to produce a certain result, thus heat expands, cold contracts, fire burns, etc. The

\* Modern German Ethnographers, *e. g.*, Peschel, Ratzel, Schurtz, have traced the origin of religion to one characteristic of the human intellect, the notion of causality. Cf. *Religion of Primitive Peoples*, D. G. Brinton, p. 44. Pres. Schurman dismissed the argument with the words "The question, Is there a first cause? is obsolete for a generation that finds God in the world and not outside and apart from it." *Belief in God*, p. 14. The writer evidently does not understand the subject treated. Prof. Knight thinks the argument illusory. *Aspects of Theism*, ch. IV.

distinction should be borne in mind, for it enables the reader to guard against confusion, indicates the true method to be pursued in proving the principle of causality, and reveals the wide extent and true value of the principle itself.

§ 5. (3) The argument is based on facts of experience. Ordinary experience is reinforced by a wealth of data from the physical sciences. We are conscious of a real causality influencing every act throughout our daily life. The agencies in nature act upon us. In like manner throughout the visible universe, object acts upon and modifies object. The various sciences set forth the nature of process. The argument, therefore, takes the form of an induction rigorously concluding from scientific data.

§ 6. (4) The principle of causality can be termed a spontaneous judgment.<sup>4</sup> It is the natural possession and property of the human mind. Nevertheless it is not so easy to formulate it in words. At the present time scholars are not content in amassing stores of facts and in tracing them to proper causes. The very foundations of knowledge have been questioned. The first principles of thought, the manner and mode of thinking have been discussed most eagerly. The ultimate result is that we have a better knowledge of the limits and needs of the mind, a clearer grasp of the principles themselves and a more luminous insight into current difficulties.

§ 7. (a) The principle of causality is by some expressed as *every effect has a cause*. So taken the principle is immediately evident; its truth is forced upon the mind without the slightest hesitation or reflection. But it possesses no value when applied to objective facts in a proof for the existence of God.

<sup>4</sup> Fr. Harper, S. J., *Metaphysics of the School*, vol. III.

The defect is that it is tautological. The whole strength of the argument lies in showing to conviction that the world is an effect. To employ the principle in this form would be to make a gratuitous assumption in the most vital part of our reasoning and to render the attempt itself invalid and abortive.

(b) the dependent demands the independent being.

§ 8. (b) Or we may say that *what dependently exists can only be explained by postulating an independent and necessary cause.* In this sense the principle is employed in the argument from contingency. So expressed, the principle requires some reflection before its strength is apparent. We cannot say, therefore, that it is immediately evident to the mind.

(c) what begins to be must have a cause for the beginning.

§ 9. (c) Finally, it may be stated in a slightly different form, viz., *that which begins to exist demands a cause for the beginning.*\* Thus a being which now exists, but did not at some time exist, owes its existence to the activity of some other being which is termed its cause. In this form the principle is employed in the argument from causality. So expressed, it is not immediately evident.\* As in the former case reflection is necessary to grasp its force.

\* Mr. Schurman, Belief in God, p. 150, says: "The principle of causality is whatever has begun to be, whether a thing or an event, must have a cause or antecedent to account for it." So also Janet, Final Causes, p. 17. The Theistic Argument, J. Dimon, p. 82; J. S. Mill also interprets the principle of causality in this sense, yet contends that it is valid only for the changeable element in nature, whereas the permanent element, i. e., the specific elementary substances, do not come under its sway. Cf. Essays on Religion, p. 142. And in his Logic, vol. I, p. 422, says that "ultimate or efficient causes are radically inaccessible to the human faculties." This is explained by the Doctrine of Phenomenal Idealism which springs from his peculiar theory of knowledge. Cf. the Great Enigma, W. S. Lilly, p. 223.

\* Dr. Fisher, in Manual of Natural Theology, holds it a "self-evident truth," p. 10; Dr. Bowne, in Philosophy of Theism, p. 70, writes "we know directly nothing of causes." Both err in extremes.

§ 10. The same line of thought applies to both. We make use of the principle of sufficient reason. This cannot be doubted or denied; to do so is to suppose a sufficient reason for acting. Thus, whenever we act intelligently, a sufficient reason is present. If, therefore, the world began to exist, it must have a sufficient reason for beginning to be. This can be found (1) either in nothing; but this is absurd, for nothing can produce nothing; (2) or in the possibility of the world beginning to be; but this cannot be maintained, else all possible things would exist. Mere objective possibility can never be the cause why a being in such a state began to exist in concrete reality; (3) or in the world beginning to be; but this must be rejected, because a thing cannot act before it exists, and the question is to account for the initial point of its existence; (4) or in some other being which by its activity caused, *e. g.*, the world, to assume its present existence. Now this is what is understood by the efficient cause. The principle of causality, therefore, is expressed clearly and without ambiguity; its validity is shown to be strong and indisputable.<sup>1</sup> We shall now consider the principal modern errors which try to destroy its real force, and take away a fundamental prop to our faith.

## II.

### ERRORS.

§ 11. The principle of causality has been fiercely attacked by two writers who at different times exercised a strong influence in moulding the English philosophic mind.\*

<sup>1</sup>Kant held that the principle of causality is valid only within the world of our experience. Cf. Pfeiderer, Hist. of Phil., vol. III, p. 258; Lewes, Phil. of Aristotle, § 62, shows that it is absolute.

\*Their teaching is at the root of the so-called system of

Hume.

1°. Hume is the founder of the Associationist school of philosophy. For upwards of one hundred years his writings have deeply moved English thought. The leading English writers of to-day are his apologists or disciples.<sup>9</sup> To the foreigner it is the only school of philosophy that has a claim to be considered indigenous to English soil.

his notion  
of cause.

§ 12. Hume maintains that all our ideas come from experience. Granted that the mind has the idea of cause; this idea could have its source in experience alone. But, he continues, when we analyze our experience, the mind can find no sound basis to justify the formation of the concept. Experience shows that events succeed one another, not that one has produced the other; hence we have succession only, not causation. The mind does not know in what consists the connection or bond of what is understood by causation. Therefore, he concludes that causation is nothing more than succession;<sup>10</sup> that causation in the sense of efficiency has no foundation in experience, but is simply a mental fancy or exaggeration and should accordingly be rejected by the thoughtful student.<sup>11</sup>

criticism.

(a) false,  
ambiguous  
use of  
the word  
*experience*.

§ 13. (a) The reasoning of Hume starts from a patent fallacy. The solution is had in the explanation of experience. Experience can be considered as a practical acquaintance with anything by personal observation or trial of it. This comes either through the

Inductive Logic. Hence we find writers confessing that we cannot by induction rise above phenomena. Cf. Knight, Aspects of Theism, p. 144. The true answer is to show that the method of induction in this question is partial and false, that its basis is erroneous.

<sup>9</sup> The Theistic Argument, J. Dimon, pp. 10, 12.

<sup>10</sup> Mill, Logic, b. III, ch. 5.

<sup>11</sup> Natural expectation caused by repetition is the sole basis of the idea of causation." Modern Philosophy by A. K. Rogers, p. 112.

external senses which give a knowledge of the outside world, or through the internal faculties which reveal the feelings of the body, the thoughts of the mind, the movements and emotions of the will. Experience, therefore, is two-fold; external and internal. Of the two, internal ranks much higher. We may be deceived by the senses, by consciousness never.

§ 14. (b) Hume errs in holding that the idea of causality primarily comes from external experience, and that we should first of all seek in external experience for its basis and justification. On the contrary, the idea of cause comes primarily from internal experience.

(1) Consciousness testifies that we are the causal agents of our own thoughts and desires. There is a real causal connection between the mind and its thoughts, between the will and its volitions or resolves. This bond or connection is a fundamental fact of inner experience. There is nothing closer to us than our thoughts and our feelings; they constitute our very life. Here only is found the true source and origin of the notion of causality.

§ 15. (2) Consciousness also testifies that the members of the body are under the control of the will. Thus, e. g., after careful thought I determine to write; the will directs the movement of the hand and my thoughts appear on the written page. In like manner I move my feet to walk, turn the head in answer to a question, move the lips to speak. Often, it is true, my acts are indeliberate; but they ever answer an internal impulse which is found at its highest and best in the deliberate act of the rational will. This control and impulse is the connection or bond which is of the essence of causality.

the consciousness of force exercised upon us.

§ 16 (3) Again, we are certain that other bodies act upon us. Thus, e. g., a person strikes me a severe blow with the hand; there is more than mere succession in the act; there is a real communication of energy to produce an effect, viz., discoloration of face or a sudden fall. So, too, the energies of nature influence us. We are a prey to cold and heat; the sun, rain, etc., act upon us in many ways.<sup>19</sup>

the inference to the world without.

confirmed by science.

(c) the notion of cause which comes from external observation alone much different from the principle.

§ 17. (4) Finally, we infer that external objects act one upon another. This is an inference from analogy, having its basis in the most certain testimony of consciousness. It is supposed in the ordinary daily actions; it is confirmed by scientific investigation; it is illustrated in every department of mechanical work, e. g., Chemistry, Astronomy.<sup>20</sup>

§ 18. (c) External observation alone might give a vague notion of cause and effect. But this would lack the vigor and conviction which the concept possesses. Hence it would approximate to Hume's notion of succession. Consciousness tells us otherwise, and here is found the true origin of the idea. A cause is nothing more than a substance exercising active power. Hence the concept of cause springs from and is based in that of substance. Thus every cause is a substance, or every substance has the potency to become a cause. Hume's error arises from his failure to obtain a true concept of substance. To him the mind, e. g., was a bundle of qualities. Of itself, therefore, it is nothing. How then could it exercise power and become a cause? Internal experience is nothing more than a passing series of thoughts and feelings. Hence to him succession was the only bond. Causality naturally was viewed as nothing more. Real efficiency gave

<sup>19</sup> Rickaby, General Metaphysics, ch. Causation.

<sup>20</sup> Farges, L'idée de Dieu, p. 29.

place to association, and instead of a causal connection between the mind and its thought, we have the succession of idea to idea, the association of feeling to feeling in a shadowy uncertain round.

§ 19. (2) Mr. Mill confounds the principle of causality with the law of the uniformity of nature.<sup>14</sup> Thus he speaks of universal causation, *i. e.*, a uniformity in the succession of events. This arises from the physical truth that the amount of energy in the universe, both actual and potential, is ever a constant quantity and that it acts in definite ways, according to fixed laws. Hence, the principle of causation, he maintains, can be formulated as a scientific truth.

§ 20. (a) The principle of causality is distinct from the law of the uniformity of nature; it is of an altogether different order. The former is a primary conviction which has its source in our inner consciousness. It is an obvious truth forced upon the mind and holds imperious sway over the thoughts of children and savages as well as of the aged and wise. This fundamental and necessary character of the causal judgment can only be explained by holding it to spring from the depths of our rational nature.

§ 21. (b) On the other hand, the law of the uniformity in nature comes from experience. It is an induction based upon a long and careful observation of facts. It is not a self-evident truth; it does not rank as a universal and necessary principle. Mr. Mill has shown that the conviction or belief in a fixed and well-ordered system in spite of constant interferences and apparent disorders is forced upon the mind after long and patient research in the field of nature.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>14</sup> System of Logic, B. III, ch. XXI; Martineau, A Study of Religion, vol. I, p. 150.

<sup>15</sup> Logic, B. IV, ch. 21.

To Mill  
causality is  
uniformity  
of nature.

(a) One  
principle  
not the  
other: caus-  
ality a  
*a priori*.

(b) prin-  
ciple of uni-  
formity not  
*a priori*.

(c) Mr.  
Mill's error  
due to  
Hume.

§ 22. (c) Mr. Mill was led into this error by too careful adherence to the teaching of Hume. Both started from the same point, viz., that experience is the source which can give the true notion of cause. Both passed over, as of no worth, the patent and fundamental testimony of consciousness. Seeking in external experience alone for a solution they separated and proposed different but not necessarily contradictory doctrines. Hume saw series of phenomena succeeding one another; to him, therefore, causality meant succession. Mr. Mill was impressed with the marvelous order and uniformity which prevailed in the physical world. Rising above particular facts, he grasped the great law of uniformity of nature, and proclaimed this to be the principle of causality. But he took the effect for the cause, the result for the principle. Uniformity supposes constant succession of fact upon fact. This constant succession, however, is due to the causal activity of the one upon the other. Physical causality is grasped as an analogy from evident facts of consciousness and is corroborated and supposed by physical science.<sup>16</sup>

### III.

#### ARGUMENT.

Argument  
based on  
causality.

§ 23. The fact of objective causality, therefore, is established beyond question. On this the argument is based. We shall now set it forth as briefly and as conclusively as possible. From the truth that objects in nature exert an influence to produce certain effects, and these in turn produce other effects, we have what can be termed successive series of causes and effects. Each unit of the series is an effect inasmuch as it was

<sup>16</sup> McCosh, Fundamental Truth; Harper, S. J., Metaphysics of the Schools, vol. III.

produced by the anterior unit; it is a cause inasmuch as it produced the following one. Efficient causality, therefore, is a link which binds them all together.

§ 24. That such series exist is evident to ordinary observation. The various sciences, each in its own department, proposes them. Physics and Chemistry set forth chemical combinations and mechanical activities. Biology deals with birth, death, the various modes by which life is communicated. Thus many series as a fact exist. For the argument, one such series is sufficient.

§ 25. Now this series is either finite or infinite. If it be finite, then it has a first member. The existence and activity of the first member can only be explained by postulating a cause outside the series.<sup>10</sup> Else it would come from nothing or produce itself, which is contradictory. This outside cause must be uncaused; else we should go on to infinity.<sup>11</sup>

If the series be infinite,<sup>12</sup> the solution is convincing. According to the hypothesis, based on facts, each member was produced. But if each member be caused, the whole series was caused likewise. The prolongation of a series of caused units to infinity by no means

<sup>10</sup> A view opposed to this and very prevalent to-day as an effect of Hegel on modern Theistic discussion is expressed by Mr. Schurman, *Belief in God*, pp. 157, 161, 172. "The truth of the argument from causality lies not in an extra-mundane Cause or Maker of a created world, but in an intra-mundane cause or ground of an uncreated world." This is pure Pantheism. Cf. Bowne, *Intr. to Phil. of Theism*.

<sup>11</sup> J. S. Mill writes that "The First Cause Argument is of no value because no cause is needed for that which had no beginning; and both matter and force have had so far as our experience can teach us, no beginning — which cannot be said of mind." *Essays on Religion* p. 53, 143; Exam. of Sir W. Hamilton, vol. II, p. 37. In answer we refer to the argument from contingency.

<sup>12</sup> This solution is proposed by Hamilton, Mill and Bascom. Prof. Wilson, *Found. of Relig. Belief*, p. 93.

changes the nature of the series itself.<sup>20</sup> Hence a cause for the infinite series is imperative. Otherwise there would be an effect without a cause,—a statement contrary to the principle of causality.

§ 26. Again, suppose the series be infinite. In consequence a present effect would have an infinite number of intermediary causes. If this supposition be true, then no activity could be had, because an intermediary cause is also an effect and is only a cause by reason of the activity communicated by its immediate antecedent. Hence we should have, according to our reason, no ultimate effect, a conclusion contradictory to the hypothesis. But this is to be rejected as absurd.<sup>21</sup>

The conclu-  
sion.

§ 27. The conclusion is rigorous and certain. By the principle of causality the mind is forced to admit a first cause to explain the successive series of causes and effects in the world about us. This cause must be a cause in the sense that it is not an effect of a preceding cause. Therefore it is an uncaused cause, *i. e.* God.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>20</sup> It is not therefore "A doubtful piece of Logic to argue from the absolute necessity of a cause in every case to the existence of an absolute beginning which does not need a cause." Modern Philosophy, A. K. Rogers, p. 54. "The real alternative," writes Mr. Dimon, "does not lie between an infinite series and a first cause, but between accepting a first cause, or rejecting the idea of cause altogether." The Theistic Argument, p. 85. "An infinite succession of causes rests, by the very hypothesis, upon no cause." Ib., p. 85.

<sup>21</sup> Card. Newman, Discourses to Mixed Congregations, pp. 197, 198; Clark, Existence of God, p. 1, ch. 4, § 3.

<sup>22</sup> "Hence it is obvious that however remote that point to which we trace in thought the history of our universe, we are still confronted with the impossibility of accounting by physical causation for its commencement; in moral causality we do not exclude the subsequent perpetual agency of Creative Will, because in scientific reasoning we speak of it in the language of physical force." Cf. W. Carpenter, M. D., Nature and Man, p. 396; Prof. Wilson, Foundations of Religious Belief, p. 92.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### MOTION.

§ 1. The considerations drawn from the nature of the beings which make up this universe, lead the mind to the conclusion that a being exists independent and self-sufficient on whom all things depend. This is what is meant by a necessary being, *i. e.*, God.

§ 2. In the present chapter we do not dwell upon <sup>Fact of movement.</sup> the nature of the beings around us. We take the great and universal fact of movement. All things are in constant change. Astronomy sets forth the revolutions and various motions of stellar bodies. Geology explains the development of the earth. Biology is busied with the phenomena of growth. Physics and Chemistry reveal the molecular movements, caloric vibrations and the multiform combinations of inorganic elements.<sup>1</sup>

On this fundamental fact of movement and change rests the argument which constrains the thoughtful reader to admit the existence of God.<sup>2</sup>

#### I.

#### THE PRINCIPLE.

§ 3. Motion is a universal and fundamental phenomenon. To take this as a basis of an argument is not the fact <sup>The nature of the fact,</sup> an appeal to an obvious as well as to a metaphysical <sup>is questioned.</sup> truth. There is no question about the fact of move-

<sup>1</sup> The Abbé Dubois attempts to show that all the arguments for the existence of God can be reduced to that of motion, that the one only proof in motion inasmuch as all the others are only phases of it. Cf. Science Catholique, X<sup>e</sup> année, N<sup>o</sup> 6.

<sup>2</sup> Janet, Materialism of the Present Day, ch. IV.

<sup>3</sup> Aristotle, Physics, B. I., IV, VI.

ment, but there is most serious discussion about the nature of the fact. On this point Aristotle took issue with the leading schools of Greek thought. We do not go back to ancient history. The problem is at the basis of modern philosophy. The Hegelian system is the highest effort of modern metaphysic. It has influenced theistic and atheistic thought. In a treatise on the existence and attributes of God we are constantly brought in contact with its teaching. At present not one or the other aspect of the system is presented for consideration. The very concept which lies at the basis and gives form and substance to the whole structure, comes up for criticism.

**definition of movement.** § 4. In its most general signification motion can be defined as a change. Thus objects which change are said to be in motion. The change affects quality or quantity, or position in place. Ordinary observation of the external world reveals the manifold changes which make up the content of sense experience. At the same time it is an obvious truth that motion is not continuous and incessant, *i. e.*, that all things do not always move. There is constant motion going on in the world in the sense that some objects are in motion.

**implies the notion of rest and of motion.** Else we would have perfect rest and quiet. The notions of rest and of movement have each a basis in experience. Every object is not ever at rest; nor is every object ever in motion. Hence we distinguish two states; repose and movement. This distinction, so true to ordinary observation, is verified in scientific and philosophic discussion.

**illustrated in Physics.** § 5. The science of Physics treats of the properties of material bodies. It tells us that inertia and force are of the essence of physical things. By reason of inertia a body is indifferent to motion or to repose. If in motion it continues to move, if at rest it so

remains. Thus this law supposes that a body can be in one or the other state. Again, Physics speaks of energy. It distinguishes two kinds: kinetic and potential energy. The former is called *vis viva* and is nothing more than active force. Its power is expressed in the mathematical formula  $\frac{mv^2}{2}$ . Potential energy is so termed because it does not exert its power in action, but can do so when the opportunity is presented. Thus, e.g., a stone suspended in the air exerts no action, but possesses the potency to fall as soon as the impediment is removed. Potential energy is, therefore, the property of an object which is in a state of rest.

§ 6. The same distinction obtains in Metaphysics. <sup>in Metaphysics.</sup> There we discuss the properties of being. Potency and act are viewed in their real nature. We learn that potency is transformed into act by virtue of an extrinsic mover. The mover causes a body in a state of rest to exert its activity and to be in motion. The potential energy under the impulse becomes kinetic. This passage from a state of rest to a state of activity is the basis for the Scholastic definition of motion. Aristotle words it as "the act of a being in potency inasmuch as it is in potency,"<sup>4</sup> and St. Thomas explains the definition as above.<sup>5</sup> Thus the fundamental concept of Scholastic Philosophy is found to rest upon ordinary and scientific observation.

## II.

### ERRORS.

§ 7. In ancient times Parmenides, and in our own day Herbart, denied the fact of motion. The answer so effectually given to the former is also valid for the

<sup>4</sup> Aristotle, Phys., I. III, ch. 1.

<sup>5</sup> C. Gent., II, 20: III, 82; S. Th. I. q. 45, a. 5; I. q. 90, a. 2; Pere Villard, *Dieu Devant la Science et la Raison*, p. 100.

**Heraclitus.** latter, *i. e.*, *solvitur ambulando*. The error of Heraclitus, however, is much more germane to our thesis. He maintained that objects were in a perpetual motion and that repose did not exist.<sup>6</sup> This opinion has been broached by no less a person than Hegel. Heraclitus was content in teaching the motion of material things. His doctrine is, therefore, purely materialistic. Hegel, on the contrary, took the statement of Heraclitus, taught that all things were in a state of becoming, from this formed an abstract conception which he called *to fieri*, and made it the central concept of an Idealistic system. Nevertheless, the main error is found in both.

**Hegel.** § 8. With Hegel the *to fieri* is the medium between existing being and absolute nothing. All existing things are its manifestations. The evolution is seen (a) in abstract and metaphysical notions, hence the department of Logic; (b) in real existences and material phenomena, hence nature; (c) finally, the idea rises to consciousness and manifests itself in the phenomena of human thought.<sup>7</sup> Hence no rest or repose; only a constant movement and evolution.

**Criticism.** § 9. (1) The error of Hegel finds its source with Leibnitz. He taught that potency was a third something between act and pure passivity, hence a sort of intermediate entity. Hegel formed an abstraction from this which he termed the *to fieri*. Again it is false to say that all beings are at all times in act. This means the negation of a state of repose. Now physical science and sound metaphysics teach the contrary.

(2) **its results.** § 10. (2) The result of this doctrine is the contradiction between science and metaphysics. Hence the

<sup>6</sup> Farges, *L'idée de Dieu*, p. 413.

<sup>7</sup> Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind*, by W. Wallace; *Hegel's Logic*, by W. T. Harris.

disrepute into which the latter branch of knowledge has in these times fallen. Science found that it could not harmonize with philosophy. Hence it rejected philosophy altogether and justly declared that *a posteriori* conclusions should be preferred to *a priori* theories. With philosophy religion goes hand in hand. Hence the bitter antagonism which arose between science and religion. A false system of philosophy is the source of all the confusion and strife. Metaphysics is built upon Physics. The notions and principles discussed in the former find logical application and verification in the latter.

§ 11. (3) It is false to suppose that an improvement <sup>(3)</sup> cannot be modified. on the Hegelian philosophy can be made. The Neo-Hegelian system is only transitory. A change or modification of detail is no remedy to a system radically wrong. The fundamental concept of Hegel's philosophy is a scientific and a metaphysical error. The only resource is a radical change and the adoption of a system more in accordance with sound reasoning.

### III.

#### THE ARGUMENT.

§ 12. Movement is a fact of daily experience.\* It is <sup>Kinds of movement.</sup> confirmed by exact and profound scientific experimentation. Nevertheless there are various kinds of movements. These must be distinguished one from the other, not only for the sake of clearness, but especially because they give rise to separate lines of reasoning. Thus there is *local* movement, *i. e.*, movement from place to place, *e. g.*, I walk across the room, a train of cars moves from Albany to New York, the earth moves from place to place in its path around the

\* St. Thomas, I. q. 2, a. 3.

*quantitative motion.*

sun. Again, an object may change in *quantity*, *i. e.*, may become greater or smaller in size, *e. g.*, the phenomena of growth in living things of increase and decrease in inanimate objects through the forces of attraction or of friction. Hence we have quantitative change or quantitative movement. Finally, an object may change in quality, *i. e.*, remaining unchanged in size or weight, it may acquire or lose other attributes, *e. g.*, the change from heat to cold, from bitter to sweet, from white to black, from a pleasant to a nauseous odor, etc. This is called a *qualitative* change. Local motion is movement in the strict sense of the word. Quantitative and qualitative motion, however, are more properly designated by the common term, mutation. Thus we have two lines of reasoning leading the mind to admit the existence of God. The former is based on local motion and is confined to the field of physical science. The latter rests upon the notion of mutation and is more metaphysical.

*qualitative motion.*

#### IV.

##### LOCAL MOTION.

*history.*

§ 13. The argument drawn from local motion was first proposed by Aristotle. St. Thomas develops it in the sense and scope of his master.<sup>9</sup> Suarez, however, rejects the proof as limited in range and lacking in strength.<sup>10</sup> Cardinal Satolli, Fr. Pesch, Abbé Farges<sup>11</sup> have resuscitated the argument from its long oblivion,

<sup>9</sup> Cont. Gent. I, 13.

<sup>10</sup> Suarez reasons from a peculiar kind of local motion and betrays the undeveloped condition of Physics at the time. He concludes: "Igitur ex solo motu coeli nulla est sufficiens via ad hujusmodi demonstrationem conficiendam." Disput. Metaphys., Disp. XXX, sect. I.

<sup>11</sup> Satolli, Praelectiones, Quaes. II, art. III, Pesch. Institut. Phil. Naturalis, L. II, Disp. 3; Farges L'idée de Dieu, p. 61.

woven it through the facts and laws recently revealed by the marvelous progress in the physical sciences, and thrown it into a new and conclusive form.

§ 14. Physical science explains the phenomena of motion explained by attraction. motion explained by attraction. motion by attraction. This is defined as the invisible power in nature which tends to draw bodies together. The law which rules the mutual action and reaction was formulated by Newton. A body attracts another body in the direct ratio of the squares of the masses and the inverse square of the distances, *e. g.*,  $a = \frac{m^2}{d^3}$ . This law holds universal sway throughout the material universe. Thus Astronomy tells how the stellar bodies move through space along their accustomed path in obedience to this law. Physics and Chemistry reveal its working in the molecules of a body, and enunciate the laws of chemical affinity.

§ 15. The existence and universal sway of attraction is, therefore, an undisputed fact of modern science. Nevertheless scientists are not in accord as to the nature of the law. Two opposing schools exist and strong reasons are advanced by earnest and energetic adherents.

§ 16. Some scientists maintain that matter is purely passive, that of itself it possesses no force, that the action comes from another source. This is the theory of Descartes and its defenders are called Mechanists. In support of their position they appeal to the laws and principles of Physics.<sup>11</sup>

§ 17. (a) The nature of matter is revealed by the study of its laws. A primary and fundamental law is the law of inertia. By this is understood the fact that matter of itself is indifferent to rest or to motion. If it be in a state of rest, it will remain so unless an

<sup>11</sup> Farges, *L'idée de Dieu*, p. 65.

external impulse be imparted to set it in motion. If it be in a state of movement, it will continue in motion unless an external force impedes its action and brings it to a state of rest.<sup>18</sup> This principle holds universal sway throughout the material universe. The countless planets, in their swift course through the depths of space, move in mute obedience to its power. In unmolested round they hold their appointed path, because no other body is near enough to cause a deflection. If, however, their course is retarded or perturbations are discovered, this law bids us seek the cause in the presence of a heavenly body hitherto unknown. Thus the Mathematician in his study with the known perturbations of Uranus as data, could direct the telescope of the astronomer to a definite point beyond the known limits of the solar system where the planet Neptune moved.

§ 18. The law of inertia is not only true of large material masses; it is also verified of the smallest particles of matter. On this principle rests the science of Mechanics, and it renders possible the multiform chemical combinations.

(b) to law of conservation of energy. § 19. (b) A fundamental law of nature which also holds sway throughout the material universe is the law of the conservation of energy. That material forces enter into play in the world around us is a fact of ordinary and of scientific experience. These forces are not always in action. Hence in Physics we have the distinction between latent and active energy. To the former the name, potential energy, has been given, inasmuch as it is not yet active, but is in potency to become active, e. g., energy of position; thus a ball suspended in air has the latent energy to fall if the hand holding it is removed. To the latter the term vis-

<sup>18</sup> Aristotle, by G. H. Lewes, ch. IV, §§ 62, 63.

*viva*, i. e., living force, has been applied, inasmuch as it is exerting itself in action.

§ 20. Potential energy is constantly undergoing transformation into actual energy. Actual energy is likewise converted from one of its various forms into another, e. g., heat into mechanical work or into potential energy. The law of the conservation of energy asserts that in this perpetual transformation no energy is ever lost and that the sum of actual and of potential energy is a constant quantity, e. g.,  $P + A = C$ . These energies may vary; at one time actual may be greater or less than at another; yet a corresponding variation takes place in potential energy; thus the sum is always the same, e. g.  $(A + I) + (P - I) = C$ ; or  $(A - I) + (P + I) = C$ . This scientific truth leads the mind to admit a vast store of energy in nature, distinct from matter as such, in constant transformation from one form to another, whereas matter itself passively receives and transmits the movements. A contrast of this law with the law of the conservation of matter brings out more clearly the ground on which the hypothesis rests.

§ 21. The other theory contends that attraction is an active force inherent in matter. It owes its origin to Leibnitz and its defenders are called Dynamists. They maintain that matter is not purely passive. Ordinary observation, they tell us, and scientific experimentation reveal in matter an active element, which is the basis and the explanation of the phenomena of universal attraction. The law of inertia is true of matter in the sense that matter cannot move itself spontaneously. Hence a clear line of demarkation exists between the inertia or material sphere and bodies endowed with life. Yet matter possesses in itself the power to act upon matter — a power, how-

ever, limited or conditioned upon the quantity of the material bodies and the distances intervening. Thus the law of universal attraction can be expressed in a mathematical formula  $A = \frac{m^2}{d^3}$ . The conclusion is therefore drawn of a universe in which exist action and interaction without the necessity of admitting a primordial mover or initial cause of movement.

The conclusion from these theories.

This conclusion is false.

§ 22. Take either hypothesis; the reasoning is strong and conclusive. According to the first theory motion is not inherent in matter, but springs from another source. Now all particles of matter are of the same nature. Therefore, if motion were not in some way communicated to the material elements, all movement would be impossible. The very fact of motion supposes a mobile and a mover.<sup>14</sup> This inference leads the mind conclusively to admit the existence of a prime mover, the source and explanation of all movement, *i. e.*, God.

argument good, if we grant that motion is eternal.

§ 23. But, we are told, motion is eternal. Aristotle so taught,<sup>15</sup> and St. Thomas does not deny the absolute possibility. Let us grant the contention. The force of the reasoning is not at all weakened. The eternity of motion does not change its nature. That matter is indifferent to rest or motion is a physical law. As it is now, so it was in the eternal past. An external cause of motion has been shown to be necessary. On the supposition that matter be eternal, we should be forced to admit an eternal cause.

law of inertia points to a beginning.

§ 24. Again, the law of inertia shows that the motions which fall under our observation had a beginning. Thus we have a series of motions communicated. If we admit the series to be infinite, we should have an infinite series of movements, each one of which had a

<sup>14</sup> Aristotle, Metaph. IV, 6.

<sup>15</sup> Phys. LVIII, ch. 1.

beginning, and at the same time hold that the series had no beginning. But this is an open absurdity.

§ 25. In the second hypothesis matter is considered as possessing an inherent active force. The inference from this principle is no less conclusive. This inherent power of matter passes from potency to act, as observation shows. Therefore, it is not always in action. We see about us bodies at rest, passing from rest to motion, or returning again to a state of quiet. Hence we have motions constantly beginning. Therefore, we are forced to admit a prime beginning and a prime cause of the movement.

§ 26. Kant maintains that the conclusion is not warranted by the premises. He holds that universal attraction of itself is sufficient to account for motion. This opinion is out of date and to-day is rejected by scientists of great name.<sup>16</sup> It is the weak point in Kant's nebular hypothesis. Universal attraction is a law depending upon the quantity of matter and the intervals separating the material bodies. Thus it only becomes possible on the convergence of these conditions. It is difficult to explain its beginning. Quantity or space are only conditions. The mutual influence is a fact. It will not explain itself. Another source is necessary. Faye has shown this conclusively. The atoms in the primal nebula were equally distributed or not. If the former supposition be true, then the atoms would be homogeneous; unequal or different forces would be impossible; and a perfect state of equilibrium would exist. This is contrary to fact. If, however, the atoms be unequally distributed, we are face to face with a gratuitous supposition. It can for this reason be rejected; or if granted we are warranted in seeking a cause for this inequality.

<sup>16</sup> Faye, *L'Origine du Monde*, p. 120, sq.

<sup>final conclusion.</sup> § 27. The conclusion is therefore forced upon the candid mind. The universe is powerless to explain itself. A consideration of the phenomena of movement viewed in the light of physical science alone has shown this to a certainty.

## V.

## MUTATION.

<sup>mutation.</sup> § 28. Another line of thought, equally cogent, but more far-reaching in application, can be formulated from the consideration of movement in the sense of mutation. It is not confined to the changes in place which physical bodies undergo, but embraces any change whatsoever which takes place in nature." It passes beyond the limits of the external world, enters into our inner life, and takes as data, the secret thoughts and desires and emotions of the soul. The strength of the argument rests upon two fundamental principles.

<sup>(i) every being in motion was put in motion by the activity of another being.</sup> § 29. (i) The first principle is that every being which is in a state of motion is so because it has been put in motion by the action of some other being.<sup>10</sup> This is proved true of material bodies by the law of inertia. Matter of itself is indifferent to rest or to motion. Now it is a fact that all material things are not in movement. Else motion would be of the essence of matter and no rest would be possible. Ordinary and scientific experience shows this to be false. The indifference on the part of matter, therefore, can only be explained by affirming that material bodies existing in a state of movement owe the motion to the operation of a force external to themselves.

<sup>a being in motion is imperfect.</sup> § 30. Again, a being is in motion in order to obtain some perfection it does not at present possess. For

<sup>11</sup> Aug. de Civ. Del. I. II, ch. 4; VIII, ch. 6.

<sup>12</sup> C. Gentes, I. I, ch. 13.

we must bear in mind that motion here is taken in the sense of action or operation. If it already possessed the perfection, it would not move to obtain it. Hence the acquisition of the perfection is the explanation of the movement. To say, therefore, that a being moves itself, is to assert that at the same time it has or has not the perfection. It has not, inasmuch as it moves to acquire the quality; it already possesses the perfection, inasmuch as it contains in itself the sufficient cause of the movement. But this must be rejected as absurd.

§ 31. Another reason is proposed by St. Thomas in the form of an argument from induction. The Angelic Doctor draws a distinction between violent and natural movement. It is manifest that an object is violently set in motion by the sudden and overpowering influence of an external agent. As to natural movement we can distinguish between motions in the physical sphere and motions of living beings. The law of inertia proves to conviction that no material body is capable of giving movement to itself. Its indifference to rest or to motion absolutely precludes any such possibility.<sup>10</sup>

§ 32. The organic world is composed of living, of sentient and of intelligent beings; it embraces plants, animals, man. Growth is movement of a certain kind. But growth is not an absolute, it is a relative and dependent phenomenon. The plants, e. g., need earth, moisture, temperature, rays of the sun for their development. If these be removed, life would be impossible,

<sup>10</sup> "Ecce sunt coeli et terra; clamant quod facta sint; mutantur enim atque variantur. Quidquid autem factum non est, et tamen est, non est in eo quidquam quod ante non erat, quod est mutari atque variari. Clamat etiam quod seipsa non fecerint. Ideo sumus quia facti sumus; non ergo eramus antequam essemus; ut fieri possimus a nobis. Et vox dicentium est ipsa evidencia." St. Aug. Confess., l. XI, ch. 4; de Civ. Dei, l. II, ch. 4.

Inductive argument of St. Thomas.

for physical nature.

for organic world.

the plant would wilt and die, and death would be the cessation of all vital action. Furthermore, a fundamental law of Biology is that life can only come from antecedent existing life. Hence living motion is not spontaneous; it is derivative, and the fact that a living thing exists is proof that its vital motion was imparted by another being possessing life.

for animal  
life.

§ 33. The phenomena of sentient and of intellectual life are set forth in the science of Psychology. There the motions of the soul in all their extent are discussed. Our actions are always influenced by some motive. External objects come in contact with the senses and at times so strong is the power exerted that our action is precipitate and indeliberate.

for man.

§ 34. Again, we act judiciously and after mature reflection; the motive power resides in the will. But the will never acts independently of the intellect. The mind seeks motives and presents them to the will. Influenced by them we exert action. Now our act is cool and dispassionate. We speak or write or move about with hardly the show of color in the cheek or an untoward glance of the eye. Again, the motives presented by the mind may so possess our wills that our souls are moved to the very depths, our whole being is charged with emotions of divers kinds, e. g., anger, desire, pain, etc.; the perspiration gathers on the brow, the cheek burns or is ashy pale, the muscles of the face contract in pain or expand in joy, the eye reveals the passion burning within and we give vent to our feelings in a strong and resolute manner. Even here we find the influence brought to bear which is the impelling cause of action.

conclusion  
that motion  
is due to an  
external  
cause.

§ 35. Thus a complete induction verifies our principle.<sup>20</sup> The motion or action of a being is due to an external cause.

<sup>20</sup> St. Aug. De Quant. An., XXXIV; Enar. in Ps. XLI, n. 7, 8.

external source or cause. No one being is sufficient of itself. Everywhere within us and without we find objects influencing other objects in various ways with the result that the things influenced are set in motion.


§ 36. (2) The second principle is that an infinite series of movements and of moving things is impossible. This when added to the former gives to the argument a conclusiveness which cannot be shaken. Its truth is apparent when viewed in the light of the first principle. In a certain sense it can be considered as a corollary. That an object in motion owes the movement to an impulse imparted by another being has been clearly shown. It is universal and valid as a physical law. By reasoning from this as data the mind can rise to the higher plane of metaphysics, extend its vision backwards beyond an experimental research and enunciate a truth far more reaching in application.

§ 37. If a body is set in motion by another, it depends upon the other for the movement. Thus, e. g., A is moved by B; therefore A is dependent upon B, and in B alone is to be found the cause of movement in A. In like manner it is evident that B is set in motion by C, and so on until we come to a first mover or to infinity. If the first mover be moved by another, then "*omnia mutantur ab alio;*" but this is a contradiction. If we admit a series of objects imparting movement one to another and stretching back to infinity, then we are forced to deny the principle of causality or admit that no movement is possible, as has been shown.

§ 38. But it may be said, why suppose movement in a straight line; could not circular motion evade

(a) Infinite series of moving things is impossible.

the dilemma? Let us grant that the motion is in a circle, the molecules of the circumference acting on one another and forming a perfect round. Then A will act on B, and B on C, and C on D. The activity of B is due to the impulse of A, that of C to B, that of D to C, that of A to D. Now, then, A is moved by D and



and in turn moves B. Two alternatives can only be admitted. Either the movement had a beginning or it had not. If the former, then our argument is granted and we have a prime-mover. If the movement had not a beginning, then we are constrained to admit that A at one and the same instant of time is in a state of motion and in a state of repose. It is in motion because it moves B. It is not in a state of motion because it is moved by D. The principle that movement of a being is due to an impulse from an external object applies to the case with all its rigor. We are, therefore, face to face with a manifest contradiction. The conclusion, therefore, is forced upon us that a first mover exists.<sup>31</sup>

argument  
in another  
form.

§ 39. This argument can be thrown into a simpler form. Three species of movement have been distinguished. The general argument rests upon the concepts of local motion and of mutation. But movement in the strict sense of the word is local motion. This is fundamental. Scientific experimentation has shown that all other forms of movement can be

<sup>31</sup> "Viderunt (Platonici) quidquid mutabile non esse summum Deum; et ideo omnem animam mutabilesque omnes spiritus transcederunt, quaerentes summum Deum." Aug. de Civ. Dei, I. VIII, ch. 6.

reduced to it. In the action of one molecule upon another, we find that one draws nearer and nearer to the other until they meet. The molecular vibrations of a body are only possible, therefore, by local motion.<sup>33</sup> It is at the basis of all sensible phenomena. By its movements of quantity and of quality are explained.<sup>34</sup>

§ 40. If, then, all movement or mutation can be reduced to local motion, and if an analysis of local motion points to a Being distinct from the universe as the cause of all movement, it follows that the proof drawn from local motion can and should be applied to mutation. The conclusion, therefore, is manifest, even though somewhat indirect.

## VI.

## CONCLUSION.

§ 41. In drawing a conclusion from this argument, Plato and Aristotle do not contradict each other. Plato asserts that the first-mover moves himself. Aristotle, on the contrary, infers a mover who is immovable.<sup>35</sup> At first sight a patent contradiction is evident. Not so, however, when the words and the lines of reasoning are closely examined. By saying that the first-mover moves himself, Plato wishes to guard against the inference that it is inert and passive. In like manner Aristotle aims at showing that the first-mover does not move in the sense that it changes.

§ 42. The first-mover is immovable in the sense that it is not subject to mutable movement, *i. e.*, he does

<sup>33</sup> C. Gent. II, 20; III, 82; S. Th., I. q. 45. a. 5.

<sup>34</sup> Farges, *de l'acte et de la puissance*, ch. IV: The laws of physics and chemistry, of gravity, electricity and affinities are all, or appear to be, reducible to the laws of motion. Janet, *Final Causes*, p. 187.

<sup>35</sup> Κανονίς ἀκεράτης, *Physics*, B. VII, VIII; *Metaphys.*, B. XII, ch. 6, 7.

not move himself in such a manner that he changes. Thus St. Thomas reconciles the teaching of both.\* There is no contradiction. Different aspects of the one great truth are brought out prominently with a view to offset special errors.

\* C. Gent.. l. I, ch. XIII; St. Aug. de Gen. ad Lit. l. VIII, ch. 20-26.

## CHAPER IX.

### ORDER.

§ 1. The oldest and most popular argument for the *History*, existence of God is drawn from the order and harmony of the universe. In the remnants of ancient literature which exhibit the mind seeking a solution for the mysteries of life this argument appears in simple and crude form. Language, true index of thought and of feeling, goes far beyond the known records of time and presents in its vocabulary words which bear the indelible marks of order and design.<sup>1</sup> Thus to the Greeks the world was a *Kosmos*, to the Latins a *mundus*, to our forefathers a *universe*, *i. e.*, one united and harmonious whole.<sup>2</sup> The Christian Fathers and Apologists most frequently insist upon this consideration.<sup>3</sup> They cite the sublime song of the Hebrew Psalmist, "The heavens show forth the glory of God and the firmament declares the works of His hands."<sup>4</sup> They call the mind of the lowest and humblest to the marvelous harmony of the heavenly bodies in their course, to the regular succession of the seasons. They find considerations which constrain the ignorant and the

<sup>1</sup> The idea of order is expressed in the Vedic word *Rita*, which means physical or moral order and law (*Rig.-Veda*, III, 40, 4); in Zend *Ratu*, which means order and orderer (Darmesteter; *Ormazd and Ahriman*, p. 12); in Latin, *Ratus*, *e. g.*, "motus stellarum rati et constantes." Cicero, *Dis. Tusc.* V, 24, 69, *de Nat. Deor.* II, 20, 51. Cf. Müller, *Hibbert Lectures*, p. 239. For the meaning of the Egyptian word *Maat*, cf. *supra*, ch. II, p. 10.

<sup>2</sup> Cicero, *de Nat. Deor.*, I. II, c. 34.

<sup>3</sup> St. Aug. *De Ordine*; Serm. 141, al. 55, ch. I. 2; Athanasius, *C. Gentes*; Bossuet, *Conn. de Dieu et sol-même*, ch. IV; Clemens Romanus, ep. ad Corinth.

<sup>4</sup> Ps. 18.

Its force  
to-day.

learned to admit an intelligence and providence all powerful and beneficent, which shapes the course of all things and appointeth to each its place and time.\*

§ 2. In our own time this argument has been most bitterly assailed.\* The rise and influence of the physical sciences, especially of Biology and of Physiology have, for a time seemed to deprive it of force and render it worthless. The very basis on which it rests has been turned so that a series of inferences were drawn to prove the opposite. Its value, therefore, is said to be purely historic, representing only a puerile and unscientific state of the human mind.

§ 3. The attempt, however, has utterly failed. The lesson taught is that true philosophy has naught to fear from science. For a time, it is true, superficial study and hasty generalization may seem to shatter the foundation of our highest and noblest beliefs. Profound thought and critical analysis win at last, and the victory is more lasting and brilliant because of the doubt and suspense and bitter conflict which preceded.\*

## I.

### THE BASIS.

*Basis is the Final cause.* § 4. The basis of the argument is the existence and validity of final causes. Do they really exist and what

"*Nam sicut humana consuetudo verbis, ita divina potentia etiam factis loquitur.*" Aug. ep. 102, n. 33. "*ex operibus artificem cognoscere.*" Serm. 241, n. 1; serm. 197, n. 1. "Sun and moon move in regular succession that we may have faith, O India." Rig-Veda, I, 102, 2, Müller, op. cit., p. 301. The assertion of Mr. Fiske that "all attempts to study God as revealed in the workings of the visible universe, and to characterize the divine activity in terms derived from such study, have met with discouragement, if not with obloquy" can come from only one who writes in utter disregard of the history of the past. Cf. Fiske, *Idea of God*, p. 41, *infra*, § 4.

\*Farges, *L'idée de Dieu*, p. 126; Fiske, *Idea of God*, pp. 126, 128; *Cosmic Philosophy*, vol. II, p. 381, sq.

\*Faye, *L'Origine du Monde*, p. 2.

do they prove? Bacon,<sup>8</sup> Spinosa,<sup>9</sup> the modern<sup>its history.</sup> mechanical and evolution schools contend that the final cause is a pure fiction of the mind. On the other hand, Aristotle and the Christian Philosophers<sup>10</sup> have set forth the truth in clear and convincing language. In our day the Bridgewater Treatises,<sup>11</sup> the writings of Dugald Stewart, of Paley, of the Duke of Argyll, of Prof. Flint, and of Paul Janet have been to thousands an armory for the refutation of error and the defense of faith. It must not, however, be taken for granted that these various treatises are of the same intrinsic value. Bitter discussion has served to bring out into clear light the real problem and the difficulties which envelop it.<sup>12</sup> Final cause is defined as that on account of which one acts, or the end for which one acts. Hence

<sup>8</sup> De Dignit. et Augm. Scien. I. 3; New Organ, b. II, appor. 2.

<sup>9</sup> Ethics, part I, prop. 56, Appendix; Fraser, Theism, p. 80.

<sup>10</sup> Arist. Phys., I. 2, c. 8; Metaphys., I. 1, c. 4; Socrates, cf. Xenophon, Mem., I. 4, 2; Plato, Apology, Phaed., Laws, b. 12; Seneca, de Providentia; Clement of Alex. Strom., 5; Athanasius, C. Gent., n. 35; Gregory Nazian, Orat. II; Aug. de Ordine, I. 1, ch. 2; Chrysostom, de Providentia; Aug. de Vera Relig., ch. 29; serm. 141, n. 2.

"The Hand, by Dr. Charles Bell; The Adaptation of External Nature to the Moral and Intellectual Constitution of Man, by Dr. Chalmers; The Adaptation of External Nature to the Physical Constitution of Man, by John Kidd; Astronomy, Geology, Physics, treated in reference to Natural Theology, by W. Whewell; Animal and Vegetable Physiology considered in reference to Natural Theology, by P. M. Roget; Geology and Mineralogy, by W. Buckland; Power, Wisdom and Goodness of God as Manifested in the Creation of Animals, by W. Kirby; Chemistry and Function of Digestion, by C. Babbage; Footprints of the Creator, by Hugh Miller; Theologie de la Nature, par H. Durkheim; Butler's Analogy; Typical Forms, by Mc-Cosh; Faith in God and Modern Atheism, by J. Buchanan; Theism and Witness of Reason and Nature to the Creator, by Prin. Tulloch.

"J. S. Mill considers the argument from design to be the principal and strongest but inconclusive. Cf. Essays on Religion, p. 139, 155, 167. This argument is the mainstay of English Apologetical writers. Thus Prof. Fraser says "the cardinal fact is that the universe is interpretable and not chaotic, not when or whether it began to be." Phil. of Theism, p. 242;

definition of  
Final cause.

the term *final*, which comes from the Latin *finis*, *i. e.*, an end. The discussion, therefore, is narrowed down to the simple fact, are there ends in nature? Do natural agents exert activities mechanically or do they act with a certain character or predetermination in order to obtain definite ends by employing most fitting means? In the argument from causality the principle was laid down as a necessary law of the mind that a phenomenon, which began to be, demands a cause to explain its beginning.<sup>11</sup>

coincidence  
of phenom-  
ena a fact  
to be  
explained.

§ 5. At present we are not concerned with a single phenomenon, but with a group of phenomena; we do not seek to explain how a phenomenon began to exist, but we are in search of a cause to explain the marvelous agreement and coincidence of the phenomena.<sup>12</sup> This very agreement or coincidence is a phenomenon which must be accounted for.<sup>13</sup> Scientific men admit the fact and, taking it as a principle, push on in their investigations to most profitable results. In all departments of physical science, especially in Astronomy, *e. g.*, law of gravitation, in Physics, *e. g.*, the law of inertia, in Chemistry, *e. g.*, chemical combinations, it has been the source of far-reaching discoveries and the basis of fruitful hypothesis. The method, therefore, is only an application of the principle of sufficient reason to the groups of orderly arrayed phenomena in the world about us.

Knight, Aspects of Theism, p. 59; in Germany, Drobisch and Flügel maintain the same position; Pfeiderer, Phil. of Religion, vol. II, p. 221.

<sup>12</sup> "Ordo est recta ratio rerum ad finem." St. Thomas, I. q. 22, a. 1; "omne agens agit propter finem." St. Thomas, C. Gentes, II, c. 42; I. III, ch. 2.

<sup>13</sup> Janet, p. 23.

"Adjustment not our inference from facts but a part of the facts themselves." Argyll, Reign of Law, p. 82, 84, note B.

## II.

## THE FACT.

§ 6. The thoughtful student, brought face to face with the various aspects of physical nature, is forced to admit a distinction between phenomena. Some phenomena are sufficiently explained by detecting the relation to their *efficient* cause. They are results or effects; nothing more. The mind is then satisfied and is not constrained to go farther. They appear to have no aim or end. Thus, *e. g.*, the peaks of a mountain range, so varied in height and form, are simply results of nature's forces in the remote past; the masses of lava thrown up by a volcano, the fragments of rock resulting from an explosion are explained by pointing to the cause whence they happened. The mind is not forced to seek the *why* and the *wherefore*; it rests content in knowing the agency which produced them and the manner of their occurrence, *i. e.*, the efficient cause. We do not deny that they have *ends* or *purposes*; we only state an obvious fact, viz., that the mind is in no wise constrained to look for the *aim* or *ends*.<sup>10</sup>

§ 7. Other phenomena, however, have a different character stamped upon them. They bear relations not to the *past* only; they look forward to the *future*. The mind is not satisfied in discovering the *efficient* cause; it seeks to know more. It finds a relation existing between the grouping of activities and their effects which imperiously demands an explanation. The effects appear in the light of causes inasmuch as they seem to influence the apt arrangement and harmonious working of the activities. Hence the mind grasps the

<sup>10</sup> Janet, *Final Causes*, p. 7, sq.

(a) Psychol- peculiar relation of *means* to the *end*.<sup>11</sup> For illustrations we go to the physical sciences.

**organs.** § 8. (a) Physiology is the science of the human organism. Its closeness to our lives makes it a study of surpassing interest. Take up any text-book; the facts recorded give remarkable verification to our line of thought. Every organ of the body is specially adapted to definite functions. Everywhere we find a coincidence of innumerable precautions and conditionis with a view to a determined result. The senses are each a marvelous piece of mechanism. The eye, the ear, the nose, the mouth, the skin, are formed for special offices.<sup>12</sup> The processes of respiration, of deglutition, of digestion, are a constant source of wonder.<sup>13</sup>

**The human system.**

§ 9. Not only are the single organs illustrations of purpose. The harmony and co-ordination of the human system is more wonderful still. Here we find a subordination, not of single activities, but of groups of activities, and tending to the growth and preservation of the system. Hence Cuvier's celebrated law of correlation of organs: "Every organized being forms a whole — a peculiar system of its own, the parts of which mutually correspond and concur in producing the same definite action by a reciprocal reaction."<sup>14</sup> Thus from one bone he could construct an entire organism.<sup>15</sup> For this reason Claude Bernard identifies the governing idea which rules the development of the organism with the Final Cause of Aristotle.<sup>16</sup>

**The relation of sex.**

§ 10. We may go a step farther in our investigation. The most remarkable of all the facts of co-ordination

<sup>11</sup> De Pressensé, Study of Origins, B. II, ch. 1.

<sup>12</sup> Helmholtz, Popular Lectures on Scientific Subjects, p. 228; Martineau, A Study of Religions, vol. I, p. 338.

<sup>13</sup> Duke of Argyll, The Philosophy of Belief, p. 174.

<sup>14</sup> Martineau, A Study of Religion, vol. I, p. 282, 283.

<sup>15</sup> De Pressense, A Study of Origins, p. 150.

is the existence of the sexes. Here is found the adaptation of organ to organ. One is not the effect of the other; they are distinct and independent; yet can only be explained the one by the other. Now this is what is understood by finality."<sup>11</sup>

§ 11. A thoughtful consideration of these facts forces upon the mind the conviction that the relation between the structure of these organs and the work they perform could not be in virtue of a physical law merely; but there is a relation of means to an end, a marvelous adaptation of complex and different elements coalescing into a unity of action to obtain a desired result."<sup>12</sup>

§ 12. (b) Psychology furnishes another class of facts, <sup>Psychology.</sup> no less strange and convincing. Reference is made to the phenomena of instinct. We deal only with the facts. We find in animals innate capacities or tendencies to perform definite actions which tend to the preservation of the individual and of the species. This <sup>phenomena of instinct.</sup> tendency is prior to all experience or imitation, *e. g.*, the duck, the bee, etc. These tendencies have been classified as (a) instincts which tend to the preservation of the individual; (b) instincts which tend to the preservation of the species.<sup>13</sup>

§ 13. In instinct, therefore, we detect a striking analogy to function. Just as the organs are conformed to exercise special functions, so in animals we find

<sup>11</sup> Janet, *Final Causes*, p. 51, sq.; *Order in the Physical World*, tr. from the French, by T. J. Slevin. John Hedges, London, a valuable and exhaustive work.

"J. S. Mill tries to weaken the force of the argument. "Creative forethought," he writes, "is not the only link between the mechanism of the eye and the fact of sight; another is the survival of the fittest." *Essays on Religion*, p. 172. Yet he adds, "The adaptations of nature afford a large balance of probability in favor of creation by intelligence. It is equally certain that this is no more than a probability; and that the various other arguments add nothing to its force." P. 174.

<sup>12</sup> Chadbourne, *Natural Theology*, Lect. III, IV; *Doubts about Darwinism by a Semi-Darwinian*, ch. VIII.

innate tendencies to perform special acts. The function alone can explain the structure of the organ; instinct preserves the life of the animal. In both cases there is a wonderful adaptation; in the former an adaptation of *structure*, in the latter an adaptation of *action*. The striking agreement and coincidence are phenomena that cannot be explained by seeking the efficient cause alone; the relation to the effects must be explained also. Now to admit that the effects in some way conditioned the combinations of the various elements, whether of tissue or of action, is to confess that there is an *end* or *aim* in the acts themselves.

(c) Ethics. § 14. (c) Ethics is the science which deals with the principles and rules of human action. Its basis rests upon Psychology and its principle source is consciousness. It is a principle of Ethics that man acts for an end or purpose when he employs reason.<sup>\*\*</sup> Distinction is drawn between the acts of man and human acts. The former do not suppose voluntary reflection, e. g., acts in sleep or in delirium, the latter always suppose reason and consent. Now consciousness affirms that when we act we not only exert an active force, but we so exert it that our thoughts, desires, and movements all converge to a definite object. We strive to obtain this object and we so conform our acts as to secure it. This idea dominates the entire series of thoughts and motions. It induces us to seek some special means, to neglect or throw aside others. Hence, to act for a purpose is the distinctive character of voluntary activity. What is true of our own conscious experience we are constrained to admit is true of other men also.

shows that  
human  
action is  
always  
directed to  
an end.

<sup>\*\*</sup> In mental life causality and finality go together. Cf. Paulsen, Introduction to Philosophy, p. 220.

§ 15. By the same analogy that forces us to believe finality in other men. that other men have reason and free-will, the mental endowment which we possess, we are forced to admit that they act after the same manner as ourselves. Hence we strive to detect in their actions some special purpose; we are constantly attributing motives to them. We are convinced that they act for a motive, and while we may fail to detect or err in attributing false motives, the general fact remains true that their acts are regulated by some dominating idea which urges them on and gives a special character and conformation to their actions.

§ 16. Thus Ethics not only reveals the agreement and coincidence of phenomena, *i. e.*, of human actions; it also gives the explanation. It tells that the coincidence is explained not by *efficient* cause, but by the *result*, that the *result* preconceived determines the harmony of the series. Hence it gives a clear and decisive illustration of a *final* cause — an illustration which is founded in our own experience.<sup>26</sup>

"The man of science, in his scientific labors, walks by faith, by the faith that the universe is constructed on rational principles, on principles the rationality of which the human, or at any rate the scientific, mind can comprehend. His faith is that the external facts of consciousness do form one consistent, harmonious whole, regulated by the laws of nature, and that we can more or less comprehend the system which the physical universe forms. The moral philosopher holds the same faith with regard to the facts of morality, that they too are consistent with one another and are all consistent with reason and with the moral aspirations of man rightly construed." Introduction to History of Religion, by F. B. Jevons, p. 407. It is well to note that in this passage the word "faith" is employed in different senses. John Fiske writes in a similar strain, Idea of God, p. 138; so also Prof. Royce, in the Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 330.

## III.

## THE PRINCIPLE.

**The principle.** § 17. The principle of finality can now be drawn from the facts enumerated. When we find manifold activities of different kinds combining to produce a future effect, so that the effect results not from any one in particular, but from the mutual and harmonious activity of all working as a unit, the mind is constrained to admit that this coincidence of action can only be explained by admitting that the effect in some manner influenced the arrangement of the activities. The necessity and existence of this very influence transforms the effect into a cause.<sup>21</sup> The principle of finality is not *a priori* and universal. In this it differs from the principle of efficient causality.<sup>22</sup> True, every being has an effect by virtue of the fact that it is a substance exercising power. That every being has an *aim* or *purpose*, however, is by no means necessary and self-evident.<sup>23</sup> Later on in the discussion, when the principle, well-established, is applied to the interpretation of the universe, the mind may be led in a wider hope to grant purposes in creation as yet unknown to experience; but at present it would be poor logic to pass beyond well-authenticated facts. Again, the principle of finality is not universal. Some phenomena, on the contrary, cannot be explained without refer-

<sup>21</sup> By Teleology is understood "the theory which explains the prior acts of a series as determined by the preconception of a posterior." Martineau, A Study of Religion, vol. I, p. XIV.

<sup>22</sup> The Theistic Argument, J. Dimon, p. 106.

<sup>23</sup> It is not at all necessary to suppose with Hegel and Pres. Schurman, Belief in God, p. 180, that the cork-tree exists for the sake of the corks which are cut from its bark to serve as stoppers for wine bottles. The statement is shallow and flippan. Cf. also Prof. Royce, in The Religious Aspects of Philosophy, p. 282.

ence to the end. The principle, therefore, is limited to phenomena of a special kind.

§ 18. The distinctive character of the latter class of phenomena is the fact that they are not explained to satisfaction by pointing out the efficient causes. There is a gap between the cause and the effect. The mind is forced by the principle of sufficient reason to explain the deficiency. This is done by applying the second method of induction, *i. e.*, the method of differences, to the problem. The element over and above the activity of the efficient cause is found to be the conditioning and determinating influence of the effect upon the group of activities. The effect becomes a cause by virtue of its causal influence. Thus only can the mind explain the evident adaptation of activities to the future.\*

§ 19. It may be objected that chance can explain the coincidence of phenomena. This objection is not new; it is as old as philosophic speculation.<sup>\*\*</sup> That it should be advanced to-day seems strange in view of the fact that it has been refuted so often and so thoroughly. Chance is a word which cloaks our ignorance. It has no objective value. It is not a cause. It is a name given to a group of phenomena, independent of one another and without any known connection. The known relation between the phenomena is purely external. Now that such a grouping may occur, cannot be denied. The admission does not touch our trend of reasoning. Our basis is the *constant* repetition of this group with the same result. A single combina-

\* Bowne, *Philosophy of Theism*, p. 86, writes "we can understand the grouping of efficient causes only by reference to final causes, and the final cause is realized only through the efficient cause."

\*\* Lucretius, *de Nat. Rer.*, I. V, 420; criticised by Cicero, *de Nat. Deor.* II; Plato, *de Leg.* XII; *Apology*.

tion might be due to chance. The frequent combination of the same elements, and their manifold content is a phenomenon which demands a cause. Common sense assures us of this, and science employs this reasoning with profit. It is an application of the principle of induction which lies at the foundation of scientific progress.

Proof of finality found in conscious experience.

§ 20. The process to be pursued in explaining the principle of finality is similar to that employed in a preceding chapter when the validity of the principle of causality was defended against the attack of Hume. Our reasoning does not begin with and is not founded on external experience. Its source is within ourselves. We start from experience, but from our own conscious experience. Consciousness testifies that when we act in the full possession of our faculties, we act for an *aim* or *purpose*. Let us look within ourselves at any moment of the day. A thousand thoughts and wishes prove the truth of the statement. Or let us examine our actions; they are prompted by a motive or aim. I sit at the desk to prove to you, kind reader, that the existence of God is forced upon the mind by every department of human science; or I take a walk for exercise or to visit the sick; or I go about the avocations of the day with the aim of supporting my family, of acquiring fame, or of doing my duty. In each and every instance the clear type of final cause is found. It is the distinctive mark of my conscious action. The *why* and the *wherefore* are elements of my conscious daily life. When I turn to examine the acts of my fellows, I detect finality there also. As I am convinced that they have intelligence and free-will, so I am positive that the principle of finality permeates their lives. It is a reasoning from analogy, but an analogy which is equivalent to the strictest demonstration. In all

the works of human industry we read the character of finality. Men mould and fashion the materials of nature with a view to obtain definite results, e. g., house, ship, works of mechanics and of art. The sight of strange buildings causes us to ask for what purpose they were made. Thus in works which come from the hands of men we read ends and means."<sup>11</sup>

§ 21. The same reasoning can be extended to animals. Animals act from instinct. From the first instant of existence they perform without reflection and without anterior experience acts which conduce to the preservation of themselves and of the species. In this, instinctive action differs from human action. Nevertheless, we find in both the like combination of complicated actions in order to obtain a definite result. In animals, therefore, we see traces of unconscious finality; nevertheless it is finality.

§ 22. If we extend the line of reasoning to external nature, it is because our basis is strong and impregnable. We have seen that works of art exhibit the character of finality. Now there are differences between works of nature and of art; nevertheless they have some common characteristics: (a) The relation of parts to the whole; (b) the relation of the whole to the objects on which it acts."<sup>12</sup> The part has value and can be explained by showing the relation it bears to the whole.

"<sup>11</sup> Illa ergo quae rationem habent, seipsa movent in finem, quia habent dominium actuum per liberum arbitrium, quod est facultas voluntatis et rationis; illa vero quae ratione carent tendunt in finem propriam inclinationem, quasi ab alio mota, non a seipsa . . . Ideo proprium est naturae rationalis ut tendat in finem, quasi se agens vel ducens in finem." St. Thomas, I, 2, q. I, a. 2.

<sup>12</sup> Janet, Final Causes, pp. 12, 108. Prof Schurman says that Dr. Flint virtually abandons the argument from design in missing the analogy between works of nature and products of art; in the former he recognizes adaptation, not purpose, and therefore argues from order not from purpose. Belief in God, p. 185.

The whole can only be understood when viewed in relation to what it does. Hence Kant admits the identity of nature and of art. But this is what is understood by finality.<sup>34</sup> This is evident in all living beings. The unity of parts into a harmonious whole requires a cause which proclaims the principle of finality.<sup>35</sup>

in material universe.

§ 23. The reasoning can now be extended to the material universe.<sup>36</sup> Wherever we observe various activities combining in harmonious unity to produce an effect, we are justified in recognizing the effect as a final cause.<sup>37</sup> Science is not adverse to this contention. It deals mainly with efficient causes. Far from declaring against final causes it often assumes their truth as a working hypothesis.<sup>38</sup> The efficient and the final cause are not contradictory. "It must always be remembered," writes the Duke of Argyll, "that the two ideas — that of physical cause and that of mental purpose are not antagonistic; only the one is larger and more comprehensive than the other."<sup>39</sup> The series of efficient and of final causes are identical. The latter is simply the reversal of the former. In the former series we reason from cause to effect; in the latter from effect to cause. Mr. Lewes admits the force of this reasoning. "Science," he writes, "finds it indispensable to co-ordinate all the facts in a general

<sup>34</sup> "In nature there is the most elaborate machinery to accomplish purpose through the instrumentality of means. It seems as if all that is done in nature, as well as all that is done in art, were done by knowing how to do it." Duke of Argyll, Reign of Law, p. 127.

<sup>35</sup> Duke of Argyll, Philosophy of Belief, p. 172.

<sup>36</sup> McCosh, Method of Divine Government, p. 158.

<sup>37</sup> "Necessitas naturalis inhaerens rebus quae determinantur ad unum est impressio quaedam Dei dirigentis ad finem." St. Thomas, I. q. 103, a. 1; Janet, Final Causes, B. I., ch. IV, VI.

<sup>38</sup> Bowne, Phil. of Theism, p. 85. "The postulate of physical science is that the world is Kosmos." The Great Enigma, W. S. Lilly, p. 153.

<sup>39</sup> Reign of Law, p. 32; Dr. Bruce in Gifford Lectures, 1898.

concept, such as a plan." " And Mr. John Fiske holds as an evident truth that " the whole scheme of the order of nature is Teleological, and each single act in it has a teleological meaning." " In the explanation, however, Mr. Fiske approximates to the unconscious teleology of Hartmann. In face of this Mr. Rogers calmly tells us that " teleology appears only where mechanism breaks down;" the reason is that there are certain facts which can be explained by mechanism and natural law. Hence " the string of events is quite explainable on natural grounds until we reach the end and then a wholly new power is appealed to which cannot be stated in scientific terms." " And furthermore " it is a fact of history that the principle of teleology has tended more and more to be displaced by the principle of mechanism." "

## IV.

## THEORIES.

§ 24. Having set forth the basis on which the argument for theism rests, we can now examine the different theories proposed to account for the facts. It must be borne in mind, however, that they rigorously exclude the idea of God, and are therefore properly termed anti-theistic.

1°. *Mechanical Theory.*

§ 25. This theory professes to explain the facts of its order in the universe by physical causes alone.<sup>44</sup> It finds a basis in the physical sciences. There, we are

<sup>44</sup> Hist. of Phil. Prologue, p. XXXVI.

<sup>45</sup> Idea of God, p. 161.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. His Modern Philosophy, p. 56.

<sup>47</sup> Ib., p. 57.

<sup>48</sup> Descartes taught that we should not examine the ends which God has proposed to Himself in creating the world and

told, facts are presented as they actually occur. Efficient causes only are the objects of scientific investigation. The notion of finality is by no means necessary; the mind can do without it.<sup>44</sup> Science receives no detriment thereby. The nebula hypothesis, e. g., is a simple explanation of the solar system. So, too, Chemistry exhibits the phenomena of crystallization. A marvelous order is had, but no vestige of final cause. Everything is explained by the mechanical working of the physical cause.<sup>45</sup> They contend that nothing prevents us extending this view to living beings. Did not Des Cartes hold that animals were automata? As for organ and function, there is no adaptation; the function is only the natural result of the organ in act.<sup>46</sup>

Criticism.

(1) false basis.

§ 26. (1) The defenders of this theory must admit that the forces of nature are alike.<sup>47</sup> This we know to be false.<sup>48</sup> An impassable gulf separates *material* from *vital*, and *vital* from *mental* forces. What might be true of *material* energies cannot be applied to *mental* activities in face of the fact that the final cause is given as a certain fact of conscious experience. It is just as absurd and illogical to affirm that there is no place for a God in nature directing and controlling

should reject entirely from our philosophy the search for final causes; for we ought not to be so presumptuous as to believe that God has chosen to take us into His counsel. Cf. Types of Ethical Theory, James Martineau, B. I, c. 2, § 8; A study of Religion, vol. I, p. 256; Descartes, Med., 4.

<sup>44</sup> Bowne, Philosophy of Theism, p. 87.

<sup>45</sup> E. Haeckel, Our Monism, in Monist, July, 1892.

<sup>46</sup> Herbart; Lucretius, de Nat. Deorum, I. 4, V. 822; Aristotle, Metaph., I. 1, ch. 4, 6. The Neo-Kantians, with Fries and Herbart, exclude finality and explain nature and man by mechanism, although the explanation is contradictory to their religious-aesthetic view. Cf. Pfeiderer, Phil. of Relig., vol. II, p. 171, 218.

<sup>47</sup> Spencer, First Principles, Principles of Psychology.

<sup>48</sup> W. S. Lilly, The Great Enigma, p. 129.

its forces by His will, as it would be to assert that there is no place in man's body for his conscious mind."

§ 27. (2) In this theory how can we explain man. (3) it does not explain man. Is man the simple result of physical causes? Why must we admit finality as the distinctive mark of his conscious experience? Man foresees, calculates, seeks means for ends. Are these acts the pure result of physical causes? Is a being, which can shape ends for himself, the result of a nature without ends?"

§ 28. (3) The theory is partial and limited. It starts from physical sciences. Its limit cannot extend to living beings, e. g., plants and animals, much less man. Pure mechanism cannot explain the phenomena of life." A directive idea is present in the youth of the plant which accounts for the combination of acts tending to its own preservation and the multiplication of its kind." Teleology has taken possession of the language of Botany and of Biology. Thus Mr. Huxley speaks of *apparatus, plan, fabrics, in order to, for the purpose of, lay the foundation of, foreshadow.*" Mr. Spencer uses the words *fitness, manifest relations to future external events, adaptation, processes, correspondence, anticipates, adjustment, in order that, Psychology recognizes special functions as the ends of special organs,*" "regards teeth as having the office of mastication." " A mechanical theory,

<sup>10</sup> W. Carpenter, M. D., *Nature and Man*, p. 364.

<sup>11</sup> Prof. Knight, *Aspects of Theism*, p. II.

<sup>12</sup> Schelling, Hegel, Hartman, Teichmüller, Zeller reject the pure mechanical explanation. Pfeiderer, *Phil. of Relig.*, vol. III, p. 261.

<sup>13</sup> Chadbourne, *Natural Theology*, Lect. V, VII.

<sup>14</sup> Elements of Comparative Anatomy.

<sup>15</sup> Prin. of Biology; Argyll, *Phil. of Belief*, pp. 65, 136; Darwin, on Fertilization of Orchards; Mr. Wallace, in *Quar. Jour. of Science*, Oct., 1867; Martineau, *A Study of Religion*, vol. I, pp. 259, 261; Prof. Bowne, *Philosophy of Theism*, ch. VII; Dr. Paulsen, however, assures us that the prevailing view is that there is no finality in physical nature. Cf. *Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 222.

therefore, is artificial and is adverse to sound reasoning."<sup>44</sup>

(4) Science does not discard final causes. § 29. (4) Finally it rests upon a false assumption, e. g., that science discards final causes. This is erroneous. Science investigates efficient causes, but between the efficient and the final cause there is no antagonism. The one does not exclude the other."<sup>45</sup> The perception of the final cause often leads to the discovery of the efficient, e. g., the conformation of the valves in the veins led Harvey to discover the circulation of the blood."<sup>46</sup> The fact, e. g., that man always acts for a purpose does not render useless or interfere with his efficient causality. Efficient causes are agents or means to obtain the desired purpose."<sup>47</sup> "What is contrivance," writes the Duke of Argyll, "but that kind of arrangement by which the unchangeable demands of law are met and satisfied."<sup>48</sup>"

"If you place me face to face, not with an infinite living spirit, but only with what is called *the great necessity*, what enthusiasm do you expect the vision to excite? Can there be a more paralyzing spectacle? and shall I fling myself with passionate devotion into the arms of that ghastly physical giant? It is impossible: homage to an automaton-universe is no better than mummy-worship would be to one who has known what it is to love and trust, to embrace the living friend. In short, a human soul so placed would itself be higher than aught it knows within the immensity, and could worship nothing there without idolatry." Martineau, *A Study of Religion*, V. 1, p. 12.

"Dr. Gildea, Is there evidence of design in nature, in Proceedings of Aristotelian Soc., 1889-90, p. 49; Dr. Caldecott, *The Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 25, 26.

<sup>44</sup> Martineau, *A Study of Religion*, vol. I, p. 256.

<sup>45</sup> Lotze, *Microcosmus*, B. IV, ch. 1, No. 2.

<sup>46</sup> *Reign of Law*, pp. 90, 127. A false definition explains a strange and undefinable position. If we confound teleology with miracle, we can understand that "in so far as teleology means a breaking into what would otherwise have been the natural order of events by a separate and transcendent power, whose workings cannot be reduced to strictly scientific formulæ; it has the whole weight of scientific achievement against it." Cf. A. K. Rogers *Modern Philosophy*, p. 58. But this is confusing and fallacious reasoning. No wonder he continues "we must either drop the notion of end altogether, or else we must adopt some new conception of what end or design means

2°. *Theory of Evolution.*

§ 30. Evolution is a term possessing a singular attraction. A wide generalization, it elevates the mind and broadens its view. Eagerly welcomed by men of science as a universal solvent of all riddles in life and being, the hope was entertained that science and philosophy would be revolutionized and nature would be viewed in a new and truer light. It is not the purpose to criticise the theory in its entirety; that pertains to another department of Apologetics. We shall discuss the principal presentations by its leading defenders.

§ 31. (a) Atheistic evolution appears under the form (a) *Monism*. of Monism. This theory supposes the universal evolution of all forms of life; its fundamental principle is the unity of force. Its teaching is as old as Empedocles, Lucretius and Epicurus; but in the hands of its modern exponent, Mr. Haeckel, it has acquired a certain novelty and popularity. "From the motion of heavenly bodies," he writes, "and the fall of a stone, even to the growth of plants and to conscience in man, all are reducible to the mechanism of atoms." Mr. Haeckel's position is set forth in two works, "The History of Creation," and "The Descent of Man."

§ 32. By reducing all things to the mechanical criticism. action of atoms, Mr. Haeckel has once and for all done away with final causes. But this principle is a gratuitous assumption. So, too, the process of reasoning, in which he sets forth his theory at length, is made up of assumptions and false analogies. There is no need at present to enter into a detailed examina-

and how it works." (Ib.) Further on we read the following: "Mechanism explains the way in which, not the reason for which, a thing is done," and he sees no inherent contradiction between mechanism and teleology, p. 306.

tion of the system. We need only state that in essence it is identical with the Mechanical theory. The same deficiencies are found in both, and the same criticism is true of the one as of the other.

(b) Agnosticism. § 33. (b) Atheistic evolution appears under the form of Agnosticism. It is a recent and powerful phase of human thought. Its fundamental principle, according to Huxley, who coined the word,<sup>"</sup> is *positively* to follow the intellect as far as it will take you, and *negatively*, not pretend conclusions to be certain which are not demonstrated or demonstrable. Yet there is a reservation implied, viz., nothing is to be admitted on any other evidence than of the senses. In this philosophy the final cause has no place, for the order and finality of the phenomena do not appeal to the senses and are grasped by the intellect alone.

Mr. Spencer's teaching. § 34. Herbert Spencer is the greatest living exponent of Agnosticism. He has done more than any other to form a consistent philosophy of evolution on a scientific basis. He holds that there is one unknowable reality which manifests itself alike in the material and living world. He commonly speaks of this reality as force, and at times seems to identify it with force. To him matter is identical with force, and the evolution of all existing things is to be explained by the law of transformed motion. The process is a mechanical problem. A first principle is the persistence of force. This principle in its working follows certain laws: (1) Motion follows the lines of least resistance.<sup>"</sup> (2) The homogeneous becomes the heterogeneous. He assumes homogeneous matter endowed with forces. This, by reason of its instability, passes into the heterogeneous under the action of the force. (3) The passage is

<sup>"</sup> XIXth Cent., Feb., 1889.

<sup>"</sup> First Prin., p. 73.

helped by the law of segregation, which by separation or selection enables us to pass from the indefinite to the definite. In other words, it is the law of natural selection. Hence arise differences in types and species. (4) Finally, the law of adaptation, by which the being adapts itself to the environments and renders permanent the structural differentiation.<sup>43</sup>

§ 35. (1) The purpose of Mr. Spencer is to explain <sup>criticism.</sup> the universe by mechanical principles. His system, therefore, is the mechanical hypothesis in another <sup>(1) the  
mechanical  
theory  
again.</sup> form. To him the lowest forms of life are essentially the continuation of non-vital processes; while thought and consciousness are merely transformations of motion. Now this process of reasoning starts with and is bolstered up by pure assumptions.

§ 36. (2) He is forced to recognize design in the <sup>(2) he  
recognises  
design in  
nature.</sup> universe.<sup>44</sup> The laws of segregation and of adaptation are worded in the language of teleology. The very process itself by which the homogeneous passes into the heterogeneous cannot be fully explained unless we admit the final cause as guiding the complicated combination of varied elements to the gradual formation of the specific type. That structure is subservient to function, and that structural growth is prior in time to the actual or possible discharge of function are dominant facts in the whole organic world.<sup>45</sup>

§ 37. (3) Finally, Mr. Spencer's theory is the <sup>(3) a theory  
of chance.</sup> hypothesis of chance dressed in scientific terminology. Chance might explain one combination. But here we deal with frequent and repeated combinations of most complex elements with the constant recurrence of the same result.

<sup>43</sup> De Pressensé, *A Study of Origins*, ch. I.

<sup>44</sup> *Principles of Biology*; Duke of Argyll, *Phil. of Belief*.

<sup>45</sup> Duke of Argyll, *Philosophy of Belief*; Schurman, *Belief in God*, p. 174.

(c) Darwinism.

Darwin's writings.

§ 38. (c) Finally, atheistic evolution appears under the form of Darwinism. This theory takes its name from Charles Darwin, who, in 1859, published his studies on the origin of species. The work aroused profound and wide-spread discussion. A laborious life was devoted to investigations in this line. His most important writings are the *Origin of Species*, *Variations of Animals and Plants*, and the *Descent of Man*. In his younger days Darwin was a devout believer; but as he advanced in years and in the prosecution of these studies, his religious convictions became unsettled. In a letter written in 1879 he says: "I think that in general the most exact description of my state of mind is that of Agnosticism." "In his *Origin of Species* he concludes with these words: "There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been signally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one; and that whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed laws of gravity, from so simple a beginning, endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been and are being evolved." In a later volume, "*The Descent of Man*," he withdrew the concession as to the necessity of the creation of primitive types. His disciples extended the theory to the origin of life, of man and of the universe.

his teaching.

§ 39. In the point of departure the theory of Darwinism differs from that of Spencer. Spencer starts from the physical science and attempts to explain the process by the law of mechanics. Darwin takes living beings and tries, by a large and minute observation of facts, to establish a Biology of evolution. Darwin differs from other naturalists, e. g., Cope and Mivart, by explaining the acquisition of superior qualities, not through the development of active powers inherent in

"Life and Letters.

the individual and brought into exercise at favorable opportunities, but through the many exterior circumstances and causes which slowly and gradually impart to the individual the qualities it had not before. Thus Darwin required one thousand generations for the transformation of species; and this result is obtained by the exterior influences of fortuitous causes.<sup>47</sup>

§ 40. The basis of Darwinism is the general fact that life is a struggle for existence. The result of the struggle is the survival of the fittest by a process of natural selection or elimination.\* It is a fact that living things vary, e. g., the distinction of individual, of family, of type. Hence he infers the law of variability of organic forms. The variation may come from the repetition of the same acts or from disuse of the faculties which results in atrophy; and he enunciates the law of use and non-use. An illustration is drawn from the law of phonetic decay in language. Or variations can be explained by the action of the environment upon the organism, creating new needs and causing the organism to respond to the needs so that life may be preserved. Hence the law of adaptation. The variations once acquired are transmitted from generation to generation by the law of heredity, and the transmitted traits abide in virtue of the law of permanent characterization. Afterwards, in the work "The Descent of Man," Darwin added the law of sexual selection, which is only a peculiar form of natural selection. The struggle is not only for life and nourishment, but also for sexual fitness.

§ 41. It is not the purpose to criticise Mr. Darwin's criticism. theory as a whole. Its defects have been recognized by his own disciples, e. g., Wallace and Romanes, who have attempted to supply what was wanting by advanc-

<sup>47</sup> "Origin of Species.

\* Doubts about Darwinism by a Semi-Darwinian, p. 47 sq.

ing theories of their own. Its relation to the argument from design shall only be considered."<sup>6</sup>

(1) rests on § 42. (1) Mr. Darwin reasons by analogy from artificial natural selection. But this analogy is a false one. In artificial selection there is a reflection, calculation, choice, purpose in the agent. In natural selection intelligence and design are rigidly excluded. The reasoning from a work of intelligent industry to the effect of fortuitous circumstances and blind chance is faulty throughout.

(2) supposes choice in the agent, hence finality. § 43. (2) Natural selection can only count as a factor in Mr. Darwin's theory if we grant to living beings the power of choice."<sup>7</sup> Mr. Darwin's own language indicates or supposes this. If this be so, what stronger argument for final causes can be had? Finality, then, would be inherent in and universal throughout nature. In fact, the working of his laws indicate design, e. g., law of *use* and *non-use*,<sup>8</sup> of *adaptation*, of *heredity*. If we admit natural forces struggling onward to reach their highest and noblest expression in man, we can understand why Darwin broached a theory so sublime in conception. But let us exclude every vestige of finality and the theory becomes a play upon words.

(3) a theory of chance. § 44. (3) In reality Darwinism is based on the hypothesis of chance.<sup>9</sup> Hence he appeals to long periods of time, to external circumstances, to fortuitous events.

<sup>6</sup> Quatrefages, *The Human Species; Darwin et ses precurs. Francaises*; Huxley, *Life and Letters*, v. I, p. 176; vol. II, p. 372.

<sup>7</sup> Martineau, *A Study of Religion*, vol. I, pp. 288, 289; Duke of Argyll, *Philosophy of Belief*, p. 17.

<sup>8</sup> Organs develop *for*, not *by*, use. Duke of Argyll, *Phil. of Belief*, p. 17. Mr. John Fiske tacitly concedes this point when he says that "the action of natural selection upon man is coming to an end," and "man's future development will be accomplished through the direct adaptation of his wonderfully plastic intelligence to the circumstances in which it is placed." *Idea of God*, p. 163; cf. Thomas Hunt Morgan on *Evolution and Adaptation, on Regeneration*.

<sup>9</sup> Martineau, *A Study of Religion*, vol. I, p. 262; Wm. Graham, *Creed of Science*, pp. 25-35-47.

Chance, therefore, is the dominating idea in the process. The various laws he mentions are only special names for the great power of chance. This is absurd. Common sense will tell us that the marvelous developments and the convergence of so many and varied elements are not merely fortuitous. This harmonious agreement and continuity of growth requires a cause over and above the mere chance assemblage of elements. In nature all things are done by the use of appropriate means and the subordination of material structures to future work and function."<sup>12</sup> The conclusion, therefore, is evident. The theories of Evolution cannot answer the problem. They are deficient, or if they give a satisfactory answer, it is only by "begging the question." In the light of the foregoing exposition we are enabled to rightly estimate the value of Mr. Sully's words: "The significance which evolution gives to the relation between organ and function, e. g., the eye and vision, renders less necessary, for purposes of immediate explanation, the hypothesis of a divine prearrangement and preadaptation. Consequently, in these last times the teleological view of nature upheld by Christianity has had either to take the shape of a faith which seeks to disregard fact and reason, or to fall back on the more philosophical but scarcely optimistic hypothesis that the divine purpose is some unknown quantity, or at least comprehends interests of which human life forms but a very small fraction, and is carried out by means of unwavering purposes of natural law."<sup>13</sup>"

<sup>12</sup> Duke of Argyll, *Philosophy of Belief*, p. 11; Huxley, *Comp. Anat.*, pp. 10-11.

<sup>13</sup> Pessimism, p. 67. A conclusion altogether different has been reached by Mr. E. G. Robicson, in *Principles and Practice of Morality*. "The evidences of a pre-existent and predisposing purpose in nature are too numerous and too distinct to be over-

3°. *Theory of Pantheism.*

**German Pantheism.**

§ 45. By Pantheism is here understood not the doctrine of Pantheism as a whole, but only special phases which have appeared in recent years and have a direct bearing upon the argument from design. Allusion is made to the systems of Schopenhauer and Hartman. The common character of their teaching, distinguishing them from the other theories discussed, is that both admit tendencies and finalities in the universe. The work of Hartman, "The Philosophy of the Unconscious," is a storehouse for those who seek proofs and illustrations of purpose and design in nature.

**Schopenhauer.**

§ 46. Schopenhauer contends that an infinite finality exists in nature, but is not due to intelligence. He denies the right to reason from our own acts to the operations of external nature. Nature, he says, is prior to the mind, and natural action is absolutely distinct from ours. To us nature seems to act for a purpose; in reality this action is without reflection and without conception of end, for in nature there is no intelligence only a *will* blindly exerting its own activity.

**its basis.**

§ 47. He bases this theory on the phenomena of instinct. Here, he says, we find beings who work for an end with the greatest surety, yet are absolutely unconscious of any purpose in the action. Animals, e. g., insects, will the end without knowing it, nor have they the choice of means in general; so also nature acts when we say it acts according to final cause.<sup>14</sup>

**Hartman.**

§ 48. Hartman differs from Schopenhauer in declaring that not will alone, but intelligence knows everything, with the single exception of itself; thus it knows, but it does not know that it knows. Hence we

looked. With the progress of natural science these evidences are becoming every day increasingly clear."

<sup>14</sup> Die Welt als Wille, t. 2, ch. XXVI.

have the title of his system: The Philosophy of the <sup>his</sup> ~~doctrine~~. Unconscious. Hartman bases his theory likewise on Psychology. Unconscious processes, he says, lie at the basis of our conscious activity. Genius and instinct are illustrations of his contention. In all are found tendencies to definite ends. There are revelations of intelligence, but of unconscious intelligence. Thus we reason to a first cause which is absolute and unconscious.

§ 49. (1) We deny the right to make instinct the ~~criticism~~ basis of the theory. Man is nobler than the brute, and human action is more elevated than instinct. For what reason, therefore, should brute action be taken as a type of universal activity? The mechanist who reasons upwards from physical forces, the teleologist who reasons downwards from conscious action, are much more consistent than the half-way theory of unconscious reason.

§ 50. (2) What is instinct? It is a phenomenon (2) instinct most obscure and difficult to understand. Mechanical <sup>(1) not a clear explanation.</sup> activity or intelligence are much simpler than instinct. Nevertheless we are asked to take it as their explanation. Instinct is unable to explain physical activity. The impassable gulf between Biology and Physics cannot be thus bridged. Again, instinct cannot explain intelligence. Psychology proves that reason is an act of a kind specifically different.

§ 51. (3) To admit an unconscious tendency to (3) chance or zoomorphism. But chance cannot explain the order and harmony in the tendency, as has been distinctively shown. The latter theory is in contradiction to facts and must, therefore, be rejected. One explanation now remains. It is the theory of Christian Philosophy. We shall now attempt to give a brief summary of its teaching.

## V.

## THEORY OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.

**§ 52.** In the first section of the chapter the fact and principle of finality were set forth. The attempt was then made to criticise the various interpretations which modern writers have advanced. A critical analysis laid bare their defects and sophistries. The way is now clear for an answer which is in accord with our own experience and scientific investigation.

its teaching.

**§ 53.** Christian Philosophy has ever taught that mind and mind alone is the cause of the marvelous order in the universe. Therefore, mind alone can explain the facts and the principles of finality.<sup>16</sup>

(1) argument of exclusion.

**§ 54.** (1) The first argument is one of exclusion. All theories advanced to explain finality have been shown to be defective and faulty. Mind alone is the only other theory that in fact has possession. The force of this reasoning is purely negative.

(2) possible explanations.

**§ 55.** (2) If we exclude chance, as the trend of the chapter constrains us to do, the explanation of finality can be reduced to these sources: (a) Mechanical action; (b) instinct; (c) mind. Now the theory of mechanics cannot explain intelligence; therefore it is limited and exclusive. Likewise the theory of the Unconscious fails to interpret the facts of conscious daily life; therefore it likewise is limited in range and exclusive.

(a) mechanics not an explanation.

(b) nor is instinct.

<sup>16</sup> In the Dialogues on Natural Religion, Hume criticises the design argument. He denies a valid induction from art to nature, holds that chance may explain design inasmuch as the design is not at all perfect; that at the most the cause of the world-order has a remote similarity with human intelligence is only probable, too indefinite to be a principle of practical religion. Even if we admit the existence of God, the world is still inconceivable, and one hypothesis is as good as the other.

§ 56. To extend these hypotheses and make their application universal is to commit a logical fallacy. Not so, however, the theory of mind. It harmonizes with physical and biological science. The final cause does not render null and void the physical efficiency of material forces. "With his, *i. e.*, the modern man of science, belief in Mathematical Physics and familiarity with their logical structure, he must know that the cosmos, whatever else it may be, is mechanical; and that to read back any one of its systems into its elementary dynamical equivalents, and from these to return forward and predict its still future phases, is one of the most admirable exercises of Reason." "Thus, there is order, adjustment and harmony in the mechanism. In like manner the final cause is the best explanation for instinctive acts. As for mind, we have a direct example of the final cause in our conscious experience. The hypothesis of intelligence as the sufficient explanation of finality has a strong antecedent probability in its favor.

§ 57. (3) Finally, in setting forth the facts and the principle of finality we reasoned from our conscious experience to the facts of external nature. The process was shown to be sound and convincing. The analogy is so strong as to equal the most rigid demonstration. By the same right we are justified in seeking the interpretation of finality by a like process. Now consciousness gives the clear and decisive answer. It tells that finality can only be explained by intelligent action. Therefore the fact of finality so varied and manifold in nature from the activities of the atom to the complicated structure of man postulates the exist-

\* Martineau, *A Study of Religion*, vol. I, p. 326.

ence of a mind that shapes all things in number and measure to the proper end."

The mind is God.

(1) materialistic and  
(2) Ethical Pantheism.

(3) Kant's objection.

order is intrinsic.

§ 58. This mind is identical with God. To the Christian Philosopher, God is the creator and governor of all things. The argument from final causes proves this conclusively. Some writers recognize the existence of all pervading order, yet appear to deify this and make it God. To them "God is merely a synonym of nature," and "the laws of nature are the laws of God." This language from the pen of one who lays claim to scientific habits of thought, is certainly erroneous.<sup>78</sup> Others, with Fichte, object to a God different from the moral world-order and declare it necessary to go no further than that order itself.<sup>79</sup> This teaching has given rise to the *Dieu-Progrès* of Taine, Vacherot, Renan; "to the "stream of tendency that makes for righteousness" of Mr. Arnold."<sup>80</sup> Finally, others with Kant held that the teleological argument concludes to an *Architect*, not a *Creator*.<sup>81</sup>

§ 59. The works of art differ from the works of nature in this, that the former point to an external, the latter to an internal principle. Hence order is

"J. S. Mill holds that "The First Cause can be no other than Force: Force is prior to volition, hence volition is not a first cause, for Force is eternal and uncreated . . . Nor is volition coeternal with force, for it has no exclusive privilege of origination." Cf. Essays on Religion, pp. 145, 148. His argument rests upon pure assumption. J. Dimon, The Theistic Argument, p. 99; W. S. Lilly, The Great Enigma, p. 231.

<sup>78</sup> Natural Religion, ch. 2, 3; Martineau, A Study of Religion, vol. I, p. 5.

<sup>79</sup> Pfeiderer, Philos. of Relig., vol. III, p. 269.

<sup>80</sup> Farges, L'Idée de Dieu, p. 419.

<sup>81</sup> God and the Bible. A good criticism of this phase of modern thought is given by Prof. Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, B. II, ch. I, §§ II, III.

<sup>82</sup> Martineau, A Study of Religion, vol. I, p. 306, where this interpretation is defended; Prof. E. Caird, Philosophy of Kant, p. 635; Pfeiderer, Phil. and Devel. of Religion, vol. I, p. 153. Drobish holds the same view. Pfeiderer, Philosophy of Religion, vol. II., p. 219, vol. III, p. 259.

intrinsic to natural beings. Kant draws the distinction between internal and external finality.<sup>22</sup> The former is a need in the being, the latter the means nature takes to supply the need, e. g., the hunger of a cow and the grass of the field.<sup>23</sup> Therefore the tendency to order is intrinsic in the natural elements; "it is not a geometrical arrangement; it is something essential, e. g., take away chemical affinity and the element is destroyed. "Plant the shipbuilders' skill within the timber itself," writes Aristotle, "and you have the mode in which nature produces."<sup>24</sup> Thus, the mind that imposed upon natural things an intrinsic tendency to order, must have made the essence of things as they are; in other words, must have created them.

§ 60. Our course of reasoning has reached the desired end. The wonderful harmony of creation, the marvelous unity of action among elements so different in kind, the combination of diverse tendencies to a common result, all show with unmistakable emphasis that a divine mind guides the universe and gave to all its elements their course and being. End is Conclusion. not an infringement on God's perfection,<sup>25</sup> nor is purpose an evidence of limitation of power.<sup>26</sup> To act for an end is a sign of intelligence. Purpose is intrinsic to nature. The tendency to an end is natural to every agent. Only thus can the world-order be explained.<sup>27</sup> The conclusion, therefore, is imperative.

<sup>22</sup> Duke of Argyll, *Reign of Law*, p. 13.

<sup>23</sup> Chadbourne, *Natural Theology*, Lect. II, III, V.

<sup>24</sup> Pfeiderer, *Phil. of Relig.*, vol. III, p. 261.

<sup>25</sup> Phys., B. 2, c. 8.

<sup>26</sup> Spinoza, *Eth.* I, App.

<sup>27</sup> Fiske, *Idea of God*, p. 126; Mill, *Three Essays on Religion*, p. 176; Tyndall, *Fragments*, pp. 527, 353. "Contrivance is not a sign of limited intellect, but is only the rational connection of many factors with reference to an ideal end." Bowne, *Philosophy of Theism*, p. 137.

<sup>28</sup> Martineau, *A Study of Religion*, vol. I, p. 324.

We are led by another way to God, and we are constrained to accept the Theistic hypothesis, not as the best, but as the only interpretation of facts."<sup>60</sup>

§ 61. We shall not discuss at length the criticism of Kant and of Mill that the argument from design is good, but does not prove the existence of God in the Christian sense of the word, *i. e.*, God as supreme. The objection has been answered in showing that the same mind which is the Designer is also the Creator. Now creation is an act of infinite power."<sup>61</sup> Therefore the argument gives the highest and true conception of God.

§ 62. Lotze hesitates at accepting the full force of the teleological argument. He admits that it does not exclude the activity of physical causes."<sup>62</sup> Yet he sees a difficulty in granting that the Supreme Will or Mind in nature should act through means. To him this is an imperfection."<sup>63</sup> That there is imperfection we readily concede; but the imperfection does not come from the part of God; it arises from the imperfections and limitations of things. The Duke of Argyll considers this objection to spring from *a priori* conceptions. "Our notions," he writes, "must be ruled or disciplined by observation of that which is, not founded on *a priori* conceptions of what ought to be."<sup>64</sup> And again, "The necessity of contrivance for the accomplishment of purpose arises out of the immutability of natural forces. They must be conformed to and obeyed."<sup>65</sup>"

<sup>60</sup> The aim of Prof. Bowne is to prove that "the world is a unit and can be explained only by a unitary being," hence he postulates "a world-cause in place of a world-substance." Philosophy of Theism, pp. 146-59.

<sup>61</sup> Suarez, Disput. Metaphys., Disp. xx, s. 2.

<sup>62</sup> Microcosmus, B. IV, ch. 1, No. 2.

<sup>63</sup> Ib., No. 5; so also Mill, Essays on Religion, p. 178.

<sup>64</sup> Reign of Law, ch. III., p. 127.

<sup>65</sup> Ib., p. 126.

## CHAPTER X.

### CREATION.

§ 1. The human mind instinctively seeks to know the causes of things. Illustrations of this are found in childhood, as well as in mature years, in the ordinary avocations of daily life, as well as in the silent and serious meditations of the student. The line of thought pursued in this essay has revealed the true nature of the material universe. It is conditioned on every side and dependent. As such it had a beginning; in other words, it was produced. We shall now examine the various theories proposed by thoughtful minds at different times to account for its origin.

#### I.

##### THEORY OF PANTHEISM.

§ 2. Pantheism is an error which dates back to the History very dawn of philosophic speculation. In the remnants and records of human thought, preserved through the ravages of time and the changing fortunes of the human race, this theory appears in all its phases. The Pantheism of the Hindus is set forth in the Upanishads and exerted a deep and lasting influence on subsequent Indian thought. The Eleatic school in Greece, e. g., Xenophanes, Parmenides, the most powerful philosophical school in Rome, e. g., the Stoics, perpetuated the teaching for centuries. We find it proposed in the crude and bold teachings of Scotus Erigena, in the subtlety of Avincennes, in the mystic dreamings of Master Eckart, in the ever-changing and strangely contradictory systems of the German disciples of Kant. In

our own time it is worded in all the charms of prose and poetic diction, with a certain elevation of tone and a dreamy aspiration after the ideal of all that is, and a vague fellowship with nature and with man, that appeals to the cultured and meditative mind and seems to contain the promise of what the human soul has ever longed for: Light, strength, and rest.<sup>1</sup> But the promise is belied, the appearance is deceiving; an alluring but dry and empty husk is offered, or a shadow which takes form and substance only in the darkening mist, but recedes further and further from the eager seeker and vanishes into thin air before the growing light.

Its fundamental doctrine.

§ 3. The fundamental and characteristic doctrine of Pantheism consists in identifying God with all that exists. Thus, everything is God and God is everything, or rather God is the only real substance. In setting forth this principle, its defenders separate into different schools. Historically and philosophically viewed, Pantheism assumes different phases. Created things are considered as emanations from, or manifestations of, the one divine substance; or God, the universal, indeterminate Being, by a process of self determination constitutes the universe of beings distinct from one another.<sup>2</sup>

#### 1º. Theory of Emanation.

Theory of Emanation.  
mytholog-  
ical

§ 4. That existing things are to be explained by an emanation out of the original one divine substance is a doctrine found in all ancient mythologists. The ancient Vedic bards or *rishis* relate in childish and fantastic imagery how the different classes of beings sprang from the different members of Brahma.<sup>3</sup> The

<sup>1</sup> E. g., Shelley, Emerson, Theodore Parker.

<sup>2</sup> Concilium Vaticanum Sess. III, can. 4; cf. Denzigers, Enchiridion, p. 392.

<sup>3</sup> Muir's Sanscrit Texts, vol. I, ch. I.

Greek, Norse, and Aztec mythologists only differ in the local coloring of racial characteristics and surroundings which give life and force to the legend. As such, this belongs not to philosophy but to the history of religion. There it is shown that such accounts are only degenerate forms of the doctrine of creation, traces of which are everywhere found in the records of the early religious life of our race.

§ 5. The earliest forms of philosophical Pantheism Philosophical emanation. are to be found in India. The primitive Vedic, with its traces of monotheism and pure religious conceptions, gave way to the later Vedic and Brahmanic ages with their plurality of gods, caste distinctions and corrupt notions of religious belief and practice. The inevitable reaction set in. Gross superstition is revolting to our higher nature and man turns from it in disgust.

§ 6. The unity of nature and the reign of law so evident and so marvelous, impress the thoughtful mind in every age with a conviction of an underlying unity and makes Polytheism with its hierarchy of Gods and Goddesses to appear as childish fancies without a strong foundation or real meaning. Unfortunately the reaction turned to a philosophical Monism, not to a religious Monotheism. The evidence of this is found in the Upanishads, a collection of writings which date from the later part of the Brahmanic period. In them the Brahma of Indian Polytheism is deprived of his ethical character and becomes the neuter Brahman, the first principle or the primordial and sole real existing being.

§ 7. To explain the existence of the universe the Hindoo sages divide into two great schools. The one is realistic and considers the world about us to be an emanation from the one infinite substance. The other is idealistic and views the world as an illusion or

Two schools of Indian thought.

mirage, the only existing thing being the all-pervading soul or self.

(a) Materialistic.

§ 8. (a) The whole universe is Brahman, *i. e.*, absolute being. "In the beginning was that only which is."<sup>4</sup> It was one only without a second.<sup>5</sup> Others say that in the beginning there was that which was not, that it was alone and without a second; and from that which is not, that which is, was born. But this is not true. Only that which is was in the beginning. It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth.<sup>6</sup> It sent forth fire. In like manner fire sent forth water and water earth. That Being thought, let me enter into those three beings with this living self,<sup>7</sup> and let me reveal names and forms, *i. e.*, of particular existences. The Self, therefore, entered into these three elements: earth, water and fire. In so doing, existing things took their variety and shape and being. The subtlest portion of earth (food) became mind, the subtlest portion of water became breath, breath passed into heat (fire), heat into highest Beings. Now that which is that subtle essence (the root of all) in it all that exists has its being. It is the True.<sup>8</sup>

(b) Gnostica.

§ 9. (b) In the early ages of Christianity this form of Pantheism had wide sway. The Gnostic heretics

<sup>4</sup> Chandog. Upan. VI, 2 sq.

<sup>5</sup> Brih. Upan. I, 4, 11; I, 5, 7.

<sup>6</sup> Tait. Up. 2, 6.

<sup>7</sup> *Civa atma*, *i. e.*, the living self is not the Highest self, but the shadow of the highest self.

<sup>8</sup> That which is *i. e.*, *Sat*; *sat-ya*, *i. e.*, to be endowed with being True. In this passage (Chang. Up. VI, 2 sq.) not being is derived from being. The contrary is stated (Chang. III, 19, 1) In the Taith, Upan. 11, 7. "In the beginning this was not existent *i. e.*, not yet defined by form or name. From it was born what exists." In the Brih. Up. V, 5, 1, "In the beginning was water. Water produced the true and the true is Brahman. In the Mundaka Upan., 6, 9, Brahma is compared to a spider which sends out a web of being.

and the powerful school of Neo-Platonism made the doctrine of emanation a cardinal and fundamental point. Among the Gnostics some taught two supreme principles, the one good and the other bad, influenced evidently by contemporaneous Persian cosmogony. Others, however, Valentinus held that one supreme principle exists, which was called *silence*, the *depth*. From this principle other beings or Acones came forth in a series of emanations, which are considered to be the proximate principles of the universe with its various forms of existence

§ 10. (c) The Neo-Platonic school was an effort to (c) Neo-  
Platonism. resuscitate the philosophy of Plato, correcting it in certain parts so as to make it more systematic and conformable to the supposed exigencies of the times. Its founder is Ammonius Saccas, its leading teacher is Plotinus, its doctrine is pure Pantheism. One principle exists, from which all things proceed. This principle is unformed; it therefore cannot be comprehended under any known category of existing being, nor can it be the object of thought so that we could contemplate its attributes or conceive it as such or such. Beyond the reach of any created intelligence it exists alone, vast, impenetrable. From this *unity* proceeds *intelligence*, *i. e.* (*νοῦς*), and the *soul of the world*, *i. e.*, *ψυχὴ τοῦ κόσμου*.

These three principles, according to Plotinus, constitute a divinity. The universal soul by contemplating itself produces all created things, just as it is one and the same with the first principles. Thus Plotinus endeavored to combine the conception of God with the *νοῦς* of Anaxagoras and the *λόγος* of Plato, St. John, and of Philo.

§ 11. (d) In John Scotus Eriugena is found a bold (d) Eriugena. and profound exponent of pantheistic emanation. Coming forth from the learned and peaceful seclusion

of the Irish Universities, a master of dialectic, with a profound knowledge of Greek philosophy and the rare accomplishment of acquaintance with the Greek language, he is placed by Charles the Bald over the University of Paris. His name held a prominent place in the history of the intellectual conflicts which disturbed the times, and the influence of his personality and great learning was felt long after his death, for we read that the Albigenses of the XIII century claimed perfect accord with his teaching.

his writings and teaching. § 12. His principal work, in which the traces of Pantheism are found, is entitled "On the Division of Nature." By nature he understands not only all-being but also all non-being; the distinction of God and the world is only apparent; in reality they are one. Existing things emanate from God, and thus only are said to be real. By virtue of this emanation God and created things are one. The emanation takes place through the medium of the Word in whom all God's thoughts and attributes have an objective existence. The efflux goes on from all eternity; thus the phenomenal universe, *i. e.*, as we behold it, is co-eternal with the ideal universe, *i. e.*, as it exists in the Word, and the essence of God is the one substance of all things. In this sense Erigena holds that the universe is an extension and a manifestation of God's being.

(e) Cousin. § 13. (e) Victor Cousin, the founder of the Eclectic school in France, is not altogether free from the charge of Pantheism. Although he expressly condemns such teaching, and has found able apologists who endeavor to explain his writings in the orthodox sense, nevertheless his words, taken in their evident meaning, show that such was his real mind. To him substance, as such, is absolutely necessary; therefore there can be but one substance and that is God. God is the one

universal sole being. The universal being embraces both the *ego* and the *non-ego*, is one in its own substance, but appears manifold in the phenomena. He contends that creation is not the production of things from nothing, for such a conception is absurd, but the necessary production of things by God out of His own divine substance. The history of the human race is the evolution of God in humanity. This is the doctrine of emanation pure and simple.\*

§ 14. A word in criticism of the theory will not be ~~criticism~~ out of place. This form of Pantheism recognizes the two concepts of God and of the universe with their corresponding external realities. It admits that the world must have its origin and explanation in God, who is the absolute and primal source of reality. The fundamental error consists in the wrong view taken of how the world originated, in the failure to grasp the true notion of creation. This is the root and source of all the inconsistencies and contradictions which follow the theory, and render its acceptance impossible. It therefore exercises very little influence upon the trend of contemporary thought.

## II.

### THEORY OF MANIFESTATION.

§ 15. That God should manifest Himself in divers forms and ways is a belief which has left traces in the early history of all known races. Thus the *avatars* or incarnations of Hinduism rest upon this belief, and the Polytheism of the Egyptians to some writers finds in this a natural basis. The true explanation is found in Christian Theology, which represents the world as the work of God and the highest manifestation of His per-

\* Dr. Matheson, in "Can the Old Faith live with the New."

fections in the natural order, and by its side sets forth the theophanies of the Old Dispensation leading up to and finding their perfection in the Incarnation of the Eternal Son, the highest manifestation of God in the supernatural order.

Pantheistic Immanence.

§ 16. Pantheism, however, is a corruption of this truth. Christian Philosophy teaches that God is distinct from the world; Pantheism identifies both. The former contends that created things have a true substantial subsistence; the latter views existing things as modes or accidental modifications of the one eternal absolute substance.

(a) in India. § 17. (a) The earliest traces of the Manifestation Theory, or of Immanent Pantheism, as it is sometimes called, are found in India. Brahman is the abstract totality of all things. It is analogous to the word "existence" in Western Philosophy. At times the universe was considered as an emanation from Brahman. Again, it was viewed as the modification of Brahman. For just as existence has modes, e. g., quality, time, place, etc., so the supreme principle, the only real substance, manifested itself in various modes, i. e., created things. "By means of thoughts, seeing, touching, and passions the incarnate self assumes successively in various places various forms. That incarnate self, according to its own qualities, assumes many shapes, coarse or subtle, and having caused his union with them he is seen as another and another through the qualities of his body. No beginning and no end, having many forms alone enveloping everything."<sup>10</sup>

nature of Brahman. § 18. The true being, therefore, is Brahman, the Self. The Self is all, is absolute. "He became like unto every form, and this is meant to reveal the (true) form of him (Atman). This is the Brahman without

<sup>10</sup> Svetasvata Up. V, 11-13, Müller's trans.

cause and without effect, without anything inside or outside, this self is Brahman, omnipresent, omniscient. This is the teaching," i. e., of the Upanishads.<sup>11</sup> Created things are viewed as the body of the self.<sup>12</sup> They are involucra, webs of finer or of coarser tissue woven over the one and only self.<sup>13</sup>

§ 19. What is true of the visible world is true also of the gods a manifestation of Brahman. a  
the Gods. They are a part of the universe. "Each God is but a manifestation of Brahman, for he is all Gods."<sup>14</sup> Again, Vayu, Avidya, Time, Breath, Food, Brahma, Rudra, Vishnu are but the chief manifestations of the highest immortal, the incorporeal Brahman.<sup>15</sup> This all-permeating self is manifested in the Gods, in the natural bodies and forces, in the hearts of all living things.<sup>16</sup>

§ 20. It is true that in passages of the Upanishads nature of the world. the world is considered as phenomenal, not real. Examples of the mirage, of the reflection cast by flowers on glass, are given to show its illusory nature. Nevertheless it seems to have a reality or has a reality to the uninstructed.<sup>17</sup>

§ 21. (b) The Stoic philosophy was not merely a system of Ethics; it has also its metaphysics. It laid down rules of conduct, but also grappled with the problems of the world's origin and nature. This aspect of its teaching at present appeals to our consideration. (b) In Stoic Philosophy.

<sup>11</sup> Brih. Up. II, 5, 19.

<sup>12</sup> Brih. Up. III, 7; Chand. Up. IV, 5; IV, 15, 1; VIII, 7, 4.

<sup>13</sup> Katha Up. II, 5, 12.

<sup>14</sup> Brih. Up. I, 4, 6.

<sup>15</sup> Tait. Brah. Up. IV.

<sup>16</sup> Gough, Philosophy of the Upanishads, pp. 132-137.

<sup>17</sup> In the Vedanta Philosophy Lect. I, Müller considers the Vedanta to be the orthodox philosophy of the Upanishads. Prof. Gough tries in his Philosophy of the Upanishads to prove that this system is found exclusively in the Upanishads. Prof. Hopkins dissents from this view and holds that it can only be maintained by ignoring strong and plain passages which teach otherwise. E. W. Hopkins, Religions of India, p. 228, note.

*its  
teaching.*

The Stoics taught that the world was produced and therefore was not eternal. To them God was *Anima mundi*, i. e., the soul of the world.<sup>10</sup> Holding that all ideas came through the senses, they maintained that we could have no concept of spiritual beings. God, therefore, was the subtlest form of matter, an activity after the analogy of ether or physical force. God was the active principle, energizing all things, forming and producing all things, yet of one and the same essence with all. "*Quid aliud est natura quam Deus*" exclaims Seneca.<sup>11</sup> Such was the conception of Zeno and his Greek disciples. Such was the teaching of the school which most profoundly influenced Roman thought and life. Cato, Cicero, Seneca, Marcus Aurelius learned and transmitted this doctrine in language that for elevation and elegance is unsurpassed. The chief charm, it is true, is found in its ethical character. Thus their writings became the daily companions of the great Christian Doctors. In its metaphysics, however, it should be classed with realistic Pantheism or rather pure Naturalism.<sup>12</sup>

*In Spinoza.* § 22. Spinoza is the classic and ablest expounder of Immanent Pantheism.<sup>13</sup> Born a Jew and skilled in Jewish thought and traditions he broke away from the early faith to devote himself to the study of Philosophy. The teaching of Descartes was then in the zenith of power and Spinoza was brought under its influence. Taking the definition of substance proposed by Des Cartes, as that whose concept needs not the concept of

<sup>10</sup> St. Aug. de Civ. Dei, I. IV, ch. 31.

<sup>11</sup> De Benefic. IV, 7.

<sup>12</sup> "The Stoic doctrine of God was in its essence a somewhat rude Pantheism, which went further than the Socratic idealism to the pre-Socratic Naturalism." Pfleiderer, The Philosophy of Religion, vol. III, p. 244.

<sup>13</sup> J. Martineau, A Study of Spinoza; Pfleiderer, The Philosophy of Religion, vol. I, § 1.

another being for its formation, he inferred that one <sup>his teaching on God and created things.</sup> substance alone existed, viz., God. Created things, therefore, are not substances, but only modes of the one infinite and necessary substance. The infinite substance has many attributes, but two only are clearly perceived by the human mind, viz., infinite thought and infinite extension. External nature is only the image and manifestation of infinite thought. The thought is *natura naturans*, i. e., nature producing, the extended world is *natura naturata*, i. e., nature produced. To Spinoza the soul is a mode of the divine activity, the body is a mode which expresses after a certain determinate fashion the essence of God considered as something extended. They have, therefore, an identity in God, inasmuch as thought and extension are his attributes.

§ 23. Created things, being modes of God, necessarily exist. Hence the notion of necessity which influences his system throughout, rendering it a modern fatalism. Accordingly, he is led to deny free-will, or rather to teach a "free necessity," to hold predestination or fate in all its rigidity, to do away with final causes.

§ 24. The influence of Spinoza on contemporary <sup>his influence.</sup> English thought has been very great. His Pantheism seems to correspond in general trend and in many details to the mechanical conception of the universe which has so many attractions to modern scientific minds. His conception of God with the two attributes of thought and of extension reappears in English Psychology, where mind and matter are held to be the "double-faces," "two sides" or "aspects" of some fundamental reality, and in Apologetics as a Cosmic Theism, proclaimed by many to be the religion of the

future."<sup>11</sup> The English agnostic school teaches that God is unknowable and as such does not come within the scope of human thought and action; nevertheless, in all other points it is fashioned on the mould of Spinoza. Hence comes the charge—so strange at first sight—that Mr. Spencer is a Pantheist. In the criticism of his system we meet with the same difficulties that we find in Spinoza, *i. e.*, the nature of mind and of matter, the character of their interaction and the doctrine of determinism. Both Spinoza and Spencer teach a pure Naturalism, with this difference only that the God of the former becomes to the latter the Unknown and Unknowable behind the phenomena.<sup>12</sup>

### III.

#### TRANSCENDENTAL THEORY.

Idealistic  
Pantheism.

§ 25. The two theories set forth are phases of Realistic or Naturalistic Pantheism. Another, more subtle, which has exerted a deep and widespread influence on modern theistic and atheistic thought, is Ideal, or, as it is more correctly termed, Transcendental Pantheism.

<sup>11</sup> Fiske, *Cosmic Philosophy*; Jacobi, *Jewish Ideals*, p. 58; *Fortnightly*, May, 1873; *XIX Cent.*, Oct., 1877.

<sup>12</sup> To Spencer the forces of nature are interchangeable manifestations of a universal energy which pervades space in every part and exerts its influence upon the innumerable bodies that compose the universe. Each specific force is but a transformation of some other or a modification of that which is the common-ground of them all. All are but phases of the one great and persistent energy which, as Mr. Spencer declares, is the infinite force. His philosophy is thus "the scheme of thought which identifies the forces of the world with the activities of the First Cause." The inevitable consequences are that "there is one great and universal force, of which these forces are manifestations and forms, and that universal force is none other than the creative power which has formed the earth and stretched out the heavens—the ever-present, the unchangeable, the unbeginning, the unending one." Cf. *Recent Physical Theories in their Bearing on the Theistic Argument*, by Prof. B. N. Martin, in *Christian Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. I, n. xix.

(a) *The Vedanta.*

§ 26. The earliest traces of this form of Pantheism (<sup>(a)</sup> *The Vedanta*) must likewise be sought for in the far East. The Upanishads do not contain a complete and systematic doctrine. They are rather a collection of meditations or conferences between the sages of the forest and their disciples, and thrown into the form of a dialogue.<sup>\*\*</sup>

§ 27. To the Vedantist Brahman was the eternal <sup>(its)</sup> *Teaching*. reality. The universe as we see it by bodily senses is phenomenal. This is due to *Avidya*, i. e., Nescience. The aim of the Vedanta philosophy was to dispel this and teach the *Vidya*, i. e., true knowledge or *Brahma-Vidya*, i. e., knowledge of the self. Thus the eyes of (<sup>(1)</sup> *The self*) the seer became opened and he discovered the real behind the unreal. The individual self is phenomenal also; in its ultimate reality it is one with the Highest Self. The Upadhis, i. e., the body and its organs, condition the Higher Self and make it appear as the embodied self. The Upadhis are due to *Avidya*. We cannot rid ourselves of these conditions, but we can grasp their true nature, soar above them, and recognize our substantial unity with Brahman, i. e., the Higher Self.<sup>\*\*</sup>

§ 28. The knowledge of the Self as the only reality (<sup>(a)</sup> *Knowledge of the self alone necessary*) is the one thing necessary. This releases man from the miseries of life, and the fear of successive transmigrations to a higher or lower sphere of existence after death.<sup>\*\*</sup>

<sup>\*\*</sup> Max Müller, *The Vedanta Philosophy*, p. 22.

<sup>\*\*</sup> Müller, *The Vedanta Phil.*, Lec. 2; Chandg. Up. III; In the Taith Up. I, 9, good words, i. e., sacrifices and austerity are essential conditions of this knowledge.

<sup>\*\*</sup> For the act of transmigration cf. Brih. Up. III, 9. 28; VI, 2, 16; Chang. Up. V, 10. 7; The Laws of Manu; the embodiments are described with minute and fanciful detail in the *Manavadharmaśāstra*, XII, 54. sq.

**This obtained by abstraction.** The more intense the abstraction becomes, the more the senses are crushed and the "mind tranquil and subdued," "penetrates into the depths of his being. The seeming duality of subject and of object disappears before the gaze of the Indian sage and he is conscious of one being only. This being is "the great omnipresent Self" within him apprehended by a perfect abstraction.<sup>27</sup>

**Identity of individual and higher self.** This is the only one thing that perishes not in all things that perish, the one thing that gives light in all things that have no light.<sup>28</sup> Beyond this he cannot go. In illustration he points to dreamless sleep.<sup>29</sup> To the sleeper the external world has no existence. The inequalities and miseries of life have passed. The duality of subject and object have melted away. His own self has been merged into the true impersonal self, "the self hidden in all things."<sup>30</sup> For when there is, as it were, duality, then one sees the other, one salutes the other, one perceives the other, one knows the other; but when the self only is all this, how should he see another? How should he know himself the Knower?<sup>31</sup>

**cannot be conceived or expressed.** § 29. This principle has no visible form, says the Katha Upanishad. It is above and beyond the apprehension of the mind. Therefore, "it can only be described by No."<sup>32</sup> It cannot be positively conceived or enunciated. "Thou canst not think the thinker of the thought, thou canst not know the knower of all knowledge. This is thy self that is in all things that are."<sup>33</sup>

<sup>27</sup> Katha Up. I, 2,25.

<sup>28</sup> Katha Up. II, 4, 4.

<sup>29</sup> Ib.

<sup>30</sup> Chang. Up. VI, 8, 1; VIII, 11, 1.

<sup>31</sup> Katha Up. I, 3, 12.

<sup>32</sup> Br. Up. III, 11, 13.

<sup>33</sup> Brih. Up. II, 3, 6; IV, 2, 4; IV, 9, 26.

<sup>34</sup> Brih. Up. III, 4, 2; Mund. Up. III, 1, 8.

The mind is necessitated to think of it. "It is thought by him that thinks it not; he that thinks, knows it not; it is unknown to them that know it, known to them that know it not."<sup>28</sup> Nevertheless, it cannot be formed by the mind: "that which is not uttered by the voice and that by which the voice is uttered. That which is not thought by the thought, that by which the thought is thought. Know thou that only is the Self."<sup>29</sup> Sat or Brahman is to be conceived as out of space or time, as free from all qualities."<sup>30</sup> It is other than the known, and above the unknown."<sup>31</sup> It alone abides one in its essence "unchanging among changing things."<sup>32</sup>

§ 30. This supreme principle, Sat, "that which is," is at the root of everything and permeates all things. It also sees and knows because it is vision and knowledge itself. It is not a deity in the ordinary sense of the word. It is but the expression of the highest abstraction of the human mind.<sup>33</sup> The Brahman is, in our use of the word, unconscious. Consciousness is had where subject and object are apprehended as such. It is only by the extinction of consciousness that the soul returns into the unity of the self. Brahman is called light or intelligence, but not in our use of the term. He is abstract knowledge, and knowledge without an object known. All that moves and breathes and stirs is centered in the Self.<sup>34</sup> This Self is self-luminous, dwelling in the heart of every living thing.<sup>35</sup> Its light diffuses itself over the modifications of the

Brahman  
an uncon-  
scious  
principle.

- <sup>28</sup> Kena Up. II, 3.
- <sup>29</sup> Kena Up. I, 5, 9.
- <sup>30</sup> Svetas. Up. VI, 6.
- <sup>31</sup> Kena Up. I, 4.
- <sup>32</sup> Katha Up. I, 2, 22.
- <sup>33</sup> Chand. Up. VI, 8, 6.
- <sup>34</sup> Mund. Up. II, 2.
- <sup>35</sup> Katha Up. I, 2, 20.

like our word "existence."

True nature of the soul.

The phenomenal and the real.

The Self and its mirrored counterfeits.

mind and makes thoughts possible. Without this light, darkness and nothingness would envelop all things.<sup>44</sup> Brahman is the abstract totality of all things, something like our conception of existence. To the Vedantist the concrete forms or modifications of existing things were appearances. The only reality, the external essence is Sat, or Brahman, or the Self.

§ 31. The true nature of the soul is the one Self. Individuality is fictitious. An illusion hides from the individual his true nature. Under the illusion it views itself as one with the body. In this condition he is subject to the rounds of births.<sup>45</sup> In the knowledge that he is no longer a person or self, distinct from the characterless plenitude of being, he sees the truth.<sup>46</sup>

§ 32. The individual and his environment are real for the many; they are false for the few. They exist in so far as they can account for all that *seems* to go on in daily life. By intuition their existence is seen to fade away and disappear into the higher and real existence of the only Self. What is real and true in the individual is the Self within invisible. What we see in the individual is not real, but only *involucra* or seeming "woven like warp and woof over the self."<sup>47</sup>

§ 33. The individual soul is not another and independent entity. The sun mirrored upon one pool may tremble with the rippling of the surface, and the sun reflected upon another may be motionless. In like manner the real Self is reflected upon its counterfeits, the bodies of sentient creatures, and thus fictitiously

<sup>44</sup> Katha Up. II, 5, 15; Mund. Up. II, 2, 10.

<sup>45</sup> Katha Up. II, 4, 10.

<sup>46</sup> Chand. Up. VII.

<sup>47</sup> Brih. Up. III, 6, 8; Katha Up. I, 3, 10; II, 6, 7; Chand. Up. III, 14, 2. Sankara says "the individual soul is only a semblance of the one and only self, as the sun imaged upon a watery surface is only a semblance of the one and only sun in the heavens."

shares their growth, diminution and other sensible modes of life. Apart from its various counterfeits, the Self is changeless and unvaried." The individual, therefore, is only an illusion. Maya overspreads the self. This causes a fictitious limitation. The explanation or reason for the individual is avidya, i. e., nescience. The individual is such because it does not know that it is not such.<sup>44</sup>

§ 34. But Maya is more than the individual illusion. Maya is the unreal principle. Through an abstraction or aggregation, Maya came to be viewed as the world illusion. Maya is sometimes fictitious; it is neither entity nor nonentity. From the union, before all time, of Brahman, the ultimate principle of reality, the one and only being, with Maya, the illusion, the unreal principle, have proceeded all things. Things seem to be manifold, but this, too, is an illusion.<sup>45</sup> Before the subtle and penetrating gaze of the sage the veils fade away and disappear, or are merged into the totality of Self.<sup>46</sup>

§ 35. Brahman is untouched by the world-fiction. Brahman and Maya. In illustration they point to the sun which is unsullied though its rays fall on impure earth, or moving waters.<sup>47</sup> Maya, the world-fiction, overspreads Brahman, as the mirage fictitiously overspreads the desert sands. This disappears and "the great unborn consciousless Self alone remains."<sup>48</sup> Brahman alone, the inward light is real; it alone abides; it alone is worthy of our meditations and affections.<sup>49</sup> It is omnipresent like

<sup>44</sup> Gough, Philosophy of the Upanishads, p. 49.

<sup>45</sup> This is the theory of illusion, the solution of Sankara, Ramanuga holds the theory of evolution. Max Müller, Theosophy, p. 108.

<sup>46</sup> Katha Up. II, 5, 12.

<sup>47</sup> Br. Up. IV, 4, 23.

<sup>48</sup> Katha Up. II, 5, 12; Chand. Up. VI.

<sup>49</sup> Br. Up. IV, 4, 23.

<sup>50</sup> Chand. Up. II, 4, 5.

the ether."<sup>44</sup> This universal spirit is one's own spirit."<sup>45</sup>

**True wisdom and happiness.** § 36. The knowledge and vision of the Self, "the pure light of lights within the heart,"<sup>46</sup> by spiritual abstraction, purifies the wise man from the world illusion, and makes him intelligent, *i. e.*, self-luminous, frees him from the miseries of transmigration, and is the only salvation and bliss."<sup>47</sup> Many means, *e. g.*, renunciation, meditation, bodily postures are enjoined.<sup>48</sup>

**The wise man.** § 37. The sage of the Upanishads sits rigid, insensible to things around, his thoughts and feelings stifled, his mind fixed upon a single point, "the light within." As the meditation becomes more intense, his body and its environment, the vestures of the vital airs, of the inward sense, of the mind in turn fade away. The mental vesture merges into the vesture of characterless bliss, "a bliss a hundred times more than the highest human joys."<sup>49</sup> Then sorrow is no more, nor fear, nor pain. He is not troubled at the commission of evil deeds nor the omission of good works.<sup>50</sup> He is in the body, but untouched by actions, whether good or bad. "Individuals suffer because one causes belief to another. But in the universal soul, where all individuals are one, their sufferings are neutralized."<sup>51</sup> With the disappearance of the body he is liberated from the illusions of life in various embodiments. He

<sup>44</sup> Chand. Up. III, 12, 7; III, 18, 1; IV, 10, 5; Tait. Up. I; Mund. Up. I.

<sup>45</sup> Chand. Up. III, 13, 8; 14, 2.

<sup>46</sup> Mund. Up. II, 2.

<sup>47</sup> Katha Up. I, 4, 12; II, 6, 17.

<sup>48</sup> Svetasav. Up.; Tait. Up. VI, 18; VI, 24; Mund. Up. III, I; II, 2, 4; Müller, S. B. E., vol. I, p. XXIII; Katha Up. I, 2, II; Tait. Up. I, 8; Br. Up. IV, 4, 7.

<sup>49</sup> Br. Up. IV, 3, 33.

<sup>50</sup> Tait. Up. II, 9; Br. Up. IV, 3; Tait. Up. VI, 18.

<sup>51</sup> Br. Up. I, 5, 20.

has returned into the Self as water into water, light into light, as rivers into the sea." There is no longer any consciousness. "As the bees make honey by collecting the juices of distant trees and reduce the juice into one form, and as these juices have no discrimination so that they might say, I am the juice of this tree or that, in the same manner all these creatures, when they have become merged into the True, know not that they are merged into the True." " And again, "As those rivers when they are in the sea do not know I am this or that river. In the same manner all creatures, when they have come back from the Time, know not that they have come back from the Time." " The thief, the outcast, the monk are all merged into the characterless Brahman." The father is no longer father, the mother no longer mother, the gods no longer gods." In its true nature the soul is impersonal. It has lost or rather regained its identity. It did not know that it was the true Self because it had identified itself with fictitious vestures and embodiments. It regains itself, it recovers its true nature by seeing and knowing itself as it is free from the pleasures and pains of the world-illusion."

§ 38. The intuition of the unity of souls in the Self fulfils all desires. He is motionless like pure water poured out upon a level surface. Such a one passes into the self never to return, and to use a phrase oft repeated in the Upanishads, is lost "like a lump of salt in salt water." " His mind reflects the pure light of undifferenced being; his personality becomes one with

" Mund. Up. III, 2, 8.

" Chand. Up. 9, 1.

" Ib., VI, 10, 1.

" Brih. Up. IV, 3, 22.

" Ib.

" Br. Up. IV, 3, 23.

" Br. Up. II, 4, 12.

the Self. No hope of recompense spurs him on. The paradise of Brahma and the gods is but transitory and empty. As the clouds slowly break away and disperse, letting the sun shine forth in pure radiance; so the fictions of the world-seeming pass away and the self alone abides. "It is this undying Self that is outspread before, Self behind, Self to the right, Self to the left, above, below; Brahman alone is all this."<sup>11</sup> All works are exhausted; metempsychosis with all its miseries has passed; all doubts disappear; all affections are crushed; the sage wakes out of this dream-world into real being, the soul enters into the All of things.

(b) *German Transcendentalism.*

(b) *German Transcendentalism.* § 39. In the last century Emmanuel Kant, a professor in Konigsberg, dissatisfied with the condition of current philosophical teaching, felt that a remedy should be provided. For years in studious retirement he turned the problem over and over in his mind and finally published the Critic of Pure Reason. This work exerted a profound and lasting impression on subsequent philosophic and religious thought. In it are found the sources of two great tendencies of modern thought: Transcendental Pantheism, and Modern Scepticism, whose highest and legitimate form is reached in Agnosticism.

*The Critic of Kant.*

*his teaching.*

§ 40. Kant attempted to effect a revolution in Philosophy, analogous to that worked by Copernicus in Astronomy.<sup>12</sup> The radical error in preceding systems was to him the fact that they rested upon a wrong basis. Instead of teaching that thought should be conformed to external things, Kant boldly maintained

<sup>11</sup> Mund. Up. II, 2, 11.

<sup>12</sup> Critic of Pure Reason, pref. to 2d ed.; Müller's Trans., p. 693.

the contrary. He thus reversed the whole fabric of Philosophy. To him the mind was the real center, and the subjective alone was true. External things as they really exist can never be known. The mind perceives objects only as they are covered over by subjective conditions or forms of thought. These forms, *i. e.*, ideal *phenomena*, thus become the objects known. Hence the ideal only is apprehended, the real, *i. e.*, *noumena*, forever escape our grasp.

§ 41. This fundamental principle was seized by Fichte. Fichte and developed with all the ardor of an enthusiastic disciple. The subject, *i. e.*, the *I* or *me*, to him was the fundamental and only reality. The outer world was the mirror of the *I*. The existence of the *I* is a most certain fact of consciousness; its essence is unknown and does not concern us. We know it only as an activity, forming internal images and representations. The *I* is thus conceived as possessing a creative power, and by the exercise of this power becomes conscious of itself. The *I* is the subject; the object or image is the *non-I*. The image is the self-determination of the *I* and is viewed as its conscious modification. In this consciousness the *I* and the *non-I* are again united.

§ 42. The phenomena of the external world are only the representations of the *I*. These result from the activity of the *I* and are its limitations. Freed from these, the *I* becomes the infinite. The original and fundamental consciousness is that of the infinite *I*. This *I* is not conceivable by the mind, is not conscious, nor a person, nor a substance, nor a spirit, nor a reality. To attribute such qualities to God is to limit Him and place Him in the category of the finite. God is a pure activity; pure thought is the divine existence; human existence is absolutely one with the divine.<sup>The Infinite and the Finite.</sup>"

" Fichte, by Robert Adamson, ch. VI, VII.

Idea of creation.

§ 43. Thus to Fichte the *I* pure and transcendental is the only reality; this possesses infinite activity; it is thus determined to know the *I* and the *non-I*; to know them is to create; before I had the consciousness of myself, writes Fichte, I did not exist.

Schelling.

§ 44. With Fichte the *I* was the only reality; the *non-I* was its production. To Schelling they both were real, because they were one and the same. His fundamental principle was the identity of the *I* and the *non-I*, of the mind thinking and the thing thought.

Schopenhauer.

§ 45. Schopenhauer replaces the *idea* of Hegel by the concept of *will*. To him the *will* is the only reality; everything else in the world are effects, evolutions or phenomena of Will. The Will manifests itself in different ways; in nature as a physical force, in man as consciousness; therefore, only as manifested in man does it possess personality, and with the death of man loses personality. Of a personal God distinct from the world, the mind can know absolutely nothing.

Hartman.

§ 46. Hartman felt that the *will* alone was insufficient; to it must be added the *idea*. But the will and the idea are to be explained; they cannot exist absolutely; they point to a further concept, which is fundamental and primal. This principle is the *Unconscious*. It is at the same time one and everything. Through the idea and the will it evolves and becomes everything. Existing things are only the appearances of the *Unconscious*.

## II.

### DUALISTIC THEORY.

History.

§ 47. The theory of Pantheism resolves all things into one absolute principle. Other philosophers, however, explain the origin of the universe by postulating two principles equally eternal and supreme. This

theory has attracted men of great gifts but has not exerted the influence of the Pantheistic system. It is found in the highest stage of Greek philosophy. It has been ascribed to Plato." Others hold that Aristotle taught the coexistence of two eternal principles. It is certain that he maintained the eternity of matter. St. Thomas was influenced by the opinion of Aristotle to contend that creation from eternity was possible. Thus he attempted to reconcile the philosophers with the revealed truth of Catholic faith.

§ 48. The Stoics are said to hold the existence of <sup>Stoics.</sup> two principles; the one was matter, the other was the world-soul. It is easy to conceive that some of them should so believe after the analogy of man composed of body and soul. Tertullian is the authority for this."<sup>14</sup>

§ 49. The problem of good and evil has engaged the <sup>Ethical</sup> <sup>dualism.</sup> attention of thoughtful men in all ages. Various solutions have been proposed. The solution that has interest at present is that drawn from the later Persian cosmogony and taught as a cardinal doctrine by the Manichean heretics. To explain the simultaneous <sup>(a) Mani-</sup> <sup>cheans.</sup> existence of good and evil they postulated two eternal principles; the one, the cause of all the good, the other, the cause of all the evil that exists. These two principles are mutually opposed. The preponderance of good or evil is explained by temporary advantage gained by the one over the other. This teaching profoundly influenced early Christianity. St. Augustine <sup>(b) St.</sup> fell under its sway for some years."<sup>15</sup> We find it coming out afresh in the doctrines of the Albigensians of <sup>(c) J. S.</sup> the XII century. In our day it has been advanced by <sup>Mill</sup> John Stuart Mill."<sup>16</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Timaeus.

<sup>15</sup> Contr. Hermog., c. I. VIII.

<sup>16</sup> Confessions.

<sup>17</sup> Ess. on Rel. on Nature, p. 41.

## III.

## THEORY OF CREATION.

**Dependence of the universe.** § 50. That the universe is dependent has been proved to a certainty. Mathematics shows that it limited in time and in space. Physics points out that it had a beginning and that it will have an end. We can indicate the approximate period when vegetable, animal and human life first appeared. That life can come only from pre-existing life is an established truth of Biology. Hence the source of terrestrial life must be outside and beyond the universe. The laws of motion, the properties of matter prove that the inorganic world in its intimate nature depends on some higher and external power. Thus we have been led to the conception of God. His principal attributes have been indicated as far as human reason from the contemplation of mundane existences can conceive them. We know that God is a spirit; that He is living and intelligent. The problem that now confronts us is how to account for the beginning of the universe, or what is the nature of its dependence.

**Creation.** § 51. Three theories are proposed: (a) Pantheism in its various phases; (b) Philosophic Dualism; (c) Creation. The first two have been analyzed critically and found untenable. This leaves an antecedent probability in favor of the third hypothesis, viz., Creation.

**(a) antecedent probability.**

**notion of creation.** § 52. The classic definition of Creation is: *Productio rei ex nihilo sui et subjecti*, i. e., the production of a thing from nothing in the sense that before its production neither the thing itself existed, nor did any subject-matter exist from which the thing could be fashioned. An illustration may be drawn from ordinary work. Thus a carpenter may carve a piece of furniture from a block of wood, or a sculptor may chisel a statue from

a rough piece of marble. Neither the one nor the other existed as such before the workman fashioned them; hence he is said to have produced them *ex nihilo sui*. But the material existed; this the workman did not make; he simply took it and made it assume such and such a shape; hence he did not produce the statue *ex nihilo subjecti*. Thus the ordinary workman is not a *creator* but only an artificer. In extraordinary works of genius as, e. g., a wonderful poem, or a great painting, the writer or artist is called the creator and his work dignified by the title of creation, because the extraordinary brilliancy of the work, the extreme rarity and difficulty of production, the slender means at his disposal arouse in the mind the thought that from almost nothing at his disposal this man has produced something which for ages will challenge the admiration of man. The apparent absence of any material or subject-matter out of which the works of genius can be formed makes them approximate to the true notion of creation and obtains for them the title.

§ 53. For this reason creation is said to be the production of a *thing out of nothing*. The phrase has given rise to much misconception, false imputation and confusion. When we say *out of nothing*, we do not imply that nothing was the material or subject-matter after the analogy of the sculptor. Christian Philosophy has clearly and repeatedly explained the words. They do not imply any notion of material causality whatsoever; they refer only to the order of time or of succession. Thus, e. g., in explaining creation out of nothing we simply mean that before creation there was nothing; that by creation things began to exist; that there is no question of a causal connection between nothing and existence, only a mere succession.<sup>\*\*</sup> The famous

<sup>\*\*</sup> St. Thomas, *Contra Gent.* L. II, ch. 16.

from nothing dictum handed down by antiquity and employed to-day, that *from nothing nothing comes*, is thus shorn of meaning and strength. The phrase is based upon ambiguity and misconception. It only has a meaning when we admit a causal connection between the two terms. This Christian Philosophy has ever emphatically denied and it should be heard in its own behalf."

dependence explained. § 54. The dependent nature of the universe has been proved beyond question. The arguments set forth show that the world, considered as a whole or in its several parts, *i. e.*, the particular beings, alike are dependent. Now what is dependent had a beginning, or in other words, has been produced. It could not be produced by an emanation from the divine substance, nor is it a manifestation or evolution of a real or ideal divine being. These are the various phrases of Pantheism."<sup>10</sup>

(a) not by emanation. § 55. (a) It is absurd to suppose that the different beings are the emanations of God. God then would be divided; His substance would have parts, and every thing that is would be a portion of the divinity. Consciousness presents an inseparable barrier to this theory. It tells me that I am a person distinct from God and from every other being. Again, this theory refuted by Psychology and Ethics saps the foundation of Ethics. If everything were a part of God, it would have the nature of God and its activities would be divine. How, then, could we make a distinction between good and bad? That there

<sup>10</sup> St. Augustine, Op. Imp. contra Julian, V, 31; St. Thomas, I. q. 45, a. 1, ad. 3. As Lucretius expresses it  
"Principium hinc cuius nobis exordia sumet:  
Nullam rem nihilo digni divinitus unquam."

De Nat. I, V. 148.

"According to J. G. Schurman, Belief in God, p. 140, Martineau makes creation an external process like a self-scissure of the Deity in whom in some way the world was always contained;" Dr. Upton teaches a theory of pantheistic manifestation and scission in Hibbert Lectures, 1893.

is such a distinction is a fundamental and evident truth.

§ 56. (2) The Pantheism of manifestation, whether it be viewed as real or as ideal, is no less untenable. Consciousness bears witness to my own substantial reality; it tells me that *I* am not a mere mode or manifestation of something else. The substantial reality of the *I* is a firm conviction of ordinary daily life and an evident and fundamental truth of Psychology. No fallacious reasoning can obliterate this, and the system of Philosophy which neglects the distinction is faulty in its very basis and will surely fail to give the answer to the deepest questions of being and of life which the mind in every age imperatively demands.\*

§ 57. (3) It is opposed to and contradicted by the physical sciences. Everywhere in the broad field of science the substantial reality of mundane beings is taken for granted; their properties are set forth, their laws are formulated. Not only are these beings conceived and dealt with as substantial realities, but they are recognized as substances differing one from another in their substantial nature. Reasoning from this evident truth, we speak of the classifications and hierarchy of real beings. Hence also the basis for the real distinction and difference of the various sciences. Throughout there is question of substantial realities, not of appearances; of beings differing one from another in nature. In the supposition of one substance only, or of the essential identity of all things, such a process would be absurd and open to manifest contradictions.

§ 58. (4) Again, this form of Pantheism supposes that the perfect and determined have followed and proceeded from the imperfect and the undetermined.

\* *Christian Philosophy, The Soul, ch. I, VI.*

Hence the imperfect is prior to the perfect; the former produces the latter. But this is contradicted by the principle of causality. It is an evident and fundamental truth that the effect cannot be more perfect than the cause. In some manner the perfection of being which we discover in the effect must be precontained in the cause. Hence Pantheism is opposed to the first principle of sound reasoning. It is also contradicted by the principle of contradiction. If God and the world were one and the same being, then this being would at the one and same time be infinite and finite, eternal and temporary, necessary and dependent, immutable and subject to constant change, imperfect and ever becoming perfect. Such a position is absurd. Hence we are constrained to reject it altogether.

(a) not by  
Dualistic  
Theory.

§ 59. (b) Another solution is sought in the pre-existence or the eternity of matter. According to this view God fashioned the world from pre-existing matter. He thus becomes the designer or Artificer, not the Creator. This theory cannot stand criticism and for two main reasons

refuted by  
(a) nature  
of matter.

(1) It is contradictory to the known nature of matter and therefore utterly lacks foundation in fact. The properties of matter show that it cannot be eternal. Science proves that the world had a beginning as it will surely have an end. Even if we grant that matter is eternal, the hypothesis will not be one whit strengthened. Matter as such is dependent. The prolongation of its existence to an eternity will never change its nature. External matter can never be other than dependent. To maintain that God fashioned the world from pre-existing or eternal matter is a manifest contradiction. In the hypothesis it is conceived to be independent; but in its nature it is evidently

dependent. Therefore, the hypothesis is contrary to a known truth and must accordingly be rejected.

§ 60. (2) The world cannot be the cause of itself. (3) The world can-  
not be the cause of creation. It is a philosophical axiom that a being cannot act before it exists. It does not exist in hypothesis; it itself. does exist on the supposition that it exerts activity. Thus it would have existed and not have existed at the same time, which is a patent contradiction.

§ 61. (c) The final theory proposed is that of Creation. (4) Theory of Creation. This is the theory of Christian Philosophy. It alone is free from contradiction and appeals to sound reasoning.\*

§ 62. (1) The rejection of all other hypothesis is a (a) negative argument. negative argument for creation. It alone now possesses the field, and taking the fact that it has been taught consistently and constantly for two thousand years by the most powerful and soundly reasoned school of philosophy that has ever appealed to or influenced the minds of thinking men, the negative proof has a weight and force which cannot be lightly treated.

§ 63. (2) Furthermore, no contradiction can be pointed out in this theory. It is a fact that the universe is dependent and limited; it is a fact that it did not always exist; it is a fact that this theory alone does full and impartial justice to the nature of the world and the conception of God. We may not comprehend the manner, but we can reason to the fact. It is true that the act of creation implies infinite power; but the conception of God as supreme and infinite is deep-seated in the mind; it is what makes God what He is.

§ 64. (3) If it be objected that a difficulty is found in understanding how a spirit can bring into existence (c) creation not inconceivable.

\* The sublime passages in Confessions of St. Augustine, b. 10, ch. 6; b. 11, ch. 4.

*confusion of intellect and sense.* a substance distinct from itself," we answer that the difficulty arises from the confusion of intelligence and imagination. It is hard to imagine such a process. Yet it is not so hard to conceive."<sup>1</sup> The foregoing discussion is a preparation of the mind to receive and admit creation as the only possible explanation. Furthermore, by way of partial illustration we may appeal to the works of the human intellect. The mind not only builds houses, and fashions mechanical implements from materials already existing. It possesses what is called a creative power. Literature and the fine arts are its product. The more closely the human mind approximates to the concept of divine creation, the higher it is conceived to be in the scale of intelligence and the greater are its works. It clothes its concepts in the written and spoken word. How different the sight and sound from the thing signified!

<sup>1</sup> A. K. Rogers, *Modern Philosophy*, p. 51.

<sup>2</sup> J. G. Schurman, *Belief in God*, p. 148, writes that creation is absolutely inconceivable; so also Wm. Graham in *Creed of Sciences*, p. 4. In a recent speech Lord Kelvin uttered these remarkable words, "He could not say that with regard to the origin of life science neither affirmed nor denied creative power. Science positively affirmed creative power. \* \* \* It was not in dead matter that they lived and moved and had their being, but in the creating and directive power which science compelled them to accept as an article of belief. \* \* \* Modern biologists were coming once more to a firm acceptance of something, and that was of vital principle. \* \* \* They only knew God in His works, but they were absolutely forced by science to admit and to believe with absolute confidence in a directive power—in an influence other than physical, dynamical, electrical forces. Science was not antagonistic to religion, but a help for religion." *The Times*, May 2, 1903.

## CHAPTER XI.

### UNITY.

§ 1. The line of thought developed in the preceding chapters brings home to the mind of the thoughtful reader the conviction that the visible universe does not exhaust all reality, that behind and beyond what appears to sense or appeals to thought, there is another being on whom the present world rests and in whom alone it finds a rational and complete explanation.

§ 2. Call it what you may, dignify it by the most <sup>the fact.</sup> sublime conceptions of the human soul, represent it as the "World Ground,"<sup>1</sup> pause before as the great "Unknown,"<sup>2</sup> its existence cannot be ignored or denied. The labored efforts of Philosophical reasoning afford dim glimpses of a far-away truth; their tone is wavering and uncertain; they have no power over the mind; they seem like half-concessions or studied apologies. The term "God" is artfully avoided or covered over with learned verbiage. Consecrated by long use, bound with the dearest recollections of life, — the memories of childhood, appealing to our entire being with its varied questionings, needs and aspirations, no other word in our language brings the truth nearer or expresses it with more simple force or reveals its living reality and influence upon our daily lives.

§ 3. The task is by no means complete with the bare <sup>the</sup> proof that an extramundane being exists. A further <sup>problem.</sup> purpose remains. It is necessary to show, as far as human reason can, that this being corresponds to the

<sup>1</sup> Bowne, Phil. of Theism.

<sup>2</sup> Spencer, First Principles.

Christian notion of God. This is an investigation into the nature of the divine attributes. The first and fundamental problem is the Unity of God.

## I.

## UNITY.

*unity of  
God.*

§ 4. That God is one is a certainty, though not a truth evident at first sight.\* The contrary has been held and taught at different times even by entire races. Historically viewed, this teaching is justly estimated as a corruption and an error. The primitive belief of the human mind was that God is one. Research into the earliest languages reveals the forms and convictions which possessed the minds of our remote ancestors. Everywhere are found traces of a clear and definite monotheism. The records of the past, whether preserved in sacred books or engraved on monuments, confirm this conclusion. The History of Religions day by day presents arguments in support of this position. Idolatry and Polytheism were not the primitive forms of human worship. They have been given a proper place in the development of religious thought and are now viewed as degradations or corruptions of a purer belief.

*viewed  
historically.*

§ 5. Thus the farther back we go in the life of a nation, the purer and more spiritual are the conceptions of the Supreme Being. Human reason confirms the voice of history. Among the most civilized races of antiquity we find a protest against Polytheism in the form of a philosophic reaction. Hence the rise and spread of philosophical systems with the Hindus, the Greeks, and the Romans. Differing one from another

\* Inferred from the order and harmony of the universe, Athanasius, C. Gentes; St. Thomas, C. Gentes, I. I, ch. 14.

in the conception of the universe and of its formation, they nevertheless owe their origin and existence to the conviction of a unity at the base of all things. The marvelous order and harmony of the world, the reign of law which obtains throughout, the manifest signs of a universal system, made up, it is true, of many parts, yet welded into a compact whole, the scale of beings <sup>philosophically.</sup> from the pure material existences up to the highest forms of organic life, their varied and intricate relations and experiences reveal a unity of action which cannot fail to impress the thoughtful mind. The argument from Order not only proves the existence of a divine Architect and Creator; it proves also to conviction that the cause of all is one. No simpler or stronger expression of this truth can be found than in the word "universe," consecrated by long usage of English-speaking peoples. The world in all its entirety is designated by the term "universe," *i. e.*, one universal system made up of many parts.

## II.

## SIMPLE UNITY.

§ 6. It is not sufficient to say that God is a unity. <sup>simple unity.</sup> We could not draw any definite conclusion therefrom, nor could we from the phrase, as it stands, form a real and definite conception. There are various kinds of unity. To be exact we must distinguish. For under an apparently clear term the strangest aberrations of the human mind have been covertly proposed.

1°. *Collective Unity.*

§ 7. A *collective unity* is an aggregate of elements or <sup>collective unity.</sup> individuals distinct and separable, but formed into a whole by some common bond. This bond may be

*physical, i. e.,* links form one chain, or *moral, i. e.,* law unites persons to form a community or government, or *intellectual, e. g.,* as in the words or sentences of an essay or an argument.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>this the doctrine of Pantheism.</sup> § 8. That God is a collective unity is the teaching of Pantheism. Mention is here made of the Pantheism of Emanation and of Manifestation. Further on, German Pantheism, in which the notion of Evolution predominates, will be subjected to criticism. According to these forms of Pantheism the visible universe is an emanation from or a manifestation of the one divine substance. Thus existing things are a part of God; they partake of the divine nature and, in the highest sense of the word, are divine. God is therefore the sum of everything; there is nothing distinct from him; He is all that is.\*

<sup>criticism.</sup> § 9. Pantheism is compelled to teach the unity of God; but the unity is only a shadow of the reality. Under the strong light of logical analysis it disappears and there is presented to our gaze only a strange assemblage of objects differing one from another in nature.\* Even then there is a unity apparent, but the unity is that of order and of system, not

\* Christian Philosophy — The Soul, p. 71.

“ The universe is one in this sense that its differences exist harmoniously within one whole, beyond which there is nothing. Hence the Absolute is, so far, an individual and a system.” Bradley, Appearance and Reality, p. 144. “ All differences come together in the Absolute . . . The Absolute is the richer for every discord and for all diversity which it embraces; and it is our ignorance only in which consists the poverty of our object.” P. 204. This teaching is pure Idealism, after the Neo-Kantian type, for we read “ The Absolute is one system and its contents are nothing but sentient experience.” P. 146.

\* Thus the Neo-Kantians with Ritschel teach that “ God is the unity into which we combine the affections of our religious sensitivity and to which we refer them as its qualities.” Cf. L. Stahl, in Kant, Lotze and Ritschel, p. 200. In this we see Kant’s apperception, and Jacobi’s Sentimentalism combining into a form of Pantheism.

of nature and intimate constitution. Scholastic Philosophy having a basis on sound reasoning proclaims the former and from it infers the unity of the controlling power which guides and sustains all things. Pantheism proclaims the latter in opposition to the testimony of consciousness which tells me that I am distinct from my fellows and from the world around, and gives no intimation whatsoever that my nature is a part of God. It is in contradiction to the fundamental principles of right and wrong, to the common sense of man, and without the slightest vestige of scientific proof.'

#### IV.

##### *2º. Potential Unity.*

§ 10. The term *Potential* is not used in its Scholastic <sup>potential</sup> <sub>unity.</sub> meaning. St. Thomas speaks of a potential whole, as a unity which by virtue of its nature is capable of exerting its activity in various ways. These various modes or channel of activity are called potencies, a word identical in meaning with our English term *faculty*. Thus, the soul, in its nature a simple unity, exerts its activity in various ways, which are called potencies or faculties.\*

§ 11. Here by potential unity is designated a thing <sup>its meaning.</sup> which, not yet one in its complete essence, is yet in potency to become one. The unity, therefore, is the result of development; it is a something which has grown up; actually it is nothing, potentially it is something.<sup>\*</sup>

§ 12. That God is a potential unity is the doctrine <sup>its teachers.</sup> advanced in common by the Pantheistic disciples of

\*Christian Philosophy — The Soul, p. 166.

\*Christian Philosophy — The Soul, ch. III.

\*Wallace's Hegel, *Prolegomena*, ch. VII.

Kant. They may differ one from another in the starting point or in the form in which the system is proposed, nevertheless the characteristic notion is that of potentiality or evolution.

Fichte.

§ 13. Thus to Fichte, individual consciousness is the primary fact and the true basis of philosophy. The Consciousness of the absolute Ego alone originally exists. But this Consciousness receives its first form in the existence of the individual Ego. We know not the nature of that which thinks; we only know it as an activity, *i. e.*, as forming and representing images. Thus by acting the Ego creates itself; it becomes actually what it was potentially. The internal image is known as something different from the Ego.

Thus arises self-consciousness and the distinction between the Ego and the non-Ego. This duality is not real or permanent. In the very act of forming an image, the Ego is conscious that the image is only a modification of itself. In this consciousness the Ego and the non-Ego become a unity. The varied phenomena of the world, therefore, are only the representation of the individual Ego, and this in turn is lost in the inner consciousness or Ego. God, therefore, is a pure activity, just as the individual Ego is not a being but a pure activity. Pure thought is God, and in pure thought man perceives God.

Schelling.

§ 14. With Fichte the Ego alone was real; the non-Ego was its image or representation. Schelling, on the contrary, held both to be real, but their reality consists in their identity. We cannot think without thinking of something. Thus the subject thinking and the object thought have a fundamental unity. This is called the Absolute Ego and is conceived as a mind which has in itself the potency to become everything, and by its own evolution evolves the potential into the

actual, first in the world of matter and of animal life, finally in the world of man. God thus becomes "the living unity of all forces."

§ 15. To Hegel thought was existence; what is Hegel rational is real, and the absolute thought or idea is the highest reality. God, therefore, is the absolute mind. The mind conceives the Absolute as being. This concept of being is primitive, necessary and indeterminate. He calls it a pure being. As such it is distinguished from nothing. The bond of their union is a becoming, *i. e., to fieri.*

§ 16. The idea, *i. e., to fieri*, by a constant process evolves itself into all that is. The evolution is seen (1) in Logic which explains the genesis and nature of the idea; (2) in the philosophy of nature, which is the idea of its otherness. The evolution is marked by three stages, viz., the mechanical, the physical, and the organic; (3) in the philosophy of spirit, which shows how the idea returns from nature. The terminus of evolution is reached in self-consciousness.<sup>10</sup> The idea with Hegel is God, but God viewed as abstract and universal. As such He is a pure potency, containing in Himself the power to become all things. What we grasp is the becoming, the *to fieri*, a divine process, God realizing Himself in the world of nature and of man.<sup>11</sup>

§ 17. The potential differs but little from the criticism. collective unity. It is a peculiar aspect only of the latter. The same criticism applies to both. The

not different from  
collective  
unity.

<sup>10</sup>"The strength and merit of the Hegelian philosophy lay in this that it applied the Idealism of the Kantian subjective philosophy to the historical life of humanity and has understood that life in the light of a development of the spirit in conformity with law." Pfeiderer, *Philosophy and Development of Religion*, vol. I, p. 23.

<sup>11</sup>Belford Bax, *Handbook of History of Mod. Philosophy*, p. 406.

characteristic of the latter form of Pantheism is the element of a perpetual evolution process.<sup>12</sup> To Schelling God only becomes personal in self-consciousness. With Hegel the highest manifestation or evolution of the idea, *i. e.*, God is found in self-conscious mind. Now the conception of a potential God evolving and realizing Himself in nature and in man is a travesty of the truth.<sup>13</sup> It is a pure ideal conception, based upon unsound metaphysical principles, and without the slightest verification. It represents a conception of God at first indeterminate, imperfect, vague, and indefinite, who by a perpetual process of evolution becomes definite, more perfect and more determined.

*purely  
ideal.*

*self con-  
tradictory.*

§ 18. The thoughtful reader sees what a strange contradiction is here presented, *i. e.*, of an abstract entity, determining itself,<sup>14</sup> and becoming more perfect by virtue of its very limitation, and realizes how inevitably such a teaching has failed to hold the assent of the earnest thinkers in our days. Hence the attempt to modify these doctrines, to preach a Neo-Hegelianism or to pass by Hegel and start once more from Kant.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>12</sup> The Absolute is "the result together with its becoming." This process of evolution is crowned and consummated in spirit, is itself the ultimately real. Cf. A. Seth, Hegelianism and Personality, p. 81. With Mr. Rogers in Modern Philosophy, p. 222, "A unity which, as intelligent and active purpose, takes up the complexity of means which are needed for its accomplishment as an essential part of itself." And Mr. Schurman writes "In the case of the Ego we have not merely a mode of the divine activity; we have as it were a part of the divine essence." Belief in God, pp. 227, 228.

<sup>13</sup> To Mr. Bradley everything is the absolute, "the ideal system of metaphysics is to show how the world physical and spiritual realizes by various stages and degrees the one absolute principle." P. 359; cf. also Dr. S. Harris, Phil. Basis of Theism, p. 410.

<sup>14</sup> Pfeiderer, Phil. of Religion, vol. II, p. 79.

<sup>15</sup> Recent writers recognize this error in Hegel and try to explain it away by contending that he is concrete not abstract. Cf. A. R. Rogers, Modern Philosophy, ch. on Hegel. "That nature should be comprehended as the living tissue which a

Neither one nor the other can furnish what the mind craves. It is in vain that we try to pull and twist their teaching. The fundamental principles of both are erroneous. The sad consequences they lead to are only legitimate products.<sup>14</sup> Both are in contradiction to true science and sound philosophy. Their only real value is now historical. Looking back we view them as abnormal phases in the history of the human mind, and wonder how we could be so deeply influenced by them. Constant and earnest thought has shown how strange these assumptions, how patent their contradictions, how distant and speculative they are, how hard to realize their teaching, and what little real influence they had upon our lives.

### 3°. *Abstract Unity.*

§ 19. By abstract unity is understood a unity which is the creation of the mind and has existence only in the mind. God thus becomes an ideal, and religion consists in the worship of the ideal, *i. e.*, in our conscious recognition of and aspiration to it with its corresponding influence to uplift and purify the intellectual and moral life. Not, however, in the sense that God or Christ is proposed as an ideal by Christian Philosophy. Jesus has a real and objective existence, and owing to the divine perfection of His nature He is, in the highest meaning of the term, a model according to which we should fashion and mould our lives. The ideal God of modern philosophy is far

divine spirit is ever weaving" is not a "doctrine dangerous or even antipathetic to natural theology." Schurman, Belief in God, p. 174.

<sup>14</sup> Thus Feuerbach inverted Hegel's position and taught that the human spirit was God. "He is nothing more than the Optative of the human heart converted into the certain and blessed Indicative. Pfeiderer, Phil. of Religion, vol. II, p. 119.

different. It is a simple conception representing the highest aspiration of our social, or intellectual, or ethical life, vague and shadowy in its nature, having no reality, and conveying no meaning any other than the projection of the mind upon itself. This idea appears in various forms; and its wide prevalence to-day calls for a distinct and separate discussion.<sup>17</sup>

shown in  
(a) Positiv-  
ism :  
The Relig-  
ion of  
Humanity.

§ 20. The aim of Positivism was the reform of society. It is therefore primarily a Sociology. Its peculiar metaphysical and religious aspects can thus be explained. All departments of learning lead up to Sociology; it is the culmination and perfection of the sciences. To propose a new science of Sociology — one free from the imperfections and errors hitherto taught and followed, Comte felt that the fundamental principles which obtained in the hierarchy of science should be modified or changed. Hence his Metaphysics, which alone was adopted by some disciples, *e. g.*, Littré, and the English writers, *e. g.*, John Stuart Mill, Frederick Harrison, George Eliot. To us, at first sight, this seems to be Positivism in its purity. A critical examination, however, reveals that the meta-

<sup>17</sup> Modern Guides of English Thought in Matter of Faith, ch. V, George Eliot, R. H. Hutton, p. 275. "You do not so much as touch the threshold of religion, so long as you are detained by the phantoms of your thought; the very gate of entrance to it, the moment of its new birth, is the discovery that your gleaming ideal is the everlasting Real, no transient brush of a fancied angel wing, but the abiding presence and persuasion of the soul of souls; short of this there is *no object* given you, and you have not even reached the specified point of *admiration*. Within the limits of pure sincerity, no one can ever *worship* either a nature beneath him or an idea within him; however big may be the one, though it comprise all forces and all stars, if that be all, it will be venerable to no spirit that can comprehend it; and however fine may be the other, if it be but a dreamer's image, a phenomenon of perishable consciousness, it can never be more than the personality that has it, so as to make him suppliant." J. Martineau, A Study of Religion, vol. I, p. 13.

physics of Comte contain nothing new, that they can be considered as the legitimate consequences of Hume's teaching, and that accordingly many English writers have proposed the same, and distinctly disclaim any dependence upon or indebtedness to Comte.<sup>11</sup>

§ 21. Comte's theology was the offspring of his <sup>Comte's</sup> teaching. Sociology. Humanity to him was the dominating idea. To uplift and perfect the human race was his sole aim. In his metaphysics he considers that alone to be positive which is within the domain of the senses. What is above or beyond the reach of sense does not exist. Hence there is no God, no angel, no soul. The religious instincts of our nature are a fact, which obtrudes upon every conscious mind and cannot be ignored in any system of Philosophy. The human soul will worship God, even to the extent as to create Gods for its worship. Comte felt that the need had to be supplied. Having shut off every avenue by which the mind might rise to the true concept of God, of necessity he invented a false one. If nothing exists but what sense shows, we must fashion God from the testimony of sense. As a natural and logical consequence of his system, he made man the highest object of worship. Not the individual, for our feelings would revolt, but humanity as a whole in its highest development. The final end of his Sociology and Philosophy thus becomes the highest object of faith and worship. The abstract idea of humanity becomes God. This idea is made the center of an elaborate ritual, borrowed entire from the liturgy of the Catholic Church. He marked out a festal year, he prescribed an elaborate ceremonial. By unmeaning shadows he attempted to give reality and life to what was destitute of either.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Christian Philosophy — The Soul, ch. IV.

<sup>12</sup> Taine, Vacherot, Renan teach that God is only a human

(b) in  
Ethical  
Culture  
Religion.

**§ 22.** Another form of abstract Unity in Theism is that set forth by the advocates of Ethical Culture. The source of this theory may be traced to Kant. The principle of his Critical Philosophy is that the human mind can never know things as they really are and can thus never attain objective truth. The practical reason, however, supplies the deficiency. It gives the basis for a philosophical system. Hence the important place given to his peculiar theory of Ethics. Fichte develops the idealism of Kant's theoretical philosophy and joins to it the ethics of the practical.<sup>20</sup> Hence the ethical idealism which runs through his writings — an idealism which has influenced Goethe, Matthew Arnold, Carlyle, Emerson,<sup>21</sup> John Stuart Mill,<sup>22</sup> the Neo-Kantian School with Fries and A. Lange,<sup>23</sup> and modern writers on Ethical culture.

its  
teaching.

**§ 23.** Ethics is the conception of what ought to be. It holds up the picture of our ideal selves. Ethical religion turns the thoughts of men to the ideal ends of human life. It is practical because ideal.<sup>24</sup> Man must act up to the ideal.<sup>25</sup> The noble side of God is the ideal conception of the perfect.<sup>26</sup> The personal God taught in Theology is an illusion.<sup>27</sup> All that men have gathered into the form of God is but the image of our possible selves. When we say that Christian love and justice are actually ruling in the world, we give expression to a myth. Our ideals do not reveal

ideal which the world gradually realizes by an indefinite progress, hence the term *Dieu-Progrès*. Farges, *L'Idée de Dieu*, p. 419; cf. Royce, *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 246.

<sup>20</sup> T. Pesch, *Kant et la Science Moderne*, p. 196.

<sup>21</sup> Sovereignty of Ethics, *Divinity School Address*, Character.

<sup>22</sup> Utility of Religion, pp. 101-117.

<sup>23</sup> Pfeiderer, *Phil. of Relig.*, vol. II, p. 173.

<sup>24</sup> W. M. Salter, *Ethical Religion*, p. 8.

<sup>25</sup> Ib., p. 9.

<sup>26</sup> P. 11.

<sup>27</sup> P. 12.

anything outside ourselves, but only indicate what we ourselves should be."<sup>28</sup> The good and right are simply what should be. Of themselves they are nothing. Their only meaning or reality is as ideals of action."<sup>29</sup> Morality is reason uttering itself; an ideal for doing."<sup>30</sup> It is the highest thought in man and it is there to rule."<sup>31</sup> God is often a name for that supreme sanctity which is in every man's breast; the word itself is ambiguous; the ethical obligation is in the reason and nature of things."<sup>32</sup> Hence morality is in its essence ideal."<sup>33</sup> All separate moral rules may be resolved into the supreme one, *i. e.*, to seek the general welfare, the universal good."<sup>34</sup>

§ 24. A new religion therefore rises, whose basis is trust in man. And the religious man of the future will give himself to dreams of the perfect without questioning or concern."<sup>35</sup> An ideal aim stands out before every one."<sup>36</sup> It is not to please some supernatural being in the skies, it is not to follow some far-away historical figure in the past. It is closer to us than this; it is in our own heart; it is given to us in our very nature as moral beings."<sup>37</sup> At the same time we are told that "morality is the assertion of ourselves;" hence we are independent of any law and the doctrine of supreme individualism holds sway."<sup>38</sup>

§ 25. This moral impulse forms the substance of our nature. To Fichte religion is the element of duty con-

<sup>28</sup> P. 13.

<sup>29</sup> P. 63.

<sup>30</sup> P. 65.

<sup>31</sup> P. 69.

<sup>32</sup> W. L. Sheldon, *An Ethical Movement*.

<sup>33</sup> P. 28.

<sup>34</sup> Ib., p. 39.

<sup>35</sup> P. 41.

<sup>36</sup> Felix Adler, *Creed and Deed*.

<sup>37</sup> P. 57.

<sup>38</sup> P. 43; T. Pesch, *Kant et la Science moderne*, p. 170.

ceived after this manner. God is nothing more than the power that works in all toward the accomplishment of the highest demand of duty.<sup>20</sup> He is, as Mr. Arnold puts it, "the power that makes for righteousness."<sup>21</sup>

Criticism.

(1) result of Kant.<sup>22</sup>

(2) Sentimental Idealism.

(3) independent morality.

(4) not satisfying or permanent.

§ 26. (1) This teaching, advocated so boldly in choice and elegant diction by modern disciples of culture and ethical Associations, shows to conviction that Kantian philosophy as a system of truth is a failure. Its consequences are illusions and nihilism.<sup>23</sup> In place of God we have a refined form of Sentimental idealism. It is the logical sequence of Kant's two great works. In the Critic of Pure Reason he teaches that the mind is unable to seize objective truth, hence idealism. In the Critic of Practical Reason he holds that morality is autonomous, that man is a law and end to himself.<sup>24</sup>

§ 27. Hence the modern doctrine of an independent morality which forms the fundamental teaching of the Neo-Kantian School, *e. g.*, Ritschl, Lange, etc. Morality degenerates into an ideal creation which takes form and tone from the peculiar temperament or bent of mind. Thus we have the æsthetic ideal of the Neo-Kantians, or the practical ideal which verges so closely to Positivism and its religion of humanity.

§ 28. Human nature will reassert itself. As the poet so well says

Truth crushed to earth will rise again  
The eternal years of God are hers.

The human mind can rise to the proof of God's existence; the human heart craves for the great and living God. A true theory of knowledge is our only guide.

<sup>20</sup> C. C. Everett, Fichte, p. 257.

<sup>21</sup> Literature and Dogma.

<sup>22</sup> L. Stählin, in Kant, Lotze, and Ritsch, p. 69.

<sup>23</sup> A. Cresson, La Morale de Kant, ch. IV.

The problem of to-day, both in Philosophy and in Apologetics, is the nature of the human mind. In this vital question modern philosophy from the time of Kant has been drifting helplessly. What wonder is it to find men teaching the most patent travesties of truth when they perceive objects as through glasses colored by prejudice and false theories! "<sup>48</sup>

### III.

#### THEORY OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.

§ 29. Christian Philosophy has ever taught that God is a most simple unity. To understand the meaning of this phrase, we must have a clear notion of the term, *simple*.

(1) The word *simple* is used in contradiction to the word *composite*. What is simple is not composite; what is composite is not simple. The terms are antithetical. The analysis of the one throws light upon the meaning of the other.

§ 30. We can distinguish three kinds of composition; or rather a composite thing can be so in three different ways. Thus we speak of *physical*, of *metaphysical* and of *logical* composition.

(a) A *physical* composite is a being made up of physical parts really distinct or distinguishable. It is applied to and embraces material objects. Matter is composite in whatever way we may view it. Hence arises the notion of quantity. If the parts are really distinct, we have discreet quantity, which becomes the subject-matter of Arithmetical science. If the parts are continuous we have continuous quantity, the properties of which are explained in Geometry. Moreover physical forces which are inseparable from matter are

<sup>48</sup> T. Pesch, *Le Kantianisme et ses erreurs*.

also quantitative. They can be weighed, measured, calculated, as we learn from the science of Physics. In analysis and experimentation they are considered as quantities. They may therefore be justly termed physical composites.

God not such.

§ 31. Now the nature of God is not such. The train of reasoning, which proves that matter and physical forces are dependent and limited, shows conclusively that neither matter nor physical forces could adequately explain this universe. Matter is matter wherever it is found. Its nature remains unchanged, despite the varying circumstances of place or position; it is utterly unable to account for its own existence, much less explain the existence of anything else. God, therefore, cannot be a composite unity. This teaching is Pantheism and differs only in word from open Atheism.

§ 32. But have we in experience any being or class of beings which are not material? The answer comes without hesitation. Introspection reveals the existence and the nature of the soul. We know it to be a spiritual substance; in its own essence immaterial, it is able to subsist independently of matter. Physical composition is utterly foreign to its nature. It is therefore called a simple immaterial unity. In its nature far above material existences, it approximates more closely to the true concept of God. Nevertheless it falls far short of what the human mind holds God to be; and this for two main reasons.

(b) not a metaphysical composite.

§ 33. (b) The soul is a metaphysical composite. It is simple in essence, inasmuch as it is not made up by the coalition of parts really distinct; nevertheless the imperfection of its nature and of its activity is a reason why it is regarded in the light of a composite.

§ 34. In a metaphysical composite the parts are not separate entities which coalesce into a unity. The object is viewed in its own essence. This essence is considered distinct from its existence and its acts. Essence is a concept which is different from existence. Essence is what makes a thing such and not otherwise. Existence is what constitutes a thing in the objective order of reality and distinguishes it from what is only possible. Thus the essence of man is rational animality; his existence is the concrete fact that he is an objective reality. The concepts are different because they designate different things. The distinction is clearly brought out in possible things. Thus objects which are possible are those which can exist but do not yet actually exist. Inasmuch as they can exist they have an essence. In metaphysics we treat of their essences and question the nature and extent of their reality. In so far, however, as they do not yet exist, they have no existence. They are in the pure state of possibility. They began to exist and we conceive it due to the fact that existence has been added to essence. Hence arises the composition of essence and existence.

§ 35. This composition is found in every dependent being. Its very dependence shows that at a definite time it began to exist, that before existing it was in a state of possibility, and was simply an essence. That the visible universe is dependent has been proved to a certainty. There was a time accordingly when it did not exist. As such it was only possible; it had essence, but not existence. Hence a composition of essence and of existence is true of every being in the universe. This is due to its dependent nature. Wherever we find dependence or an initial beginning, there we can distinguish between a state of possibility and the state of actual existence. This is true of the human soul.

There was a time when we did not exist; our nature is therefore dependent; we were possible before we began to be.

§ 36. What is true of essence and of existence can also be verified of a continued state of existence. Every living being grows. Growth is a law of life. But growth means acquisition. In the progress of growth a being constantly puts forth activities and acquires development in a manner proportionate to its nature. We speak here only of intelligent beings. Thus the mind of the child grows or develops by the acquisition of knowledge, by the exercise of thought. The child, e. g., has the capacity to think, to acquire knowledge, to become a learned man. This is accomplished by laborious study. Thus we can distinguish between the mind destitute of knowledge and the thought or learning which it obtains. The one added to the other makes him learned. Hence we have a composition. The learning is viewed as something perfecting the mind. If the mind knew everything from the beginning, it could acquire nothing new. Its thought could not then be viewed as perfecting its nature and there would be no composition.

its source  
and basis.

§ 37. Hence the composition arises from its imperfection. Now metaphysical composition cannot be found in God. He is the first cause, the prime mover, the orderer of all things. In nature He is not dependent. He therefore never began to be but always was. Thus there never was a time when He was merely possible. In Him there is no composition of essence or existence. The same is true of His acts. If we conceive that the acts of God perfect His nature, He becomes imperfect, limited, dependent. This is contradictory to the notion formed from the conviction that He is independent in His own existence, yet sustains all things.

and from a consideration of the infinite perfection which is necessary for the creative act.

§ 38. (c) Finally there is what is called Logical composite. In Logic we distinguish between the genus and the specific difference. Individuals are classed into groups. There is a common element in all which is the basis of the classification. This element is called the genus. Thus, e. g., animal is the generic element of man and brute. Nevertheless there is another element which gives rise to a distinction in the generic group. This element is called the specific difference and is the reason why we separate a genus into many species. Thus, e. g., rationality is the specific element in man. It marks him out from the other species of the genus, animal.

§ 39. The union of the genus and the specific difference constitutes a logical species. Thus, e. g., man can be viewed as a logical composite made up of genus and specific difference. This composition obtains in Logic. It forms the basis of Logical classification. In every individual a generic and a specific element are found. By reason of this they are placed in definite categories.

§ 40. Now God is not in any category. He is above all categories. He differs in nature from created things. When objects are placed in the same category, it is by reason of a common element. This element is the same in all; each individual agrees with the others in this common characteristic. But God is not of the same nature as creatures. He is uncreated, they are created; He is independent, they are dependent; He is infinite, they are finite and of limited perfection. Hence we cannot consider God as a genus, of which created things are species. God exists, as also creatures. But God's existence differs in nature

from existence in creatures. Hence existence in one has not the same meaning as existence in the other. The term *existence* is applied to both not *univocally*, *i. e.*, in the same meaning, but *analogically*, *i. e.*, after a certain manner or likeness. The concept of God, therefore, affords no reason for distinguishing genus and species. There is no basis for a logical composition.

God a  
pure act.

§ 41. We are thus led to understand how it is that Scholastic Philosophy speaks of God as *pure act*.<sup>44</sup> In God there is no possibility. No potency to be or to become is found. Potency or acquisition is a sign of imperfection. It is a mark of limitation and dependence. It is found in created and dependent beings, not in God. Therefore God is conceived as a *most pure act*.<sup>45</sup>

God not  
a soul.

§ 42. The soul, in its highest activity is independent of the bodily organs. It can subsist after dissolution of the body. Its nature is unorganic and spiritual.<sup>46</sup> Nevertheless it was created to animate a bodily frame; this inclination is a part of its nature and is retained after separation from the body. The dependence upon the body is only extrinsic; yet it is natural. Because of its spiritual and unorganic nature, the soul is termed a *spirit*; by reason of the dependence upon the body, it is termed a soul. Through the bodily senses it obtains the materials of thought. In co-operation with the body it exercises the acts of sensation and of movement. Without this inclination to be united to a corporeal organism, the soul would

<sup>44</sup> Aristotle, Metaphys. XI, ch. 6.

<sup>45</sup> "Tu facis nos Domine cui esse et vivere non aliud atque aliud est; quia sumnum esse, atque sumnum vivere id ipsum es? Summus enim es et non mutaris." Aug. Confess., I. 1, ch. 6.

<sup>46</sup> "Christian Philosophy — The Soul, ch. V-VI.

have a pure spiritual existence. By reason of the <sup>but a pure</sup> spirit tendency, its existence is to a certain extent organic. Hence we speak of the soul as a *spirit*, but not a *pure spirit*. Thus the soul is dependent in its nature and is not entirely self-sufficient. Its natural and perfect state is union with body.

§ 43. Not so with God. Christian Philosophy has ever taught that God is a pure spirit. For this reason in the early centuries of our era the Fathers of the Church took issue with the Stoics. They maintained in strong and eloquent argument that God could not be *the soul of the world*, as Stoicism taught. The notion of dependence in any shape whatever is foreign to their belief in the divine nature. To them God was the first cause, leaning on nothing else, self-sufficient and of infinite perfection. This teaching they embraced and expressed under the term *pure spirit*. To no other being was this term applied. As far as imperfect human speech could go, this term alone expressed simply and clearly the characteristic of the divine essence.<sup>44</sup>

§ 44. The mind is now prepared to grasp the true relation of the Creator to the universe. This problem has occupied the attention of philosophers at all times, presents various aspects and gives rise to various interpretations. Thus some lay exclusive stress on the transcendence of God over creatures, and we have the school of Deists. Others appeal to the immanence of God in creation, and thus formulate the doctrine of Pantheism. The truth lies in recognizing the fundamental doctrine of both. God is both transcendent and immanent. He is transcendent by virtue of His

<sup>44</sup> Fenelon, *Démonstration de l'existence de Dieu*, p. II, ch. V; Franzelin, *De Deo Uno.*, § III, ch. III.

nature; He is immanent by His presence and activity.<sup>\*\*</sup> In illustration we go to the living organism. The soul is present everywhere in the living body, but is of far higher nature than the material elements. So but in an infinitely higher manner God is transcendent to but immanent in the world He hath made.<sup>\*\*</sup>

<sup>\*\*</sup> "Quod ubique sis, quem nullus circumscribit locus, et solus es praesens etiam iis qui longe sunt a te." Aug. Conf., V. 2; ep. 137, n. 4.

<sup>\*\*</sup> "Deus est ubique per essentiam, praesentiam, potentiam." Card. Satolli, de Deo, q. 8, a. 3. St. August. ep. 118, n. 23; 137, n. 4; ep. 187. "De Presentia Dei." The contention of Mr. Fiske that two separate schools existed in the early church; one with the Greek Fathers recognizing the immanence of God, the other with the Latins insisting on His transcendence is without foundation. Cf. Fiske, Idea of God, ch. V, VI.

## CHAPTER XII.

### PROVIDENCE.

§ 1. Our line of thought has led to the conviction <sup>Summary</sup> that behind the visible universe there exists a Supreme <sup>of the</sup> preceding. Principle which is the source and explanation of all existing things. The world within our conscious breasts and the wide world without, alike unite in postulating God. Physical science needs God to explain nature; mental and moral science needs God to explain man.<sup>1</sup>

§ 2. The problem is about a truth, not concerning a mere hypothesis.<sup>2</sup> The task, however, is not yet complete. The true conception of God implies more. To the soul of man in all ages God is not a mere philosophical entity, colorless and independent of any relation whatsoever to the universe. The proofs presented for God's existence contain much more. They show not only that God exists but that He is in constant touch with the world. Hence the further notion of Providence to complete the concept of God.<sup>3</sup>

§ 3. By providence of God is understood God's government of the world.<sup>4</sup> Universal and coexistent with the limits of creation, God's government holds sway over the most insignificant creatures and the most

<sup>1</sup> Farges, *L'idée de Dieu*, p. 20.

<sup>2</sup> Prof. Bowne, *Philosophy of Theism*, p. 8.

<sup>3</sup> Dr. Bruce assumes the providential order of the world as a hypothesis and then shows that it is justified by facts. Cf. Gifford Lectures, 1897. This method is unnecessary and betrays confusion or weakness of argument.

<sup>4</sup> Prof. Wilson, *Foundations of Religious Belief*, p. 339; Aug. de Ordine, I. I., ch. I.

minute particles of matter.\* Possessing its sole source in the uncreated wisdom of the God-head, it nevertheless presents various and different aspects when viewed in application to existing things. To place the truth in strong and clear outline, to avoid confusion and error in this most difficult question, it is necessary to draw distinctions and to treat the several parts of the distinctions in detail. Not that God Himself is varied or made up of parts or is changeable; His truth is one and His divine providence is a unity. But just as a single ray of light thrown upon a prism takes divers forms and colors, so, but in an infinitely higher manner, God's government seems diverse because of the diversity in the creatures which are under its sway. Thus we have the different departments of the Physical Sciences, of Biology, of Physiology, of Psychology, of Natural and Christian Ethics.

method. § 4. The distinction to be made in treating God's Providence falls in the same line as that made in setting forth the arguments to prove God's existence. These arguments were divided into two great classes: those drawn from a consideration of man's nature and those based upon the study of the external world. After the same method we shall discuss God's Providence as exemplified in the external world and in the life of man. In the present chapter the former question shall occupy our thoughts. In the following, the Providence of God over the being and life of man shall be examined carefully and in detail.\*

\* Janet sees a *rational* order in the system of laws which pervade the universe, a *providential* order in the system of means and ends. *Traité Élémentaire de Philosophie*, p. 845. "Creare namque dicitur condere et ordinare." *Aug. de Mor. Manich.* ch. 7.

\* Notion of Providence not to be confounded with the marvelous. *Fraser, Theism*, p. 66.

## I.

## NOTION OF PROVIDENCE.

§ 5. The idea of government is intimately connected <sup>government and law.</sup> with the idea of law. The one is a correlative of the other. The relation is not so much of logical necessity. Its basis is in the concrete facts of the external world. It is forced upon the mind by external observation and confirmed by profound study. The intimate connection between government and law is not limited to special spheres of activity or unfolded by special departments of human knowledge. It is coextensive with existing things and developed by every branch of human science. Thus from the prevalence of law we can reason to the existence of government; from the nature and stability of law we can infer the nature and strength of the governing power.

§ 6. The word "law" is employed in various <sup>meaning of law.</sup> meanings. These meanings are not absolutely different; they represent aspects of the same thing, or rather they indicate the different phases in which law is realized. Nevertheless the word, as it stands, is ambiguous and requires definition.

§ 7. (a) The word "law" is applied to designate an <sup>(a) order and groups of things.</sup> observed order of things. In this sense the word is taken for the effect. The orderly sequence of phenomena which go to form a system impresses the mind with the notion of law and the word is employed to signify the system itself. Thus we speak of the reign of law and order. The cause of the observed order may be unknown. The mind simply grasps and states the effect. This is naturally more obvious. To the ordinary observer the constant and uniform sequence of phenomena is what is meant by the laws of nature.

Even in the sphere of physical science the term law is applied to special groupings of facts. The famous three laws of Kepler, which opened up a new vista in Astronomy and made Newton's labors of so much value, have no other meaning. They express a scientific truth beyond which scientists for years could not progress, but the truth was simply a newly observed series of facts. In this sense laws form the beginning of every inductive science.<sup>1</sup> Only after patient and experimental investigation upon an observed order of phenomena is the real scientific bond and its nature unfolded. Hence the second meaning of the word "law."

(b) proximate cause of the order, i. e., force.

§ 8. (b) The term "law" is also employed to designate the force or cause of the orderly sequence. An order of phenomena which is constant and uniform is itself a fact which demands an explanation. Such an inference is merely a special application of the general principle of causality. The mind instinctively rises to the conception of some force behind the facts and exerting its activity through them so that they combine into a uniform arrangement. The force in an operation is conceived to be the cause of the orderly sequence. The order is the effect. To obtain a knowledge of the forces which work in and through phenomena is the aim of physical science. Their discovery is a sign of progress and a mark of perfection. Years of patient and unremitting labor are considered well-spent if the facts at length are made to tell the secret of the marvelous adjustment. We can then speak of nature's laws in a higher and truer sense. Many things heretofore shrouded in mystery are cleared up and their manifold relations can be expressed with the precision of a mathematical formula. One such

<sup>1</sup> Whewell, the Inductive Sciences.

discovery often revolutionizes a science and brings to the name of the scientist a halo of undying fame. The discovery of the law of gravitation by Newton marks an epoch in history. Linguistics, Sociology, Philosophy of History, every branch of natural science deals with laws in this special meaning of the word.\*

§ 9. (c) Finally, law can be viewed in the law-giver. (c) ordinatio rationis. It there appears as an act of the reason "*ordinatio rationis*." The mind perceives the utility or necessity of a certain line of action, reflects upon the means most fitted to accomplish the purpose and then prescribes the rule with the binding power of the will. In its highest analysis, therefore, law is a rule having its source in the mind and will of a superior. Laws are distinguished according to the nature of the beings affected or the means employed, as, e. g., positive law and natural law. The former is a direct and explicit enactment; the latter is an inclination implanted in the nature of things by which they act in such or such a manner. Again, laws are called divine or human, if they have source in a divine or human power.

## II.

### THE MATERIAL WORLD.

§ 10. The relation between the notion of Providence, Government and Law is very intimate. The one can be inferred from the other. Government is possible only through law; law implies a guiding and restraining power. The inference is not drawn from *a priori* principles, nor is it based on the metaphysical essence of things. It is a truth of experience and is based on a wide induction from facts. The relation is therefore

Providence, Government and Law.

\* Prof. Wilson, *Foundations of Religious Belief*, p. 339.

\* St. Thomas, I. 2, q. 90, a. 4.

a necessary one. At present the nature of that relation is of little moment. The reader is now prepared to follow the line of thought and to grasp its bearing on the problem.

*Reign of law shows mind.*

§ 11. The existence of a mind behind phenomena has been proved. The characters of intelligence are indelibly stamped upon the universe. The reign of law which obtains throughout from the smallest atom up to the highest forms of organized existence, so marvelous in precision and endless contrivance, raises the thoughts from the visible to the invisible, from the finite objects of sense to the conviction of an infinite mind that gives to each its appointed sphere and measure of action.<sup>10</sup>

*government.*

§ 12. But intelligence is not the only inference. The prevalence of law leads to another conviction. It reveals the method and mode of divine government.<sup>11</sup> The reign of law in the physical world is a uniform and patent fact. The constant and regular sequence of phenomena is a necessary condition for science. Without it science would be impossible. How, for example, could I explain a state of things which was never the same, but constantly changing, and so that no order or sequence could be detected in the change? I should give up in despair and say that everything was in confusion and that I could not understand. Now science does not answer after this fashion. Every aspect and department of the material world is brought under careful observation. Everywhere order and law

<sup>10</sup> Aug. de Gen. ad Lit., I. IV, ch. 32; Serm. 141, 241; Franzenlin, de Deo Uno, p. 34.

<sup>11</sup> "There is nothing in scientific experience inconsistent with the belief that those laws and sequences are themselves due to a divine will." Mill, Essays on Religion, p. 136, and he adds, "there is nothing to disprove the creation and government of Nature by a sovereign will; but is there anything to prove it?" P. 137.

obtains.<sup>13</sup> What at first seemed confusing was made clear upon the discovery of a deeper or wider law.

§ 13. Astronomy more than any other science especially *Astronomy*. impresses the truth of law and order. The wide expanse of the heavens studded with countless thousand stars has been for ages a subject of meditation with the peasant and the philosopher. To ordinary observation these tiny bits of light seem stationary. Yet science assures us that some of them are many times larger than our own globe; that they move with incredible swiftness, faster, e. g., than an express train, or a bullet from a rifle; and that they are in a constant process of change. The laws which rule their movements can all be reduced to the simple law of gravitation. This explains the intricate and manifold relations of one to another. The combinations and adjustments in the heavenly bodies are almost infinite in number and of marvelous delicacy.

§ 14. Not only among the large bodies of the planetary system does law hold sway; it obtains also with the smallest particles of matter.<sup>14</sup> The science of Chemistry presents most beautiful and wonderful illustrations of forces in mutual adjustment. The laws which govern chemical combinations are very exact and intricate. Each elementary substance combines with other elements only in definite proportions. The new substance formed by the combination possesses properties very different from its elementary parts.

<sup>13</sup> Mill, Essays on Religion, p. 133; Bowne, Philosophy of Theism, p. 64. "The heavens are crystallized mathematics; crystals are solid geometry; laws of force are numerical;" McCosh, Method of Divine Government, p. 128, sq.; Thomas Hill, Geometry and Faith, A Supplement to the IXth Bridgewater Treatise; J. Dimon, The Theistic Argument, p. 103; Duke of Argyll, Reign of Law, p. 73; St. Aug. de Lib. Arb., I. II.

<sup>14</sup> For invariable laws in the smallest particles of matter. Wurtz, The Atomic Theory; McCosh, Method of Divine Government, p. 117.

Nevertheless in combination the original elements are not destroyed. When the compound is dissolved, they reappear with their native properties and activities. Thus two parts of Hydrogen combine with one part of Oxygen to form water. The compound is a liquid; the composing elements are gases, which reappear when a voltaic current is passed through water.

The Science of Acoustics is founded on the perceived relation between sound and number. Optics is expressed in laws relating to angles and numbers; the angles of reflection, of incidence, the powers of refraction are set forth in numerical tables. So likewise the law of gravitation, the laws of Kepler are those of form and number. Thus Astronomy is applied Mathematics. In all physical investigations we find geometrical symmetry and arithmetical proportions.<sup>14</sup>

both organic and inorganic.

§ 15. Organic Chemistry presents Combinations which are a constant source of wonder. The same elements enter into the formation of substances which have different or even contradictory properties; thus, e. g., sugar differs but little from the potato in the chemical analysis. The same elements are found in both, but the proportion is slightly different. So also Tea and Strychnia differ not in the elements, but only in the proportion according to which the elements combine. The former substance is an article of food, a pleasing stimulant, soothes after severe labor and helps to sustain life. The latter is a deadly poison, paralyzes the nerves and almost instantaneously brings the rigor and pallor of death to the animal frame. There is no chance in these combinations. If so, what confusion would ensue, and how frail would be

<sup>14</sup> Cf. McCosh, Method of Divine Government, p. 117; St. Aug. in proving the existence of God again and again appeals to numbers. De Lib. Arbitrio, I. II.

the tenure of life! The proportions, however, though very fine, are stable and constant, as is shown from the science and practice of Medicine. Thus diet can be regulated or changed as bodily needs require, and special compounds can be prescribed as medicines for particular ailments.

§ 16. More marvelous still is the fact that the elementary or simple substances are so few in number when compared to the great number of their products. Out of this small number the myriad varieties of inorganic and organic matter are formed. Physics is a science which deals with the movements of material bodies. It collects data of the various physical motions, investigates their modes of action and tries to simplify them by a reduction to law. Hence we have the laws of motion, of hydraulics, of heat, etc. They enter into the course of study in our schools. All the mechanical contrivances which make life so pleasant are based upon or are applications of these truths. The ingenuity of man cannot surpass the works of nature in precision, intricacy and detail. The steam-engine speeding along the rails at the rate of a mile a minute, is yet under the firm control of will that holds the throttle. In like manner behind the forces of nature there is a will which guides and controls all.<sup>16</sup>

§ 17. Thus the existence of law in the physical world gives some conception of the ways of Divine Providence. God governs the material world through the

<sup>16</sup> Thus Bacon holds "that the inductive inquiry into the natural causes that may be found by our senses within the material part of the universe, and which are the established conditions of the changes that go on around us, so far from dissolving faith in a dominant providence, should only make those most devoted to scientific investigation see more clearly than others do, that full intellectual satisfaction even is not to be attained without recognition of the invisible providence of God in the natural evolution." Fraser, Theism, p. 81.

Influence to  
mind and  
will.

God's gov-  
ernment in  
the physical  
world.

physical law. The marvelous contrivances into which these laws enter point to a directing and governing mind.<sup>10</sup>

### III.

#### THE ORGANIC WORLD.

Law in organic world.

Biology.

§ 18. The same uniformity of law which reigns supreme in the material universe is also found in the world of living beings.<sup>11</sup> This sphere is not unknown to science. At the present time it holds a leading place in scientific investigation. Biology is yet in comparative infancy and a wide scope is open for further research. Nevertheless the data already collected throw much light upon the growth of the organism. Biology investigates the conditions and laws of organic development. The origin of life is a problem which can never be solved by physical science. Not so the laws of life. They can come under careful observation and be classified. Thus we find that the living being does not spring instantly into maturity. Its growth is gradual and according to fixed laws. The laws of nutrition, of assimilation, the phenomena of atavism and of sterility, the influence of environment have been studied and their manner of working carefully noted.

§ 19. These laws may vary in their working by reason of the different nature of the living being. Thus, e. g., nutrition in the plant is not carried on in the same way as in the animal. This difference, however, is one of many and does not destroy the essential truth which prevails throughout the organic kingdom, viz., that growth is attained through nutrition.

<sup>10</sup> Aug. de Civ. Dei, I. VIII, ch. 6; I. X, ch. 4; Confess., I. X, ch. 6; de Lib. Arbitr., I. II, ch. 17; de Vera Relig., ch. 29; de Gen. ad. Lit., I. 8, ch. 23-26; Cicero, de Nat. Deor., I. II; Athanasius, C. Gentes; Plato, Laws, B. X.

<sup>11</sup> Bowne, Philosophy of Theism, p. 68; Aug. ep. 137, n. 8.

§ 20. If we seek a knowledge of the human organism <sup>Anatomy and Physi-</sup>  
we go to the sciences of Anatomy and Physiology. <sup>ology.</sup>

The former investigates the structure, the latter the functions of human life. The marvelous adaptation therein revealed is the result of definite laws combined according to some fixed plan. This combination takes place with a view to definite needs of life. The adaptation of structure to fulfill some special purpose, or to discharge some special function is a fact which for ages has filled the thoughtful mind with wonder. Not only do we find it exemplified in the eye and the ear, but also in every part of the human frame. The lungs, the throat, the stomach, the phenomena of respiration, of deglutition, of digestion, the skin, the covering of the teeth, the bones, the very words in which we express thought, are all striking illustrations. They speak of wisdom adapting and combining means for special ends.\*

§ 21. Let us turn to the study of animal life. Comparative anatomy gives the data. We find the animal fitted by nature with special means to preserve life. It has its own weapons of offense and defense. Not one is left unprotected. These means are not all of the same kind. They have not been manufactured by any human art; they are the endowment of nature and more wonderful than human ingenuity could supply. Let us take an illustration.

§ 22. To Solomon, the wisest of men, the flight of <sup>special ill-</sup>  
an eagle through the air was something he could not understand. Modern science has been able to explain the fact, but the explanation does not in the least lessen the wonder; on the contrary, our admiration is heightened. The laws of gravitation and of atmospheric resistance, which seem contrary to the possibility

\* Doubts about Darwinism by a Semi-Darwinian, Longmans, Green & Co., p. 33 sq.

of flight, are the very ones by which flight is accomplished."<sup>18</sup>

(a) Flight of birds. § 23. (a) Birds are heavier than the air; if they were lighter, they might float like a balloon, they could not fly. By the law of gravitation, therefore, they should fall to the earth. But another law is brought into play which neutralizes the effects of gravitation. This law is the resisting force of the atmosphere. The resisting power acts equally in all directions. In order that the law of gravitation be counteracted, atmospheric conditions must be overcome. This is accomplished when the body capable of flight presents its maximum surface to the resistance of the air in the perpendicular direction and its minimum in the horizontal direction. The conditions are fulfilled in the anatomy of the bird, *e. g.*, by the broad surface of the expanded wing and the narrow edge as it speeds through the air. But this is not sufficient. A bird motionless with outspreading wings will fall slowly to the ground. The wings do more than balance the law of gravitation. They strike the air downwards with such violence that a reaction upwards results. Hence the law of the elasticity of the air and its reacting power against compression.

§ 24. That the wings should strike the air so that reaction follows, the wing-muscles must be strong, compact, of special form and not too heavy. Otherwise the weight of the bird would bring it quickly to the ground. Hence the strokes of the wings of most birds are too rapid to be counted. The compression of air in the stroke is achieved by the feathers, quills, and small amount of bone. Again, the conformation of the wing prevents the upward from naturalizing the downward stroke. Hence we have the convex upper surface and the concave downward surface. The

<sup>18</sup> Martineau, A Study of Religion, vol. I, p. 279, sq.

difference in power between the two is illustrated in the umbrella. How much more difficult it is to pull an outstretched umbrella down than to push it upwards! Besides the feathers *underlap* so that in the downward stroke they present an air-tight surface; whereas in the upward stroke, they separate and permit the air to escape.

§ 25. The problem of flight is not yet solved. Birds move in a forward direction. A study of this fact opens up another chapter in adaptative structure. The wing-feathers are set backwards, *i. e.*, in the direction opposite to flight. At the base the feathers are strong and firmly fixed; at the end they are flexible. Thus the air compressed by the downward motion of the wing cannot escape upwards because the feathers underlap and are air-tight, nor can it escape forwards because the front edge of the wing is hard and rigid. Its easiest manner of escape, therefore, is backwards and in so doing it lifts the elastic ends of the feathers communicating, as it passes along the wing, a forward push to the body. Thus the same volume of air not only sustains the bird's weight against the force of gravity but imparts also a forward impulse. The bird is therefore sustained and propelled by the same stroke."

§ 26. (b) A most interesting study in Natural History (b) means of preserving life. is that which deals with the weapons of offense and defense employed by animals, either in securing food or in warding off hostile attacks. No living being, however small and insignificant, is left defenseless or unprovided. The Author of Nature has provided for all, has given to all the means of sustaining life. These means are varied. In illustration the attention of the reader is drawn to a phenomenon very curious

" Duke of Argyll, Reign of Law, ch. III.

indeed, but very interesting not only from a scientific point of view, but as an illustration of the workings of Divine Providence. Allusion is made to the phenomena of adapted color for the purpose of concealment.

<sup>assimilated  
color.</sup> § 27. The phenomena of assimilated color do not take place by accident. We find therein strong evidence of purpose and design. It is certain from careful observation that a natural law governs the process. The nature of that law, its scope and manner of working, have not yet been put to scientific examination. Our present knowledge justifies the inference that the law goes into operation only upon the presence of certain conditions. The combination of these conditions are indicative of purpose. Thus we know that the law does not exist in animals which possess other means of avoiding danger and only in those animals which otherwise would be an easy prey to natural enemies. The law of concealment affects color or structure. Some animals, *e. g.*, the grouse, ptarmigan, woodcock, exhibit a change in the color of their plumage. In summer they can hardly be distinguished from the grass and the foliage of trees and shrubbery. In winter, however, their feathers are like the driven snow. That the change is due to organic causes is shown from the fact that it is gradual and natural, like, *e. g.*, the phenomena of moulting, and varies with the seasons. Other animals show the phenomena of concealment in structure. The Mantidae, *e. g.*, are very much like a vegetable growth. With utmost difficulty they can be distinguished from a leaf or vegetable matter. The special adaptation of structure as of color is designed for a special purpose. What stronger evidence of divine wisdom could be found ?

§ 28. The traces of Divine Providence are therefore visible throughout the range of organic life. The

scope of the present work does not permit an exhaustive detail. Volumes could be written in support of the position maintained. Illustrations are to be found on every page of Natural History, of Comparative Anatomy, of Physiology, of Biology, of Botany, of Linguistics. The present aim is to establish certain principles. These are (a) the existence of laws in the organic kingdom; (b) the adaptation of manifold conditions converging to obtain definite results. The former shows the method of divine government which prevails in the organic world as a whole. The latter proves the existence of a Divine Providence over every living thing, from the smallest and most insignificant even to the highest form of organic life.\*

## IV.

## DIFFICULTIES.

§ 29. The line of reasoning is scientific and cogent. The data are drawn from the verified facts of science. The interpretation is in accord with scientific methods. Another aspect of the problem can now be considered. It is the logical sequence of what has preceded. Its force at first sight negative, in reality adds very much to the argument, by strengthening apparently weak places and by imparting solidity and thoroughness to the whole.

§ 30. It might be objected that the conclusion drawn is more certain and universal than is warranted by a candid examination of the facts. Are there not, it is urged, evident signs of misgovernment in the universe? How then can we legitimately infer that an All-wise Providence guideth all things?

\* McCosh, Method of Divine Government, pp. 11-26.

problem  
stated.

§ 31. Before an effort be made to face the difficulty, it is wise and even necessary to know the ground on which we stand. A calm and judicious estimate can then be made of the issue. Let us grant that there are evidences of disorder in the physical and in the organic world. At the same time the evidences for order and purpose are certain and cannot be denied. The former do not render the latter of no value. On the contrary, the indications of confusion are very few in comparison with the facts of purpose and appear, therefore, as difficulties or exceptions to a well-grounded line of reasoning. Thus the more patent fact is order and purpose. This can only be explained by the existence of a creative and governing mind. For the tendency to order and adaptation is not something externally bestowed upon objects; it springs from and is founded in their intimate constitution. Only a mind that created and constituted the things could implant the order whose traces are so visible and marked. In face of this fact the difficulties adduced are few and of minor importance. The presumption for a governing mind is so strong that it cannot be shaken. Even before the contrary facts are subjected to a searching analysis, there is a strong antecedent probability that they can be explained in the light of the main argument.

(c) pertur-  
bation in  
stellar uni-  
verse.

§ 32. (a) It is true that traces of disorder are found in the planetary system. The moons of Jupiter, the motion of Uranus, are well-known examples. But it would be poor logic to infer from these facts that the government of the stellar universe is imperfect. The harmony and order among the heavenly bodies is an evident fact of ordinary and scientific observation. The interpretation of this order in the form of a theory is something very different from the order itself. Our interpretations may be weak and imperfect. Every

day discoveries are made which constrain the mind to alter or throw aside scientific hypotheses. Science gains by the change and nature itself is presented in a simpler and more wonderful light.

§ 33. So too in Astronomy. The signs of disorder (a) *Astronomy.* are viewed in the light of the nebular theory proposed by La Place. Now this theory is not well established; it is unable to account for all the facts. Hence we find a disposition among scientific men to propose a new explanation. Prof. Faye has made the attempt.<sup>31</sup> Thus the objection fades away in the light of more recent research. The difficulties are due to a contracted view of nature. They enter as harmonious facts into a larger and truer generalization.

§ 34. The pleasure seeker in our northern woods is (b) *meteorology.* often puzzled by the changes of weather. He sets forth in the morning with a clear and bright sky. The waters of the mountain lake are calm and placid. Suddenly the heavens are overcast, the wind strikes the water, the waves pitch and seethe as in a tempest. The storm is of short duration and all is quiet and bright again. In the Alpine regions, where the mountain peaks tower on every side, these storms clothe the scenery with an aspect of grandeur. In the soft warm sunlight which follows, the glories of the Jungfrau shine resplendent. The storms that sweep our eastern coast, the blizzards that devastate the Western prairies, the hurricanes of the ocean are similar phenomena on a grander scale.

§ 35. In the wide range of Nature there is nothing more indicative of confusion and disorder. Language fails to picture our impressions of the scene. We speak of the elements let loose in a wild and senseless rage. In illustration we instance man so filled with

<sup>31</sup> *L'Origine du Monde*, ch. X.

passion as to be no longer under the guidance of reason. But strange to say there is order and law in the storm. In every large city throughout the land there are weather-bureaus which note the conditions of the atmosphere and indicate the changes soon to happen. Facts are gathered, compared and classified. The laws which guide their play come out every day more plainly and are subject to verification. As yet Meteorology is in its infancy, nevertheless the broad groundwork of a science is there detected and constant investigation points to the near future when another department of nature will be intelligible to men. Modern science, therefore, can in the words of the Hebrew Psalmist, point to One " who rides the whirlwind and rules the storm."

(a) in organic Kingdom.

§ 36. (b) The objections against our argument drawn from the organic kingdom seem very formidable. Upon examination we shall find this to be due to exaggeration and to a partial view of the facts. A distorted truth is an error of the most dangerous kind. A common and radical fault with some minds is the inability to study facts impartially. They seem bent on swerving to extremes. One explanation seems plausible and is presented without regard to others which are equally or more so. This is the chief difficulty in the present problem. If we grasp this we shall be prepared for a candid examination of the facts.

(a) prodigality of nature.

§ 37. (1) We are told that there are many instances where intention has been frustrated. In proof attention is called to the prodigality of Nature in the production of seeds. On all sides we behold a lavish waste. In the flowers of the garden, shrubbery, grain, trees, we see the same foolish expenditure.

Finding that of fifty seeds  
She often brings but one to bear.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>29</sup> In Memoriam, LV.

§ 38. In putting the objection to the test of criticism, <sup>criticism.</sup> it is necessary to separate the fact from the inference.

The fact is that a few seeds comparatively bear fruit. <sup>(1) order of nature very complicated.</sup>

The inference drawn is that there is a frustration of purpose.

Facts well authenticated cannot be disputed.

We are at liberty, however, to question an inference and a conscientious regard for truth demands that we do so when just grounds are had. So in the present case. The order of nature is very complicated and very partially understood."

§ 39. To make a bold assertion in real ignorance of <sup>(2) acts have more than one purpose.</sup> the question is to advance beyond the region of fact into that of pure conjecture. To insist upon one

explanation to the disregard of others is the sign of a biased and illogical mind. As in the solar system the exceptions indicated by the hypothesis of La Place fit in most harmoniously with the theory of Faye.<sup>"</sup> In view of the fact that purpose is universal in Nature,

why may not the results which appear as exceptions to one purpose, be rather the fulfillments of another?<sup>"</sup> There is no ground whatsoever for holding that an act has one purpose or intention only. The analogy of a wide experience declares the contrary and is constantly strengthened by the results of scientific investigation.

I. e. g., give an alms with the two-fold intention of pleasing God and of relieving a worthy indigent. The seeds of grain so abundant on the stalk have not one

purpose only, viz., reproduction; they minister to our wants and form an important article of food. The luxuriant vegetation of the Carboniferous age, at first sight a magnificent waste, enters into our coal-beds,

and supplies us with fuel and warmth. How unfortu-

<sup>"</sup> Butler's Analogy, ch. IV.

<sup>"</sup> L'Origine du Monde.

<sup>"</sup> Prof. Jevons, Principles of Science, vol. II, p. 468.

nate that we live so close to our surroundings! Objects run together and intermingle. Only the superficial and narrow relations of particular things impress the mind. If we could withdraw a little distance, the harmony and majesty of Nature's plan would come out in clear light, the relations of particular objects to the great whole could then be grasped, and in the perception all small differences would sink away."<sup>26</sup>

(1) to perceive a relation is not to perceive all contained in the relation. § 40. Thus to perceive a relation does not imply that all contained in the relation is also known. The many particular elements and their intimate connection, are disclosed only after long and serious study. In like manner we may perceive intention and yet fail to see all that is intended. Nature presents a concatenation of causes and effects. Everything has an influence of some kind on its environment and is modified in turn. Not only are natural things viewed as causes and effects; they likewise are means and ends. The imperfect state of scientific knowledge may often lead us to consider as ends what in reality are means. To rest in the knowledge of a proximate purpose and to forget or neglect the existence of a more remote, is to fail at grasping the scientific truth that a natural object has varied relations and may serve various ends."<sup>27</sup>

(2) in animal life.  
e. g. useless organs.  
criticism. § 41. Another difficulty is drawn from animal life. Comparative Anatomy reveals structures without any apparent purpose. The phenomena of rudimentary organs is a standing objection to the prevalence of purpose. How then, we are asked, can these facts be reconciled with the existence of an all-wise Providence?

§ 42. An answer to this objection can be found in the very source from which it has been taken. Comparative

<sup>26</sup> W. S. Lilly, *The Great Enigma*, pp. 208-213.

<sup>27</sup> Duke of Argyll, *Reign of Law*, ch. IV.

Anatomy tells of rudimentary organs but does not positively assert that they are without purpose. The latter is an inference based on narrow and partial views.<sup>20</sup>

(1) fact to  
be dis-  
tinguished  
from infer-  
ence.

§ 43. Rudimentary organs are not without place or relation in organic life. They reveal the existence of a great plan. Homology of structure is a fact of science. The science of Biology is yet in its infancy. The phenomena of life-development have not yet been thoroughly investigated. Our knowledge is therefore limited. Enough is known, however, to justify us in viewing these organs in a wider relation, *i. e.*, to the general type. On this ground we can consider them in reference to the past or to the future. They indicate either what has been or what is yet to be. It is true that particular parts of the organism are of no apparent use to the particular animals. But when viewed in relation to the general type, we find that no one part is useless to all. Throughout animal life the vertebrate type prevails. At the same time there is a marvelous adaptability of this type to the variety of animal life. The fact simply is stated. No effort is at present made to assign reasons or theories. Rudimentary organs should be viewed in their relations to the general plan of organic life. If so, can we say that they are of no value? Does science affirm that they are altogether useless? May we not view them as factors in a larger plan and a wider purpose? Science does not gainsay; on the contrary, urges us to do so.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>20</sup>"Huxley shows that it is almost impossible to prove that any structure however rudimentary is useless, and answers Haeckel with the dilemma: either these rudiments are of no use and they ought to have disappeared, or they are of some use and are no arguments against teleology." Dr. Gildea, Is There Evidence of Design in Nature, in Proceedings of Aristotelian Society, 1889-90, p. 51.

<sup>21</sup>Janet, Final Causes, p. 149, sq.

(3) source of  
the difficulties not in  
nature but  
our inter-  
pretations  
of nature.

§ 44. The difficulty, therefore, fades away in the brighter light of scientific progress. As before in the material and plant kingdoms, it has its source not in nature, but in our own interpretations of Nature. Larger knowledge and deeper research are the true solvents of Nature's mysteries. Not that the mind can hope to grasp all; something will yet remain difficult to understand; nevertheless past experience and the consciousness of doubts removed will caution us not to be precipitate and impose our own short-sighted conclusions as the result of careful and exact investigation.

## CHAPTER XIII.

### PRAYER.

§ 1. Man is the highest and noblest creature in the visible universe. Endowed with intelligence and free-will he possesses the characteristic privilege of rational intercourse with his fellows. In his spiritual nature, made to the image and likeness of God, his soul instinctively turns to his Maker in aspirations of worship, of hope and of intercession. The relation between God and man is far different from that which exists between God and the lower creation. The element of intelligence is there found. This reveals a special aspect of Divine Providence. A question is thus presented of peculiar interest in itself and of vital importance at the present time. Its solution is necessary to obtain a true notion of God; and by certain leaders of scientific thought it has been made an issue in the conflict between religion and unbelief.

§ 2. The question is two-fold; it concerns God and man. Can man pray to God and in answer to prayer, does God exercise a special providence over man? In reality it is resolved into a discussion on the physical effects of prayer. Christian Philosophy answers in the affirmative and points to divine interference in the form of special providences and miracles.

§ 3. Prayer is not treated in its full theological bearings. Only one aspect is considered, viz., its relation to physical science. The purpose is to investigate the statement whether science has shown the utter absurdity of any interference on the part of God in answer to our prayers.

§ 4. God and man are two great facts. The relation of the soul to its maker is religion. This was the purpose of Christ's coming, of His life and death. He tells of God and also of man. He gathered and expressed in simple words our natural duties and to these added the truths He found in the bosom of the Father.<sup>1</sup> Man is to know, love and to serve God. But he must do this in Christ Jesus. The expression of this knowledge, love and service is called worship. The soul of worship is prayer.

## I.

### THE FACT.

*what is  
prayer.*

§ 5. Prayer springs from the knowledge of God and the needs of our souls. It is the elevation of the mind to God. So universal and so natural is the act of prayer that it seems an instinct and part of our being.<sup>2</sup> As we open the eyes of the body to the light, so do we raise the soul to God. Between God and the soul there is a constant intercourse. God acts on the soul; this is called His grace. The soul receives God's grace, co-operates with it and looks up to Him; this is prayer. In prayer the soul raises itself to the presence-chamber of God and speaks to Him in direct and familiar converse as if there were no other creature in the wide world.

*its place in  
a christian  
life.*

§ 6. Hence no nobler exercise of the soul; none giving more honor to God or drawing down greater blessings. In prayer we look up on high to our Father, the source and beginning of our being, the hope of an endless blessedness. We thus lead a life which we hope to continue after death in company of angels and saints who live in the vision and contemplation of God.

<sup>1</sup> John. 1-18.

<sup>2</sup> Duke of Argyll, *The Philosophy of Belief*, p. 448.

We are not alone in the world. Life is made up of friendships, of the mutual exchange of kindness, love and devotion. Now in prayer we hold converse with God. We exercise towards Him the virtues of faith, hope, love, sorrow, gratitude, child-like devotion. Again, friendship with the great and good puts at our command their wealth and influence. But prayer is the privilege of God's friends, and as the Holy Fathers tell us, is the key which unlocks the treasures of heaven. Nay, more, in dealing with men, God chooses to act after the manner of men. Hence prayer is the appointed means in His providence by which men are called to win eternal crowns. It is called the channel of God's grace to the soul. In prayer we lay open to Him our needs, tell Him of our trials, dangers, temptations; and through prayer, light, strength, hope and comfort come. A life without prayer is dwarfed and imperfect; and is so through our own fault.

§ 7. In the Holy Bible the necessity, power and conditions of prayer are set forth in many ways. The prayers of Abraham,<sup>8</sup> of Moses,<sup>9</sup> of Anna,<sup>10</sup> of Job are very beautiful. Every shade and feeling of the soul is expressed in the Psalms. But we go to Jesus for our prayer. His was a life of continual prayer and converse with the Father. He was not always occupied in teaching or in working miracles or in deeds of mercy, but He was always praying.

## II.

### THEORY OF MODERN SCIENCE.

§ 8. Modern scientists of a certain school recognize the universal fact of prayer. The impulse to pray is too deeply imbedded in the human soul, finds expres-

Modern  
Scientists  
attack  
prayer.

<sup>8</sup> Gen. 18-23.

<sup>9</sup> Exod. 32-10.

<sup>10</sup> I Kings 1-12.

sion in too persistent a manner and enters too intimately into the life of the race, to be erased by a mere stroke of the pen. Educated in an atmosphere of scepticism, openly antagonistic or at least indifferent to the claims of religious belief, their general turn of mind and tone of thought leads them to invent and to exaggerate the objections against the Theistic position. Apparently frank and ingenuous in word and in method of treatment they would convey the impression of a sincere and impartial mind. That they are conscientious is not the subject of discussion. The purpose only is expressed to treat them as such, and to employ in discussing their words the same spirit of candor and impartiality which they habitually claim as their glory and justification.

(1) Mr.  
Tyndall's  
position.

(a) neces-  
sary char-  
acter of  
natural  
laws.

§ 9. (1) Mr. Tyndall views the subject of prayer from the standpoint of physical science. The strong and secure basis of his inference is "the necessary character of natural laws." To him the undeviating uniformity of sequence between consequent and antecedent makes the association of both inseparable in thought. In a question of fact experience is the best and sole guide. The strict adherence of this method has raised modern science to its present preeminence and given to its conclusions a strength and cogency which can in vain be assailed. Now a divine interference with the course of nature in answer to prayer is rendered unbelievable by scientific experience.\* If God should answer our prayer for physical benefits or to ward off physical calamities, the interposition would assume the form of a physical fact and as such fall

\* As the Duke of Argyll says: "In prayer the question is whether the reign of law does not preclude the possibility of Will affecting the successive phenomena either of matter or of mind. Reign of Law, p. 63.

under the tests of experience. But the explicit testimony of experience is in favor of the necessity and inviolability of natural law. Hence to admit that prayer has a physical effect upon the natural sequence of phenomena would force the mind to admit a contradiction. A common testimony, viz., experience, would bear witness to the truth of two opposite and irreconcilable facts.

§ 10. The inference drawn is against the efficacy of prayer. To him a rejection of the inviolable uniformity of natural law is a contention too inconceivable for thought. The evidence in its favor is too strong; its relation to modern scientific progress too fundamental to be questioned. The only alternative is to reject the contrary hypothesis. "Only where," he writes, "the antecedents of a calamity are vague or distant is it that men think of resorting to prayer to advert it." Thus prayer has its source in ignorance, and is never employed where our knowledge of the facts is complete. Then scientific means are resorted to and we look to science, not to God, for help and assistance.'

§ 11. (2) It does not follow that prayer is of no value whatsoever. Modern science has only restricted its efficacy within certain limits. It is absurd, we are told, to pray for physical benefits, nevertheless prayer is not without beneficial effect. It is an element in the development of moral life. Just as I, e. g., by going through a course of physical culture will develop the muscles and become strong. The only advantage

<sup>(1)</sup> Frag. of Scien. Reflec. on Prayer and Natural Law. Justin Martyr says that the Sophists of his time "seek to convince us that the Divinity extends his care to the great whole and to the several kinds, but not to you or to me, not to men as individuals. Hence it is useless to pray to Him; for everything occurs according to the unchangeable law of an endless series." Neander, vol. I, p. 9.

which results is the effect of the activity upon the bodily constitution. In like manner prayer gives a special tone and strength to character. It is an important factor in the culture of the moral life. The man who prays, even though the prayer may never have obtained a physical effect, yet carries about with him the fruit of prayer. It is seen in the deepening of spiritual life, in the elevated tone of thought, in the strength and nobility of high endeavor, in the atmosphere of sweetness and light which ever seems to accompany him.<sup>8</sup>

§ 12. This theory is not confined to men of science. It has invaded the pulpit and is preached as the true doctrine of Christianity.<sup>9</sup> Mr. Tyndall thinks it "a wholesome sign for England that she numbers among her clergy men who are wise enough to understand all this and courageous enough to act up to their knowledge."<sup>10</sup> In their hands it is proposed as an aspect in the Gospel of modern culture.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>(1) in gene-</sup> criticism. § 13. (1) In the following section, where the problem of special Providence is investigated, a detailed examination of this theory will be found. At present it suffices to indicate the general line of criticism.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>(2) neces-</sup> § 14. (2) The *necessity* and *inviolability* of physical law are ambiguous terms. They require explanation.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>8</sup> "Prayer is no more a begging for favors or an act of intercession. Supplication for outward benefits has given place to petition for spiritual gifts and this to pure aspiration, the desire for excellence." Recollect. and Impress., O. B. Frothingham, p. 206.

<sup>9</sup> Drobisch and Herbart teach that while God is Father by reason of creation in the beginning, He now leaves mankind in the deepest silence as if he no longer had any part in them. Pfleiderer, Phil. of Relig., vol. II, p. 226.

<sup>10</sup> Fragments of Science, I, c.

<sup>11</sup> Duke of Argyll, The Philosophy of Belief, p. 466.

<sup>12</sup> Fisher, Faith and Rationalism, p. 128, sq.

<sup>13</sup> "If it be true that laws are invariable, it is not less true that

To base a theory upon ambiguous phrases is illogical; but to take advantage of the ambiguity, at least unconsciously, with a view to exaggerate and give iron-bound strength to a favored position is a reflection both on the reasoning powers of the advocate and on the intellectual capacity of the reader. Furthermore the uniformity of nature is no obstacle to free-will in working out its purposes; on the contrary, it is the condition absolutely necessary that the will may carry out its purposes and bend the energies of nature to its sway.

§ 15. (3) Again, the conservation of energy is no difficulty in the problem of prayer. Scientific experiment has shown that it does not prevent the interference of free-will either on the movements of the body or on the forces of nature. Therefore we can reason *a pari* to divine interference.

§ 16. (4) The view of Mr. Tyndall is partial and exclusive. To him the world is a physical aggregate. Now there is both a *physical* and a *moral* order. The former is made up of physical forces and the principle which prevails is that of necessity. The latter embraces a system of *moral* laws and the great principle is that of liberty. The consideration of the physical order gives rise to the mechanical theory; from the study of the moral order the teleological theory is formed. Just as the teleological view prevails over and rules the mechanical, so the moral order prevails over and guides the physical. Hence the universal sway of mind and will which Mr. Tyndall himself recognized at the close of his life.<sup>15</sup>

they are subject to endless variation." J. Dimon, *The Theistic Argument*, p. 112.

<sup>14</sup> Duke of Argyll, *Philosophy of Belief*, p. 464; Dr. Momerie, *Origin of Evil*, p. 239.

<sup>15</sup> Janet, *Traité Élémentaire de Philosophie*, p. 846.

## III.

## MIRACLES.

Prayer answered by miracles and special providences. § 17. Christian Philosophy has ever taught that in answer to prayer God at times interferes with the ordinary course of physical phenomena. As a result particular events happen otherwise than they should, and are designated by the special title of miracles. The word "miracle" comes from the Latin *mirari*, and signifies an event which excites wonder and admiration. This is so for two reasons, viz., the cause is hidden, and the event is contrary to that we should expect.<sup>16</sup>

miracle.I<sup>o</sup>. Notion.(1) unknown cause:(a) partially.

§ 18. To have a clear conception of a miracle it is necessary to explain what is meant by a hidden or unknown cause. The cause of an event may be unknown in two ways; (a) either partially, *i. e.*, to a certain number only. Thus, *e. g.*, an uneducated man sees wonderful things in every branch of science; he knows not how they happen and he is unable to explain or to trace them to a natural cause. In every sphere of physical science he pauses in wonder before hidden and unknown agencies. Not so, however, with the learned specialist. He has after laborious study penetrated the secrets of natural phenomena. An eclipse is predicted and described in detail by the astronomer. The wonders of electricity are explained by the student of physics. Some modern writers, taking this meaning of unknown, apply it to the present question. They assert that miracles are the effects of natural unknown causes, that these causes daily come to our knowledge

<sup>16</sup> Aristotle, Metaph. I, ch. 2.

with the result that the sphere of the miraculous is slowly but surely narrowing. They look to the time when natural science shall have driven the miracle out of court and regard it only as a relic of a by-gone ignorant age

§ 19. (b) The cause may be hidden, however, in another manner. This happens when the effect is of such a character that either in substance or in the manner of occurrence it goes against scientific facts or simply surpasses the known powers of nature. Thus, e. g., raising the dead to life, or the instantaneous recovery of a mortally sick man are beyond scientific explanation. In this case the cause is hidden not to the uneducated only.<sup>11</sup> Science itself stands silent and dumbfounded. It is powerless to give an explanation. Science had nothing whatever to do with the events. They were wrought by other means, far out of proportion to what was accomplished. This, therefore, is the meaning in which the term "hidden" or "unknown" is employed. No effort is made to take advantage of an ambiguity; rather a definite and restricted meaning places the problem in clear light, removes all doubt and opens the way to a decisive solution.<sup>12</sup>

"Modus quo corporibus adhaeret spiritus comprehendendi ab hominibus non potest; et hoc tamen homo est." Augustine, de Civ. Dei, I. 21, ch. 10.

<sup>11</sup> Quia causa una et eadem a quibusdam interum est cognita et a quibusdam incognita, inde contigit, quod videntium simul aliquem effectum aliqui non mirantur; astrologus enim non miratur videns eclipsim solis, quia cognoscit causam, ignarus autem hujus scientiae necesse habet admirari, causam ignorans. Sic igitur est aliquid mirum quoad hunc, non autem quantum ad illum. Illud ergo simpliciter occultum; et hoc sonat nomen miraculi, ut scilicet sit de se admiratione plenum non quoad hunc vel quoad illum tantum. Causa autem simpliciter occulta omni homini est Deus. Ejus essentiam nullus homo in statu hujus vitae intellectu capere potest." St. Thomas, Sum. Theol., I. q. 105, a. 7.

Its true  
nature

§ 20. The mind is now enabled to grasp the true conception of a miracle. By a miracle is understood a physical event which either substantially or in the manner of its occurrence exceeds the order and power of created nature. (a) It is a *physical* event, *i. e.*, an event which appeals to the senses and is known by the senses.

(a) physical  
event.

§ 21. (b) It is an event which is above and beyond the power or mere natural causes. This is the distinctive character of a miracle. It is an *extraordinary* occurrence. Not only is wonder aroused at the sight, but the cause completely baffles investigation. It is often urged, especially by men of science, that we do not know all the laws of nature; therefore, in a particular case we are unable to decide that an event does not take place by the sole operation of these laws.<sup>11</sup> The objection is more specious than well founded. It is undoubtedly true that natural events have been termed miracles on hasty and insufficient evidence. Mistakes happen not only in ordinary daily life but even with men of learning. Our position is not in the least weakened. How comes it that there is a deep-seated conviction in the minds of men as to the possibility and actual occurrence of true miraculous facts? This conviction is universal in time and in place. It springs from and is a complement to the belief in God.<sup>12</sup> Mistakes do not destroy the belief. Facts well authenticated strengthen and confirm it. To these appeal is made. Our knowledge of natural laws is not exhaustive. Though limited, the knowledge is nevertheless true.

<sup>11</sup> The Duke of Argyll praises Locke for holding that we can never know what is above nature unless we know all that is within nature. Cf. Reign of Law, p. 25, and tells us the boundaries of the natural are not known. P. 18.

<sup>12</sup> Demus aliquid posse, quod nos fateamur investigare non posse. In talibus rebus tota ratio facti est potentia facientis.<sup>13</sup> Aug. ep. 137, n. 8.

objected  
that we do  
not know  
all the laws  
of nature.

answer.

We know in particular instances their range and efficiency. Their properties and sphere of action are not altogether an enigma. Thus, *e. g.*, fire burns, natural laws cannot restore sight to the born blind, nor life to the dead. When, therefore, in a particular case an event of the like nature comes to our knowledge, we are justified in inferring that the cause is above nature and that a miracle has taken place. It is not necessary to know all the laws of nature. What is required is a knowledge of the laws having a bearing upon the event in question.<sup>11</sup>

§ 22. (c) The event is extraordinary in two ways; (c) either either it substantially surpasses the power of natural laws in substance or in or simply in the *manner* of its occurrence. Thus, *e. g.*, the glorification of the human body, the restoration of life to the dead, of sight to the born blind are events which are entirely beyond the efficiency of natural forces. Hence we say that the *fact* itself is a miracle, that the *event* itself is utterly beyond natural efficiency.

§ 23. Again, an event may be miraculous not so much in what has happened as in the *manner* of its occurrence. Thus, *e. g.*, a man may be seriously ill with fever and immediately regain health; or a storm may take place instantly in a clear, cloudless sky. These events might occur in the natural course of things. Nature restores the sick, and condensation of the atmosphere causes rain to fall. The miracle, however, is in the manner of the happening. This is so sudden, so startling that the ordinary course of nature is interrupted and a power above physical law is judged to interfere. The manner in which they take place is entirely different from the natural. Therefore

<sup>11</sup> W. S. Lilly, *The Great Enigma*, 112.

we are justified in concluding that another and different agency is at work."<sup>23</sup>

### 2°. Errors.

§ 24. The problem of miracles is one of the leading questions of the time. Intimately connected with the notion of God, it enters into and forms an important chapter in any discussion of Theism. Its opponents have held a leading position in literature and science.<sup>24</sup> The productions in the defense have been no less brilliant and learned. The purpose of the latter is to show that God has a real interest in His creation, and in divers ways throughout history has given to men a pledge of His fatherly love. Taking issue with men of different prepossessions and of various schools of thought, their arguments assume a peculiar form and tone. Sometimes it has happened that in the honest desire to conciliate an adversary they have taken a line of reasoning which is a virtual surrender of their own position.<sup>25</sup> A brief classification of erroneous teach-

<sup>23</sup> Excedit aliquid facultatem naturae tripliciter: uno modo quantum ad substantiam facti, sicut quod duo corpora sint simul vel quod sol retrocedat, vel quod corpus glorificetur, quod nullo modo natura facere potest; et ista tenent summum gradum in miraculis. Secundo aliquid excedit facultatem naturae non quantum ad id quod fit, sed quantum ad id in quo fit, sicut resuscitatio mortuorum et illuminatio caecorum et similia. Potest enim natura causare vitam, sed non in mortuo, et potest praestare visum, sed non in caeco; et haec tenent secundum locum in miraculis. Tertio modo excedit aliquid facultatem naturae, quantum ad modum et ordinem faciendi. Sicut cum aliquis subito per virtutem divinam a febri curatur, absque curatione et consueto processu naturae in talibus; aut cum status aeris divina virtute in pluvias densatur absque naturalibus causis, sicut factum est ad preces Samuelis et Eliae; at hujusmodi tenent infirmum locum in miraculis." St. Thomas, Sum. Theol., I. q. 105, a. 8.

<sup>24</sup> W. MacIntosh, DD., *The Natural History of the Christian Religion*; Arthur K. Rogers, *The Life and Teaching of Jesus*; Otto Pfeiderer, *Gifford Lectures*; Strauss, *Life of Jesus*; Renan, *Life of Jesus*.

<sup>25</sup> Duke of Argyll, in *Reign of Law*, ch. I.

ing, therefore, is of greatest importance to obtain a true knowledge of the question under discussion.

§ 25. (a) Pantheists of every school unite in rejecting the possibility of a miracle. This is the logical and consistent development of their fundamental belief. To them God is everything and everything is God. The divine is the only reality. We are a part of its substance, or its passing shadows. The realistic Pantheism of Spinoza teaches that only one substance exists which manifests itself in the phenomena of matter and of thought. This view obtains to a great extent in modern science. Its most recent exponent, Mr. Spencer, teaches that this substance is the unknowable, that its physical activities alone can be grasped by the mind, and to the evolution and interplay of these forces the phenomena of the entire universe in all the grades of being and of life can be reduced. Thus every event is the natural outcome of definite antecedents. In appearance the doctrine is Pantheism; in reality it is Materialism.

§ 26. Another form of Pantheism is the Idealism of Hegel. To him there is only one being which evolves into the world of nature and of man. This being is the *idea*, the *re fieri*. The highest stage of the evolution is reached in human consciousness, where it becomes conscious of itself; in reality the human mind is but a phase of the divine; at the basis there is no distinction; we have the consciousness of the divine, inasmuch as the divine reaches consciousness in us.

§ 27. The identity of human and divine consciousness is proposed by the school of Neo-Hegelians. At present they form an important factor in philosophic thought. Earnest in soul they accept Hegel's teaching as the highest exposition of philosophy, and strive to reconcile it with Christian belief. But if all exist-

ing things are only a manifestation of the idea in its constant evolution, if the human consciousness be fundamentally one with the divine, where shall miracle have place? Every occurrence is miraculous in so far as it is the direct manifestation of divine agency. The idea alone is real; all things else are the phases of that reality. The divine consciousness is one with our own and unfolds its energy in every thought and action.

(b) Physical scientista. § 28. (b) Another modern school of thought attacks the doctrine of miracles from a far different point of view. Allusion is made to a certain class of physical scientists. Impressed by the reign of law and the uniformity of natural events, they assume that the constancy of this order precludes all possibility of divine interference. To them a miracle is a violation of the laws of nature.<sup>28</sup> Their basis, therefore, is physical science. To admit a miracle, they tell us, would be equivalent to the destruction of science.<sup>29</sup>

criticism. § 29. A criticism of this position is not at all difficult. The theory rests upon an ambiguity and an exaggeration. The phrase "the order of nature is constant" is ambiguous. The word "constant," i. e., uniform, expresses either a fact or a necessary truth. With the former meaning no fault can be found. In the latter sense the phrase is not correct. The uniformity of nature is a truth of experience. It is not self-evident and is attained only after a long and patient research. The great majority of mankind have ever looked upon this world as liable to interference on the part of higher agencies. Finally, Mr. Mill has shown that the conviction in uniformity of nature prevails

(i) order of  
nature is  
constant.

<sup>28</sup> Dr. MacIntosh, in *Natural History of Christian Relig.*; A. Lang, *The Making of Religion*, p. 18, cites Hume as its first promoter.

<sup>29</sup> Duke of Argyll, *Reign of Law*, p. 17.

only among the educated and civilized few."<sup>21</sup> The belief, therefore, has not the character of a self-evident, necessary and universal principle. To exaggerate an induction from experience into a necessary truth is a fallacy. Nevertheless how often are we reminded that nature's laws are inviolate! This course of reasoning fails in the object.

§ 30. Now a miracle can be in perfect accord with nature's uniformity. For the laws of nature remain intact. The fact of a miracle does not cause them to disappear. A miracle has nothing to do with laws as such. It concerns only a particular event. When a miracle takes place, the laws of nature are not abrogated. Only in a particular case their effect is suspended. Hence the result is other than would happen. Fire did not cease to burn when the three children were protected from its ravages in the furnace; nor did the law of gravitation cease to have force when Jesus walked upon the waves of the sea of Galilee. The law remains intact; the particular event only is influenced.

§ 31. A good illustration can be found in our own voluntary activity. I can, by interposing, vary the particular events of physical forces. Thus I dash water to my face every morning in opposition to the law of gravitation, or I lift a heavy weight or drag a sled up hill, or row against a strong current. These are ordinary and familiar facts. My will interferes with one course of events by bringing a stronger force to counteract the efficiency of the former. A miracle is somewhat analogous. God interferes with an ordinary occurrence. His will is powerful to suspend a law in a particular case. The uniformity of nature is not disturbed. They who reason to the contrary are

<sup>21</sup> Logic, B. III. ch. 21.

guilty of the fallacy "ignorantia elenchi," *i. e.*, missing the point. The difficulty is the creation of their imagination.

(c) miracles  
are possi-  
ble, but  
never actu-  
ally took  
place.

Huxley.

Tyndall.

Their rea-  
son (a) from  
nature.

(b) deny  
historical  
testimony.

§ 32. (c) Finally, some writers, *e. g.*, Hume, Kuenen, Tyndall, and Huxley, deny the actual existence of miracles.<sup>28</sup> They view the question as a matter of fact.

The mere possibility is granted or dismissed from consideration as irrelevant. "Denying the possibility of miracles," writes Mr. Huxley, "seems to me quite as unjustifiable as speculative atheism."<sup>29</sup> Mr. Tyndall admits "The theory that the system of nature is under the control of a Being who changes phenomena in compliance with the affairs of men, is, in my opinion, a perfectly legitimate one."<sup>30</sup> Yet he continues: "But without *verification*, a theoretic conception is a mere figment of the intellect, and I am sorry to find us parting company at this point."<sup>31</sup> They, however, reject miracles from lack of evidence. No human testimony to them can ever produce credence in events opposed to known natural laws. The tendencies of nature more than overbalance whatever men may say to the contrary.

Furthermore they attack the testimony itself. The persons and circumstances are closely examined with a view to show that the witnesses of the event were not able to have trustworthy evidence, that the fact itself was a simple natural phenomena. Thus Renan

<sup>28</sup> MacIntosh, in Natural History of the Christian Religion; Huxley's Hume, p. 133; Present Day Tracts, n. 28. The Origin of the Hebrew Religion, E. R. Conder.

<sup>29</sup> Spectator, Feb. 10th, 1886; Duke of Argyll, Reign of Law, p. 89.

<sup>30</sup> Fragments of Science, p. 468.

<sup>31</sup> P. 469. J. S. Mill assures us that "science contains nothing repugnant to the supposition that every event which takes place results from a specific volition of the presiding power, provided that this power adheres in its particular volitions to general laws laid down by itself." Cf. Prof. Wilson, Foundations of Religious Belief, p. 339.

tells us that Jesus walked not upon the sea but by the seashore. Strauss explains the gospel miracles as myths. Huxley takes a real or fancied miracle and assails the evidence leaving the impression; I told you so; all are of the like nature. The *a priori* objection that human testimony is worthless in face of nature's uniformity is a strange exaggeration. We have seen criticism. that the uniformity of nature is an induction from experience and has not the character of an absolute truth. Furthermore the occurrence of a miracle by no means interferes with the orderly course and system of nature. If human activity can interfere with the ordinary course of one or more laws by interposing a contrary tendency without destroying the constancy of the laws or the uniformity of nature, surely the divine can do the same. Only a particular effect is suspended; the law remains intact.

§ 34. The effort to invalidate human testimony may succeed in particular cases. Exaggeration may take place. However, the truth of our thesis does not rest upon a fallacy or an exaggeration. We are the first to reject and repudiate such a method. Strong and free in the full and harmonious accord of reason and revelation, the Christian mind is active and eager to study the truth in all its bearings. The separation of dross from the pure ore is a lasting and genuine gain. He works for the years in building and ornamenting the temple of truth. The spirit is all the more eager because it has the truth as its possession and inheritance; all the more free to reject what is unsound because of the abundant material. That miracles have been established as well-authenticated facts cannot be questioned. We do not go to the past. Our own time has witnessed them. Reference is made to the miracles admitted at Rome in the process of the

canonization of saints. The tests are most scientific; the witnesses are of undoubted intelligence and probity. An examination of the facts will convince the most sceptical mind.

#### IV.

##### SPECIAL PROVIDENCES.

**§ 35.** The providence of God over men is shown to a striking degree by the miracles wrought in their behalf. They are extraordinary proofs of His justice and loving kindness. Nevertheless when we kneel to pray morning and evening we do not beg God to work miracles or that our lives shall be constant prodigies of His power. The consciousness of our own littleness in His presence, the sense of His holiness, greatness and majesty bend the strong will, bring low the soaring hopes and impart an humble and reverential spirit to our prayer. Even when our petitions are most earnest and ardent, the spirit of trust in God's infinite knowledge and all-embracing love breathes throughout. We speak to God, of our needs and longings, confident that He will answer in His own good way. Hence the place and scope of Special Providences.

Special  
Provi-  
dences.

**§ 36.** By Special Providences are understood events which happen in the course of Nature through the instrumentality of natural laws. We cannot discern either in the event itself or in the manner of its happening any deviation from the known physical course. What we know, however, is that events shape themselves in response to our prayer. The laws of nature are invariable; they always and of necessity produce the same effects. One important factor, nevertheless, must not be forgotten. That the laws of nature produce an effect, the same conditions must be present. If the conditions vary, the effects also vary. By alter-

we do not  
always  
pray for  
miracles.

ing the conditions other tendencies of nature are made predominant, and the law which would otherwise work out its effects yields to other and stronger laws." In this way our wills interfere with the workings of nature.

§ 37. The progress of science shows not only new <sup>Illustrated.</sup> laws but also reveals the manner and means by which we may subject these laws to our aim and service. The vast field covered by the practical sciences are a striking illustration. We do what nature herself could never do; we make nature a servant to carry out our plans. Rivers are bridged, railways constructed, the telegraph and telephone carry messages over seas and across continents. The uniformity of natural laws, far from preventing our efforts, is the fundamental and necessary condition which render them possible." We do not create new forces, we only set force working against force.

§ 38. The contention that the uniformity of physical laws renders impossible their subordination to a higher will is opposed to ordinary and scientific experience. Every move of my body, every motion of the soul effectually proves this assertion groundless. Thoughts and feelings, buried deep in my mind and heart, cause the eye to sparkle, bring the color to the cheek, accelerate the movements of the limbs, and give animation to the whole bodily frame. In writing to you, kind reader, does not my will move my arm and set the pen at work? The law of inertia does not prevent my writing, nor is the law abrogated because I write. Or I may rise from the desk and walk out into the air; or I play at tennis, or bathe in the clear water. Is the law of gravitation rendered null and void? Every

<sup>a</sup> Duke of Argyll, *Reign of Law*, p. 96; Noah Porter, *Elements of Moral Science*, p. 564.

<sup>b</sup> *Reign of Law*, p. 98.

movement of my waking life is an illustration of the thesis.

(c) from the sciences. § 39. Science also comes with its examples. Water is decomposed into hydrogen and oxygen gases by simply passing through it a current of voltaic electricity. Mechanical and chemical combinations in the laboratory show how one force neutralizes another. The science of mechanics and of medicine especially render the truth obvious. Or we pass from physical to living elements. Chemical forces serve the vegetable world, and this is under the sway of the animal kingdom which in turn obeys man. Or the elements may be living men. Here we have the science of government. The influence of a superior will over an inferior will is illustrated in daily life, in politics, in civil society, at home, with friends. I may carry out my aim by influencing and controlling the desires of others. They work with me and for me. If I am ambitious, I seek the favor of those in power; if I am unable to perform an act, I seek a powerful friend to influence others where I should fail.

§ 40. Now if such power rests with man, if he can do so much with the forces of nature and his fellow beings, can God do less? Can we not believe that at our prayer God may cause the conditions of natural phenomena to so combine that through his special agency we obtain our hearts' desire, and yet so that to the ordinary observer the event happens in its ordinary place and time. To the devout soul, however, all is different. He recognizes God's mercy and is devotedly thankful for the Fatherly care. He knows that God has managed the event in some way. The hidden power and love displayed is the response to the prayer. When, therefore, we pray for rain, or to avert a calamity, or to prevent the ravages of plague we beg

not so much for miracles or prodigies of omnipotence. We ask that He who holds the heavens in His hands, and who searches the abyss will listen to our petition and in His own good way bring about the answer we need.

## V.

## CONCLUSION.

§ 41. How easy, therefore, it is for God to answer our prayer! We do the same for friends every day. The sphere of our influence is limited, but we can to some extent bend energies and wills to a good and holy cause. Is God less powerful than we? If nature's laws remain constant, notwithstanding our interference, does God's will destroy the uniformity?

§ 42. But it is said that our prayers are not always answered. In reply to this we may say that the objection does not affect our position in the least. If a prayer be answered but once, the thesis holds good. In order that natural laws should work a result, certain conditions are necessary. So, too, with prayer. That prayer be what it ought, subjective conditions are required. Our Lord speaks thus, and the Apostles enumerate them. St. Augustine proposes the query why prayers are not always answered and gives a solution. This question may go beyond our knowledge. We cannot penetrate the mind of God and explain why He does so or otherwise. We may rest content that He who reads our hearts knows what we want and what is best for us. However, that God cannot answer prayers for physical benefits because of nature's uniformity, is a problem within the scope of reason. We can solve it and the answer is too strong and clear to be shaken.

§ 43. There is a providence over all things and over the lives of men." He cares for all, even the lowliest. In man, His government shows itself not only in the powers of the body and of mind, but in special and extraordinary ways. In answer to our prayer, God worked miracles and causes nature's laws to group according to our wishes.

<sup>24</sup> Plato, *Laws*, B. X, ch. 11; Aristotle, *Metaphys.* XI, ch. 6; "O tu, bone omnipotens," exclaims St. Augustine, "qui sic curas unumquemque nostrum tamquam solum cures; et sic omnes, tamquam singulos." *Confess.*, l. III, ch. II; *de Gen. ad. Lit.* l. 5, ch. 21.

## CHAPTER XIV.

### PESSIMISM.

§ 1. The phenomena of existence and of life affect the human mind in various ways. By a necessity of nature we fashion views of the world from the contents of individual experience. The extent and nature of our environment, the peculiar disposition and power of the soul find unconscious expression. What we think and feel gives form and color to our lives. We breathe a peculiar atmosphere, and its influence is felt by our associates or, embodied in the written word, exerts an uplifting or depressing force on future ages.

§ 2. The evils of life have at all times strongly <sup>Problem of</sup> ~~Evil~~ impressed the minds of men. The earliest records of human speculation show the attempts made at a solution. In the Vedic writings the problem appears and elicits a cry of despair. It is crystallized into a system with the Parsees and the later Manichaeans. Its mournful tones are heard in Greek poetry. It has occupied the great minds of Christian philosophy, and has drawn forth the deepest thoughts of an Augustine and a Thomas Aquinas.

§ 3. At present we are concerned with one answer ~~Pessimism~~. Pessimism is an error which is contemporaneous with philosophic thought. Its traces appear in every stage of history. Its influence upon the minds of the passing generation has been widespread and profound. The miseries of existence have so impressed the minds of some as to furnish data whereon is built a philosophy of life which sees no good in the world,

recognizes no beneficent purpose over man, excludes all joy and goodness, and teaches that sorrow and pain and evil alone reign in undisputed sway.

## I.

## BUDDHISM.

Hindu  
mind meta-  
physical.

§ 4. The problem of life early took possession of the Indian mind. The longing to pierce the veil of mystery which envelops his being called forth the highest efforts. Beautiful are some passages of the Sacred Books. The human soul answers in mournful tones to the touch of life's realities. The cry may vary in strength, in its human echoes, but it is ever the same. Again and again it is heard in the Hindoo Scriptures. The voice is the voice of humanity, and the answer is what humanity alone can give.

1°. *Origin.*

origins of  
Buddhism.

§ 5. Before the rise of Buddhism, India already possessed a voluminous literature. Its growth can be determined from difference in language and development of thought. The principal periods are the Vedic, the early Brahmanic, the Upanishads, and the later Brahmanic. No sharp line of demarkation can be drawn between them. They run into each other and overlap. Viewed in relation to the subject-matter the Upanishads are by far the most important. They are the earliest remains of Indian Metaphysics.

Upan-  
ishads.

§ 6. The sole problem of the Upanishads is release from the miseries of life. The solution proposed is a transmigration which holds sway from the lowest forms of existence to the highest intelligence. The character of life in the present state shapes the following. Evil-doing leads to lower forms of life, while the good rise in the scale of existences. The highest stage, how-

ever, is not permanent. Gods and men are parts of the world system. The purest intelligences and most blessed spirits must descend sooner or later to run again the course. There are stages, no final resting place, for the soul on its journey. Once the merit has been exhausted, the soul falls to a lower sphere to begin its dark and painful ascent. Misery only and vanity are found in life. No afterhope to cast a beam of comfort on the chill and gloomy present. Not the fear of death palls the Indian mind, but the dread of birth. Death brings no surcease to sorrow and suffering. As plants spring from seed, and seed falls from the ripened fruit, so birth and death, death and birth follow each other with the inexorable rigor of a physical law.<sup>1</sup>

That — once and whereso'er and whence begun —  
Life runs its rounds of living, climbing up  
From mote, and gnat, and worm, reptile and fish,  
Bird and shagged beast, man, demon, deva, God,  
To clod and mote again.<sup>2</sup>

§ 7. Great is the sorrow of the rich at the loss of pessimistic their riches, says the Atma-Purana, of the prince at the approach of death, of those in paradise at the expiring of their merits; there is pain in the performance of the rites, there is pain in the fruition of the reward, at the thought of its loss, there is pain on the fresh birth in the world.<sup>3</sup> No peace, no rest, no end. Activity was considered as the root of evil. Even good acts at the most prolong the flow of life.

§ 8. Buddhism is the logical and natural sequence of the principles set forth in the Upanishads.<sup>4</sup> The same Buddhism  
the logical  
Development.

<sup>1</sup> Brih. Up. III, 9, 28.

<sup>2</sup> Arnold, Light of Asia, p. 96.

<sup>3</sup> Chand. Up. II, 10, 7; Brih. Up. VI, 2, 16; 9, 3; Manavad-harmasutra XII, 54, sq.

<sup>4</sup> Müller, S. B. E., vol. XV, Introd., p. xxvii.

**Gotama however abolished distinctions.** pessimistic theory of life throws its gloomy shadows over the one system as over the other.<sup>8</sup> The same dread of birth is the nightmare to be freed from. Gotama, however, made a change in the means employed to avoid a rebirth. In the Upanishads the student is drilled in lower wisdom, *e. g.*, rites and sacrifices, as a preparation for the higher, *e. g.*, abstraction and meditation. Gotama abolished the distinction and opened the higher path to all. The highest purpose of the soul is to return to original nothingness and final extinction. All things have sprung therefrom; all things have this destination.<sup>9</sup> In the words of the Sankya-Karita, "so through the study of principles, the conclusive, incontrovertible, one only knowledge is attained, that neither I am, nor aught is mine, nor do I exist."<sup>10</sup>

### 2°. Teaching.

**Buddhism a common not a specific term.**

§ 9. Buddhism is a common name designating the popular faith in many lands. Not only is it applied to existing creeds; it has a history reaching back over two thousand years. The study of its development and present condition reveals not Buddhism but Buddhsisms. It varies in every land just as it has varied in the course of time. The reason is that Buddhism in its origin was not a religion. Its founder simply propounded a philosophy of life. In propagating his doctrines the early missionaries did not compel the inhabitants of other countries to give up their native beliefs. They adapted Buddhism to the condition of those to whom they preached. Hence many varieties sprang up, crystallized and flourished. The Buddhism of China, *e. g.*, is not the Buddhism of

<sup>8</sup> Müller, *Chips from a German Workshop*, vol. I, p. 223 sq.

<sup>9</sup> Chand. Up.

<sup>10</sup> Pfleiderer, *The Phil. of Religion*, vol. IV, p. 8.

Ceylon.<sup>8</sup> Just as these forms are not identical with the primitive teaching.<sup>9</sup> At present we are concerned only with the teaching of Gotama as far as this can be learned from the results of modern critical and historical research.

§ 10. Buddhism can be considered as a system of thought and as a philosophy of life. It has, therefore, not a religion but a philosophy. a metaphysical and an-ethical aspect. Lacking in the constitutive elements which go to make up a religion, it has no true or just claim to the title. The question is now of primitive Buddhism, not of the later excrescences which pass under that name. The metaphysical basis of the system only demands our present attention.

§ 11. While seated under the Bo-tree of Benares in deep meditation upon the Chain of Causation, i. e., <sup>The Four Noble Truths.</sup> the unending cycle of birth and death, of death and birth, Gotama, in a flash, or by an inner illumination as his disciples are wont to say, perceived a solution for the dark sodden veil of mystery and misery which envelops life. This solution is embodied in the famous Four Noble Truths which form the kernel of his system. Around and from these his moral teaching is developed, and by them is adequately understood and explained.<sup>10</sup> <sup>(1) Sorrow is universal.</sup>

§ 12. In the first sermon by which the triumphant chariot-wheel of his doctrine is set in motion the Four Truths are emphatically expressed.<sup>11</sup> They are:

1. That sorrow is universal: "This, mendicants, is the noble truth of sorrow; birth is sorrow, old age is sorrow, sickness is sorrow, death is sorrow, the presence of the unloved is sorrow, the absence of the loved is sorrow, all that one wishes for and does not get, is

<sup>8</sup> Biel, Copleston, Bigandet.

<sup>9</sup> Rhys Davids, Kellogg.

<sup>10</sup> Copleston's Buddhism, p. 111.

<sup>11</sup> Buddha's Dhammapada, V. 190-192.

sorrow: Briefly the five elements by which beings hold to existence are sorrow."<sup>19</sup>"

criticism. § 13. In so far as Gotama states the fact of sorrow, the words are true. But they only express a partial view of life. Happiness is a fact also. The joy of hard won achievement, of motherhood, of child-like innocence, of well-doing, the joy which springs from the right exercise of the higher emotions cannot be ignored. To insist upon the sorrows of life to the utter exclusion of the joys is a travesty of truth. To proclaim that sorrow is the primal, fundamental and universal fact of conscious existence is an unwarranted assumption or rather a perversion of the testimony of consciousness. Christian Philosophy admits the coexistence of happiness and of sorrow, but teaches, as shall be shown, that the former is the primary and fundamental fact, and explains their true ethical meaning and import.

(2) desire is the cause of sorrow. § 14. (2) That the cause of sorrow is desire. "This, mendicants," says Gotama, "is the noble truth of the cause of sorrow. Desire that leads from birth to birth, and is accompanied by pleasure and pain, seeking to gratification here and there, namely, desire of sensual pleasure, desire of existence, desire of wealth."

criticism. § 15. The three-fold division of desire can be reduced to the desire of existence. That sensual gratification leads to sorrow is a truth illustrated on every page of history. In giving statement to this, Gotama simply laid stress upon a fact; but again and again assures his hearers that the desire of existence is the main and real cause of sorrow. If all existence is sorrow, as we learn from the first Truth, then desire of existence is the true source of sorrow. This desire perpetuates Karma and leads from birth to birth in unvarying

<sup>19</sup> Christian Philosophy — The Soul, p. 48.

round. With Gotama there is no soul. Individual life is made up of a combination of the five groups of elements or Skandhas. Desire is the reason of their combination into the Karma and causes the Karma to be perpetuated in other forms. It thus becomes the constitutive of personal existence."<sup>13</sup>

§ 16. (3) That the cessation of sorrow is brought about by the eradication of desire. "When this fierce thirst (*i. e.*, desire) overcomes, full of poison, in this world, his sufferings increase like the abounding Birana grass. This salutary word I tell you, as many as are here come together: Dig up the root of thirst, as he who wants the sweet-scented Usira root must dig up the Birana grass."<sup>14</sup>"

§ 17. The Third Truth follows from the Second. It ~~criticism.~~ is true that the diminutions of desire cuts off many occasions of disappointment and sorrow. At the same time it deprives us of the purest and noblest joys. Life is effort, and is shown forth in activity. A great and noble soul is filled with desires of good. Do not these desires furnish the sweetest joys? It is of Catholic faith that God rewards the longings of the soul for good, even though we lack the strength or opportunity to put them into execution. In the silence of my room I may kneel in prayer that God may be glorified by all His creatures, that He may rule in the hearts of all men, that He may give me light and strength to do His holy will. My desire becomes a swelling hymn of praise. In acting thus, how can I do wrong? He bids me fill my mind and enlarge my heart with such as these.

§ 18. Again, the very possession of desire reacts upon temperament and character. It gives elevation

<sup>13</sup> Kellogg, *The Light of Asia and the Light of the World*, p. 210 sq.; Rhys Davids, *Hibbert Lectures of 1881, Rise and Growth of Religion*.

<sup>14</sup> Buddha's *Dhammapada*, ch. XXIV, V, 335-337 sq.

of mind, it broadens my horizon, it imparts firmness and resource amid the varying happenings of life. Or suppose I strive to put my hopes into execution. There is energy and joy in the effort, but what exultation of spirit in the achievement! True, reverses come to the wisest and the best. But there can be no failure in the effort to be good and true. By a word or act I give sympathy or help to the struggling or downcast. I add to the happiness of others, I cause the sun to break through the gloomy cloud, I become greater and better in its light and warmth. Happiness is found in action and the cessation of activity cramps the heart and makes life friendless and cheerless.

(4) This done by the noble eight-fold path. § 19. (4) The Fourth Truth teaches that the one way to accomplish this end, *i. e.*, the extinction of desire, is the noble eight-fold way. "This, O mendicants, is the noble truth of the way of living which leads to the extinction of sorrow; it is the noble eight-fold way; right faith, right resolve, right speech, right action, right living, right effort, right recollection, right meditation." "<sup>15</sup>"

criticism. § 20. At first sight these precepts appear beautiful and excellent. We are apt to interpret them after our own manner of thinking and in the light of Christian philosophy. This is to fail utterly in grasping their true meaning. The term "right" has not the same sense in Buddhism as in Christian ethics. The "right" views of life, *e. g.*, are those set forth in the Four Noble Truths. They are right only on the admission that Atheism is true and Pessimism is the only gospel of mankind.<sup>16</sup> Ignorance of these truths is the immediate cause of existence in so far as it perpetuates

<sup>15</sup> Davids, Buddhism, p. 44 sq.; Buddha's Dhammapada, ch. XX, V, 273-276; Copleston's Buddhism, p. 130 sq.

<sup>16</sup> Kellogg, The Light of Asia and the Light of the World, p. 302.

Karma and involves the individual in the eternal chain of causation."<sup>11</sup>

§ 21. Thus the doctrine of Pessimism is the dominant note of Buddhism. That all existence is evil, was the spectre ever before the mind. The supreme effort of life was to cease to live. Nirvana, *i. e.*, extinction of lust, was the goal leading to Parinirvana, *i. e.*, the extinction of being.<sup>12</sup>

## II.

### SCHOPPENHAUER.

§ 22. This Philosophy of life, so dismal and shorn of hope, was the gospel to countless struggling human souls in India over two thousand years ago. In our own time it has been proposed to European minds as the panacea for all our woes. About one hundred years have passed since Sir William Jones brought to English readers the treasures of ancient Hindoo literature. His extravagant praises of its worth attracted the attention of scholars. The number of students interested in this department of Knowledge constantly increased. It was reserved, however, for the master-mind of Schopenhauer to appropriate its philosophy, and to set it forth in a scientific form, becoming thus the founder of modern Pessimism.

§ 23. In Schopenhauer two currents of philosophic thought converge to form a new system. By nature and early education a German, he came under the influence of Kant and his immediate successors, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. In after-life a devoted admirer and disciple of Buddhism, he drew therefrom the inspiration and substance of his teaching. Yet the elements of both can be clearly traced.

<sup>11</sup> J. Wordsworth, M., A.. The One Religion; appendix I, by Prof Frankfurter, pp. 371-372.

<sup>12</sup> Hopkins, The Religions of India, p. 321.

fundamental doctrine.

Will the one reality.

The world essence.

§ 24. His fundamental doctrine is the distinction between the phenomenal and the real world. Thus he accepts Kant's initial principle of the phenomenon and the noumenon, as also the Maya of Buddhism. The phenomenal world is what is known in sense-experience; it exists only to the percipient mind; its real nature is pure mental representation (*Vorstellung*). With Fichte he holds that the phenomenal is a world of appearance which depends on the activity of the mind and ceases to exist with the percipient mind. Not so the real. Schelling conceives this as *absolute thought*; Hegel, as the *idea*, which transcends and enfolds all that is known as subject and object. To Schopenhauer *will* is the one universal substance and essence of every individual thing. It is manifested in the blind courses of nature, as well as in the deliberate acts of man.<sup>19</sup>

§ 25. Hence his definition of Will as that which contains the various manifestations of impulse and feeling. Kant taught that the principle of causality held sway only in the world of phenomena, *i. e.*, *Vorstellung*. Therefore *will*, in as far as it is the absolute and real, is not the cause of the world, but its essence and real being. In every individual phenomenon we may distinguish two elements; the will, *i. e.*, the constant principle of being, and a variable phenomenal cause. In its ceaseless striving, the will is free from all determination. In its essential nature unconscious, motives have no influence over its actions. The signs of purpose everywhere visible in nature<sup>20</sup> are true of phenomena only, not of the real or absolute will; in it there is no prevision or design. In preserving the distinction between the real and the phenomenal, in

<sup>19</sup> Sully, *Pessimism*, p. 84.

<sup>20</sup> The World as Will, Vol. 2, ch. 28, p. 375.

ascribing purpose to the latter and denying it to the former, Schopenhauer frequently contradicts himself.

§ 26. The phenomenal world is the objectivation of the will. This objectivation takes place through the medium of ideas. They are the intermedium between the real and the phenomenal. In animals and in man the manifestation is recognized as the will to live. Every creature strives for life. Life is the aim and the end of existence. The way is thus presented for a problem, the solution of which casts a peculiar aspect over his whole system of philosophy. What, he asks, <sup>The value of life.</sup> is the real value of life? Does the end for which we strive justify the toil and anxiety employed in the striving, does its possession yield real satisfaction? The answer he gives is an emphatic negative. The striving to live arises not from choice but from a blind instinct. If life were happy it might have value. But the preponderance of pain over pleasure shows that happiness is only an illusive dream. To live is to <sup>(1) a priori</sup> strive. Now striving has its source in want or discontent. We are not satisfied with what we have, or we <sup>(a) life due to strife and discontent.</sup> need something we have not; therefore we strive for what lies beyond. This of necessity involves suffering.

§ 27. As the nature of the will is a continuous striving we can readily understand that lasting satisfaction is impossible. The satisfaction we do at times obtain is only temporary, and marks the starting-point of a new effort. Schopenhauer compares the nature of the will to an insatiable thirst, or a craving hunger. Happiness is like the sweet <sup>(b) real</sup> food, having the power to please in the mouth, losing it when swallowed. As the poet expresses it:

Pleasures are like poppies spread  
You seize the flower, the bloom is shed.  
Or like snow flakes on the river,  
A moment white, then gone forever.

(c) happiness is something negative.

(d) pain is positive.

(a) progress individual or social, means larger knowledge, and greater needs.

(3) means of escape.

**§ 28.** Happiness is something negative, *i. e.*, the satisfaction of a need, the stilling of a pain.<sup>21</sup> But the permanent or real element in our lives is a striving. Satisfaction is instantaneous and fleeting only, and gives way to the strong current of desire which constitutes our nature. Hence, new striving, suffering and pain. The fact of suffering is essential and universal.<sup>22</sup> It is of the essence of things, in as far as it is inseparable from striving. Man, however, suffers more than lower creation; and the more intelligent, the more intense is the suffering.

**§ 29.** Schopenhauer concludes to the evil of existence from a consideration of man's essential nature. He reasons also from the data of experience. The intellectual development of the individual brings with it a larger knowledge and a wider mental range. Desires multiply and are intensified. Thus wants arise and wants bring suffering. So also with society and nations. Progress of necessity increases suffering. The progress we are wont to herald is not a sign of betterment, but a sure indication that the world is growing worse. Hence to live is to suffer, not through an accident of circumstance, but from a necessity of nature. To earnestly desire life is folly. The conscious affirmation of will is the source of misery. To this source can be traced the belief in immortality.

**§ 30.** The only means of escape from the suffering and pain of existence is the denial of the will to live. Here is found the basis of wise and virtuous conduct, since this denial is founded in our recognition of the true nature of life. What is real is the absolute Will; all else are merely seemings. The veil of Maya over-spreads the real, and is the reason why we apply par-

<sup>21</sup> Kant, Anthropology, No. LIX.

<sup>22</sup> Metman, Le Pessimisme moderne, pp. 81-93.

ticular names to individual objects. It is the principle of individualization. But these individual objects are not real; they constitute the phenomenal world only. By holding this truth firm in mind we penetrate the veil of Maya, we see that individual things are only seeming, and grasp the essential oneness of all. The intellectual vision of the one underlying reality quiets the Will. It no longer affirms itself as an individual distinct from other Wills. Hence arises true self-denial, *i. e.*, denial of the Self, which culminates in a denial to live.<sup>23</sup> This state of quiescence is the highest attainable happiness. We are passive spectators of the passing vanities and miseries of life; and are at peace in the worst of all possible worlds.

§ 31. The philosophy of Schopenhauer is an Ideal-Criticism. The initial error lies in the full acceptance of Kant's theory of knowledge. If the noumenon, <sup>(1) erroneous theory of knowl-</sup> *i. e.*, the real, cannot be grasped by the perceiving mind, and if the phenomenon, *i. e.*, the ideal appearances, can only become the object of cognition, the source of the system can be seen at a glance. He inferred the unity of the *real* from the unity of creation. Unlike Hegel he did not look upon the *real* as *idea*, but as *will*. With Fichte he considers the objects around to be of the stuff that dreams are made, or, as the Buddhist would say, illusions caused by Maya overshadowing the *real*. Now Kant's theory rests on the confusion of sense-perception and intellectual knowledge, on the failure to grasp the true nature and powers of the mind.<sup>24</sup> A system, therefore, which rests upon a false basis cannot be true.

§ 32. Schopenhauer maintains as a fundamental principle that activity is evil. This is not true. Let <sup>(2) fundamental principle is false.</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Sully, Pessimism, p. 101.

<sup>24</sup> Christian Philosophy — The Soul, p. 37 sq.

us appeal to our conscious experience. Is there not a joy in labor, in putting forth our powers of body or of mind, in the recognition of what we have done as well as in the reasoned hope of what we can do? Grant that our nature craves for what we have not; the craving is not an abnormal thirst; there is what we may call a healthy desire. The pleasures of sense are to the generality of men more than a fleeting gratification of crying needs. Diseased minds are sometimes found, but of these we do not speak. There is in the depths of our nature a well-spring of activity which finds vent in a thousand ways. The high resolve, the courageous endeavor, the fire of enthusiasm, the flush of anger, have spurred great souls to live and to live so as to make mankind, nobler, purer, better. The cities in which we live, the comforts we enjoy, the books we read, are not the product of men who passed their lives in constant misery. If the highest good were quiescence and apathy, how miserable would be our lot! Human nature rebels against such a creed. To live is an inalienable possession of our nature. Man will not crush out existence. In this is seen the superiority of Christianity. Unlike Buddhism it recognizes the fundamental desires of human nature, and far from crushing, strives only to uplift and direct them. Christ came to those "who dwelt in the shadow of the valley of death." He came that "they might have life and have it more abundantly." To point out the real dignity and value of life, to offer to mankind the means and aids which purify, ennable, and make life a priceless blessing has ever been the aim and purpose of our Christian religion.

§ 33. The disciples of Schopenhauer, Bahnsen, Frauenstadt and Taubert modify to some extent the teaching of their master either in its metaphysical or

ethical aspect. The most important, however, is Hartman, who presents a system based on the main lines of Schopenhauer with important additions from Schelling and Hegel.

### III.

#### HARTMAN.

§ 34. In 1864 Hartman published the *Philosophy of doctrine the Unconscious*, which contains the substance of his philosophy. He recognizes one ultimate reality; hence his theory is, as with Schopenhauer, a kind of Monism.<sup>\*\*</sup> The individual objects around us are activities or manifestations of the one reality. In this, true to his German antecedents and environment, he presents a form of Pantheism. The world is due to a (<sup>(1)</sup> genesis. combination of will and idea; the will in itself is an empty form; a definite aim or purpose, *i. e.*, content, must come from another source; this is found alone in a mental representation. Hartman claims to agree with Spinoza, who holds one ultimate substance having two attributes. The student, however, readily perceives that he has ingrafted the *idea* of Hegel upon the *will* of Schopenhauer, and beyond underlying both he postulates the *absolute* of Schelling, which he names the *unconscious*.<sup>\*\*</sup>

§ 35. Thus to Hartman the Unconscious includes the will and the idea. He teaches that the manifestation of unconscious will and intelligence can be recognized: (a) Throughout the organic world as, *e. g.*, in the functions of the spinal column, and cerebral ganglia, in voluntary and reflex movements, in instinct, in the formation, growth, and the recuperative processes of the organism. (b) In the human mind, *e. g.*, (b) in man.

<sup>\*\*</sup> Royce, *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, pp. 259-263.

<sup>\*\*</sup> Sully, *Pessimism*, p. 131.

sexual love, feeling, character, morality, æsthetic judgment, artistic creations, mysticism, etc." From these data he infers an all-pervading reality which he terms the Unconscious.

(3) Matter and mind resolved into the unconscious.

§ 36. Matter is made up of innumerable atomic forces. Their activities are merely acts of volition. Hence the theory of atomic wills and the resolution of matter into will. The distinction between matter and mind is thus blotted out. In reality they are identical. Organic life is the will acting with the purpose or aim of producing higher and still higher forms. The organic evolution, therefore, is not merely mechanical; it is guided and upheld by the direct action of an unconscious will. Individual variation, natural selection and inheritance play only subordinate parts in the development. Sensation and thought are explained as due to a collision or conflict of wills after the same manner as matter comes into existence by the interaction of atomic wills. In this we perceive the influence which the monads of Leibnitz and the plurality of Herbart left upon his mind, and how he has tried to reconcile the plurality with the Monism of Spinoza, Schelling, Hegel and Schoppenhauer.

(4) Hedonism in Ethics. value of life.

(a) *a priori* life is suffering.

§ 37. Hartman follows Schoppenhauer in viewing life from the Hedonist standpoint. Its value is measured by the balance of pleasure over pain. Now by the very nature of our existence pain always is in excess of pleasure. The reason of existence is the blind impulse to will. But to will or to strive implies defect and need. Thus the will by its nature is never satisfied. Life is never complete, and existence is the result of folly. Not to be is better than to be. The very reason of existence, therefore, becomes the source of pain and sorrow.

\* Sully, ib., p. 119.

§ 38. Hartman is not content in showing the failure (b) a posteriori of life as the logical result of his philosophy. He appeals to experience. By a large and wide induction he attempts to make secure the conclusion reached from *a priori* reasoning. His exposition of the wretchedness of life is much more complete and searching than that of Schopenhauer. With ruthless hand he shatters the ideals man has venerated, exposes the shams which enter into our conscious existence, and holds up to contempt and scorn the very objects which are enshrined in the sacred memories of childhood and are the source and mainspring of high resolves and noble deeds in after life. To him, woman is a degraded thing. Only a mind besotted, only a soul steeped in the mire of degradation, only a heart dead to the slightest affection for what is true, beautiful and good, could inspire the pages inscribed with his name.

§ 39. The work of Hartman is a storehouse to those (s) design in the universe is the work of the unconscious. who seek proofs for design in the universe. To him the world has a rational aim. The rational element, *i. e.*, Hegel's idea, which gives content to the pure potency of will, is the fundamental reason of the world-order. He disagrees, however, with Hegel in affirming that consciousness is the proximate, not the final end in the evolution of the universe. Hartman holds that the final end is had in appeasing the cravings and strivings of the will. This is accomplished by divorcing (b) final aim is to destroy desire and life. the will from the mental representation and thus reducing it to its primal state of pure potency. The conscious denial of will is the means to be employed. Thus an antagonism is engendered and the will is reduced to a pure potency.<sup>20</sup>

§ 40. (1) The system of Hartman is more complete *Criticism.* and systematic than that proposed by his master. In

<sup>20</sup> Sully, Pessimism, p. 140.

(1) Pantheistic.

it are found traces of a synthesis and attempt at reconciliation of antecedent German Philosophic thought. Nevertheless it is purely pantheistic and labors with the defects indigenous to every system of Pantheism. The initial postulate is the fundamental identity of all existing things. Now consciousness conclusively shows this to be false. We are distinct one from another; my conscious life is my own possession. I am not of the same nature as the stone, or the tree, or the brute.

(2) Same result as with Schopenhauer.

§ 41. (2) The conclusion of Hartman's system is the same as Schopenhauer's. The addition of the rational element only supplies a defect; it does not alter the nature of the evolution. Therefore the same criticism which so effectually exposed the conclusions of one, tells with the same effect against the other. Life is not a blunder or a folly; existence is not a fundamental mistake. Such words as enthusiasm, virtue, heroism, goodness, truth, beauty, find place in the lowest lives and leave an indelible imprint upon the page of history.

(3) false theory of Ethics.

§ 42. (3) The standard of Hedonism which both follow is not the true test of the value of life. The very consequences to which it leads are a telling argument against its truth. Principles which logically result in despair do not make the world better and give no ray of comfort to struggling human nature. In the following chapter this standard will be closely examined. Its real worth will be shown to be illusive and inimical to what is our highest aim and prize.

#### IV.

##### INFLUENCE.

Influence on Literature, e. g., Leopardi.

§ 43. The influence of Pessimism upon modern thought has been deep and widespread. To Schopenhauer and Hartman it is a well-developed system of

philosophy. Leopardi consecrated his poetic genius to express in stirring verse the tale of life's wretchedness.<sup>29</sup> He is thus the real poet of Pessimism.<sup>30</sup> Diffused by them, its teaching has permeated every rank of society and every sphere of life. We find its traces in conversation, in the papers, on the stage, and throughout contemporaneous literature.<sup>31</sup> It is seen in "Queen Mab," in "Misery and Mutability" of Shelley, Tennyson, Goethe, Carlyle, in Tennyson's "In Memoriam," and Goethe's "Faust," in the grim Carlyle exposing the shams of life, in the fine Byronic despair. Byron.

Count o'er the joys thine hours have seen,  
Count o'er the days from anguish free,  
And know whatever thou hast been,  
Tis something better not to be.

Musset complains that he has come too late in a world Musset. too old.<sup>32</sup> Lamartine hears in nature the voice of one Lamartine. long sigh, and wonders what crime he committed that he should be born.<sup>33</sup> The tone of disappointment, of the eternal unfitness of things is dominant in the writings of the naturalistic school, in the works of Loti, Bourget, George Eliot, and Hall Caine.<sup>34</sup> The exclamation of Euripides: "Swift-fated and conscious, how brief is life's pleasureless portion!"<sup>35</sup> is repeated by Bourget. George Eliot. Hall Caine. Omar Khayyam. the admiring readers of Omar Khayyam and of Heine, Bourget. George Eliot. Hall Caine. Omar Khayyam. Heine. the sweet singer of the world pain.

<sup>29</sup> His *L'amour et la mort*.

<sup>30</sup> "Sombre amant de la mort, pauvre Leopardi," writes Musset; Tulloch, Modern Theories in Philosophy and Religion, p. 169, sq.

<sup>31</sup> Royce, *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 117.

<sup>32</sup> "Je suis venu trop tard dans un monde trop vieux."

<sup>33</sup> Le Desespoir.

<sup>34</sup> "L'homme en se civilisant, n'a-t-il fait vraiment que compliquer sa barbarie et raffiner sa miserie?" P. Bourget, *Essais de Psychol. contemp.*, p. 322; R. H. Hutton, *Modern Guides of English Thought in Matter of Faith*, ch. V, George Eliot.

<sup>35</sup> Lewes, *History of Philosophy*.

<sup>Literature  
not wholly  
pessimistic.</sup> § 44. It is false, however, to hold that literature is wholly pessimistic. More than one poet, from the analysis of his own inner consciousness, has sung

"Sweet are the uses of adversity."

<sup>Keats.</sup> and more than one toiler along life's highway has learned that sweet rest comes after labor, and sweet joy after pain. Keats forms a contrast to Byron, Hellenbach has drawn a kind of Optimism from the philosophy of Schopenhauer, and Wordsworth, the poet of nature, from communion with her various moods, has learned that

<sup>Words-  
worth.</sup>

Wilderness and wood  
Blank ocean and mere sky, supports that mood,  
Which with the lofty, sanctifies the low,

and warns us too apt at times to look upon the gloomy side, that

If life were slumber on a bed of down,  
Toil unimposed, vicissitude unknown,  
Sad were our lot.

<sup>Olla La  
Prune.</sup>

Sir John Lubbock has written the beautiful work on the Pleasures of Life; the scientific Meliorism of George Eliot and of Sully have been submitted to exhaustive criticism, and Olla La Prune has presented the Christian standpoint in the philosophic essay "Le Prix de la Vie." A healthier tone is visible in the decline of the Positivistic school and in the revival of Romanicism.

## V.

### CAUSES.

<sup>In general.</sup> § 45. A discussion of Pessimism would not be complete without advertence to its causes. A thorough analysis is difficult and would embrace elements too minute and varying for place in the present dissertation.

Peculiarity of temperament, manifold circumstances of life, fill the soul with sad thoughts and gloomy forebodings. Three principle sources, however, can be indicated.

§ 46. (a) Philosophical: To this head are reduced the systems of Buddhism, of Schopenhauer and of Hartman. The Pessimism which they teach is the logical result of the attempt to explain the system of the universe. The principles are false; they spring from a false theory of knowledge, and lead to a kind of Pantheistic Nihilism.

§ 47. (b) Ethical: A false theory of life leaves an imprint in the form of Pessimism. This is especially true of Hedonism, the recent aspect of ancient Epicureanism. Kant taught that happiness conceived as enjoyment can never be reached.\* History is replete with proofs of this statement. Individual experience tells that pleasure is an empty mirage which leaves the toil-stained seeker sad and disconsolate. A higher motive should rule our acts. There is a moral order and a moral law universal and imperative to which the individual must conform, very frequently at the loss of pleasure or enjoyment. If we sought pleasure only, why struggle against temptation, why row against a strong contrary current? Only thus is life's prize won, is character formed and men stirred to high and heroic deeds. Pleasure enervates and softens manhood, lowers the standard of action, kills earnest endeavor and leaves the devotee a prey to scepticism, weariness and disgust.\*\*

§ 48. (c) Religious: Finally, Pessimism may be traced to a denial of a good and just God. Around this truth are clustered the religious and philosophic

\* Sully, *Pessimism*, p. 67.

\*\* Royce, *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, B. I, ch. V.

beliefs which alone give to life a reason and a moral worth, and explain the facts of suffering or of death. Hope rests upon faith. Remove this and all the progress of modern science in vain can comfort the sad and unhappy soul. Life becomes an enigma, with only its human and sorrowful side apparent. The only recourse is had in a scientific Meliorism which is a vain dream or the shadow of Pessimism."<sup>20</sup>

§ 49. Christian faith alone transforms life and sheds over the lowest and most sad the soft, warm sunlight of its teaching. Virtue can reign in the lowliest hamlet, vice may run riot upon a throne. The goods and ills of life are powerless to alter our worth and dignity; they only serve to render it more conspicuous.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>20</sup> Metman, *Le Pessimisme Moderne*, pp. 319, 358.

<sup>21</sup> Mgr. Gay, *Christian Life and Virtues*.

## CHAPTER XV.

### EVIL.

§ 1. The existence of evil is a startling fact in individual experience. When in moments of silent meditation we look into our souls, we trace there scars of repented sins or festering sores of evil habits. The injustice and malice of men, however much we may battle against the conviction, takes deep root in the mind, fills the imagination and hangs over our waking lives like a dark and heavy pall. The actions of others are carefully examined, or their biographies are read, and the same tale of physical or mental suffering is told. The history of man confirms our judgment and exhibits sorrow, suffering and misery. Our own convictions are read in the physical and animal world. Evil everywhere exists; life itself is conditioned by pain. In face of these facts how can man admit the existence of a good and merciful God?

#### I.

##### THE PROBLEM.

§ 2. The existence of evil, we are told, is widespread. It is found in inanimate and animate creation, in animals as also in man. It assumes different aspects, nor is it always of the same force. To be thoroughly treated, the problem should be made definite.

§ 3. Evil is the antithesis of good. To understand its nature we must first obtain a clear notion of what is meant by good. The idea of goodness is fundamental. It enters into the thought of every conscious mind; it is applied to a great variety of objects, and

what is the  
good.

finds expression in some of the most beautiful passages in literature. Nevertheless the notion is not easy to define. The important part it plays in our rational life, its intimate relation with the ideas of the true and beautiful, its moral influence on what is highest and noblest, as well as on what is lowest and base, its connection with the generous, the selfish and the æsthetic emotions, are apt to suggest a superficial or partial and erroneous conception. The atmosphere in which we live, the manner of viewing persons and events, the value of life itself are in danger of perversion. They hinge on what we hold to be good. Human nature in the past has sought the good and will seek it in the future.

implies a  
relation  
based on  
objective  
facts.

§ 4. Goodness is an abstract noun formed from the adjective "good." In its primary and concrete signification, therefore, it denotes a quality or attribute of things. Further analysis shows that the attribute or quality which inclines us to call an object good, is not conceived as something absolute. The idea of good, as well as of truth and of beauty, implies a relation. In the good, the object appeals to the will; in the true, to the mind; in the beautiful, to the æsthetic sense. The relation is, however, not purely logical; it has a real objective basis in external objects.

a subjective  
and objec-  
tive ele-  
ment in the  
notion of  
goodness.

§ 5. Thus the concept of the good contains a subjective and an objective element. The objective element is the quality or attribute inherent in the object; the subjective element is the peculiar relation to the will or desire. The objective element is conceived as fundamental; the subjective as constitutive; both combined form the complete and correct notion. This enables us to understand how it is that writers present conflicting views in the analysis of the good. Some laying stress on the objective element alone, identify

goodness with perfection. It is true, perfection is contained in the concept of goodness. Hence what is perfect is good. Thus, e. g., God, the most perfect being, is the highest good. Nevertheless over and above the element of perfection, the notion of goodness exhibits a relation to the will which is its characteristic mark. Thus Aristotle,<sup>1</sup> St. Thomas,<sup>2</sup> and Cicero,<sup>3</sup> describe the good as that which is desired or sought by all. Others viewing the subjective to the exclusion of the objective element have been led to treat of the good as a sentiment, beautiful in itself, but possessing no reality save as the projection of our hopes and tastes. To the consistent followers of Kant the good is purely subjective. What is objective is beyond the reach of the mind. The supremacy of the will, upon which Kant so strongly insists in his Critic of Judgment, is nothing more than the dictum of the individual. The logical outcome of his teaching finds historic illustration in the sentimentalism of Jacobi and Schleiermacher, in the æsthetic idealism of Fichte and the Neo-Kantians.

§ 6. Finally, some recognize the subjective and the objective elements, but, forgetful that the will for <sup>goodness, utility, pleasure.</sup> divers reasons seeks an object apprehended as good, confound goodness with utility or pleasure. Thus we have the school of Utilitarianism proposed by Bentley and both Mills, and the ancient theory of the Epicureans reappearing under the modern form of Hedonism.

<sup>1</sup> Ethics, I. I. c. I.

<sup>2</sup> C. Gent. I. I. ch. 37; S. Theol. p. I, q. 5, a. I. 3, 5, 6; q. 48.

<sup>3</sup> I; q. 60, a. I, 21.

<sup>3</sup> De Finibus, I. I.

## II.

## IN THE MATERIAL WORLD.

principal of finality. § 7. In a preceding chapter the problem of the Final Cause was fully discussed. The conclusion established beyond question was that ends and purposes exist in creation. An examination into our inner life shows that every waking moment is filled with an object in view which guides and controls our thoughts, affections and actions. The explanation is found in the constitution of our nature. The two great faculties of the soul are mind and will. A rational act springs from their harmonious union. The mind points out the way and furnishes the motives of action. The will imparts the moving power by which the act is put into execution. To act with a motive is a sign and proof of rational life. Now motive is the reason why our acts combine in a special line for a fixed object; nay, more, it is the reason why we act at all. In this way our actions are clothed with a purpose and the principle of finality rules over our conscious existence.

in man  
in nature. § 8. The same conclusion is forced upon the mind from the consideration of external nature. Ends are everywhere found, and ends suppose and demand purposes. The knowledge of the laws which hold sway in the external world is obtained from the study of the physical sciences. Pick up whatever branch of science you will, there is always found something in the language or tone of thought which reveals the universal sway of purpose. As in a concerted and well-developed course of human action the individual acts conspire and combine under intelligent guidance to form one harmonious and efficient whole, so in the world without. The individual objects have a special position in

the scheme of things and a definite function to perform. They bear definite relations to one another, act and interact according to determined and determinable laws, thus constituting a closely joined, compact and connected whole. Thus we speak of the system of nature, distinguish grades of existences in creation, and call the universe a divine fabrication.\*

§ 9. Some modern writers strongly maintain that the physical view of nature is in direct opposition to the religious. By the former they understand the mechanical view; by the latter the teleological. In a former chapter the question has been discussed, and shown to be not in accord with truth. The error is due to a confusion of terms occasioned by a narrow frame of mind. The confusion disappears as soon as the meaning and sphere of both are defined. The mechanical view represents the world as resulting from the interaction of physical agencies; the teleological as controlled by purposes, whether great or small. By insisting exclusively upon either we are led into error and become one-sided and exaggerated. The truth lies in the harmonious union of both.\*

§ 10. Two theories conflict only when they give different explanations of the same thing viewed under the same aspect. There is no conflict when they strive to account for different things or are concerned with different aspects of the same thing. Thus, e.g., Physiology and Anatomy treat of the human body. They

\* "There are harmonies in the works of God beyond painter's pencil and poet's pen, falling upon the soul with a more melodious rhythm and a sweeter cadence than the most exquisite music." McCosh, Method of Divine Government, p. 135.

"This chapter may present some considerations in answer to the difficulties felt and expressed by Prof. Royce in The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, B. II, ch. I. The line of thought is a development of the Design-Argument which is thus shown not to be "a halting half-Theism." Ib., p. 279.

are different sciences, yet do not run counter to each other. Physiology treats of the functions of the living body; Anatomy of the structure of the inanimate frame. In like manner Psychology discusses the nature and activity of the human soul, yet does not deny that the process of digestion is carried on according to chemical laws.

mechanical theory concerns the means, finality the end or purpose.

§ 11. The present difficulty is solved in an analogous manner. The mechanical view of the universe is concerned only with the means or laws of the world-order; the teleological with the purpose of these laws or with the order itself. That I have a purpose to accomplish supposes the existence of means through which only it can be worked out. The means vary according to the nature of the end desired. Thus I make use of my own words, actions and conduct, or employ the influence of friends to secure employment for myself or for others. Again, in building a house I use stone, brick, cement, wood, according to the principles set forth in the science of Architecture. Take, e.g., the department of Mechanics. In the steam engine, in hydraulics I combine known laws of nature to work out my own purposes. Every day man's dominion over the physical forces is widening. Are these wonderful machines and devices less the proof of definite purposes simply because natural forces and material are the means employed? The mind of man controls and guides physical elements to carry out his own designs. In the daily life of the humblest artisan or mechanic we find abundant illustration of the manner in which the mechanical and teleological views of the world work in harmonious accord. Traces of mind working behind and through phenomena, prevail throughout the universe. The very existence of the marvelous world-order is a striking proof. The purposes of the divine

mind are carried out through mechanical and physical agencies. In the divine government both views coalesce into a grand harmonious unity. The fact that throughout nature ends and purposes are everywhere visible is not only a truth of modern science, it is a fundamental principle of Scholastic Philosophy. Both are in full accord and this unity of teaching prepares the way for a deeper insight into a truth involved in the fact and springing from it.

§ 12. The existence of ends supposes the existence of tendencies. Thus we speak of an object tending to an end. The tendency is a quality or property inherent in the object by which it passes from a state of rest into activity or varies its form of activity in the pursuit of the thing sought. A tendency, therefore, is a power of activity which an object possesses. To speak of an object without a tendency of some kind is to go contrary to all known experience. For tendency is of the nature of a thing, and to affirm that a thing is without a tendency is equivalent to say that it has no concrete existence.

§ 13. Tendencies spring from the nature of a thing. Therefore things of a different nature possess different tendencies. A superficial knowledge even of the various sciences brings this home to our minds. The forces of nature, energy of whatsoever kind, human activity, are classed under the common name of tendencies. For our present purpose we may distinguish two divisions only: natural and rational. Natural tendencies embrace the forces which prevail throughout inanimate creation. The knowledge is found in the physical sciences. Their nature and modes of operation become the subject of study and experiment. Thus we formulate the laws of their interaction, e. g., of attraction, in virtue of which the myriad bodies of the universe

hold their appointed round and a harmonious unison prevails. Or we express chemical affinities and proportions according to which molecules show special inclinations to one another so as to form special compounds, *e. g.*, H<sub>2</sub>O shows how strong is the affinity of oxygen to combine with two parts of hydrogen, thus forming the natural element of water. The study of physical nature is a concerted effort to investigate the properties of bodies and to express them in a scientific formula. With every discovery or advance in science, the knowledge of the qualities or properties of things acquires a corresponding increase. But the properties of bodies are nothing more or less than their tendencies or inclinations. By reason of these properties bodies have definite forms of activity and definite inclinations to the objects which make up the environment.

rational tendencies.

§ 14. Rational tendencies are the activities of human nature. The soul of man has two great potencies or powers; intelligence and will. The will is the source and controlling power of human action. The intelligence ministers to our activity in so far as it shows the will what to do and furnishes motives of action. The rational will is characteristic of human nature and makes it distinct from lower creation. Beings in the scale of existence below man act by a necessity of nature; in given circumstances they cannot help acting, and we are enabled with mathematical precision to calculate the direction and intensity of the act. Man alone acts from free-choice, and in acting he is guided by the intellect which supplies motives either for acting or for abstaining from action, or for doing the opposite. The will seeks what the intellect apprehends as good. This good excites the desire, which in turn arouses our activity and thus takes on the character of a final cause. The nature of the rational

tendency will be analyzed further on; at present the problem concerns natural activities and inclinations.\*

§ 15. A study of the natural tendencies reveals the existence of ends everywhere in the world about us. Objects have definite inclinations to one another. The near presence of an object arouses another to act. Thus we explain the marvelous combination of activities in inanimate as well as in animate nature; e., g., the phenomena of growth. The mutual interaction everywhere visible is for the mutual perfecting of the objects concerned. The object sought perfects the object seeking, just as this in turn is perfected by the possession of that to which it tends.

§ 16. What impresses the student of nature is the definite subordination of activities. One object leads to another, which in turn ministers to another in the various spheres of physical science. Natural tendencies are the means by which one object acts upon and perfects another, just as this object is conceived as the source or cause arousing the activity or tendency. If this object were not present there would be no motion or tendency; only a potency to action or an inclination to act which would lie dormant owing to the absence of a moving cause. Thus is opened up to the mind the notion and function of the final cause, as an object which arouses the dormant energy or potency of another and becomes the end of the other's activity.

§ 17. We are thus led on to a further consideration. Objects do not act upon one another at haphazard. There are definite tendencies to definite ends. The marvelous order in the universe and the harmony

\* This enables the student to understand the meaning of "appetitus naturalis, sensitivus, rationalis" so frequent in Scholastic Philosophy.

which reigns throughout can only thus be explained. There are determined relations and tendencies. The reason must be sought in the nature of the things themselves.'

tendencies reveal mutual fitness

hence the notion of goodness.

§ 18. Tendencies suppose a natural fitness or agreement between things. An object seeks another in so far as it perfects the other in some way. Thus the analysis of inclinations reveals the fitness or agreement of things. But fitness and agreement shows the idea and existence of goodness. We have seen that the notion of goodness implies a perfection or quality in an object which arouses the activity of the agent, fits into its natural constitution and perfects it either in being or in activity. Whatever, therefore, possesses a fitness for the agent in the sense that it excites to action and perfects the agent in any way is said to be good.<sup>1</sup> Now this is the object of every natural tendency. From this it follows that good is coexistent with tendencies; it is their reason and explanation. But tendencies are universal throughout nature; therefore goodness holds universal sway.

goodness a universal and fundamental element in nature.

§ 19. The existence of goodness as a fundamental, universal element in nature is the necessary consequence of the argument from design.<sup>2</sup> The universe is a vast system of beings different in nature joined one to another and forming a harmonious whole. One object ministers to another so as to constitute a compact well-connected unity. The tendencies or natural inclinations are the means employed by the Divine Architect to connect being to being. These inclinations are potencies possessed by every

<sup>1</sup> Urraburu, *Ontolog. Disp.* 7, c. 3, a. 2.

<sup>2</sup> "Bonum habet rationem causae finalis." St. Thomas, 1. q. 5, a. 2, ad. 1; "verum est in anima sed bonum in rebus," 1. q. 16, a. 1.

Card. Satolli, *de Deo*, q. 5, a. 4.

object; they only become activities through some external and exciting or moving cause. The reason why an object moves or arouses another from a state of potency to action is because it possesses a quality which perfects and is fitting to the nature of the agent. Now the possession by a being of a quality which draws another being to it as to an end and perfects that being is what constitutes the notion of goodness. Thus an intimate analysis of the world-order shows that goodness is the basal element; it is a part of its very constitution and its reign is universal and supreme.

### III.

#### IN HUMAN LIFE.

§ 20. The existence of evil in human life is a problem much more interesting and difficult. Its closeness to our daily lives, its apparent contradiction to the fundamental desire of happiness, make it a part of our conscious selves. It enters into every philosophical treatise which proposes to explain the mysteries of our being. Many theories have been advanced differing in point of view and in the strength of reasoning. The true solution is found in the profound study of man's nature. Thus Kant and Fichte viewed the problem from an ethical standpoint.<sup>10</sup> The aim is true but the exposition is vitiated by an erroneous philosophy.

§ 21. The purpose is not to trace the development of the question in the past. That pertains to the History of Philosophy. Its present phases are of more vital importance. They naturally spring from the

<sup>10</sup> So also Brown in Phil. of Human Mind, Lect. 93; cf. McCosh, Method of Divine Government, p. 32; Sully, Pessimism, p. 68.

ethical theories of life. What concerns us at present, therefore, is to investigate the standard and value of human life.

### *1°. Hedonist Theory.*

**Hedonism.** § 22. Hedonism is the theory of those who teach that pleasure is the end of conduct and the criterion of morality. Set forth in persuasive language by Epicurus, it deeply influenced ancient Greek and Roman civilization.<sup>11</sup> Proposed in our own times by men of great authority it has reappeared under a new name as a philosophy of moral conduct.<sup>12</sup> Its various phases permit a wide scope of human activity. Thus there are intellectual, æsthetic and sensuous pleasures. The consistent Hedonist, therefore, may be an apostle of intellectual culture,<sup>13</sup> a lover of the beautiful, or a seeker of sensuous gratification. These forms do not appear separated by a rigid line of demarkation. History shows that they inevitably run one into the other. The influences of a Christian environment, the natural promptings of a noble soul may preserve the individual from contamination. But there is nothing in the theory itself which restricts to one class of pleasures only, which forbids the disciple from seeking pleasure in the full realization of all his desires. Its legitimate consequences are seen in a pessimistic tone of thought,<sup>14</sup> in the drama and novel of modern sensualism.<sup>15</sup>

**criticism.** § 23. (1) The theory of Hedonism is subjective. As such it is variable. What pleases one does not always please another. Hence there is no stable

<sup>11</sup> Cicero, *de Fin.* I, 9; II, 3; *Tuscul.* III, 18.

<sup>12</sup> Bentham, *Principles of Morals and Legislation*, vol. I, p. 1; Hodgson, *Theory of Practice*, vol. II, ch. 2.

<sup>13</sup> E. g., Marius the Epicurean, cf. James Seth, *Ethical Principles*.

<sup>14</sup> Royce, *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, B. I, ch. V.

<sup>15</sup> W. S. Lilly, *The Great Enigma*, p. 65.

foundation for human conduct. But this is contrary to the testimony of consciousness and is contradicted by the universal practice of human legislation. An examination of our inner life shows that conduct is not governed by mere subjective desire. There is a constraining power over our acts which cannot be explained by the subjective constitution of the individual alone. Else whence the remorse and sorrow which follow evil deeds, the approbation and peace in the soul of the righteous? Conscience, the guide, witness and judge of our life, is the voice of a law outside and beyond us. Everywhere legislation is controlled by a principle which supposes an objective moral order. The existence, therefore, of an objective rule and guide of morality is a complete refutation of the theory of pleasure.<sup>10</sup>

§ 24. (2) It is wrong to maintain that *pleasure* is the true and only meaning of *good*. The good is the object of our desire inasmuch as its possession perfects our nature.<sup>11</sup> But in seeking our own perfection we often undergo suffering. Thus, e. g., a physician gives bitter medicine, or performs a painful operation in order that health be restored or life saved. Again, I undertake excruciating mental labor, or face trials and death on the battlefield. My efforts are by no means the dictates of pleasure; they are accompanied by pain, disappointment and bodily suffering. Yet they are a good. Thus all through life I seek the *good*, in seeking it I acquire *virtue*, and I acquire virtue at the dictates of *duty*. Where, then, are these words in the vocabulary of the Hedonist and what is their

<sup>10</sup> W. S. Lilly, Right and Wrong, ch. III; J. Ming, S. J., Data of Modern Ethics, ch. IV; H. Meyer, S. J., *Institutiones Juris Naturalis*, ch. II.

<sup>11</sup> Walter Hill, S. J., Ethics, p. 17.

meaning? Whether it pleases or not heroism is a noble thing!"<sup>18</sup>

(a) conse-  
quences.

§ 25. (3) That Hedonism is not the true theory of moral life is shown by its consequences. These are two-fold: (a) It has fostered what is base and ignoble in our nature. The consistent seeker of pleasure is not a great and good man. The higher springs of action are closed to him. He is his own end and the acquisition of pleasure is the aim of existence. Hence the development of a supreme selfishness.<sup>19</sup> (b) The weakness of Hedonism gave rise to another school of morals. This, in the hands of Mill, is called by the term Utilitarianism. It is an attempt at an improvement by the introduction of the element, Altruism. A critical examination, therefore, demands our attention."<sup>20</sup>

(a) selfish-  
ness and  
disgust.

(b) Utili-  
tarianism.

its principle:  
The greatest  
good for  
the greatest  
number.

§ 26. John Stuart Mill, a disciple of Bentham, recognized the weakness of his master's position and attempted to strengthen it by supplying the defect. To him it is not the individual good which is the standard of conduct, but the greatest possible good for the greatest number. He is thus the parent of the altruistic spirit which pervades modern ethical literature.<sup>21</sup> In teaching that pleasure should be estimated by quality as well as quantity he departs from Bentham. He admits that pleasure is not a principle

<sup>18</sup> Janet, *Theory of Morals*, pp. 11, 122.

<sup>19</sup> Tennyson, *The Palace of Art*. A good negative criticism is given by Prof. Royce, in *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, B. I, ch. VII.

<sup>20</sup> Plato, *Philebus* and *Republic*, B. IX; Lecky, *European Morals*, vol. I, ch. I; Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*, vol. II; Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics*, B. I., c. 4; IV, c. I; Muirhead, *The Elements of Ethics*, B. III, ch. I.

<sup>21</sup> John Stuart Mill, *Utilitarianism*; J. Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theories*, B. II, Br. I.

sufficient in itself, but that it is necessary to make a choice between pleasures. Hence the principle of utility."<sup>22</sup>

§ 27. In setting forth the basis of Utilitarianism, *i. e.*, the passage from individual to general pleasure, which gives rise to the fundamental principle, *e. g.*, the greatest good for the greatest number, its advocates separate into two schools, viz., Empirical and Intuitive. The former, with Mill<sup>23</sup> and Bain,<sup>24</sup> seek an empirical criterion for the quality of pleasure either in legislation with Hobbes or in the general estimate of mankind.<sup>25</sup> Hence the theory of Empirical Ethics. The latter, with Sidgwick,<sup>26</sup> teaches that we have an immediate faculty of rational intuition which informs us that the good of others is as desirable an end of conduct as our own happiness. Thus we have the theory of Intuitive Ethics.<sup>27</sup>

§ 28. Mr. Spencer in the Data of Ethics attempts a reconciliation of both schools by introducing the element of evolution. According to this doctrine the experience laboriously acquired by the individual is transmitted to succeeding generations.<sup>28</sup> In the course of time the store of accumulated wisdom increases and becomes the precious heritage of the past. Thus what is empirical with the race becomes intuitional with the individual;<sup>29</sup> the true basis for a reconciliation between Egoism and Altruism is found, and rational laws hold

two schools:  
Empirical and Intuitive.

Spencer attempts a reconciliation in his Evolutionary Ethics.

<sup>22</sup> Janet, Theory of Morals, p. 13.

<sup>23</sup> Utilitarianism.

<sup>24</sup> Bain, Moral Science, p. 27; Emotions and Will, p. 203.

<sup>25</sup> Th. Meyer, S. J., Institutiones Juris Naturalis, ch. III; Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, pp. 164, 165, 166.

<sup>26</sup> Methods of Ethics, p. 379.

<sup>27</sup> J. Dewey, Outlines of Ethics, p. 46 sq.

<sup>28</sup> In Germany Ernest Laas teaches the same doctrine. Pfleiderer, Phil. of Religion, p. 177.

<sup>29</sup> Ribot, English Psychology; Leslie Stephens, Science of Ethics.

sway instead of mere empirical calculations and rules. Hence the theory of Evolutionary Ethics which is a synthesis of the best elements in Hedonism, in Empirical and Intuitional Utilitarianism. Under the title of Scientific Meliorism, this theory finds able exponents in George Eliot and Mr. Sully.

**Criticism.** § 29. (1) Mr. Spencer's theory of Evolution is only a specious effort at reconciliation. In reality it leaves the difficulty unsolved. The teaching of moral growth by evolution is a pure assumption and is contradicted by facts. It is not true that primitive man was a savage, as the doctrine must assume. Comparative philology and historical investigation show that in the earliest known times man had ideas of religious and moral truth and expressed these ideas in language and institutions which show a high grade of intelligence. Again, how in this theory account for deteriorating nations and civilizations? Yet everywhere history points to facts of degeneration. That knowledge acquired by parents is transmitted by organic evolution is a statement advanced without proof. Genius is never thus evolved. The ethical value of our present civilization is not due to the law of evolution, but to the influence of Christian teaching.<sup>30</sup>

(2) Sidgwick's theory is false: moral good and evil do not depend on results of the act. § 30. (2) Mr. Sidgwick teaches that the results of the act are the only tests of its righteousness.<sup>31</sup> Moral good or evil, therefore, depends on the consequences of the act. If the consequences be good, the act is good; if the consequences be bad, the act is bad. But what then becomes of the distinction everywhere recognized between the acts of man and human acts? The former are acts performed by man when asleep or

<sup>30</sup> W. S. Lilly, *The Great Enigma*, 170, sq.; J. Ming, *S. J.*, *The Data of Modern Ethics*, ch. III.

<sup>31</sup> *Methods of Ethics*, B. I., c. IV; B. IV, c. I.

without consciousness; the latter are those which spring from mind and free-will. According to Mr. Sidgwick there is no moral distinction. Nevertheless there is a distinction and a very great one. It is found in motive and free-will which belong to the latter class only. Hence not consequences but motives and free-choice which antedate the act give to it a moral value. Only thus can we account for the moral laws of right and wrong. Finally, to make consequences the test of morality is to teach an impossible criterion. How can any one calculate the possible results of his acts?"

§ 31. (3) Just as Utilitarianism defeats Hedonism,<sup>(3)</sup> Hedonism and Utilitarianism refute each other. so does Hedonism overthrow Utilitarianism. The basis of Mr. Mill's teaching is utility. But utility is not a principle. The useful is what serves a purpose; hence a means to an end." Now to Utilitarianism, this end can only be pleasure. Yet it has been shown that pleasure cannot be an end.

§ 32. (4) Above pleasure and above utility there is <sup>(4)</sup> law of duty above the law of duty. Our inner consciousness bears witness to the fact. The dictates of this law must be obeyed. We know what is right and what is wrong. We are constrained to do the one and avoid the other, even at the sacrifice of earthly honors and possessions."<sup>5</sup> True, we can refuse to obey, but the refusal does not destroy the dictate of conscience; it ever abides, like Banquo's ghost, the avenger even of a secret wrong."

<sup>33</sup> T. R. Birks, First Principles of Moral Science, ch. III.

<sup>34</sup> Mr. Wallace contends that there is in nature a sense of right and wrong antecedent to and independent of utility. Cf. Natural Selection, p. 353; cf. also Forum, April, 1891 "Will Morality Survive Faith."

<sup>35</sup> Mallock, Is Life Worth Living, p. 47.

<sup>36</sup> Sophocles, Shakspere, Goethe, as Mr. Mallock justly observes, depict man struggling or failing to struggle after right. In Macbeth the impression left is not that Duncan shall sleep forever, but that Macbeth shall sleep no more; not the

*3°. The Theory of Christian Philosophy.*

*evil in animal life.* § 33. Christian Philosophy teaches that man is a rational animal. In common with the brute he has a complete animal nature. But over and above he possesses the characteristic endowment of intelligence and free-will. In discussing the nature and value of evil, it is necessary to clearly understand what part pain plays in animal life.

*the Animal kingdom.* § 34. Scientists speak of an animal Kingdom. The term is based upon and expresses the existence of order in the animal world. This order is constituted by the unity and harmony of tendencies. The animal has faculties of sense, e. g., sight, hearing, etc., which arouse tendencies of various kinds. In the exercise of these tendencies it seeks and acquires that which perfects its being. Animal tendencies can be reduced to two main classes; what conduces to the preservation of the individual and of the species. Besides the organs of sense, the animal possesses instinct. Instinct is a positive element and accompanies the operations of the senses. The study of instinct and of animal activity reveals another element in animal life, viz., the sanction of pleasure and of pain. The sensitive life of animals is the source and principle of their action. But in acting they have no reason to guide them. They have, however, the law of pleasure and of pain. Physical evil is the pain which results from the lesion of an organ. Physical good is the pleasure which follows the true satisfaction of animal tendencies. Thus animal pleasure is an instrument to preserve, just as animal pain is a natural means to restore the extinction of a dynasty, but the ruin of a character. In Measure for Measure and Faust, the struggle is centered in female chastity; this makes Isabella heroic, Margarite unfortunate. In Antigone the purpose is to live up to the enduring laws of God. Is Life Worth Living, p. 136.

*made up of tendencies.*

*tendencies are of two great classes.*

*sanction of pleasure and of pain.*

proper order."<sup>24</sup> The animal seeks pleasure and flies from pain. In so doing it conduces to the maintenance of order. The sensation of pain makes the sufferer seek to put an end to the pain. The cessation of pain is the cessation of organic disorder. To destroy pain is equivalent to the destruction of sensitive life, *i. e.*, the animal itself. Is not this fact the indication of wisdom? Cruelty does not consist in inflicting pain,<sup>meaning of cruelty.</sup> but in taking pleasure in causing suffering. There is no proof that God is cruel in the pains of animals. They alone do not make up animal existence. The pleasure derived from the exercise of tendencies form the main feature. Pain only enters in as a small part <sup>place of pain in animal life.</sup> of animal life, and even then its function is to restore the animal organism, to direct animal tendencies, so that pleasure may again prevail."<sup>25</sup>

§ 34a. Furthermore, in the observation of animal pain we are prone to exaggeration. We estimate the suffering by the standard of human sensibility. This is a radical error. The intensity of our suffering is due to <sup>(1) element of intelligence lacking.</sup> memory of the past, to provision of the future, to association with others."<sup>26</sup> But animals have no intelligence. The past and future do not accentuate their pain. Their suffering is confined to the present only. Finally, in limiting pain to the present, we do not take into account the difference of temperament. This difference has an important bearing on human pain, how much more so with the brute? Its nervous organization is not so delicate and sensitive as ours.<sup>(a) difference in nervous organization.</sup> That very fact lessens the keenness of their suffering.

<sup>24</sup> Mr. Mill admits this in *Essays on Religion*, pp. 190, 191.

<sup>25</sup> Bonniot, S. J., *Le Problème du mal*, b. III, ch. II; b. IV, ch. 5; Chadbourne, *Natural Theology*, p. 119.

<sup>26</sup> R. F. Clark, S. J., *The Existence of God*, ch. III.

Natural sympathy leads us, therefore, into a vital error."<sup>33</sup>

*good means  
not only  
pleasure,  
utility.* § 35. We have seen that the *good* admits of more than one meaning. It may signify *pleasure*, and on this meaning is based the theory of Hedonism. Or it may signify *utility*, whence arises the theory of Utilitarianism. The defect in these theories was shown to lie in the claim to be the supreme and sole guide of human conduct. But *good* has another meaning, viz., that, the possession of which, enables and perfects our nature in the highest and best possible manner.<sup>34</sup> This leads to the conception of the *highest good*, the *summum bonum*, "the discussion of which forms so important a place in the philosophy of Plato and of the Christian Fathers, especially St. Augustine."<sup>35</sup>

*The moral  
order.* § 36. Just as a physical order prevails in the material world, and an animal kingdom in animal nature, so there is a moral order in the world of man. With this difference, however, that man alone has the government and guidance of his own acts. Material bodies exert tendencies by a physical necessity; animals act in an analogous necessity governed by the feelings of pleasure and of pain; man alone possesses intelligence and free-will, by these he guides and becomes the responsible agent of his actions.

*conscience  
a witness  
to it.* § 37. But man is not independent in the sense that he is a law to himself. In the soul of every rational creature there is a hidden monitor which proclaims the ineradicable distinction between good and evil. Its dictates are part and parcel of our conscious selves.

<sup>33</sup> J. R. Illingworth, in *Lux Mundi*, The Problem of Pain; Prof. Bowne, Philosophy of Theism, p. 232.

<sup>34</sup> Franzelin, De Des Uno, p. 227.

<sup>35</sup> Hence the distinction in Philosophical manuals of *bonum delectabile*, *bonum utile*, *bonum honestum*.

"St. Augustine, de Beata Vita; De Mor. Eccles., I. 1, c. 3; I. 2, c. 1.

Its voice is ever heard in the deep silence of the soul, telling what we should do or what we should avoid, rewarding with the tone of approval or censuring with the pangs of remorse. The voice of conscience is the witness of a higher law which has its basis in God. Thus we have the conception of a moral order.

§ 38. By obedience to the dictates of this law man seeks the good. The possession of this good perfects his nature. Christian philosophy teaches that God is not only the basis of the moral law, but He is also the supreme and ultimate end of human conduct.<sup>43</sup> God is the basis of the moral law; the ultimate end of human conduct.

The life of Christ is an illustration of this truth. He everywhere proclaims that we must seek God above all things, that He alone is our true and ultimate good, and in possession of Him we shall be truly happy.<sup>44</sup> As a means to obtain this end, our highest good, He enforces the natural precepts of the moral law; sets them forth more clearly, and adds thereto the rules of Christian conduct. Thus revelation throws a flood of light upon our end and the means to obtain it. We see more plainly the nature and extent of our duties, what we should seek and what we should avoid.

§ 39. We are now enabled to investigate the nature of evil. In works of art, evil is a defect of aptitude, a defect in the application of the aptitude, a defect in the union of the aptitude with the destination. The destination determines the value of the work.<sup>45</sup> In works of nature and in the acts of man likewise, the destination determines the value. Evil, therefore, is whatever destroys the destination.<sup>46</sup> It is seated

<sup>43</sup> St. Augustine, *De Mor. Eccles.* I, 13; *de Civ. Dei*, XIX, 4; *Hill, Moral Phil.*, p. I, ch. I.

<sup>44</sup> "Secutio igitur Dei, beatitatis appetitus est; consecutio autem, ipsa beatitas." *Aug. de Mor. Eccl.* I, I, n. 18.

<sup>45</sup> Bonniot, S. J., *Le Problème du mal*, I. II, c. 3; St. Thomas, C. Gent, I. II, c. 4; I. IV, c. 7.

<sup>46</sup> This meets the contention of Prof. Knight that the

principally in the will, for by the possession of free determination man can seek or refuse to obtain his destiny. Evil, therefore, is a defect; it is the privation of a good demanded by the destination of a being. It supposes a positive subject. Of itself it is nothing, for all that exists is good in virtue of its reality. All that exists, however, is not perfect, *i. e.*, it has not all the reality it should have. The absence of that reality is the reason why a being that is good in virtue of what it has, is rendered evil by reason of what it has not, but should have. Now a being can be evil either in its constitution, or in its operations, or in its destination. Thus defects in the animal constitution of man render him an imperfect animal. They are not of necessity evils for *man*. The refusal of the will to obey the dictates of the moral law is the supreme evil. The moral order is thus destroyed. This evil is an imperfection of operation and results in the failure to reach his proper destination. Other evils in life may help the attainment of our last end; they are, therefore, evils only in a relative sense.

§ 40. Let us turn now to a study of man's nature. He is called a rational animal. Possessing a complete animal nature, he has also the distinctive properties of intellect and free-will. The life of man is essentially a development. In early years he appears only an animal; the signs of reason appear later on. As an animal the young child is governed by the animal law of pleasure and of pain. The cry of the infant indicates an organic need or disorder; it is thus a natural instrument for the preservation of life. With the dawn of reason he is under the sway of a higher law. Nevertheless all through life he retains his two-fold nature. As an animal he is subject to the inclination after argument from Design constrains us to admit a designer of evil. Aspects of Theism, p. 73.

a thing  
good by  
what it has,  
is evil by  
what it has  
not but  
should  
have.

The su-  
preme evil  
is in the  
refusal of  
will to obey  
moral law.

In child-  
hood law of  
pleasure  
and pain  
rules.

with dawn  
of reason  
comes  
knowledge  
of the  
moral law.

sensitive goods, as a rational being he is under obedience of a moral law which inclines to higher goods. The needs of food and clothing which when unsatisfied cause pain, are at the basis of all industrial progress.<sup>44</sup> The inclination to sensitive goods often comes in conflict with the dictates of the moral law. This conflict is called temptation. Thus, e. g., fear in presence of danger is a law of animal life. But if the moral law imposes an obligation to brave danger, e. g., in the discharge of duty, fear becomes a temptation. We should struggle against it and do what we ought to do. Thus temptation is the attraction of pleasure and the shunning of pain; and is due to the instinctive and passionate promptings of our animal nature. These movements are good in themselves, e. g., in the animal; they only become an evil in as far as they conflict with a higher law, e. g., the moral order. Hence good things may become an evil, just as evil things, i. e., pains, may become a good in as far as they are instruments for the preservation of order.

§ 41. The distinction can now be made between physical pain and moral evil. The one is not the other; they should not be confounded. Even in man physical pain is not of necessity an evil; it may be a natural instrument for the preservation of order.<sup>45</sup> Man still retains his animal nature. Ill deeds entail not only suffering of mind, e. g., remorse, shame, etc.; they also give rise to bodily pain. The mental suffering and bodily pain thus become natural signs of disorder or excess, and natural instruments for the restoration of the right order and harmony which should rule our

*conflict of  
the two  
standards.*

*physical  
pain and  
moral evil.*

*pain an  
instrument  
for preser-  
vation  
of right  
order.*

<sup>44</sup> Martineau, A Study of Religion, vol. I, p. 77.

<sup>45</sup> "Ut, quoniam bonorum inferiorum dulcedine decepti sumus, amaritudine poenarum erudiamur." Aug. De Vera Rel. XV.; cf. Fairbairn, The Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 2d ed. 1902, ch. IV.

pain an  
occasion  
for virtue.

pain shows  
the true  
value of  
life.

conclusion.

lives. Again, the anticipation of pain is often a preventative of evil acts and a stimulation to good. The knowledge that we shall suffer, if we do evil, is a strong motive to good. The factor of pain thus stretches out to the future as well as holds connection with the past.<sup>44</sup> Finally, pain helps in a higher manner. It presents occasions for actions which are the crown and glory of Christian manhood. The virtues of self-control, of self-sacrifice, of fortitude, of patience which enter into the formation of perfect character, blossom only in presence of suffering. Without these human action would lose its value, and virtue would degenerate into selfishness.<sup>45</sup> Suffering shows the value of life. It calls us to a consciousness of our destiny. It reminds us that we have not here an abiding dwelling-place. The thought of an immortal blessedness hallows and transforms our grief, just as the warm sun breaking through the rain clouds diffuses its soft warm light over nature, and makes the drops on flower and leaf sparkle like jewels.<sup>46</sup>

§ 42. A brief summary of the line of thought can now be made. Everywhere throughout nature tendencies are found. Tendencies are a proof of the final cause. The essence of the final cause is the good. Of necessity material and animal nature seek what is good. Thus the reign of goodness is universal and supreme. Man, however, is free in the guidance of his acts. He also seeks the good. But the truly good in human life is not found in pleasure nor in utility."

<sup>44</sup> J. J. Ming, S. J., *lib. cit.*, ch. VII; J. R. Illingworth, *The Problem of Pain*, in *Lux Mundi*.

<sup>45</sup> Lecky, *European Morals*, vol. I, p. 136; Seneca, *de Prov.*; *de Beata Vita XV*; Martineau, *A Study of Religion*, vol. I, p. 94; St. Aug., *De Vera Relig.* XV; Adv. Marc., l. II, ch. 14; *De Mor. Eccles.*, l. I, ch. VI.

<sup>46</sup> St. Paul, *To the Corinthians*, II, ch. IV.

<sup>47</sup> Mill's objection to God's goodness rests on ambiguity and

It is had in obedience to moral law enlightened by Christian faith. Thus moral order is preserved. If evil enters into human life, it is owing to the violation of order by free-will.<sup>14</sup> Pains are not an evil as such. They are natural instruments whereby sensitive beings are constrained to maintain order. As such they become subservient to good. In no way, therefore, can the existence of evil be ascribed to God. Creation viewed as His work proclaims His wisdom and goodness.<sup>15</sup>

§ 43. The doctrine is the teaching of Optimism. By this we do not mean to say that the present world is the best possible world. Leibnitz thought so because he felt the position necessary for the defense of the Christian concept of God. Such a theory, however, is not at all required and is in patent contradiction to daily experience. The optimism here set forth is not absolute, it is only relative. We do not teach that the world is made up of the best possible things and natures. God could have made us angels, instead of frail mortal human nature. We only proclaim the rule of order and harmony. Each individual, while not the best possible, is nevertheless best adapted by nature to minister to the wants and perfection of others. Throughout there is an adaptation of means to ends; all converging to declare and make manifest the glory of the Creator, to show forth His eternal wisdom, goodness and power.<sup>16</sup>

false meaning of the word "happiness." Cf. *Essay on Relig.*, p. 194; *Nature*, p. 65.

<sup>14</sup> "Catholica fides est: omne quod dicitur malum, aut peccatum, aut poenam peccati." St. Aug., *Lib. Imp. de Gen.*, ch. I.

<sup>15</sup> Thus St. Thomas sees in goodness the reason of creation. "Divina bonitas est ratio cur Deus velit alia a se," C. Gent., I, 86; and this is made the authoritative teaching of Catholic philosophy. Cf. *Concilium Vaticanum*, sess. III, cap. 2; St. Aug. *Confess.*, I XIII, ch. I.

<sup>16</sup> Rom. I, 20; St. Augustine, *De Vera Relig.*, n. 76.

## CHAPTER XVI.

### NATURAL AND SUPERNATURAL.

The problem

§ 1. A philosophy of Theism would not be complete without the discussion of a problem involved therein, on whose clear conception the scope and nature of the treatise depends. The meaning and sphere of the Natural and the Supernatural is a fundamental issue in any treatise on Natural or Revealed Religion. These words stand for something more or less definite in the mind of every thinking man. The ideas which they convey are as ancient and as widespread as the existence of religion itself. In our own times the great advance in knowledge and the use of modern methods in history and the physical sciences have inspired the effort to purge out the old leaven of error and superstition from the common heritage of man's highest convictions and beliefs. In this conflict the question of the Natural and the Supernatural has been one of the outposts most bitterly attacked and most tenaciously defended. It is wise, therefore, before entering upon the discussion, to carefully examine the ground, to weigh the resources at our command and to know the strength of the position.

#### I.

##### THEORY OF POSITIVISM.

The Agnostic view.

§ 2. Positivism as a system of philosophy arose in France under Auguste Comte about fifty years ago. Its influence upon modern thought has been wide and profound. Starting with a system of definite ideas, it gradually assimilated itself to a peculiar mental atmos-

phere of the places whither it was carried until at present it is distinguished rather as a tone of thought or a certain aspect of things than as a clear and systematic body of doctrine. Thus it is often confounded with Agnosticism and its adherents have been classed Agnostics. More frequently it has been claimed as the exclusive property of modern science, and, by a certain class of thinkers its subtle metaphysics has been spread broadcast as the well-ascertained conclusions of scientific research and experiment. For this reason the view of Positivism is often called the Agnostic or the scientific view.<sup>1</sup>

§ 3. Positivism teaches that direct observation of and experimentation on facts is the only method of knowledge. By facts is understood the phenomena which are grasped by the senses. Thus the only order of existence is the material. Beyond the material there is nothing. What is termed absolute and supersensible is merely the product of the fancy. Comte assures us that there is a striking resemblance between the childhood of the individual and of the race. Then the imagination holds complete sway; fable, not cold historic truth is attractive and the world is peopled with creations of childish wonder. This he calls the theological or imaginative stage and is illustrated in Fetichism, Polytheism, Monotheism. In reality there is no God, no angel, no soul. The man of science whose mind has been trained to investigate the positive facts of nature and of mankind looks back with a feeling of pleasure tinged with regret that he cannot believe as he did when a child, but must accept the cold, stern realities of life. He considers that these beings of fancy are good for children, but should have no place with full-grown men.

<sup>1</sup> Christian Philosophy — The Soul, ch. IV.

The super-natural.

§ 4. The supernatural, therefore, is a fiction of the mind, a sweet delusion,<sup>1</sup> a chimera, or a product of disordered reasoning.<sup>2</sup> The natural alone exists; it alone is the object of knowledge and by natural is understood physical nature. Physical science thus becomes the only aim of an intellectual man. To know nature is the sole and highest ambition. Not that this knowledge can lead to anything higher. Physical science shows man his true place in the world and furnishes what conduces to his real perfection as an individual and as a member of society. Thus the physical sciences lead up to Sociology, Comte's last and greatest effort. Man's well-being is to be obtained by physical means. He is purely an animal; Physiology is not different in nature from Psychology; and all human phenomena can be explained by the action of the environment upon the organism.<sup>3</sup>

Idea of humanity.

§ 5. Comte felt that the idea of God could not be wholly eradicated from the human mind by his principles. He invented a substitute which, much to the

"The rational attitude of a thinking mind towards the supernatural, whether in natural or revealed religion, is that of scepticism as distinguished from belief on the one hand and from atheism on the other." J. S. Mill, Essays on Religion, p. 242. With the result "that the whole domain of the supernatural is removed from the reign of Belief into that of simple Hope." Ib., p. 244.

"In many scientific treatises and in magazine articles we find the word supernatural used to designate what is at variance with or in violation of natural law." Duke of Argyll, Reign of Law, p. 5; Müller, Natural Religion, p. 119.

"The influence of this teaching upon English thought is very great. Thus the Duke of Argyll writes "The truth is that there is no such distinction between what we find in nature and what we are called upon to believe in Religion as that which men pretend to draw between the Natural and the Supernatural." Reign of Law, p. 50. And "Christianity does not call on us to believe in any exception to the universal prevalence and power of law." P. 51. Yet we find him teaching "The superhuman and in this sense the supernatural element, i. e., the ideal conformity and unity of conception, e. g., the vertebrate plan." P. 31. (cf. Author of "Natural Religion.")

discredit of his vaunted scientific method, is nothing more than a fiction of the mind. No such being as God exists, nevertheless he invented a God for his purpose. Man is the apex of the animal series, the highest product of nature. Now science shows and helps on the progress of mankind. This idea of human progress and development is uppermost in every mind and unifies by a common purpose the divine elements of struggling humanity. The idea of humanity thus becomes a center of unity for the followers of the new philosophy and is held up as an object of worship. The highest aim is the perfection of the race. Man should strive for this, should keep it ever in his thoughts, should hold it in reverence and homage. But the perfection of the race is accomplished by means of the physical sciences. Therefore the Natural is our only knowledge and our only possession. The Supernatural does not exist.

§ 6. (1) The fundamental error of this theory is the criticism. false doctrine concerning the scope and limits of human knowledge. The senses do not constitute the only channel through which we acquire truth. We are moral and intelligent beings. The existence of Ethics, of Metaphysics, of Theodicy as sciences show that the mind can grasp what is above and beyond sense. The possession of a spiritual nature, of higher faculties mark man out as distinguished from the brute. Intellect can never be degraded to the level of sense. It is the crown and the characteristic of human nature. A philosophy that ignores this is false to man's true dignity and must inevitably fail.

§ 7. (2) It is false to teach that the early history of nations can be compared to infancy in the sense that the contents of our beliefs are the mere creations of fancy, and possess no objective validity and give way

<sup>(1)</sup> False theory of knowledge.

<sup>(e)</sup> false basis.

to the maturer reflections of sober years. Historic research has shown that pure and noble truths were in the possession of mankind far back at the very dawn of time. Darkness of the understanding and weakness of the will may have obscured these truths for a time. They shine forth again with renewed splendor and are confirmed by the most laborious and exact scientific reasoning.\*

## II.

### THEORY OF PANTHEISM.

§ 8. By the natural, the Positivistic theory understands the physical world only. This lies within the scope of sense-experience, our only source of knowledge. What is beyond the range of sense does not exist. The supernatural, therefore, has no meaning and conveys no story any other than the product of childish or irrational fancy.

**doctrine.** § 9. To this the present theory presents a strange contrast. The Pantheist holds that there is no distinction between nature and God. The world about us is the emanation from or a manifestation of one divine substance. Whether the one reality be termed *substance* with Spinoza, or the *ego* with Fichte, or the *absolute* with Schelling, or the *idea* with Hegel, is of little practical moment. These are only different forms of presenting the same teaching.

**influence.** § 10. The influence of this school is not confined to writings strictly philosophical. It is found in poetry and in literature. Matthew Arnold, Carlyle, Wordsworth, Shelley in England, Emerson, Alcott and the Concord school in America disseminate its teachings. Modified somewhat by philosophic and scientific discussion, it is known to-day as the Neo-Kantian or Neo-

\* Christian Philosophy, p. 101 sq.

Hegelian system. The leading thinkers in England and America welcome it as a last recourse from a rampant materialistic scepticism. Nothing can happen in nature that contradicts or transcends its laws; nothing above nature, or contrary to nature, for the power of nature, is as infinite and unlimited as the power of God. There are no real miracles or supernatural occurrences, and the notion of miracle is only of subjective importance. The idea of miracle is based on ignorance of natural causes. For all God's operations follow necessarily from His nature as the properties of a triangle from its nature. Thus to Herder <sup>natural and super-natural</sup> revelation is not supernatural in its contents. Jacobi <sup>Herder.</sup> says God's existence is more evident and certain than our own and therefore requires no proof: our spiritual consciousness is for us directly transformed into a consciousness of God.\*

§ 11. Emerson teaches that the one eternal immanent being is the soul. It is the universal background of our own particular existence. He writes that "the currents of this Being circulates through me and I am part and parcel of God." Visible objects are merely projections of God, the web or clothing of the Soul.<sup>Emerson.</sup> It is everywhere manifest and everywhere the same.<sup>\*</sup> To Mr. Green there is one eternal divine substance. <sup>Green.</sup> This is the universal self-consciousness. He teaches that consciousness has a double character, unity and manifold. As a unity it is an end realizing itself in and through the manifold; as a manifold it is subject

\* Pfeifferer, *Philosophy of Religion*, vol. I, pp. 218, 229. The same teaching runs through the *Idea of God*, by J. Fiske, p. 109.

<sup>1</sup> To Goethe also the world is the woven and flowing garment which at once hid and manifested God's essence. Cf. Fairbairn, *The Place of Christ in Modern Theology*, p. 196. He taught that Spinoza was a Christian Theist. Ib.

<sup>\*</sup> Nature; Over-Soul; The Transcendentalist; Wood-Notes.

Royce.

to change, a means to an end. The consciousness of the individual is a manifestation of the one universal divine self-consciousness.<sup>9</sup> In our own country Dr. Royce is an ardent advocate of Pantheistic Idealism. To him the whole universe is nothing more or less than a system of ideas. All minds are in essence one, and the whole world of ideas constitute essentially one world with which each individual is identified.<sup>10</sup>

The logical inference is that the natural or the supernatural alone exists.

§ 12. The teaching of Pantheism on the problem of the Natural and the Supernatural is thus easily grasped. Pantheism assumes logically a Theistic or an Antitheistic form. In the latter there is no place for the Supernatural; the Natural alone exists. In the former there is no place for the Natural. If I am part and parcel of God, if my intelligence is a portion of the universal divine self-consciousness,<sup>11</sup> the word Natural is devoid of meaning.<sup>12</sup>

§ 13. Some modern writers on Theism accept this philosophy as a ground work. They speak of an intuition of the divine, of the divine idea in the consciousness, and draw therefrom a proof for the existence of God. The aim is to reconcile Hegel's philosophy with Christian belief. They forget, however, that the two are fundamentally opposed and to combine both is to sacrifice truth in the interests of an unnatural harmony. God is not the world, and the world is not God.

<sup>9</sup> T. H. Green, *Proleg. to Ethics*, p. 182; W. Fairbrother, *The Philosophy of T. H. Green*, p. 157; Pres. Schurman, *Belief in God*, p. 227.

<sup>10</sup> *Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, ch. XI.

<sup>11</sup> Spencer, *First Principles*, § 34.

<sup>12</sup> The Monistic development of this theory is seen in Pfleiderer and Lipsius. To them the natural and the supernatural are different sides of the same process. That which on the divine side is viewed as Revelation, is, on the human side, simply the development of man's moral and religious consciousness. Cf. Pfleiderer, *Phil. of Religion*, vol. IV, pp. 46, 94.

Human reason is a participation of the divine light," nevertheless a created thing. From the consideration of our mental life we may reason to God, but we do not see God in the mind, nor is our reason the possession of God in the sense that human and divine consciousness are in essence one and the same. We can understand how it is that men of devout religious nature should attempt a reconciliation. The criticism is that the peculiar frame-work of the philosophic system renders a reconciliation impossible. Their minds are prepared to accept truth and eagerly seek the truth. Through no conscious fault, however, they possess error and falsehood.

#### IV.

##### THEORY OF DR. BUSHNELL.

§ 14. Some forty years ago the Rev. Dr. Bushnell history. attempted a solution of the present problem in a work entitled "Nature and the Supernatural." The volume is interesting both for the novelty of the doctrine set forth and for the broad scope and apparently unbiased tone of thought. He recognizes that Natural and Supernatural are two different words in the English language, which have different meanings and admit of different application. Far from hedging or explaining away the difficulty, he boldly faces the task and broaches an explanation which was eagerly taken up by the religious world. Succeeding writers on the Theistic controversy accepted the theory as the simplest solution of an anxious problem. We find it permeating contemporaneous thought and broached by writers like Prof. Knight,<sup>13</sup> Dr. S. Harris,<sup>14</sup> Prof.

<sup>13</sup> St. Thomas, I, q. 84, a. 5.

<sup>14</sup> Aspects of Theism.

<sup>15</sup> Philosophic Basis of Theism.

Bascom,<sup>16</sup> Coleridge,<sup>17</sup> Noah Porter,<sup>18</sup> and Prof. Fraser.<sup>19</sup>

doctrine.

§ 15. To Dr. Bushnell the Natural is what is under the law of cause and effect. "Nature is that world of substance, whose laws are laws of cause and effect, and whose events transpire in orderly succession under those laws."<sup>20</sup> The supernatural is what is outside the range of cause and effect. It is "that range of substance, if any such there be, that acts upon the chain of cause and effect in nature from without the chain, producing, thus, results that by mere nature could not come to pass."<sup>21</sup>

human agency  
is super-  
natural.

§ 16. So much for the definitions. He then proceeds to illustrate and make clear his meaning. We, as powers of activity, are not in the line of cause and effect; we are free in our own choice of actions or of objects. The idea of our personality is therefore supernatural. The whole range of human agency over the powers of nature is supernatural.<sup>22</sup> Acts which spring from human liberty, *e. g.*, lifting a weight, criminal or artificial acts are supernatural.<sup>23</sup> Man stands out clear and sovereign as a being supernatural and his definition is that he is an original power acting not in the line of causality but from himself.<sup>24</sup>

not entirely  
however. § 17. Nevertheless, he continues, it is erroneous to think that man is wholly supernatural. In certain parts or departments of the soul, *e. g.*, memory, appetite, passion, attention, imagination, association, disposition, the will-power is held in contact with con-

<sup>16</sup> The New World, June, 1895, art. The Philosophical Basis of the Supernatural.

<sup>17</sup> Aids to Reflection.

<sup>18</sup> Science and Sentiment, p. 285.

<sup>19</sup> Philosophy of Theism, pp. 249, 255, 269.

<sup>20</sup> Nature and the Supernatural, p. 43.

<sup>21</sup> P. 45.

<sup>22</sup> P. 44.

<sup>23</sup> P. 51.

ditions and qualities that are partly dominated by laws of cause and effect. As far as they are concerned, man is pure nature. He is only a power superior to cause and effect at the particular point of volition where his liberty culminates, and where the ministration he is to maintain over his whole nature centers.<sup>44</sup> Hence all <sup>will is super-</sup>  
<sup>natural.</sup> the functions of the soul, will alone excepted, are nature.<sup>45</sup> Whatever is will, or is the effect of free agency is above nature. Thus true manly heroism is supernatural,<sup>46</sup> and character is supernatural.<sup>47</sup> All free agencies, the created and the uncreated, are, as being free, essentially supernatural in their agency.<sup>48</sup>

§ 18. (1) The advantages of the theory are at <sup>(1)</sup> criticism. first sight obvious. For this reason it has commended itself to many minds perplexed at difficulties which seemed to defy solution. By fixing the scope of the supernatural so as to include free action, whether created or uncreated, the truth of its existence was established beyond question. If my free choice, or the influence which I exert over the forces of nature are supernatural, then I am directly and immediately conscious that the supernatural is a reality. The sphere of miracles is likewise extended and I cannot gainsay their possibility. For, in this theory, miracles would not be specifically different from human action. Hence the truth of the miracle could be proved by showing the power of the will over inanimate nature.<sup>49</sup>

<sup>44</sup> Ib.

<sup>45</sup> Ib.

<sup>46</sup> P. 56.

<sup>47</sup> P. 57.

<sup>48</sup> P. 85. So also with John Stuart Mill. Nature means "not everything which happens, but only what takes place without the agency or without the voluntary and intentional agency of man." General Result, pp. 9, 64, on Nature. Dr. Momerie inclines to the same view. Basis of Belief, p. 14.

<sup>49</sup> This criticism is made by Mr. Lecky relative to the Duke of Argyll. Cf. Reign of Law, ch. I.

(s) not of  
real value.

(3) errone-  
ous.

§ 19. (2) The benefits obtained by the sacrifice of truth are only apparent. They are never lasting or of real value. The extension of the supernatural beyond just limits, the restriction of the scope of the natural, do not advance us a step nearer the solution. The distinction is confusing, and under severe analysis stands without warrant. According to Dr. Bushnell the natural embraces physical and animal nature. But why exempt man? Is he not within the limits of nature? And is not the will a natural endowment? In the exercise of voluntary action man is not transcending the sphere of his own nature.\*

#### IV.

#### THEORY OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.

its import-  
ance in  
Christian  
philosophy.

natural.

nature.

(s) cause of  
nature.

§ 20. The distinction between the Natural and the Supernatural is a cardinal one in Christian Theology. With the Incarnation of the Son of God and the fruits of the Redemption, the superabundant "riches of grace" and of "glory" were made manifest to men. In developing the teaching the Fathers of the Church made use of words and phrases best fitted to express with fullness and precision the meaning of these great truths. Thus in course of time certain words became crystallized in Catholic teaching, having borne through the fire of criticism the precious heritage of divine truth.

§ 21. "Natural" is that which belongs to nature. Supernatural is what is above nature. The whole discussion, therefore, centers on the meaning and scope of the word nature.

§ 22. The word Nature is employed in more than one sense. In poetic language and in Pantheistic teaching Nature is spoken of as the producing cause or

\* Dr. Fairbairn admitting the principles of Dr. Bushnell draws the following inference: "Nature is not rationally conceived when the supernatural is excluded, but only when it is viewed as standing in and through the supernatural, i.e., when Nature is conceived as constituted not by forces that can be measured or by energies that struggle for life, but by the thought which makes it and which finds it intelligible, that is, organizes and articulates it into a coherent and rational idea," The Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 2d ed., 1908, p. 56.

governor of the universe. Again, we are wont to ask what is the nature of such and such a fact or phenomenon. In this sense the word nature is used for essence and the answer we expect is supposed to indicate how the fact or phenomenon is constituted. Yet in strict philosophical language nature means more than essence. It signifies the essence of an object viewed as the principle or source of the activities which the object exercises.

§ 23. Viewing the term Nature in this latter sense, we can clearly perceive that Nature means (a) whatever pertains to the essence of a thing inasmuch as it is a constitutive part; (b) whatever is required for the specific perfection of a natural object; (c) whatever is within the scope and limits of an object acting according to the laws of its own intimate constitution. If we employ the term nature, not in an individual, but in a collective sense, then the Natural means whatever does not exceed the activities and exigency of the beings which go to make up our visible universe.\*

§ 24. With this firm in mind we can say that the Natural means (a) the material universe with its forces, as set forth in the Physical Sciences; (b) the organic world, the properties and activities of living bodies, as explained in Biology, Physiology, Anatomy, Zoology, etc.; (c) everything that pertains to the constitution of human nature, *i. e.*, not only bodily organism and life, but the higher powers of mind and of will as exposed in Psychology, the course of man's history on the earth, *e. g.*, Anthropology, the duties and relations to fellow-men in society, *e. g.*, Ethics, Sociology, Politics, etc. The powers of mind and of will, therefore, are natural. The knowledge we acquire by the use of our mental faculties, the power we exercise over our

\* Schrader, de Triplici Ordine.

fellow men, the creative products of genius, are within the scope and sphere of the natural."<sup>31</sup> Language justifies our exposition. We speak not only of *physical* nature or of *organic* nature with Dr. Bushnell, but we discourse about *human* nature. Thus the word *nature* in its collective sense, *i. e.*, the natural order, embraces the beings and activities of not one or two, but of the three great spheres of natural objects.

super-natural.

§ 25. The definition of Supernatural now is made very simple. It means whatever is beyond and above the scope and exigencies of nature. The word is employed to designate whatever belongs to the economy of divine grace. Thus revelation, sanctification, the light and strength we obtain in prayer through the merits of Christ are supernatural. Created nature by itself is unable to elicit supernatural acts; they are over and above its power; they depend on free gifts bestowed by God for our justification. Above nature, they nevertheless perfect nature by raising the soul to a participation of the uncreated life of God.

<sup>31</sup> "What man has ascertained by the unaided exercise of his own powers is termed natural." J. Dimon, *The Theistic Argument*, p. 22.

## CONCLUSION.

Thus the principles of sound philosophy show that our belief in God has a basis in fact. The data were drawn from our own nature and from the world without. They are the well-established results of the modern sciences. In reasoning from these facts, we pursue a course that cannot be questioned. The principles of reasoning employed are at the very foundation of thought. Falsely stated at times their truth comes out upon closer analysis.<sup>1</sup>

It is often urged that our conceptions of God represent Him as a human being. The difficulty is more specious than real. The explanation is found in the examination of our mental life. Composed of body and soul we are so constituted that sense impressions arouse thought, and that the mind in action expresses its thoughts by sense images. Thought and sensation are different, yet go together in our conscious lives. Thus abstract and immaterial concepts are expressed from the data of sense-experience. So we must express God from the content of our own knowledge. In representing Him we choose the highest symbols of our conscious experience. In the visible world man is the highest and noblest creature. God is therefore expressed after the analogy of man.<sup>2</sup> At

<sup>1</sup> It is not true, therefore, to hold that "theism is the fundamental postulate of our total life. It cannot be demonstrated without assumption, but it cannot be denied without wrecking all our interests . . . Strictly proved by nothing . . . implicit in everything." Prof. Bowne, in *Philosophy of Theism*, p. iv. This savors of Kant, ib., p. 32. In the same breath Prof. Knight calls God "the great postulate" and "the universal essence of all things." *Aspects of Theism*, p. 28.

<sup>2</sup> St. Aug. *De Gen. Contra Manich.*, l. I, n. 27; *Quaest. in Levit.* 93; *De Gen. ad Lit.*, l. VI, n. 20; Mr. Fiske admits this. *Idea of God*, p. 135.

the same time we are conscious that the expression is imperfect and insufficient. We confess that the limitations of our minds do not enable us to represent God as He really is and as we conceive Him to be.<sup>1</sup> Pure thought passes beyond the bounds of sense, yet in expression must make use of the data derived from sense. Thus viewed anthropomorphism presents no difficulty. We do not make God like ourselves.<sup>2</sup> We employ the highest figures we know and admit that they fall far short of the reality.<sup>3</sup>

The various proofs alleged in the preceding pages should not be viewed as separate and distinct. They coalesce into a unity. The various sciences represent each only a part of created nature. The universe in its entirety cannot be known from one alone. We do not confine our reasoning to one grade of existences nor to one kind of proof. All things come from God and all reveal the hand of their maker. But they do not reveal Him in the same manner.<sup>4</sup> The world of thought points to a foundation Truth; conscience and the moral order tell that He is just and righteous. The unity in the ever-changing multiplicity of external things show that one Being of intelligence and will is the cause of the wonderful adaptions we see about us, the reason of their conditioned dependent existence, and the sufficient cause for their movement.<sup>5</sup> The order

<sup>1</sup> St. Aug. *De Mor. Eccl.*, n. 17; *De Vera Relig.*, n. 99; *Confess.*, I. I, ch. IV; I. VII, ch. I; I. VI, ch. III. Yet Mr. Fiske tells us that the knell of anthropomorphic or Augustinian theism has already sounded. *Idea of God*, p. 134.

<sup>2</sup> Fiske, *Idea of God*, ch. VIII, develops this view; criticised by Prof. Knight, *Aspects of Theism*, pp. 129, 211.

<sup>3</sup> Theophilus of Antioch, *Ad Autolychum*, I, cap. IV.

<sup>4</sup> "Quod et rerum creatarum sit effector (Deus), et lumen cognoscendarum, et bonum agendarum; quod ab Illo nobis sit et principium naturae et veritas doctrinae et felicitas vitae." St. Aug. *De Civ. Dei*, I. VIII, ch. 9.

<sup>5</sup> Janet, *Traité Élémentaire*, p. 848

prevalent in the material, organic and human world reveals a Providence which guides all to their appointed end, and exerts a special care over man. The notion of goodness is obtained from the analysis of finality and is made more evident in the study of human life. Thus from a close study of nature we rise to the knowledge of a great and good God.\* Christian revelation takes these fundamental aspects and throws greater light upon them. God reveals Himself in His own divine Son.<sup>†</sup>

The purpose of this volume is to collect the scattered rays of light which flash in upon the mind from created nature and to show that they converge behind the world of sense in what the agnostic falsely calls the Great Unknown. God is and can be known. The soul instinctively rises to Him in prayer. The acquisition of modern knowledge does not lead us to throw aside the belief of childlike piety. A closer study of nature and of life grounds still deeper in the mind the truth learned when a child. In the sublime song of the Psalmist we may say "The heavens show forth the glory of God," or with St. Augustine, "Do not seek without; enter into thy own self; in the inner man dwelleth the truth."<sup>‡</sup>

\* Mr. Müller's criticism that the three famous arguments, Cosmological, Ontological and Teleological, have collapsed before the tribunal of Formal Logic, is by no means sound. *Physical Religion*, p. 240.

<sup>†</sup> St. Augustine, *De Lib. Arb.*, I. I, n. 5.

<sup>‡</sup> *De Vera Relig.* 27



## **APPENDIX I.**

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**CRITICISM OF THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS  
EXPERIENCE, BEING THE GIFFORD LEC-  
TURES OF 1901-1902, DELIVERED BY  
WILLIAM JAMES, PH.D., LL.D., AT  
THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURG.**



## APPENDIX I.

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In the Gifford Lectures of 1901-1902, Prof. James proposes to answer two questions: "What are the religious propensities?" and "What is their philosophical significance?" p. 4. The unexpected growth of the psychological matter, as the author tells us in the Preface, caused him to confine the Lectures to the first question. Hence the volume is entitled "The Varieties of Religious Experience." An exhaustive examination of the problem suggested by the second question is therefore deferred to a future work. However, toward the last, indications are given of the possible trend of thought to be developed in the promised philosophical treatise, and are of sufficient importance to call forth a passing word of criticism.

### I.

#### PRINCIPLES.

In the final chapter "Conclusions," Prof. James insists on the well-known fact, which is an abiding consciousness in every human life, that there is a struggle between our higher and our lower nature. "The Individual," he writes, "so far as he suffers from his wrongness and criticises it, is to that extent consciously beyond it and in at least possible touch with something higher, if anything higher exist. Along with the wrong part there is thus a better part of him, even

though it may be but a most helpless germ," p. 508. A result of this conflict is that "he becomes conscious that this higher part is conterminous and continuous with a *more* of the same quality, which is operative in the universe outside of him, and which he can keep in working touch with, and in a fashion get on board of and save himself when all his lower being has gone to pieces in the wreck," ib. Thus the nature of the "more" and our relation with it constitute the fundamental problem in the Philosophy of Religion. "The more, as we call it, and the meaning of our union with it, form the nucleus of our inquiry," p. 511. The "more" he designates by the name of God, and the reason given is that as "God is the natural appellation, for us Christians at least, for the supreme reality, so I will call this higher part of the universe by the name of God," p. 516.

In presenting a solution of the fundamental problem Prof. James appeals to the empirical method followed so closely throughout the work. The empirical method is also adopted by Dr. Royce in the Gifford Lectures, "The World and the Individual," and is closely adhered to in my present philosophical treatise on God. In accepting as a postulate the Phenomenal Idealism of Sensism Dr. Royce can find no real elements in the contents of conscious experience. What he calls the Real is simply the Ideal, and his theory is from its very beginnings a pure Idealism. My treatise differs from Prof. James, (a) in my contentions that there exists in man a substantial spiritual principle called the Soul, (b) and in the interpretation of the contents of conscious life as to their bearing on the existence of God. Dr. Royce explicitly rejects the "Soul;" Prof. James is not willing that the term "Soul" should be taken

"in the ontological sense," p. 195. Both, however, practically admit its existence. Dr. Royce by personifying the Idea, Prof. James by personifying the present state of consciousness, ib.

In working out the nature of the "more" and our "union" with it, by the empirical method, Prof. James makes a distinction between "the Conscious Self" and "the Subconscious Self." "Apart from all religious considerations, there is actually and literally more life in our total soul than we are at any time aware of," p. 511. The "Subconscious Self," he writes, "is now-a-days a well-accredited psychological entity," ib. And in it he finds "exactly the mediating term required," ib. With this by way of preamble he tentatively suggests the solution. "Let me then propose, as an hypothesis, that whatever it may be, on its *farther* side, the "more" with which in religious experience we feel ourselves connected is on its *higher* side the subconscious continuation of our conscious life," p. 512. Thus "we have in the fact that the conscious person is continuous with a wider self through which saving experiences come, a positive content of religious experience which, it seems to me, is literally and objectively true as far as it goes," p. 515. In explaining the "farther limits of this extension of our personality," he writes: "The further limits of our being plunge, it seems to me, into an altogether other dimension of existence from the sensible and merely understandable world. Name it the mystical region, or the supernatural region, whatever you choose." He, however, calls "this higher part of the universe by the name of God," because "God is the natural appellation, for the Christian at least, for the supreme reality," pp. 515, 516. This conclusion has no direct and rigid reference

to the material universe, "That the God, with whom, starting from the hither side of our own extra-marginal self, we come at its remote margin into commerce, should be the absolute world-ruler, is of course a very considerable over-belief," p. 518.

Such is the tentative philosophical hypothesis, briefly set forth, with the promise of detailed development in a future work.

## II.

### CRITICISM.

(1) The word Self is used in a wrong sense by Prof. James as well as by Dr. Royce and many modern writers on Psychology. In the exposition above given Prof. James makes his theory rest on the distinction between the Conscious Self and the Subconscious Self. This is a loose way of writing and philosophically is incorrect. In a former work I have outlined at some length the notion of the Self (*Christian Philosophy, The Soul*, pp. 71-76, 245-264); Prof. James would be more exact to speak of the conscious *states* and the subconscious *states* of the Self. Thus the Psychologists who write on the *normal Ego* and the *hysterical Ego* fall into the same error. If the words have any philosophical meaning, they only express the *normal* and the *hysterical states* of the Ego. Neither consciousness nor memory alone, nor both together, constitute the Self; they simply make us aware of our personal identity. Hence the intellectual life of the self cannot be restricted within the limits of consciousness and of memory, but stretches out beyond and includes a wider content. This is clearly shown in unconscious cerebration, in automatic action, in the

phenomena of forgetfulness, in hypnotic suggestion, in sleep and in delirium.

(2) Scholastic Philosophy expressly teaches that the human soul is a spiritual entity, which exerts activity in a twofold manner, *e. g.*, in mind and in will. These powers in our conscious life bear striking analogy to the centrifugal and centripetal forces of the material universe, to the functions of the afferent and the efferent nerves in the bodily organism. Furthermore, it teaches with St. Augustine that the mind is *actually* finite but *potentially* infinite, or with the oft-repeated dictum of St. Thomas "*mens fit quodam modo omnia.*" This marvelous power of the mind to reach out into the great unexplored realm of truth is a patent fact of conscious experience. "Our minds have the conception of God; we discourse of His infinity; of His mercy, and loving kindness; with awe we contemplate His majesty and spotless holiness. Yet I cannot see these notions with the eye, nor hear them with the ear, nor feel them with the hand. I may strive to picture them upon the imagination and confine them to color and to form, but like a bird they are away on the wings of thought far up into vast empirion of mind, and I sink back in failure. I may speak of them, but I do not exhaust their meaning; and to those who hear, the spoken word gives an insight into the mind's possibilities" (*Christian Philosophy, The Soul*, pp. 109, 110). The words of Prof. Tyndall on this subject are suggestive. "The domain of the senses in Nature is almost infinitely small in comparison with the vast region accessible to thought which lies beyond them. From a few observations of a comet, when it comes within the range of his telescope, an astronomer can calculate its path in regions

which no telescope can reach, and in like manner, by means of data furnished in the narrow world of the senses, we make ourselves at home in other and wider worlds, which can be traversed by the intellect alone" (Radiant Heat in Fragments of Science, cited ib. p. III).

(3) There is much that is to be accepted in the facts which Prof. James adduces, viz., that there is a realm of truth stretching out on every side which ever lightens up under the constant activity of mind, and successively reveals vast unknown expanse. These considerations have appealed to the greatest and deepest thinkers of the ages. In the chapter on Mental Life I have outlined this argument and called it the argument from the realm of Truth. Prof. James, however, in citing the existence of Truth, gives indications of a tendency toward Idealistic Pantheism. It would be a misfortune, indeed, after this beautiful study — by far his best and most suggestive work — if he should commit himself to a Pantheistic solution. To some minds Pantheism is enticing; it has a certain stimulating power; it lifts above the hard facts of severe thought and effort to the ideal, the vast, the infinite. If we do away with the Soul and regard mind as a "stream of consciousness," the very fact of the subconscious lighting up on one side into the present state of consciousness and on the other reaching out to be merged into the unconscious Beyond, leads only too readily to a Pantheistic identification of our own stream of consciousness with the great ocean on the unconscious which we may term God. Our minds have an intuition of Truth not of God, and the truth which we grasp is not continuous with God nor in its entirety is it to be confounded with God. But from the exist-

ence of truth throughout the universe we reason to its cause, its basis, its foundation which is God.

(4) Finally in the hypothesis suggested by Prof. James it is difficult to account for Personality and for Consciousness in God. For Personality is not Consciousness nor is it constituted by consciousness. So far as we can experimentally infer the "farther side" of the "more," which "on its *hither* side" is "the subconscious continuation of our conscious life," p. 512 is by no means conscious. What really takes place is that in the act of knowledge *we become conscious of it* as a realm of truth stretching out with the vast regions to be explored by the mind. Nor is *it*, i. e., the "more" a person or self, but in the same act of knowledge, some part of the "more" is appropriated by our own self and constitutes for the time being a particular *state* of our own personality.



## APPENDIX II.

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### CRITICISM OF

*The World and the Individual, being the Gifford Lectures of 1900-1901, delivered by Josiah Royce, Ph.D., LL.D., at the University of Aberdeen.*



## APPENDIX II.

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The most important contribution on the Metaphysics of Religion in recent years from the pen of an American writer is the publication of the Gifford Lectures delivered by Dr. Royce at the University of Aberdeen, entitled "The World and the Individual." In these lectures is set forth for the first time the system of constructive Idealism which has been taking shape in the mind of Dr. Royce since the publishing of his early philosophical essays some twenty years ago. The reader faces a theory of the Universe completely worked out and set forth with a wealth and vividness of language. In this the writer differs from Prof. James, whose more recently published Gifford Lectures contain the results of an analytical investigation of the elements which go to form a system with only a faint adumbration of the system at the close and the promise of exhaustive development in a future work.

### I.

#### CONCEPTIONS OF BEING.

Dr. Royce tells us that his Gifford Lectures are "a philosophical inquiry into first principles," and "an application of these first principles to problems that directly concern religion," vol. I, p. vii. By "first principles," he means the principles of Ontology, and he, therefore, calls his work a treatise on the Metaphysics of Religion. (Vol. I, Introduction.) To him

Religion must be studied "primarily as a body of ontological problems and opinions, in other words as, in its theory, a branch of the Theory of Being," vol. I, p. 11. Yet in the Introductory Lecture of the second volume, he takes the reader into his confidence by the assurance that science is "the field of empirically accredited facts," religion "the field of facts beyond the range of human experience." Therefore, "an Idealistic Theory of Being lies beyond all human experience," vol. II, 13; thus his Metaphysic becomes an Idealism, his Ontology an Ideology.

Closer and more detailed study places beyond doubt that this is the real value of Dr. Royce's contribution to the Philosophy of Religion. With the avowed purpose of discussing the Metaphysics of Religion he first of all proposes a Theory of Being. The Theory of Realism, of Mysticism, of Validity are criticised and set aside as defective.

**Realism.**—The Realistic conception of Being is "the typical notion of socially respectable conservatism, whenever such conservatism begins to use the speech of technical philosophy," vol. I, p. 91. Realism asserts "that to be real means to be independent of ideas, which, while other than a given real being, still relate to that being," vol. I, pp. 92, 62. Hence the world according to Realism is "a world of independent Beings," vol. I, p. 103. The Realistic conception of Being Dr. Royce rejects. (1) It "especially tends to sunder the *what* from the *that*, the essence from its existence," vol. I, p. 106. In other words it "sunders external and internal meaning; is exclusively external," vol. I, p. 75. Hence "its central technical difficulty is the nature of individuality and the naming of universals," vol. I, p. 76.

(2) With Realism "independence destroys linkages among beings, hence "the problem of the One and the Many proves to be the great test problem of realistic metaphysics," vol. I, p. 112.

(3) If the beings are "mutually independent," "the many entities of this realistic world have no features in common," and possess no "common characters," vol. I, pp. 127, 131. Therefore, "the realm of a consistent Realism is not the realm of One nor yet the realm of Many, it is the realm of absolutely nothing," vol. I, p. 137.

(4) Finally it is contradictory for "it asserts the mutual dependence of Knowing and of Being in the act of declaring Being independent," vol. I, p. 76.

**Mysticism.**—The mystical conception of Being is, to Dr. Royce's view, the opposite of the Realistic and must also be rejected. "The mystic asserts that the real cannot be wholly independent of knowledge \* \* \* that the reality of which you think and speak is first of all a reality meant by you \* \* \* that within you lies the sole motive to distinguish truth from error, reality from unreality, the world from the instant's passing contents," vol. I, p. 189. Hence with Mysticism "To be real means to be in such wise Immediate that, in presence of this immediacy, all thought and all ideas, absolutely satisfied, are quenched, so that the finite search ceases and the Other is no longer another, but is absolutely found," vol. I, p. 144. In this sense it differs from "common-sense Realism," which "makes the truth an independent Being, that is beyond our striving, in the sense of Being wholly apart from every knowledge which refers to it," vol. I, p. 173. Dr. Royce notes the unrest and aspirations of the human soul and holds that "Primarily in seeking Be-

ing, we seek what is to end our disquietude," vol. I, p. 154. Thus, "Being is once for all, to a finite thinker, at least in part, the Other that he seeks," vol. I, p. 148. The purpose of the mystic is the deliberate and conscious rejection, as something to be overcome, of "the common-sense antithesis between the immediate and the ideal, and between the real and the desirable," vol. I, p. 155. Hence Mysticism teaches that "to be means to quench thought in the presence of a final immediacy which completely satisfies all ideas," vol. I, p. 186. "Absolute immediacy" is attained "on the borders of unconsciousness when we are closest to dreamland slumber," vol. I, p. 168, and "to be possessed of absolute knowledge is to be unconscious," vol. I, p. 191.

Dr. Royce rejects the mystical conception of Being for the reason that it is partial and incomplete; its great fault is that like Realism it goes to an extreme but in an opposite direction. "The mystic in general knows only Internal Meanings, as the Realistic considers only External meanings," vol. I, p. 176.

**Being as Validity.**—The third conception of Being which Dr. Royce rejects is termed the Theory of Validity. It differs from the two preceding theories in its designation as a Transformed Realism. Thus "Being is that which is known, is found giving to ideas their validity, as that to which ideas ought to correspond," vol. I, p. 201. "To be real now means primarily, to be valid, to be true, to be in essence the standard for ideas," vol. I, p. 202. In this third conception, Reality is identified with Validity, for "what is Being then but the Validity of ideas," vol. I, p. 204. Dr. Royce calls this the theory of Critical Rationalism. "God is no longer a person. \* \* \* The impersonal con-

ceptions of a Righteous order of the universe remains," vol. I, p. 206. Thus this theory is found in the teaching of Aristotle, St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, and of Kant according to Dr. Royce, vol. I, pp. 227-239.

The defect of the third conception of Being is that it "consciously attempts to define the Real as explicitly and only the Universal," vol. I, p. 240, *i. e.*, "bare abstract universal and does not assert the individuality of Being," vol. I, p. 290. To be or to be valid means that an idea "has truth, defines an experience, that at least, as a mathematical ideal, and perhaps, as an empirical event, is determinately possible," vol. I, p. 227.

Thus in this sense real Being is possible Being, *i. e.*, Being "whose Reality lies in its Validity," vol. I, p. 233. A negative answer is given to the question, "Can there be two sorts of Being both known to us as valid but the one individual, the other universal, the one empirical, the other merely ideal, the one present, the other barely possible, the one a concrete life, the other a pure form," vol. I, p. 261. For these reasons Dr. Royce sets it aside for his own explanation which he calls the Fourth or the Synthetic Conception of Being.

## II.

### PRINCIPLES.

The method adopted by Dr. Royce in dealing with the problem of Reality is to view it "from the side of the means through which we are supposed to attain reality, *i. e.*, Ideas," vol. I, p. 19. The fundamental question, therefore, is the nature of the idea.

(1) To Dr. Royce "the idea is as much a volitional

process as it is an intellectual process," vol. I, p. 311. In fact "all our thinking is itself a process of willing," vol. I, p. 153. "A color seen, a brute noise heard is not an idea," vol. I, p. 24. Hence "the idea is a will seeking its own determination. It is nothing else," vol. I, p. 332. It "appears in consciousness as having the significance of an act of will," vol. I, p. 23. By way of illustration I am informed that "when I have an idea of the world, my idea is a will, and the world of my idea is simply my own will itself determinately embodied," vol. I, p. 327. In this sense he speaks of "the essentially teleological inner structure of conscious ideas," vol. I, p. 310.

(2) To make clearer and more explicit what he understands by the idea, Dr. Royce distinguishes the "Internal and External meanings" of ideas. Vol. II, Lect. III. By the Internal meaning he understands the "conscious inner purpose embodied in a given idea," by the External meaning "the embodiment" itself which as such is a part of sensitive experience, vol. I, p. 308, sq. To a superficial thinker there is a conflict between the external and the internal meaning. This is only apparent. Deeper down there is a harmony inasmuch as the external meaning is subordinated to the internal meaning. For the "external meaning must be interpreted not primarily in the sense of mere dependence upon the brute facts, but in terms of the inner purpose of the idea itself," vol. I, p. 33.

Hence the external meaning is only apparently external, and in very truth is but an aspect of the completely developed internal meaning," vol. I, p. 36. The contrast between the internal and external meanings is solved by "conscious selection," vol. I, p. 31, *i. e.*, by the "conscious inner purpose of the idea" selecting

its own partial embodiment or fulfillment. Thus in the idea, conscious selection plays a part analogous to that played by natural and sexual selection in the Darwinian hypothesis as to the development of the organic world.

On the distinction between internal and external meaning is based the theory of judgment. For "to judge is to bring the *what* into relation with the *that*," vol. I, p. 273, it "is to consider internal meanings with reference to external meanings," ib. By the *what* Dr. Royce understands "the abstractly universal," by the *that* "the individual," vol. I, p. 294.

(3) We are now prepared to understand what is meant by "the essential relation of idea and object." This is "the world-knot," vol. I, p. 431. By the "object" of the idea Dr. Royce does not mean the objective content of the idea, *i. e.*, the thing of which the idea is representation, but "the purpose of the idea." For the word object in the English language is susceptible of two meanings, *e. g.*, the subject-matter and the aim or purpose. As can be readily inferred from what has been said Dr. Royce so defines the idea "as not formally to presuppose the power of ideas to have cognitive relations to outer objects," vol. I, p. 20. For he tells his readers that "your intelligent ideas of things never consist of mere images of the things, but always involves a consciousness of how you propose to act toward the things of which you have ideas," and therefore "intelligent ideas belong, so to speak, to the motor side of your life rather than to the merely sensory," vol. I, p. 22. He admits that "the idea is a representation of a fact existent beyond itself," vol. I, p. 23. Yet maintains that "representative character is not the primary character, for "this is its inner character as relatively fulfilling a purpose," vol. I, p. 24.

Phrases as "fact beyond itself" and "object" are to be interpreted in terms of "purpose." For "the idea in seeking for its object is seeking for the determination of its own just now indeterminate will," vol. I, p. 333. "This further determination is given only in terms of experience," vol. I, p. 334. For "my conscious will as expressed in my ideas does logically determine what objects are my objects," ib. Hence "the object sought is simply the precise determination of this very will itself to unique and unambiguous expression. \* \* \* For the object is a true other, and yet it is object only as the meaning of this idea," vol. I, p. 331. Thus, "whatever the object, it is still the object for a given idea solely because that idea wills it to be such," ib. The determination of the object by the will he calls a "selection." "That an idea has an object depends, at least, in part upon this that the idea selects its object \* \* \* and this selection is manifested in consciousness by what is usually called attention," vol. I, p. 317. The relation of idea to object is "essentially the relation of a partial meaning to a totally express rational meaning," and "the relation of partial and total meaning is, at the same time, the relation of any finite will to the expression of the complete content of that same will," vol. I, p. 431.

(4) If we bear in mind that the idea is to be interpreted in terms of "purpose" and that "all our thinking is itself a process of willing" we may be able to grasp the peculiar meaning Dr. Royce attaches to the universal. "Ideas as they come to us in their finite imperfections are at first indeterminate, and for that very reason, vague, general, or as technical language often expresses it, abstractly universal," vol. I, p. 336. Hence "an universal, in the abstract sense of the term,

is known to us merely as that of which there might be another instance," ib. For, as shall be shown later on, the idea in seeking its own determination assumes more and more unique character.

(5) The transitions from the idea to Being and Reality, and the application of the one to the solution of the other is made very easy in the philosophy of Dr. Royce. For "the whole problem of the nature of Being is in the end a study of internal and external meanings," vol. I, p. 32. Hence "to be is to fulfill a purpose," vol. I, p. 335. The Being to which any idea refers is "simply the will of the idea more determinately, and also more completely expressed," vol. I, p. 353. The "purpose" of the idea, the "object" or "other" which it consciously seeks is, therefore, the constituent of Being and Reality. Thus, "our concept of Being implies that whatever is, is consciously known as the fulfillment of some idea," vol. I, p. 396. This knowledge is possessed either "by ourselves at this moment, or by a consciousness inclusive of our own," ib. That Dr. Royce proposes a theory of Idealistic Pantheism is evident from a careful study of the context, vol. I, pp. 397-400, and will be brought out clearly in the application of the theory to God and to the World. We have no immediate perception of the external world, vol. II, p. 159, nor have we "fundamental assurances," vol. II, pp. 70, 160. For the "idea" is "a conscious striving" and the "object" of the idea is the "purpose" which it consciously seeks. Matter is "mere appearance," vol. II, p. 213, and the fundamental principle of knowledge is that of "a vast conscious process," vol. II, pp. 226, 240.

In seeking its object "any idea whatever seeks absolutely nothing but its own explicit, and in the end

complete determination as this conscious purpose, embodied in this one way. The complete content of the idea's own purpose is the only object of which the idea can ever take note. This alone is the other that is sought," vol. I, p. 339.

In consulting experience "we are simply seeking aid in the undertaking to give our ideas a certain positive determination to *this content* and *no other*," vol. I, p. 297, but he adds that "we never reach that," ib. Hence "this individual determination itself remains, so far, the principle character of the Real, and is as an ideal, the Limit toward which we endlessly aim," vol. I, pp. 297, 446. The distinction of the Ideal and the Real involves no separation; at the basis they are identified. For "the Real is that which is *immediately beyond* the whole of our series of possible efforts to bring, by any process of finite experience and of merely general conceptions, our own internal meaning to a complete determination," vol. I, pp. 280-299.

Reality thus becomes "the goal of life's journey," vol. I, p. 188, and "what determines us to acknowledge as real a system of particular facts is the Ought," vol. II, p. 41.

If we bear in mind that the idea "selects" its own object, *i. e.*, purpose, and if "purpose" constitutes the Real, we can understand after some fashion what Dr. Royce means when he writes that Being is "a selection from abstractly possible contents," vol. I, p. 449, that "what is, is a selection from possibilities," ib., that "so long as you define mere universals (*i. e.*, vague, indeterminate strivings as they first come to us in their finite imperfections, vol. I, p. 336) mere general notions of things, you define neither the Being of objects nor the truth of ideas," vol. I, p. 452. The reason is that

"the essence of Being is to be individual," vol. I, p. 348, and the individual is due to "the selective character of every rational conscious process," vol. I, p. 449.

(6) The notion of Truth in the system of Dr. Royce, like the notions of Being and of Reality, follows naturally from the notion of the idea. To Him "truth is the adequate expression and development of the internal meaning of the idea itself," vol. I, p. 33. Ideas, therefore, "really possess truth or falsity only by virtue of their own selection of their task as ideas," vol. I, p. 32. And as ideas by "selection" constitute Reality and Being, so also "Being has to be that object which makes ideas true or false," vol. I, p. 349. An idea is false "unless that kind of identity in inner structure between ideas and object can be found which the specific purpose embodied in a given idea demands," vol. I, p. 306. Hence "it is not mere agreement, but intended agreement that constitutes truth," vol. I, p. 307. There is "no purely external criterion of truth," vol. I, p. 306, for the "sole motive to distinguish truth from error is within," vol. I, pp. 189, 308. "The embodied purpose, the internal meaning, of the instant's act is thus *a conditio sine qua non* for all external meaning and for all truth," vol. I, p. 311. In fact purpose is "the test of truthful correspondence of an idea to its object," vol. I, p. 306. We say that "this instant's idea is true, if in its own measure and on its own plan, it corresponds, even in its vagueness, to its own final and completely individual expression," vol. I, p. 339. In like manner the error of an idea "is always a failure to win the intended aim of the idea, precisely in so far as the idea sought truth," vol. I, p. 324.

## III.

## APPLICATION.

Thus in a brief outline, employing as far as possible his own words, I have endeavored to set forth the basal concepts of a philosophical system which has placed Dr. Royce the peer of metaphysical writers in America. These concepts are the *idea* and its *object*. On these his whole system is constructed and from their peculiar content it takes form and existence. To make the exposition complete it is necessary to show the application of these concepts to God, to the World, and to the Individual.

To Dr. Royce the absolute is "a system" yet "an unique and individual system," vol. I, p. 563. It is an individual because the act of an individual is an "insight and a choice," vol. I, p. 446; vol. II, Lect. VII, and individuality of self is "the unique conscious plan," vol. II, pp. 293, 326. The absolute is not distinct from the World, for he speaks of the "whole individual Being called the World," vol. I, p. 40, and tells us that "the true World as rightly viewed by an absolute insight would be a world of selves, forming in the unity of their systems, one Self," vol. II, p. 106. Thus, "the Absolute Individual is the sole completely integrating Self," vol. II, p. 447. He teaches the "infinity of the real system of the Self," vol. II, p. 451, and holds that "the various individual selves are the various self-expressions of the same system," vol. II, p. 448. It is wrong to suppose that "a new individual" is a "new thing;" it is only "a new kind of life-purpose," vol. II, p. 308. What in ordinary language we term Individuals "are all the various ex-

pressions of the absolute in so far as they are many," vol. II, p. 336, and "are made distinct through their various meanings," vol. II, p. 239. The Soul is "no monad, but a life individuated solely by its purpose," vol. II, p. 238. Hence "It is will in God and in Man that logically determines the consciousness of individuality," vol. I, p. 460. Selective attention and the nature of individuality are "studied as aspects of will," vol. I, Supplementary Essay. The World is nothing more than an endless *ketten*, *i. e.*, a series," vol. I, p. 588, and "in its entirety an embodiment of our own will," vol. II, p. 61, or "an expression of my will," vol. II, p. 295. For "the Theory of Being requires us to view every fact of Nature and of man's life as a fragmentary glimpse of the Absolute life, as a revelation, however mysterious and to us men now in detail illegible, of the unity of the perfect whole," vol. II, p. 8. That this is the logical inference from the notion of Being is evident from the doctrine that "to be means simply to express, to embody the complete internal meaning of a certain absolute system of ideas: a system moreover which is genuinely implied in the true internal meaning or purpose of every finite idea, however fragmentary," vol. I, p. 36. He confesses that "our ideas imperfectly embody our will, and the real world is just our whole will embodied," vol. I, p. 37. Hence it is that "my own purpose of comprehension is itself a part of the world-purpose" and "within its limits represents one aspect of truth," vol. II, p. 107. Thus, "amidst all the complexities of nature and of man's life, we are dealing with fragmentary glimpses of an Absolute Unity," vol. II, p. 9. If we ask what is the nature of these "complexities" and "fragmentary glimpses" we are told that "In case of Nature in gen-

eral as in particular of man, we are dealing with phenomenal signs of a vast conscious process, whose relation to Time varies vastly, but whose general characteristics are throughout the same," vol. II, p. 226. Hence, "for our own idealistic view, all nature is an expression of mind," vol. II, p. 158. The phenomenal world Dr. Royce calls the "World of Description" and from it distinguishes the world of Appreciation, *i. e.*, the world of socially interrelated selves," vol. II, pp. 107, 155, 309, or "the world of Life," vol. II, p. 26.

The unity of the World is "a unity of consciousness," vol. I, p. 466. The universe "is a well-ordered Infinite Series, which as embodying a single plan may be rightly viewed as forming a totality," vol. II, p. 146. Hence "the fundamental structure of the universe is essentially both teleological and conscious," vol. I, p. 432, and "the world is one with God," vol. II, pp. 271, 292, Lect. III. We ascribe to the true world "a certain eternal type of Being," vol. II, p. 111, and the reason is that "a temporal world must needs be, when viewed in its wholeness, an eternal world," vol. II, pp. 133, 138. As a fact "in defining time, we have already and inevitably defined eternity" for "time viewed in its wholeness is eternity," vol. II, p. 337, and "the temporal order is identical with the eternal order," p. 386. Thus "the whole real content of this temporal order is *at once* known, *i. e.*, is consciously experienced as a whole by the Absolute," vol. II, p. 138. In illustration we are told that if you "listen to any musical phase and grasp it as a whole, you thereupon have present in you the image, so to speak, of the divine knowledge of the temporal order," vol. II, p. 145, the difference is only "one of span," ib. The doctrine of the unity of Being implies "that all selves

are known, without any true separation, in the organism of a single world-life," vol. II, p. 393. Hence "the whole of time will contain a single expression of the divine will and therefore, despite its endlessness, the time-world will be present as such a single whole to the Absolute, whose will this is, and whose life all this sequence embodies," vol. II, p. 147. Thus "the Absolute is identical with our whole will expressed" and "we are the divine as it expresses itself here and now," vol. II, p. 408.

Man's personality is "constituted by contrast," vol. II, p. 425. The contrast between the self and the not-self "comes to us primarily as the contrast between the internal and the external meaning of the present moment's purpose," vol. II, p. 272. The true self of an individual "is not a datum, but an ideal," vol. II, p. 287; and "any finite idea is so far a self," vol. II, p. 272. For self is created by a life-plan, by possession of an ideal, by an intent to remain other than my fellows, despite my divinely planned unity with them," vol. II, pp. 268, 276. Hence the self of the individual "is constituted by contrast with other selves," vol. II, p. 296. Thus, "when I seek my own goal, I am looking for the whole of myself. In so far as my aim is the absolute completion of my selfhood, my goal is identical with the whole life of God. But, in so far as, by my whole individual self, I mean my whole Self in contrast with the Selves of my fellows, then the completion of my individual expression in so far as I am this individual and no other, i. e., my goal, as this Self, is still not any one point or experience in my life, nor any one stage of my life, but the totality of my individual life viewed as in contrast with the lives of other individuals," vol. II, p. 135. In its entirety the "Self is the whole of a

self-representative or recurrent process and not the mere last moment or stage of that process," ib. For "every finite Internal Meaning wins final expression, not merely through the last stage of its life, but through its whole embodiment," p. 270. The Absolute is the "one absolutely final and integrated Self," vol. II, p. 289, and as Self "is inclusive of a variety of various but interwoven Selves," p. 288, may more, it is "our own very selfhood in fulfilment," vol. II, p. 302. Thus "man is one with God," vol. II, pp. 148, 275, 327; Lect. III, VIII. In describing the Absolute as a self-representative system Dr. Royce wishes to insist that "every fact in this system fulfills a purpose," vol. II, p. 297. He tells us that "longing exists in the Absolute Life and as a significant part thereof," vol. II, p. 299, that "the Absolute to be complete must include finitude," vol. II, p. 302, that the Absolute is "thought inclusive of will and expression," vol. I, p. ix, and aims "to bring into a synthesis the relations of knowledge and of will in our conception of God," ib. Human experience is limited and to him its characteristic limitation is "that it grasps within the narrow limits of *this* or *that* instant, fragments of a meaning which can only be conceived with consistency by regarding it as embodied in an experience of a wider scope, of determinate constitution, and of united significance, vol. II, p. 24.

Dr. Royce denies the existence of a substantial soul, vol. II, pp. vii, 60, 267, and holds that God is the only substance, vol. I, p. 11. "Man is (only) the fragment of a whole, whose inner unity is far beyond the reach of our present form of consciousness," vol. II, p. 8, and "a new individual life is a new way of behavior appearing amongst natural phenomena," vol.

II, p. 315. To him the principle of morality is "to harmonize thine own will with the World's will," vol. II, p. 348, and moral freedom is to hold by attention or to forget by inattention, an Ought already present to one's finite consciousness," p. 360.

When Dr. Royce speaks of the "background of reality" he means "the world," vol. II, p. 55. An act of concrete knowledge is "an abstraction from the background." Abstraction is "a selective process" and is very much akin to Kant's apperception. In this sense Dr. Royce speaks of the "underlying unity of the object of knowledge," vol. II, p. 56. Hence in the act of knowledge there is no active mind but only idea-forces which in some way, by virtue of the purpose and energy which constitute the internal meaning of the idea, rise over the threshold of consciousness. "This passing moment of consciousness" is "the fragment of our will," whereas "the world in its entirety is the embodiment of our whole will," vol. II, p. 61. The so-called unity of apperception is to him "as aspect," vol. II, p. 148, a "fragment," vol. I, p. 401; vol. II, p. 270, of a larger unity, which is "the unity of the world," the "unity of ordered series," pp. 70, 292. The rising of present consciousness out of the background of reality is explained by the "recurrent process," vol. II, p. 297. The characteristics of self-recurrency shows how it is that a process which in its entirety is considered as the only reality, as the Absolute, appears in "fragments," or "aspects," or "sensible phenomena," which we call "the empirical self," vol. II, p. 266, and the "visible world," vol. II, p. 288. The "ordered series," *i. e.*, the world is "a unity," because it is "the expression of a single volitional process," vol. II, p. 86. Hence "the reality is not the world apart from the

activity of knowing beings, it is the world of fact *and* the knowledge in one organic whole," vol. II, p. 102. For "the world acknowledged as beyond is presented to us at every moment as a single whole *within* which the facts are present," vol. II, p. 86. Time and eternity are thus two aspects of a single process and represent "the twofold view of your nature as a temporal process and as an eternal system of fact," vol. II, p. 147.

## IV.

## CRITICISM.

The attempt to grasp and set forth the system of Dr. Royce is by no means an easy task. The peculiar meaning he attaches to words, many of which have a place in the ordinary vocabulary of daily intercourse, the singular beauty of the style, the lavish wealth of illustration make the work of a critic one of the greatest difficulty. The exposition presented in the preceding pages may not be exhaustive; at least it is complete in the sense that the reader can gather therefrom the salient features of his philosophical theory. The method adopted is somewhat different from that followed in a course of lectures on the same subject delivered before the Summer School at Cliff Haven, N. Y., during the session of 1902. There in five lectures I discussed the problems of Being, of Reality, of Knowledge, and of Truth. Here I have pursued a different plan by selecting the fundamental problem, viz., the nature and meaning of the idea, and treating it after what may be termed the genetic method, *i. e.*, viewed the idea in all its phases and developments. The reader thus has a deeper insight into the mind of

Dr. Royce, a clearer view of his system and a better opportunity to estimate its philosophical as well as its practical value.

(1) The classification of the Four Conceptions of Being, with which Dr. Royce prefaces his treatise, is vague and unsatisfactory when viewed as a classification, and erroneous when studied in detail. He admits that he presents an extreme form of Realism, but this admission shows that his criticism is not broad, nor scholarly, nor exact. In rejecting Realism as a theory which proclaims being and reality to be independent of mind, he fails to distinguish between the human and the divine mind. That the world has being and reality independent of our minds is a fact so evident that no elaborate system of Philosophy can destroy. But no one, unless he be a Materialist and an Atheist, admits that the world is independent of the divine mind. A like criticism holds good for his presentation of Mysticism. To the mystic, in his view, being and reality is what is immediate. But this definition is vague and inaccurate. Mysticism is not a relation of immediacy to any being whatsoever, but to a particular being, viz., God. If Dr. Royce's definition were true, the little child at school, who sees for the first time on the blackboard the mathematical equation  $2 + 2 = 4$ , and grasps its immediate truth, would be a mystic. If a friend should call on me and we have a heart-to-heart talk, we could not of necessity be called mystics. Or take another illustration. A crisis comes in a man's life. He faces the issue and plans his course and conduct. Is he a mystic? If I make a meditation, or examine my conscience, I am not a mystic and yet I am in immediate relation with reality. Moreover an exact and thoughtful writer would not fall into the

error of citing without discrimination St. Bernard and the philosophers of the Upanishads as examples of mystics.

A like criticism applies to Dr. Royce's description of the Third Conception of Being. The truth of ideas consists in their correspondence with things. The things exist as concrete particular facts. Hence it is not true to say that Being as objective Truth is universal. Plato taught archetypal forms or ideas, and the Conceptualists of the Middle Ages held that universals as such were real and existing. Dr. Royce evidently is not familiar with the famous controversy as to the nature of universal ideas which played so prominent a part with the Schoolmen. A universal as such is the creation of the mind, its form is logical yet it has a basis in reality, because the mind grasps the common nature of individual things. The common nature is denoted by the phrase "*ens essentiae*," the existence of the particular fact is called "*ens existentiae*." Dr. Royce denies the concept of common nature, yet keeps the distinction in the terms the *what* and the *that*—the *internal meaning* and the *external meaning*, although these terms have a peculiar meaning, because of the peculiar meaning he attaches to the idea. Peter Lombard, Albert the Great, Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas of Aquin, Duns Scotus reflect the development and acme of scholastic philosophy, which is justly termed the greatest monument of carefully reasoned thought the world has ever seen. They all taught that a universal idea viewed as a universal was the creation of the mind, but that it had a foundation or basis in existing things inasmuch as the *content* of the universal idea represented the essence of a particular thing conceived as the same in

many individuals. Hence it is that in Ch. IV of the present volume I infer the existence of objective truth from the *content* of the idea. It is thus that the reality of the external world enters into the realm of thought, and a discussion conducted on these lines avoids the extreme of Idealism. This concept of the universal also furnishes a sound basis for the distinction between existing and possible things, and in what sense the predicate of reality applies to them. Thus the Conception of Being as Validity is capable of a true interpretation, and as such can be classed as a Mitigated Realism.

(2) The Synthetic Conception of Being developed by Dr. Royce is the basis of his philosophical system. A critical examination of this solution is of primary importance to the student who wishes to grasp the meaning of Dr. Royce's contribution to the Philosophy of Religion or to give a true estimate of its value. What gives to the Synthetic Conception its special characteristics is the phrase "the object of the idea." This phrase not only constitutes the Synthetic Conception but gives form and existence to Dr. Royce's whole Theory. To understand the importance of the phrase it is necessary to analyze the meaning of the words.

(a) Dr. Royce defines idea in terms of will: "It is as much a volitional process as an intellectual process." But this doctrine is contrary to the testimony of consciousness. That intellect and will are different is an elemental fact of conscious experience. The intellect is the cognitive form or mode of our conscious life; whereas the will is the source and spring of motive power. The intellect is primarily and essentially receptive; the will on the contrary is effective. A Psychologist would be no more justified in combining

intellect and will, than would be a Physiologist in teaching that the afferent and efferent nerves have one and the same function. Moreover these faculties are unequal in the individual. Thus, *e. g.*, we find a man who has a weak intellect and a strong will, or another who has a strong intellect and a weak will. Intellect and will are called faculties or modes by which our soul-life is manifested. Hence, although distinct from each other, they are not separated in the sense that they are two entities but coalesce into a unity by virtue of the spiritual principle, *viz.*, the soul, whose modes of activity they are. Only thus can we reconcile the unity of consciousness with the diverse experiential elements of our conscious life. Dr. Royce denies the existence of a substantial soul, and in its place accepts the unity of apperception. Now the unity of apperception is a theory of modern Psychology from the time of Kant to explain the phenomena of intellectual life without having recourse to a Soul. But what about the phenomena of willing? Dr. Royce sees the difficulty, and to meet it blends together intellect and will by asserting the primacy of will, *i. e.*, by making intellect a process of willing. Thus he broadens the unity of apperception by making it include the phenomena of willing and adds to it as a distinctive characteristic the power of "selection" or of "choice." This solution may be simple and ingenious, but it is not true. An examination of our conscious life does not justify the primacy and domination of the will as explained by Dr. Royce. While every act of the will is of necessity accompanied by an act of the intellect in the form of a *motive*, yet it is not true to say that every act of the intellect necessarily entails an act of the will. Here we have the crucial point in the problem of Free-will.

Freedom of will demands the distinction of intellect and will. When we say that the will is free, we mean that it has the power of choice, *e. g.*, that when the mind proposes a course of action, the will can choose either to act or not to act, or to act in one way or the other by a selection among the various motives presented. By the power of "selection" Dr. Royce understands not the power which the will has to choose among the motives presented by the intellect, for to him intellect and will are one, but the power inherent in the *idea* to select from "the background of consciousness." By way of illustration I would say make the unity of apperception a volitional process and endow it with the power of selection from the background of consciousness, and you have some conception of Dr. Royce's idea.

The doctrine of the idea, as proposed by Dr. Royce, is therefore a pure fiction of the mind and at variance with the elemental facts of conscious experience. Moreover is Dr. Royce aware that, in setting forth the doctrine of the idea, he has taken an advanced unprotected position and lies exposed to a merciless cross-fire? Let me explain. Dr. Royce is a phenomenal Psychologist, *i. e.*, he teaches a Psychology without a soul. In the present course on the Philosophy of Religion, he proposes to treat exclusively the Metaphysics of Religion. The fundamental problem of the Metaphysic of Religion is to him the Theory of Being. He attempts a restatement of the Theory of Being based on the study of the nature of the Idea. Here we have a professed phenomenal psychologist writing a treatise on Metaphysical Psychology. The metaphysic he proposes is a personified Idea of a very peculiar structure. The result is that whereas the hypothesis of a soul is

simple, natural, justified by and in harmony with the phenomena of conscious experience, the hypothesis of the idea, on the contrary, is a pure creation of a subtle fertile mind and contradictory to the obvious facts of mental life. Probably Dr. Royce might reply that he denies the Soul by virtue of "the mere theoretical consciousness," and admits in its place the Idea by reason of "the more explicitly volitional consciousness," p. 27. This distinction is the reason given for designating the World of Description as other than the World of Appreciation. The distinction may be useful, but we do not understand it. The difficulty is to admit a theoretical consciousness distinct from a volitional consciousness when the mind and the will are unified.

(b) *Object of the Idea.*—If we bear in mind that according to Dr. Royce the idea is "a will seeking its own determination," vol. I, p. 332, we can understand that the "object of the idea" is "the complete content of the idea's own purpose," vol. I, p. 329, and as such is the "other," the "beyond," the "goal of life's journey." The object, therefore, is not something in the world around us which is grasped by the mind in a cognitive act, but the object of our will in the sense that it is the purpose and goal of our striving. This meaning naturally follows from his definition of the Idea. In criticism I would say that it is true to call the object of the will's striving a purpose or goal. But it is a mistake to restrict the object of the intellect to the purpose of our conscious tendencies. The object of the intellect is a purpose or goal only in case of the ideal. But our intellectual life is cognizant of many objects besides ideals. Speculative or contemplative knowledge as such includes no positive volitional process such as Dr. Royce holds to be constitutive of the idea.

Again if the definition of the Idea given by Dr. Royce is false, so also is the definition of the object false. Now we have seen by an examination of our conscious experience that the idea is a product of the mind, that the mind and the will are distinct and should not be confounded. Hence, we cannot define idea as "a will seeking to its own determination," vol. I, p. 332. Nor can we define the object of the idea as the purpose or goal of this tendency.

Finally the error of defining object in terms of purpose is the result of another error, viz., the denial of immediate perception of the external world, vol. II, pp. 159-161. Hence in his system external things cannot be the objects of ideas. This is Idealism pure and simple. Now it is certain that we have direct and immediate knowledge of the world around us. Through the senses we are brought into direct cognitive contact with external things. The senses of sight and of touch make us aware of extended and resisting bodies. Hearing, smell and taste furnish sounds, odors and tastes. It is true that sounds, odors and tastes do not exist as such independently of us, that they are the product of the stimuli acting upon the sense-organs. Nevertheless, the stimuli are material and external, and therefore in these sensations the external and material elements are present. Aristotle long ago mentioned this distinction in sense-cognitions. Thus we have immediate perception of the external world. The teaching that sensations are the direct object of the mind was introduced into English Psychology by Locke, and has been ever since the fruitful germ of philosophical error. A logical form which has wrought much confusion in contemporary thought is the Phenomenal Idealism of Sensism. But this very error is the postu-

late of Dr. Royce's Theory of Being, for he writes, "Leave out the realm of the past from our conception of the real world, and our empirical universe at this instant, would shrivel for us, into a mere collection of almost uninterrupted sensations," vol. I, p. 403.

(3) The student is now prepared to form some estimate of the philosophical system set forth by Dr. Royce. It may justly be called a synthesis formed from the best elements of modern Idealistic Pantheism merged into one whole. He takes from Kant the unity of apperception and by endowing it with the power of selection makes it not a pure intellectual but an active volitional process. The moral order of Fichte is static, the purpose-tendency of Royce is dynamic. The word *idea*, he takes from Hegel, yet interprets it in terms of Schopenhaur's *Will* and of Hartman's *Striving*, and makes it conscious throughout. By the unity of the "process" he identifies man and the world and God. With Taine and Vacherot he holds that God is the goal, *i. e.*, *Dieu Progres*, "that far off divine event toward which the whole creation moves," yet differs from them in teaching that the Absolute is not the goal alone, but the goal together with all the machinery of the striving; hence he calls the Absolute a system. With Spinoza he holds that God is the one substance, but differs from him in teaching that consciousness is the sole attribute of that substance, and that material things are only phenomenal "fragments" or "aspects" of the purpose seeking its complete embodiment. By the "dynamo" of ideas, vol. II, pp. 174-178, he approximates to Leibnitz's monads and Fouilée's "idea-forces." He starts from what he considers an experimental basis, *i. e.*, from the facts of experimental Psychology, yet views these facts in the light of

the Phenomenal Idealism of Sensism, and thus his system is vitiated in the beginning by a preconceived doctrine of Idealism. In the intense introspection and the theory of the Self he shows the influence of the Hindu Pantheism. By teaching that the Absolute is a unity, that in this unity Man, the World and God are unified, that external things are phenomenal fragments or aspects of one great conscious striving process, he seems to hold a Pantheism of Manifestation, and thus differs from Prof. Howison, who maintains a plurality in the Absolute.

Upon the whole the Gifford Lectures of Dr. Royce are a disappointment to many who have read with delight his previous publications, and watched with interest the gradual development of his mind. His beautiful and sympathetic tribute to Scholastic Philosophy, which appeared in the *Boston Transcript* at the death of Pope Leo XIII. has endeared him to the great mass of thinkers and writers in this country who look to the Schoolmen for a philosophical solution of the great problems affecting human life and destiny. It seems a pity that Dr. Royce had not devoted more time to a careful study of Scholastic Philosophy before he issued these Lectures in their present form. The most interesting feature of his intellectual life is that he has been struggling against a philosophical environment initially created by Locke and Kant and developed in one form or the other by the philosophical writers of the nineteenth century. The hope was engendered that at the publication of his system, which was in process of formation, he would break from the influence of thinkers whose fundamental principles have been shown to be false. In this sense the lectures are a disappointment. From a literary point of view The World and the Indi-

vidual are inferior to the Spiritual Aspects of Philosophy. Viewed as a system they are too vague and abstract and transcendental ever to exert an abiding influence on the development of philosophical thought. Subjected to a rigid analysis the principles therein set forth are at variance with the elementary facts of conscious life and are contradicted by the ordinary language and experience of daily existence.

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